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The delict of medical negligence is based on the process of identifying fault on the part of a 
medical professional or medical institution for the harm caused to a patient. The medical 
professional or hospital is criticised for the alleged substandard care that resulted in injury to 
the patient. Unfortunately, medical professionals sometimes perceive a claim for 
compensation based on liability as a personal attack on their character that suggests that they 
are inefficient or incompetent, whereas it should be seen as a way of correcting a wrong. 
Furthermore, cases like Michael v Linksfield Park Clinic
1
contribute to public cynicism about 
a prejudiced judicial system that seems to favour the medical profession. Michael v Linksfield 
Park Clinic
2
embodies this perceived injustice, as it is a case where uncomplicated surgery for 
the repair of a broken nose in a healthy young man resulted in permanent brain damage. The 
facts in the causal chain of events were that the anaesthetist, in administering certain 
anaesthetic solutions, caused a hypertensive crisis that he failed to control. This caused the 
patient to go into cardiac arrest, which was not adequately managed. The patient suffered a 
hypoxic incident with insufficient oxygen to the brain and, ultimately, permanent brain 
damage. The medical professionals failed to explain the medical clinical course of an 
anaesthetic-induced error to the court and thus the court did not appreciate the medical 
reality. ‘Medical reality’, in this sense means the true interpretation of the medical facts. 
Because liability cannot arise before causation has been established, the focus of the thesis is 
on the medical interpretation of the injury in order to determine factual and legal causation. 
Perhaps the need to understand such ‘unfairness’ or injustice is the motive behind the 
legal appeals for the reintroduction of the res ipsa loquitur maxim in medical negligence 
cases in South Africa. Maybe it is a plea for the introduction of an all-encompassing phrase to 
confer a reverse onus on the defendant based on the complexity of the science of medicine – 
or indeed in all complex technical cases. Perhaps it is simply an appeal for greater equality in 
the doctor-patient relationship thereby advancing patient’s rights. The South African 
Constitution
3
 as the supreme law of the country includes a Bill of Rights for a society based 
on ‘social justice and fundamental human rights’
4
 with equal rights and equal opportunities to 
                                                 
1
2001 (3) SA 1188 (SCA). Cf CE Pienaar An analysis of evidence-based medicine in context of medical 
negligence litigation (unpublished LLM dissertation, University of Pretoria 2011), available at 
http://upetd.up.ac.za/thesis/available/etd-09212011-130356/unrestricted/dissertation.pdf (accessed 3 February 
2012). Pienaar describes the anaesthetic chaos  that occurred during the operation in detail. 
2
Michael (n 1). The plaintiff failed to discharge his onus of proof from the available medical evidence and the 
court dismissed the plaintiff’s case. See chapter 1 para 3.1 
3
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (the Constitution). 
4






 It stipulates that ‘everyone has the right to have access to health care services’ and the 
right to make decisions over your own body ie the ‘right to bodily integrity’.
6
 The 
Constitution places a positive obligation on the state to promote the rights of all South 
Africans taking into consideration the wrongs of the past, socio- and economic injustices and 
the right to equality and human dignity; this is referred to as a substantive approach to adapt 
the common law so that it fulfils the constitutional needs of the country. It should provide 
more substance to the concept of equality with a purpose to rectify wrongs and eliminate past 
racial discrimination.
7
 The Constitutional Court has linked the notion of equality with human 
dignity. Any violation of a human right affects a person’s dignity and should be interpreted as 
a form of discrimination.
8
 This strong constitutional influence resulted in the court leaning 
towards a wider interpretation of legal principles.
9
 This is in line with the global movement 
towards bending the rules of causation in certain cases, motivated by the desire to remedy 
breach of human dignity and to safeguard physical and bodily integrity.
10
 
South Africa currently has a compromised health system. A finding of fault in 
medical negligence cases is directed at an individual health professional or institution and 
such claims rarely highlight organisational errors or badly managed systems. However, 
statistical evidence
11
that shows an increase in medical negligence litigation in the last five 
years may well indicate systemic failures. South Africa is fighting crime, corruption and 
systemic failures. Although it seems inadequate to promote human dignity to the homeless in 
South Africa where people are starving, it should remain our constitutional vision and goal to 
strive for and promote human dignity as a human value worthy of protection. It is certainly 
                                                 
5
Preamble to the Constitution. 
6
Section 27(1)(a)and section 12(2) of the Constitution respectively. 
7
City Council of Pretoria v Walker 1998 (3) BCLR 257 (CC). The court held that it is the duty of the 
municipality to eliminate all disparities in the community. The aim is substantive equality and not formal 
equality so the previously disadvantaged community was treated with a ‘softer hand’.  
8
Oppelt v Head: Health, Department of Health Provincial Administration: Western Cape [2015] ZACC 33.The 
human worth (dignity) refers to a situation where all human beings are treated equally for purposes of section 
9(2) of the Constitution and in respect whereof they may not be unfairly discriminated against in terms of 
section (3). See chapter 2 para 7. 
9
Oppelt (n 8). The majority ruled in favour of the plaintiff based on inadequate policy and system structures. 
10
Chester v Afshar (2004) All ER (HL) 24, where the English court developed the English common law on 
causation to protect patient rights and  the ‘right of autonomy and dignity can and ought to be vindicated by a 
narrow and modest departure from traditional causation principles’. 
11
See article written by Prof M Pepper (University of Pretoria, Department Immunology) 
http://www.news24.com/Archives/City-Press/Doctors-lose-patience-as-suites-spike-20150429 (accessed 14 
March 2013). The author describes a case in point, the death of Rita Nel (45) of Carolina, Mpumalanga. On 2 
April she was admitted to the Steve Biko Academic Hospital in Pretoria with a lung condition, and had to 
undergo a diagnostic CT scan. However, the scanner was broken and, because the Gauteng health department 
had failed to pay their suppliers, the latter refused to repair the machine. For three weeks, Nel lay untreated in 
the hospital, waiting in vain for the scan. She died untreated on 23 April. Cf Bulletin of the World Health 




worthy of being developed by means of the substantive constitutional approach for a better 
South Africa.
12
One sees activists, like the group Know Your Constitution, 
13
campaigning for 
the Constitution to be made available to the people in all South African languages. From this, 
it is natural to see the public developing a growing interest in, for example, patients’ rights 
and awareness regarding the expected standard of health care delivery. Because the function 
of the Bill of Rights is to enable rights to be vindicated and to provide remedies when duties 
have been breached, it is not surprising to find claims based on the fallacy that any medical 
accident or ‘any medical injury’ or negative medical outcome is or should be seen as a breach 
of a legal duty by a medical professional. 
The global increase in litigation in the field of medical negligence is perhaps as a 
result of a heightened general awareness of patients’ rights. However, from a medical 
perspective, the increase in litigation may be based on unrealistic expectations from the 
public regarding treatment options and surgical outcomes. An additional cause for the 
increase in litigation may be the consequence of the rapid development in the field of 
technical-medicine (such as laparoscopic surgery) and its higher risk of injury.14 It is in this 
technical field where the incidence of injury decreases with the experience of the surgeon and 
where the unaware jurist might be tempted to make use of the res ipsa loquitur maxim. 
Another silent, yet fundamental, cause of the increased number of court cases is the shift in 
focus of managed health care systems to cutting costs rather than delivering effective health 
care. This has a marked influence on medical insurance systems. Such a notional shift in 
managed health care is cause for concern in respect of the expected standard of care, as cost-
reducing principles increase the risk of compromising the golden standard of care delivery in 
health care. One can only be astounded at the lack of ethical considerations and the failure of 
integrity and respect for human life exhibited in Sibisi NO v Maitin, 
15
where a larger-than-
normal baby was born with severe shoulder paralysis. When asked why he had not 
considered performing a caesarean section when dealing with this large baby (4.5 kg) of an 
                                                 
12
City Council of Pretoria v Walker (n 7). See chapter 2 para 1, for a discussion where a substantive 
constitutional revolution is described as the achievement of the goal of equality in a community by correcting 
wrongs of the past. It will sometimes come at a price for those who were previously advantaged in favour of the 
previously disadvantaged. It describes the action needed to be taken to advance the position of those who 
suffered unfair discrimination in the past. It considers the community as a whole and it includes socio-economic 
disadvantages and it promotes human dignity.  
13
T Hodgson ‘Towards an active citizenry’ Daily Maverick 30 October 2013, available at 
http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2013-10-30-towards-an-active-citizenry-bringing-the-constitution-to-
the-people (accessed 3 February 2014). 
14
See chapter 4 para 10 regarding the risks and complications of this procedure. 
15




African woman – African women are known for their smaller pelvic frames – the defendant-
doctor testified that, in accordance with the American Family Physician guidelines,
16
 these 
risk factors (of the case) were not a reason for performing a caesarean section. He observed 
that, if an unnecessary caesarean section was performed, it would entail a huge cost factor: 
performing about 2 000 caesarean sections to prevent one shoulder dystocia. Perhaps similar 
managed health care guidelines
17
 were the cause of an obstetrician’s reluctance to perform a 
caesarean section in England in Pearce v United Bristol Healthcare NHS Trust,
18
 where a 
baby went 14 days beyond term and the failure to perform a caesarean section caused the 
death of the unborn baby. In another English case, Montgomery v Lanarkshire, 
19
a large baby 
was born during normal delivery with cerebral palsy (brain damage) to a mother of small 
build. When asked why a caesarean section was not considered, the defence of the 
obstetrician in this 2015 case was that she did not warn the mother of the high risk of 
shoulder dystocia because most women would then elect to have a caesarean section as 
opposed to natural birth. 
The interaction between law and medicine is challenging and complex because of the 
intricacies of diseases and the function of the human body and its reaction to injuries and 
pathology. Concepts such as cause and effect in medicine, or why certain things happen to 
the body or what causes it are found in medical science, and not easily understood. Medical 
science focuses primarily on the cause of a disease or injury in order to treat or prevent it, and 
seeks medical solutions by examining the relationship between medical conditions and their 
occurrence. It does not focus on the causal chain to attribute liability in order to compensate a 
claimant for a wrongdoing. The legal focus is on holding a wrongdoer legally accountable in 
a fair and just manner. The clinical course in medicine is seldom one occurrence but is often 
                                                 
16
In a guideline issued in December 2012 by the Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists, dealing 
with shoulder dystocia a caesarean section was not indicated; 
https://www.rcog.org.uk/globalassets/documents/guidelines/gtg_42.pdf (accessed 8 July 2016). However, see 
MA Zamorski & WS Biggs ‘Management of suspected fetal macrosomia’ (2001) 63(2) Am Fam. Physician 
302–307: ‘Elective caesarean section is not recommended for suspected fetal macrosomia (estimated fetal 
weight over 4.5 kg) without diabetes. Estimation of fetal weight is unreliable and the large majority of 
macrosomic infants do not experience shoulder dystocia. In the USA, a decision analysis model estimated that 
an additional 2 345 caesarean deliveries would be required, at a cost of US$4.9 million, to prevent one 
permanent injury from shoulder dystocia.’ In other words the cost of an unnecessary caesarean section is 
weighed against the prevention of a permanent disability like brachial plexus injury (Erb’s palsy); DJ Rouse et 
al ‘The effectiveness and costs of elective caesarean delivery for fetal macrosomia diagnosed by ultrasound’ 
(1996) 276(18) JAMA 1480–1486. 
17
See Guidelines (n 16). 
18
[1999] ECC 167; [1999] PIQR P53; (1999) 48 BMLR 118 CA (Civ Div). This case is discussed in detail in 
chapter 3 para 9.4. 
19
[2015] UKSC11; [2013] CSIH 3; [2010] CSIH 104. Fortunately the court found in favour of the plaintiff. This 




seen as a chain of events leading to optimal medical health. This ‘medical reality’ means 
understanding and appreciating the medical facts. Every single part of the chain (the clinical 
course) causes or has an effect on, or even a cumulative effect on, the subsequent part. The 
cumulative causal chain of events is explained by the medical expert in context with the 
expected or desired standard of care, which is then weighed against the care that was 
delivered. The court, against the set standard then evaluates the nature of the care delivered as 
it forms the basis of factual causation in delict. The required standard of care means more 
than simply skill and care of a doctor. It includes referring to the acceptable standard of the 
practice of medicine. For example, in Michael v Linksfield Park Clinic
20
the medical chain 
consisted of (i) a hypertensive crisis; (ii) leading to cardiac arrest; (iii) leading to hypoxia that 
ultimately led to brain damage. All these events form part of the clinical course and are pure 
medical science. In other words, the law makes an assessment according to medical standards 
and policies from the facts of the injury and construes (in the above example) that the 
insufficiently managed hypertensive crisis led to insufficiently managed cardiac arrest that 
resulted in irreversible hypoxia and ultimate brain damage. Furthermore, every change in the 
clinical course of the patient should be evaluated to ensure that it forms part of the main 
causal chain that led to the injury. If this is not done, the defendant cannot be found liable for 
the undesired outcome, based on a failure to establish legal causation.
21
 
Without satisfying all the elements in delict, namely (a) a commission or omission 
(actus reus), (b) that is unlawful or wrongful (wrongfulness), (c) that was committed 
negligently or with particular intent (culpa or fault), (d) that results in or causes the harm 
(causation) and (e) the existence of injury, loss or damage (harm),
22
 the plaintiff would be 
unable to convince the court to attribute liability to the defendant. The elements of delict test 
whether the defendant’s conduct should be seen as the breach of a legal duty in law and 
whether the defendant’s conduct falls short of the expected standard of care.
23
 Negligence 
(culpa) is established only when it becomes evident from the defendant’s testimony that he 
failed to act reasonably in the circumstances.
24
 
                                                 
20
Michael (n 1). 
21
Lee v Minister of Correctional Services [2012] ZACC 30; 2013 (2) SA 144 (CC); 2013 (2) BCLR 129 (CC) 
para 39. 
22
Judd v Mandela Bay Municipality 2011 ZAECPEHC 4 para 8. 
23
Sea Harvest Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Duncan Dock Cold Storage (Pty) Ltd [1999] ZASCA 87; 2000 (1) SA 
827 paras 21–22. 
24




The thesis argues that in medical cases the law in South Africa as it stands contains no 
easy solution or catch-all phrase encapsulated by the res ipsa loquitur maxim. More 
particularly, in medical negligence cases one has to appreciate the medical causes and effects 
to be able to say ‘the facts speak for themselves’ or ‘res ipsa loquitur’, which would rarely be 
the case considering the difficult science of medicine. In determining liability based on the 
breach of a legal duty in a medical case, there is ultimately only one question, and that is 
whether the plaintiff, having regard to all the evidence in the case, has discharged the onus of 
proof on a balance of probability.
25
Such a judgment is possible only with a proper 
appreciation of the medical reality. In South African law, even the unintentional leaving of a 
swab in a patient’s body is not evidence of negligence (culpa and liability) or even a 
presumption of negligence, if all the delictual elements are not satisfied or cannot be inferred 
from the facts.
26
If an investigation into the circumstantial evidence is necessary to evaluate 
the medical professional’s conduct at the time of the injury it would conflict with the design 
of the res ipsa loquitur maxim in a medical negligence case and the possible opportunity to 
make use of the maxim falls away. The fact of the injury is not an ordinary occurrence that is 
known to the non-medical person. To argue in South African context that, the maxim attracts 
a presumption of negligent conduct (culpa) based on the fact of the injury because of the 
extraordinary nature of the injury in a situation under the control of the defendant-doctor will 
not discharge the onus of proof resting on the plaintiff. Such an allegation lacks substance in 
terms of delictual principles. It is vague and does not provide sufficient information for a 
court to arrive at a decision that inadequate care caused the injury, because there are too 
many alternative explanations that are not negligent in nature. In South Africa, to get a 
medical professional to explain why he failed to guard against leaving a swab behind, 
requires at least sufficient circumstantial evidence to show, for example, that the doctor 
neglected his legal duty to the patient by ignoring the swab-count of the theatre nurse. The 
thesis ultimately argues that the application of the maxim is not the solution to the problem of 
assisting plaintiffs in medical negligence cases in South Africa. As the law stands, the 
plaintiff’s case will be better served by preparing a medical case based on medical expert 
evidence than to allege lack of care without considering the other delictual principles. 
                                                 
25
Sardi v Standard and General Insurance Co Ltd 1977 (3) SA 776 (A) 780C–H per Holmes J. 
26
Minister of Safety and Security v Van Duivenboden (2002) (6) SA 431 (SCA) 441E–442B (para 12), where 
Nugent JA said that ‘[w]here the negligence manifests itself in a positive act that causes physical harm it is 
presumed to be unlawful, but that is not so in the case of a negligent omission. A negligent omission is unlawful 
only if it occurs in circumstances that the law regards as sufficient to give rise to a legal duty to avoid 




The author had a career in the medical profession before becoming involved in the 
legal profession, which gave her insight into the nature of the medical merits of a case 
supported by expert medical interpretation. She found that medical negligence cases are often 
dismissed on the ground that insufficient medical information is presented to the court. In 
addition, unfortunately, she found that some medical professionals are determined to mislead 
the court into believing unjustifiable alternative causes of harm.
27
Once the plaintiff’s case is 
mired in such an inaccurate interpretation of the medical facts, any legal inference or factual 
inference made will be flawed. This influenced the author’s decision to take on the daunting 
task of explaining the methodology of medicine and the legal principles applicable to claims 
for medical negligence. It follows that one can hardly draw a factual presumption, ie the 
function of the res ipsa loquitur maxim, from complex medical facts that are not clearly 
appreciated. This led to the statement of the thesis, namely, that the res ipsa loquitur maxim 
is incommensurable with the medical reality. 
The author trusts that this thesis may provide a guide for novice legal practitioners in 
the interesting field of medical negligence litigation, with its proud roots in Roman law. The 
author does not favour the use of the res ipsa loquitur maxim in medical negligence cases in 
South Africa, based on the argument that the maxim does not satisfy all the elements in 
delict. In summary, it is the author’s view that it is fundamental that the South African 
plaintiff should make use of medical expert evidence that sets the desired standard of care for 
the court. This standard is then contrasted against the standard that was delivered. 
Furthermore, the plaintiff should rely on remedial equality principles that ensure that the 
basic right to be treated with dignity, predominantly in context of bodily integrity, is 
promoted and has been respected. Managed health care studies that are based on cost and not 
based on optimum health care, should be investigated to monitor any disregard for bodily 
integrity. The common law should be development on a continuous basis in accordance with 
constitutional principles. In this context, the relaxation of causal principles should include a 
South African court moving to a more inquisitorial approach with more judicial involvement 
in medical cases, as it may assist with the elimination of possible medical expert bias. 
 
                                                 
27
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The thesis’ objective is to explain why there are good grounds to support the approach of the 
South African court, as stated by Brand JA in Buthelezi v Ndaba:1the res ipsa loquitur maxim 
can ‘rarely, if ever, find application in cases based on alleged medical negligence’ in South 
Africa. Although it has been held2 that, each case must be decided on its own merits and that 
‘the question of negligence or no negligence must be ascertained from a consideration of all 
the facts viewed as a whole’, the court concluded that it ‘cannot determine in the abstract 
whether a surgeon has or has not exhibited reasonable skill and care’. The thesis sets out to 
clarify that the word ‘abstract’, by implication, means that, without an appreciation and 
understanding of the concrete factual evidence regarding the defendant’s conduct and frame 
of mind at the time of the incident and the cause of the injury, the court is unable to address 
the question of negligence or (in terms of the maxim) infer negligence. Determining liability 
in a medical case is a value judgment based on understanding the cause of the injury (based 
on the medical reality) and the material facts setting out what the doctor ought to have known 
about the risk of a potential injury at the time and whether he took reasonable steps to prevent 
such an injury (culpa). Unquestionably, this means understanding that the actual injury and 
the dreaded occurrence are one and the same thing.3 The thesis argues that a non-medical 
person may understand medical facts different from a medical professional and the true 
medical facts is the medical reality of each case. Without a proper understanding of the 
medical reality, which is most likely abstruse for the non-medical person, the causal link 
between the action of the defendant and the harm is not obvious. It should be clear that the 
subject matter of the action or omission is the very subject matter of the damage. 
Consequently, presenting further evidence to establish the element of negligence (culpa) ipso 
facto excludes the application of the res ipsa loquitur maxim. Although the court in more 
recent times4has suggested in an obiter remark that the time may well have come to jettison 
the maxim and replace it with prima facie evidence, the court appears to have agreed with the 
standing precedent.5 It was reaffirmed that all the evidence must be viewed as a whole and 
assessed to discharge the onus of proof on a preponderance of probability, which again by 
implication means the maxim is excluded.  
                                                 
1
ZASCA 72; 2013 (5) SA 437 (SCA) para 16. See the explanation in chapter 2 para 8. 
2
Van Wyk v Lewis 1923 E 37; 1924 AD 438 at 445, 453 and 461–462. 
3
Kruger v Coetzee 1966 (2) SA 428 (A) 430E–F. 
4
Goliath v MEC for Health, Eastern Cape 2014 ZASCA 182 para 12, referring to Ratcliffe v Plymouth and 
Torbay Health Authority [1998] EWCA Civ 2000. 
5
Van Wyk (n 2) 453 and 461–462, where the court stated that the maxim will ‘rarely, if ever, find application in 




Before the latest dictum in Goliath v MEC for Health, Eastern Cape,6 suggesting that 
‘the time may well have come … to jettison [the maxim] from our legal lexicon’, academic 
writers7 had argued that the res ipsa loquitur maxim should be applied not only in medical 
negligence cases but also in related legal procedures in medical law, like medical accidents, 
medical inquests, criminal procedures, and disciplinary inquiries instituted by the Health 
Professions Council of South Africa. This triggered this thesis’s examination of the 
prerequisites for delictual liability and the criteria for the application of the res ipsa loquitur 
maxim in South Africa. To make its case, the thesis considers the historical and present use of 
the maxim in England and Wales in medical negligence litigation.8Finally, the thesis 
discusses multiple medical clinical scenarios as examples in order to appreciate the required 
standard of care against which the delivered standard of care of the defendant-doctor is 
weighed. The role of the maxim is discussed in these contexts to demonstrate that sometimes 
the answers of the defendants in rebuttal of the maxim lack justification in medical context. 
Several more plausible explanations might have been overlooked if the medical facts and 
legal principles are oversimplified. Although this is no different from any other action that is 
brought in delict, the complexity of the medical reality is often the cause of confusion. The 
thesis reinforces the statement that a profound appreciation of medical principles is necessary 
before drawing factual presumptions, which is contrary to the design of the res ipsa loquitur 
maxim. 
In extreme or ‘blatant-blunder’ cases, for example if the wrong limb is amputated, 
fault and breach of legal duty are obvious, as all the elements in delict are found from the 
facts, ie wrongfulness, causation and negligence (culpa). Although this is perceived to be a 
perfect example of the application of the res ipsa loquitur maxim, it conflicts with a 
distinctive feature of the maxim, ie that a factual presumption is permissible only when the 
key facts are available but the cause of the injury remains unknown (it has to be inferred from 
the occurrence).9 For this reason, the maxim is also not applicable to blatant-blunder cases. 
These obvious-error cases differ from retained-swab cases. In the latter, there is a lack of 
information to draw a factual presumption of negligence. If multiple alternatives (that do not 
involve negligence) are available that may show that the patient indeed received the expected 
                                                 
6
Goliath (n 4) para 12, citing Ratcliff (n 4). 
7
P van den Heever & P Carstens Res Ipsa Loquitur and Medical Negligence (2011) 36. 
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Ratcliffe (n 4), which is discussed in chapter 3 para 7. 
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Chapter 2 para 8. In Administrator Natal v Stanley Motors Ltd 1960 (1) SA 690 (A) 700 the court referred to 
the English case Barkway v South Wales Transport Co Ltd [1950] 1 All ER, where Lord Porter stated that if the 




standard of care (for example, the surgery was interrupted because the patient’s condition 
became critical and unstable), the maxim cannot apply. Such information will only become 
known if the court is fully informed of the medical reality of the situation.  The South African 
court does not accept the maxim in a general way (the mere fact of the injury), which means 
that if the plaintiff relied solely on the maxim, the end result will be that the plaintiff did not 
discharge his onus of proof. The thesis found foremost that the maxim compares 
unfavourably with conventional delictual principles in South Africa. The purpose of the res 
ipsa loquitur maxim is to draw a factual inference from the available evidence because no 
direct evidence is available.10 The court was faced in Van Wyk v Lewis with this problem.11 It 
is argued that the incorrect application of the maxim as a rebuttable presumption rather than a 
factual presumption may well be the reason why the maxim is excluded in medical 
negligence cases in South Africa. 
The thesis reviewed the use of the maxim in the context of constitutional rights and 
patients’ rights as it may be of general public importance to determine whether the 
application of the maxim addresses any perceived imbalance in the doctor-patient 
relationship.12 The South African legal system is moving towards a substantive approach, 
which means that the court evaluates any constitutional right taking into consideration the 
broader context of the community, like previous wrongs that should be corrected, equality 
rights, socio-economic status and human dignity.13 Should the maxim be included in patients’ 
rights? The right to dignity14 and bodily integrity is part of the intrinsic worth of human 
beings and human beings are to be treated as being worthy of respect and concern. Any 
disregard for bodily integrity is a violation of a human right. In the light of the latter, the 
                                                 
10
Chapter 2 para 5. Prima facie evidence means that there is enough evidence that, if not refuted, will become 
conclusive evidence and res ipsa loquitur means that because the facts are so obvious a party need explain no 
more. See PJ Schwikkard & SE van der Merwe Beginsels van die Bewysreg (2009) 22 for the difference 
between prima facie evidence and prima facie proof. 
11
Van Wyk (n 2), where the court said that all the facts should be viewed as a whole and concluded that it 
‘cannot determine in the abstract whether a surgeon has or has not exhibited reasonable skill and care’. The case 
is discussed in chapter 2 para 3 and chapter 4 para 5.1. 
12
Ibid at 151. Van den Heever and Carstens argue that everyone is equal before the law and has the right to equal 
protection and benefit, and that a victim of a medical accident is at a procedural disadvantage because such a 
patient does not understand what happened from a medical perspective. 
13
Oppelt v Head: Health, Department of Health Provincial Administration: Western Cape [2015] ZACC 33, 
where the majority widely applied the principles of causation, highlighted the reasonableness concept in the 
element of wrongfulness, and concentrated on the relaxed principles of negligence. See chapter 2 para 7. 
14
S v Makwanyane and Another 1995 (6) BCLR 665 (CC); 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) at para 328. The Judge said: 
“The importance of dignity as a founding value of the new Constitution cannot be overemphasised. Recognising 
a right to dignity is an acknowledgement of the intrinsic worth of human beings: human beings are entitled to be 
treated as worthy of respect and concern. This right therefore is the foundation of many of the other rights that 




thesis investigated whether the maxim might assist the patient with his medical case from a 
constitutional point of view. 
Several medical negligence cases illustrate in both South Africa and England that the 
use of the maxim attracts medical explanations that are not always consistent with the injury 
and that there are more plausible alternatives as medical reality that were not identified and 
tested. It was clear that in some cases insufficient medical evidence was presented to the 
court. In the South African law of delict there can be no liability if the delictual elements are 
not all identified. The act complained of must have caused the injury; ‘but for’ the act the 
plaintiff would not have been injured. The ‘but for’ test is important, even if the test does not 
provide a comprehensive test of causation.15 The central reason why the design of the maxim 
is not suitable to medical cases in South Africa is that medical reality has to be discerned. 
This is done by weighing up the expected standard of care against the standard received. 
From this factual causation and negligence (culpa) are determined. As with any other case in 
delict, if, at the close of a case, not all the elements in delict have been proved, the plaintiff’s 
case will fail. If a South African plaintiff alleges a broad inference of negligence (based on 
the fact of the injury) he will be unsuccessful.16 This explains why the application of the 
maxim is more problematic in South Africa than in England.  
Turning then to the English court the thesis found several similarities. The English 
court weighs the comparative risks and benefits of a case and then reaches a defensible 
conclusion on the matter17 and that negligent conduct means failing to do what a reasonable 
man would do, or to do something that a prudent and reasonable man would not do.18 The 
English court then considers the balance between due care and negligence. English law 
requires a professional to perform his services with reasonable care and skill19 and any failure 
in this regard is deemed to be substandard care classified as a lack of care. The issue will 
usually be whether the defendant breached a duty of care (ie displayed lack of care) in a 
situation under his control and whether such a breach caused harm to the patient.20 An 
unusual injury in these circumstances will be sufficient to allege lack of care and to require an 
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Chapter 2 para 4.3. 
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Chapter 2 para 8. 
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Chapter 3 para 2; Bolitho v City and Hackney Health Authority [1998] AC 232 at 241–242. 
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Chapter 3 para 2; Blyth v Birmingham Waterworks Co. (1856) 11 Exch 781 at 784. 
19
Chapter 3 para 2; Greaves and Co. Ltd v Baynham Meikle & Partners [1975] 3 All ER 99 at 103–104, where 
Lord Denning MR said that the law does not usually imply a warranty that a professional will achieve the 
desired result, but only a term that he will use reasonable care and skill. 
20
Chapter 3 para 2; Lochgelly Iron and Coal Co. v McMullan [1934] AC 1 at 25. The duty of care, as a matter of 





explanation from the defendant-doctor (the design of the maxim). The duty of care is found in 
the doctor-patient relationship and is easily determined, as the doctor undertakes the task of 
providing advice, a diagnosis or treatment21 to the patient. The scope of the doctor’s duty is 
not limited to a duty not to harm the patient, but also a duty to inform the patient about risks 
and to provide proper and adequate advice to a patient.22 An English claimant can take a 
defendant-doctor to court simply based on an allegation of a failure to warn about a material 
risk.  Furthermore, if a surgeon performs an operation without the consent of the patient he 
commits a battery, even though his intention was to benefit the patient.23 
In comparison, the South African delictual law differs substantially from its English 
counterpart. In South Africa, if the elements of negligence, causation and wrongfulness are 
not proved as part of the delict, then the plaintiff’s case will fail.24 The South African court 
interprets the element of negligence as subjective in the sense that the court puts itself in the 
shoes of a particular defendant to determine, under the circumstances, whether he has 
foreseen that harm and has taken steps to prevent it. In England a case may be brought on any 
one of (i) insufficient advice ie failure to warn against risks; or (ii) failure to diagnose; or (iii) 
failure to treat a patient. In South Africa the duty of the doctor to provide proper advice and 
information about risks and complications is included in the patient’s consent to the operation 
or treatment and forms part of the element of wrongfulness. In England, the failure to obtain 
proper consent from the patient can be a cause of action that stands on its own. Significant to 
this investigation, is the fact that the English court allows for a broad inference of lack of 
care, (based on the injury) when things go wrong under the direct control of the doctor. The 
claimant is allowed to call for an explanation. The inference (design of the maxim) is thus 
elevated to a rebuttable presumption that needs an answer from the defendant. It differs 
substantially from South African legal principles. The fact of the injury is not enough 
evidence to presume lack of care of the defendant-doctor (even if the situation was 
completely under his control). It simply lacks substantive proof to aver negligence and 
causation. Lastly, the element of causation is established as part of the delictual principles in 
South Africa and equally important in England when the harm must be linked to the action of 
the defendant. The principles underlying causation are uniform in both the English and South 
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Chapter 3 para 2; Cassidy v Minister of Health [1951] 2 KB 348 at 359, where Denning LJ said that if a man 
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African courts except for the use of procedural tools like the res ipsa loquitur maxim in 
England.  
There are various significant points to be made. First, binding case law in South 
Africa has established that the res ipsa loquitur maxim is not part of medical negligence law 
because the court found that liability should be ascertained from reviewing all the facts of a 
case and this cannot be done in the abstract25 (or in a general way). Second, the obiter dictum 
of the court in Goliath v MEC for Health Eastern Cape26 should be heeded: the res ipsa 
loquitur maxim should be replaced with prima facie evidence with the support of medical 
expert evidence, as the maxim tends to oversimplify complex medical realities and thus 
increases the risk that the court may decide cases for reasons that cannot be justified from a 
medical perspective. Third, recent English case law held that medical expert evidence has to 
be used in addition to the use of the maxim, which most likely may have the effect that the 
maxim may also have lost its appeal in medical law in England.27 Fourth, not only have the 
legal principles been misunderstood in South Africa, but basic medical realities have been 
conceptually misunderstood, which may have contributed to the disagreement between 
scholars concerning the use of the res ipsa loquitur maxim.28 The design of the res ipsa 
loquitur maxim, ie to be in a position to infer negligence (culpa or liability) from an 
occurrence,29 is of no use in medical negligence cases because the standard against which the 
defendant should be measured (the medical reality) is unclear. Fifth, if a decision was made 
to depart from established principles for constitutional and policy considerations and a 
genuine reverse onus or even a rebuttable presumption was imposed on the defendant to 
prove that he acted without negligence, this may infringe on the constitutional rights to 
equality and just administrative fairness of the defendant. It would allow plaintiffs to court 
with claims based on unrealistic expectations, as undesired outcomes in medicine do not 
necessarily flow from negligence. Sixth, in the light of the aim of the South African court to 
favour a more substantive approach over the old formal and textual approach, thereby 
departing from established legal principles, a relaxation in the usual approach to a medical 
case could be justified based on equality, dignity and respect for mental and bodily integrity. 
However, this does not support an argument to allow the maxim for all the reasons given 
above. South Africa should learn from the experience of the English court to bring a case 
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with medical expert opinion and to guard against a possible additional burden of proof on the 
plaintiff to rebut the maxim, which is discussed later.30 The court should exercise caution and 
should promote and protect the rights of equality and seek to reinforce basic rights by not 
holding a defendant liable for the payment of damages when the violation of a right is not 
shown to have worsened the plaintiff’s physical condition. 
 In conclusion, the maxim remains a notional idea without substance in law in medical 
negligence cases in South Africa. If the maxim is used for no other reason than to assist a 
plaintiff to get to court, legal experience from England reveals that the use of the maxim 
seems unhelpful at most, without the support of medical expert evidence. Indeed, in the South 
African context it is clear that use of the maxim may lead to plaintiffs advancing 
insufficiently-prepared evidence, which in turn is vulnerable to rebuttal by defendants 
introducing alternative explanations that are most unlikely from a medical perspective. Such 
an unlikely explanation may well place a further burden on the plaintiff ie that of the 
alternative explanations offered in defence, but also that of his case.31 
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1. The e-medicine medical search engine was used as a first search and easy reference. The 
individual authors were then researched. 
2. The thesis has a legal component and medical component. The references in the 
bibliography are split accordingly. Of fundamental importance is to note that, in South 
African law no question of liability arises before it has been established that the negligent act 
complained of was the cause of the damage ie causa sine qua non. Therefore, the focus of the 
thesis is on the medical interpretation of the injury in order to be in a position to determine 
factual and legal causation. 
3. The complete medical reports were unavailable for some court cases, so it is possible that 
some of the medical facts presented in court will not appear in this thesis. This was not seen 
as a limiting factor, as the science of medicine is globally recognised: the interpretation of the 
medical facts in the cases is fact-sensitive in the context of accepted international medical 
standards. The importance of fact-sensitive cases is relevant and crucial for purposes of 
establishing the expected medical standard of care to be weighed against the standard 
delivered by the defendant in proving a delictual case in South Africa. The medical standard 
means the skill and care assumed by the doctor, but also the accepted standard of practice of 
the profession. Thus, the thesis relied on the correct interpretation of medical facts before 
undertaking the legal analyses. The purpose of the analysis of English law principles in 
chapter 3 was to investigate how the medical standard is determined or how the English court 
deals with the medical standard, causation and negligence. Thus, an in-depth understanding 
of the medical reality of each case was necessary. The acceptable medical standard was 
obtained from published medical literature that sets the standard of the profession. Using this 
as basis, the legal arguments were analysed. In following this structure and method, the thesis 
discovered that the English court allows for a general allegation of negligence based on lack 
of skill and care of the defendant-doctor in an unusual situation under his direct control; it is 
significantly different in South Africa. 
4. For consistency the thesis refers to ‘plaintiff’ in the South African context and ‘claimant’ 
in the English and Welsh context (as was the use after the Civil Procedure Rules 1998 came 





5. The thesis avoids complicated medical arguments and uses only sufficient medical 
information to support alternative arguments based on scientific and medical standards to 
determine the expected standard of care and to identify the elements of negligence and 
causation. 
6. This thesis does not undertake a complete comparison of the South African and English 
approach to the res ipsa loquitur maxim and medical negligence cases in general. The 
purpose of contrasting South African law with the English legal experience is to seek 
guidance from selected cases in English law regarding its perspective on legal principles in 
medical law. Thus, English case law is analysed from a South African legal perspective for 
assistance. 
7. The thesis deals with the general principles of delictual liability and the breach of a legal 
duty and looks at specific cases from different perspectives, which inevitably resulted in 
some repeated discussion of these cases. 
8. Where relevant, the thesis refers to the medical knowledge available at the time of the case 
under discussion, but also includes more recent medical research studies on the same topic 
where this allows for a better understanding of the medical issues. Of course, whether a given 
medical professional was negligent in particular circumstances turns on the state of medical 




CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1 General introduction 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) marks a milestone in the history of 
human rights.1 The UDHR provides an internationally agreed set of standards to guide and 
assess the conduct of governments across a wide range of sectors, and has a direct bearing on 
medicine, public health, and the strengthening of health systems.2 
 Two important documents stemming from the UDHR are the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)3 and the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child (CRC).4 These human rights treaties are legally binding on those countries that have 
ratified them. With regard to health, the main objective is to establish the right to enjoy the 
highest attainable standard of physical and mental health; this objective forms an integral part 
of the treaties. All countries have ratified a binding treaty that is related to health, for 
example, the Constitution of WHO,5 the Declaration of Alma-Ata,6 the Ottawa Charter for 
Health Promotion,7 the Bangkok Charter for Health Promotion in a Globalized World.8 
 In 1997, the final Constitution of South Africa was adopted. It includes a Bill of 
Rights9 based on some of the international treaties. In particular, the preamble provides for a 
Constitution based on democratic values, social justice and fundamental human rights. 
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The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was proclaimed by the United Nations General Assembly in Paris 
on 10 December 1948; http://www.ohchr.org/EN/UDHR/Pages/Introduction.aspx? LangID=eng (accessed 14 
December 2015). 
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 S Marks Health and Human Rights: Basic International Documents 2 ed (2006). 
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United Nations (UN) ‘International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) (1966); see 
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(accessed 14 December 2015). 
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2015). 
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WHO Ottawa charter for health promotion (1986), available at http://www.mecd.gob.es/dms-static/574eadc8-
07b6-450f-b5b2-085ff1e201c8/ottawacharterhp-pdf.pdf (accessed 14 December 2015). 
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Equality and equal protection before the law are guaranteed,10 and everyone has a 
fundamental right to life, dignity, the right to reasonable health care,11 and to be treated in 
accordance with specific standards of care that will not cause harm. Carstens and Kok12 
describe the role of medical ethics as a ‘protective measure of human rights’ that seeks to ‘act 
in the best interest of the patient’. Section 8 of the South African Constitution operates 
vertically, thus affording protection to the individual against the state, but also horizontally, 
whereby it affords protection between subjects themselves. This is relevant as one foresees 
tension between the exercising of these respective rights ie between civil rights and the 
constitutional rights of equality and non-discrimination.   
 Furthermore, s 8(3) places a general obligation on the court to develop the common 
law of the country by promoting the values enshrined in the Constitution, exemplified in the 
decision of the Constitutional Court in Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security.13 In 
addition, the courts and other tribunals must, when interpreting legislation and when 
developing the common law, ‘promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights.’14 
Noteworthy is the role that human dignity plays in the transformation process in an attempt to 
eliminate the negative influences of the past and to advance core values. Human dignity is the 
human value of a person with a body, mind and soul. A right to have their privacy respected 
protection of mental and bodily integrity, reputation, feeling and identity.15 The South African 
court has since recognised the principle of a substantive constitutional approach – better 
known as transformative constitutionalism – to accept that a need exists to correct the wrongs 
of the past and to address and protect human rights. With the substantive approach the court 
applies restitutionary measures, by changing the way the law applies. The law is applied in an 
interconnected manner weighing up the means and the ends and its impact on human dignity. 
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Sections 9, 11 and 10 of the Constitution. Section 9, among other things, describes 17 grounds on which 
discrimination is forbidden. The notion of human dignity plays a significant role in the concept of equality. 
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Section 7(2) provides that the ‘state must respect, protect promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights’; also 
see Glenister v President of the RSA; Helen Suzman Foundation as Amicus Curiae 2011 (3) SA 347 (CC) (2011 
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11
The available resources of the state influence the rights of all South African citizens. See Soobramoney v 
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The court takes into consideration socio-economic conditions, any inequality and 
discriminatory factors and tests whether it is rational, reasonable and proportionally correct to 
arrive at the end result. It brought about a change from a strict formal approach to a broader 
approach which has the purpose of enforcing recognised human rights.16 The substantive 
approach also allows for a wider application of legal principles which was seen in medical 
law in South Africa. Such a broader application of legal principles was also noted in England 
(and Wales).17 It is effectively a judicial relaxation of some of the strict rules governing the 
law of delict in South Africa to protect the weak and vulnerable. It is a leaning towards 
allowing for a lighter burden of proof for plaintiffs in medical negligence cases. 
Medical ethics and duties are developed to protect patient rights and originate from 
measures contained in the Lex Aquilia.18 Medical ethics form the basis of the relationship 
between a doctor and patient and are part of defining the required standard of care in 
medicine. Any care that falls below the expected standard comprises a breach of a legal duty 
and an infringement of the patients’ rights.19 One act or omission may constitute a breach in 
both delict and contract, as the two legal concepts are integrated in the doctor-patient 
relationship.20 A surgeon may be liable in contract because he did not perform according to 
the contract and therefore breached the terms of the contract or in delict because he failed in 
his legal duty to the patient not to cause harm. Moreover, the boni mores or legal convictions 
of the community21 influence South African common law and therefore dictate what the 
expected and lawful role of the medical professional is in our society. In other words, public 
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Regarding inequality and discrimination, see President of the Republic of SA and Another v Hugo [1997] 
ZACC 4; regarding appropriate respect for diversity, see MEC for Education, KZN v Pillay [2007] ZACC 21; 
regarding religious or gender inequality, see National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of 
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Law of South Africa 2 ed (2007) chapter 35. 
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(SCA) para 13; Two Oceans Aquarium Trust v Kantey & Templer (Pty) Ltd 2007 1 All SA 240 (SCA) para 12. 




opinion plays a role in determining delictual liability.22 The legal duty imposed on the 
medical professional as a matter of policy determines whether the harm suffered by the 
plaintiff in the particular manner that it occurred can ever be actionable. This legal duty of a 
medical professional is independent of the will of the party, as it takes place in accordance 
with the legal duty owed to the patient, which is imposed by law.  
In the South African delictual context, one will be liable when a legal duty is owed 
and a person is expected to act and an ‘act of a person [that] in a wrongful and culpable way 
causes harm to another’.23All the elements in delict, ie wrongfulness, negligence (culpa), 
causation and damage have to be established to attribute liability to a defendant. These are 
separate and distinct components of the same delict, each having its own requirements and 
tests. A legal duty is owed to the patient in a doctor-patient relationship and any failure to act 
in accordance with accepted medical standards - specified by the legal duty - will be 
wrongful. In South Africa,24 wrongfulness is only one of the elements required to prove 
delictual liability. A further element is culpa,25 which in the broader context is indicative of 
fault,26 but in its narrow context means negligence (culpa). In addition to the component of 
culpa, a medical professional will be measured against the yardstick of imperitia culpae 
adnumeratur27 translated as want of skill is reckoned as culpa. It means that a reasonable 
medical professional ought to know that a patient might be injured when treated by an 
inexperienced and unskilful medical professional. The requirement of the element of 
negligence (culpa), as part of delict, is established when one has proved that the defendant’s 
conduct (to foresee harm and guard against it) was unreasonable. It would be unreasonable if 
it fell short of the standard of conduct of a hypothetical reasonable doctor in the same 
circumstances. The standard of this hypothetic reasonable doctor is found in acceptable 
international medical principles which are published and that are peer-reviewed.  
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 However, before a defendant can be held liable it has to be established that the act 
complained of caused the injury. The element of factual causation is the causa sine qua non; 
in other words, had it not been for the act the plaintiff would not have suffered the damage. 
But the defendant cannot be liable for all the consequences and if the consequences are too 
remote (legal causation) he will not be liable. Factual causation, as the term describes, is fact-
sensitive and can only be determined by connecting the action with the injury. It is argued 
that, to be in a position to establish factual causation one has to understand the medical chain 
of events that led to the injury. The thesis investigates the elements of negligence (culpa) and 
factual causation in a medical context because these elements are often controversial.28 In 
South Africa, as in other common-law countries, the plaintiff bears the difficult burden of 
proving that the defendant-doctor breached his legal duty and caused the harm.29 It is also 
often seen that when an unexpected injury occurs in a medical case, evidence to determine 
liability is not easily available to the plaintiff and it is most likely known to the defendant.30 
This is one reason why the use of the maxim res ipsa loquitur appeals to plaintiffs who feel 
the need for assistance to lighten the burden of proof.  
Van den Heever and Carstens31 state that the imbalance of power in the doctor-patient 
relationship is a primary reason why the res ipsa loquitur maxim should be reintroduced in 
medical cases in South Africa. The thesis argues that the maxim may not be relied on in 
South African courts. It undermines the basis for establishing the elements of a delict. No 
factual inference can justifiably be made if the key facts are unavailable to support an 
inference of negligence on a balance of probability, and no such inference of negligence can 
be made if the medical facts are not properly appreciated and understood. The court cannot 
draw a presumption of fact from the fact of the injury, as the elements of factual causation 
and negligence (culpa) are fact-sensitive and based on the medical reality. The interpretation 
of medical facts for the medical professional is very different from the interpretation of a 
non-medical person. Under these conditions, the maxim should not be applied to medical 
cases.  
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An argument may perhaps be made for the introduction of the maxim based on 
constitutional grounds,32 but before considering this, it should be established whether the 
maxim contributes or has any value in a medical case. Against this background, the thesis 
sets out to investigate the reasons why the South African courts33 have rejected the maxim 
and, in addition, to investigate whether a more lenient approach for a wider application of the 
maxim, similar to the English system, may be justified in the South African law. The South 
African Constitution34 directs that the common law must be developed; therefore, the function 
of the law may well be to redress the perceived imbalance of power in the doctor-patient 
relationship by easing the burden of proof for the patient. Nonetheless, the thesis argues that a 
plaintiff is not entitled to be compensated and a defendant is not bound to compensate the 
plaintiff where the alleged breach of duty is not shown to have caused or worsened the 
condition of the plaintiff. Any suggested judicial interference or departure from legal 
principles should be justified, rational and reasonable and in accordance with delictual 
principles.35 
 
1.1 Background to the res ipsa loquitur maxim 
The earliest use36 of the phrase res ipsa loquitur in legal matters was by Cicero when he 
addressed the court in defence of his friend Milo, who was accused of murdering Clodius. 
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Circumstantial evidence was presented by Cicero to support an argument of self-defence. As 
a final argument, Cicero summed up the evidence and stated that the body of facts (res) spoke 
for itself – ‘res ipsa loquitur’ – despite the vagueness of his argument.  
Subsequently, about 2000 years later, the maxim was introduced in England, where 
the first benchmark cases in which the maxim of res ipsa loquitur was implicitly applied 
were Byrne v Boadle in 1863 and Scott v London & St Katherine Docks Company in 
1865.37In the former, a barrel that fell from a window injured a passer-by and, in the latter, a 
bag of sugar fell from the second storey of a building, injuring a person passing by. The 
maxim was not discussed, but the occurrence was adequate to infer lack of care. It seemed 
that it was inferred that, had the proper care been exercised, the harm would have been 
prevented. In 1935, an Australian court cautioned against the use of the maxim. Dixon J in 
Fitzpatrick v Walter E Cooper Pty Ltd38 remarked that the phrase res ipsa loquitur ‘does no 
more than furnish a presumption of fact’. The court referred to the English case of Ballard v 
North British Railway Co,39 where it was held that the maxim does not discharging the 
plaintiff from carrying the burden of proof. It was held that if an alternative explanation 
(without negligence) was provided by the defendant, then the defendant had refuted the 
factual presumption created by the maxim and the plaintiff still had to prove his case. At the 
time, the presumption drawn from such descriptive facts were neither conclusive evidence of 
liability nor a rebuttable presumption, only an inference from the fact of the occurrence. Only 
if the defendant failed to provide the remainder of the factual evidence with his explanation, 
devoid of negligence, would the plaintiff have proved his case. 
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In South Africa,40 in the leading case of Van Wyk v Lewis reported in 1924, the res 
ipsa loquitur maxim was considered and rejected in the context of medical negligence. The 
minority relied on the English decision of Hillyer v The Governors of St Bartholomew’s 
Hospital41 and concluded that the mere fact that a foreign substance is sewn closed in the 
body of a patient constitutes a case of negligence (culpa). The majority, unconvinced that 
negligence in the form of culpa had been shown from all the relevant facts, rejected the 
maxim for any future medical negligence case.42The majority explained that the court must 
place itself as nearly as possible in the exact position in which the surgeon had found himself 
when conducting that particular operation, and then determine from all the circumstances 
available whether the surgeon acted with reasonable care or negligently. It is argued that, to 
make use of a presumption of negligence (the maxim) without key factual information 
(relevant to the element of culpa and causation), it is not possible for a court to place itself as 
near as possible in the exact position in which the defendant-doctor has found himself. 
Nevertheless, based on the stare decisis doctrine, this ‘celebrated ruling by a three-judge 
appellate bench has functioned as protective shield as far as the doctor is concerned’43 by 
preventing a plaintiff to ask for an explanation early in litigation. Ever since, this case has 
provided authority that the res ipsa loquitur maxim does not apply to medical negligence 
cases in South Africa.44 Subsequent cases in South Africa attempted to reintroduce the 
maxim, the more important being Cecilia Goliath v MEC for Health, Eastern 
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Cape.45Unfortunately, the court avoided going into the reasons for abandoning the res ipsa 
loquitur maxim but it correctly decided the case on all the facts as a whole. It seemed obvious 
that we had seen the last of the maxim in South African medical law, but plaintiffs have 
nevertheless persisted in trying to make use of the maxim. 
 
1.2 Legal argument 
Notably, the ruling in Van Wyk v Lewis was contrary to the precedent in English law46 and 
other legal systems47 and, in this regard, attracted strong criticism. Authors were divided in 
their approach to the purpose of the maxim in medical law.48 As mentioned previously, Van 
den Heever and Carstens49 argued that the court in Van Wyk v Lewis50erred in directing that 
the occurrence of a retained swab is an uncertainty. It should not be interpreted as ‘relative’ 
or inconclusive evidence. Such an occurrence - leaving the swab in the patient - is conclusive 
evidence of breach of a legal duty. It should be seen as ‘absolute’ evidence of such a breach; 
it is not dependent on surrounding circumstances.51 It is not clear whether these authors 
interpreted the term ‘absolute’ as conclusive evidence of negligence or as a rebuttable 
presumption. Either way, the authors’ viewpoint is not correct; a presumption of fact on key 
facts (which is the effect of the maxim) is not a rebuttable presumption of law, it is, at best, a 
weak possibility of negligent conduct without any circumstantial evidence to support an 
allegation of negligence except for the fact of the injury. The authors stated that the decision 
of the court cannot be supported, as it is based on a ‘fundamental misdirection’ ie a left-
behind swab is sufficient evidence of breach of a legal duty and so the case should not be 
regarded as uncontested authority. For obvious reasons, the authors agreed with the minority 
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decision in Van Wyk v Lewis.52 Strauss and Strydom53 first argued for the application of the 
maxim in medical negligence cases. Recently Strauss54 has advised that an adverse event 
should be seen as a presumption of negligence: ‘mere proof by a plaintiff of an injurious 
result caused by an instrumentality which was in the exclusive control of the defendant or 
following on the happening of an occurrence solely under the defendant’s control, gives rise 
to a presumption of negligence’. Yet again, it is not clear if the author is referring to the 
design of the maxim as a factual presumption; however, Strauss now seems to regard as 
correct the Van Wyk v Lewis55dictum. Although this may seem to be the function and design 
of the maxim in ordinary cases involving falling barrels or falling bags of sugar, it cannot be 
the same in medical cases. Bags do not fall from windows and, as a presumption of fact, it 
implies that the other key facts are sufficient to ascertain prima facie fault. It is not so in a 
medical negligence case, as sometimes swabs can be left in wounds for reasons not known to 
the uninformed person and further investigation is needed to complete the picture. Notably, a 
difference between two concepts may well be the reason for the divided legal opinion. The 
function of the maxim allows a permissible factual inference56 to be drawn based on other 
available facts; it is not a presumption of negligence (rebuttable presumption of fault). The 
factual inference leads the court to draw certain inferences or conclusions from known facts.57 
In other words, from certain known facts, in the ordinary course of everyday life, other facts 
can be inferred based on logical reasoning.  
International authors also have different opinions about the function of the maxim. 
Fleming58 explained that when analysing the cases related to the res ipsa loquitur maxim it is 
not possible to categorise the type of case where the maxim would apply as the types of 
accidents differ and are unique. Giesen59 remarked that the use of the res ipsa loquitur maxim 
is ‘a type of circumstantial evidence based on logical reasoning whereby certain facts may be 
inferred from the existence of or ordinary occurrence of other facts’.  
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To this end, certain questions are raised regarding the nature of ordinary facts. More 
particularly, ‘ordinary facts’ in the medical context or any other specialised context cannot be 
the same as ‘ordinary facts’ in layman’s terms. The stage is set to argue that an ordinary 
occurrence of everyday life cannot include specialist spheres. The interpretation of medical 
facts by medical experts is the basis of a medical case. It sets the desired standard of care 
against which the delivered standard will be measured; it is the telling of the medical story of 
what should have occurred and what indeed occurred. The explanatory facts form part of the 
chain of events and describe the medical reality. If the medical reality in the medical context -   
or reality in any other specialised context for that matter - is not understood, how can the 
elements of delict be tested on a preponderance of probability? Each and every element must 
be satisfied to assign liability to the defendant.60 For example, when the signs and symptoms 
of a disease or illness are observed, the medical professional will rule out certain forms of 
disease-patterns by elimination. This is called the diagnostic process with its cause-and-effect 
approach. A blood pressure of 180 over 110 (fact) is meaningless to many non-medical 
persons, but one medical interpretation (medical reality) in accordance with medical 
principles will reveal a person suffering from hypertension, with a higher than normal risk of 
thrombosis (inference based on facts). Certain medical interventions may seem blameworthy 
to the layperson, but fall well within standard conduct for the medical professional. For 
instance, if the common bile duct is cut without explanation (justification) it cannot be 
concluded that it was done in a culpable manner. If such a bile duct was trapped in a 
cancerous growth and even with carefully dissection was torn, the conduct (action of tearing 
the bile duct) would not be negligent and would be justified given the circumstances. 
Therefore, this thesis argues that the fact of the injury is not sufficient evidence to render an 
act prima facie negligent (culpa) or attracts a presumption of fact – the res ipsa loquitur 
maxim - based on key facts. An inaccurate understanding of the medical reality would result 
in an incorrect legal inference. The fact of the injury creates a mere possibility of negligent 
conduct that should be investigated to further a plaintiff’s case. The medical reality is based 
on accepted international medical standards analysing the underlying medical and not the 
assumed inferences of the legal mind. The onus is on the plaintiff to prove the existence of a 
causal relation between the wrongful, culpable act and the loss suffered that is sufficiently 
close to determine legal causation. For this reason, a proper appreciation of the medical 
reality tested against the standard and general medical norm is critical. Legal causation hinges 
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on excluding other factors or influences that may have broken the causal chain and that are 
too remote to have caused the damage. Furthermore, it seems that the fact of the injury only 
has a bearing on the element of wrongfulness in delict and not on the element of negligence 
(culpa).61 Put differently, it is clear that leaving a swab in the body of a plaintiff is wrongful - 
based on the duty not to cause harm - if it is not justifiable. However, there is no evidence 
that the action was negligent (culpable conduct) if further evidence in explanation from the 
defendant is not provided, because of the subjective nature of the element of culpa. But, in 
the South African court, a defendant is only obliged to explain his actions when a prima facie 
case has been brought in evidence. Thus, the plaintiff’s case will fall because the mere fact of 
the injury is not prima facie evidence of negligent conduct. It confirms the potential 
confusion between the interpretation of a factual presumption as opposed to a legal 
presumption and that this may be the underlying cause of the lack of consensus among 
academic writers.  
Moving the emphasis to the legal duty not to harm because it is an infringement of 
patient rights to bodily integrity, and so forth, other academic commentary was examined. 
Hirsh et al62 also believed that the ‘underlying premise of res ipsa is the result bespeaks 
negligence’ or, put differently, one of the requirements in a res ipsa loquitur case is that the 
facts must be such that no other conclusion but that of negligent conduct (culpa and liability) 
can be drawn from them. These authors based their statement on a presumption drawn from 
the action of the defendant. They were of the opinion that in a medical negligence case it is 
assumed that the defendant knew what occurred, or at least is more likely than the plaintiff to 
have known what occurred. They explained that in some jurisdictions the maxim might shift 
the burden of proof to the defendant to show conduct free from negligence, while in others it 
merely puts an obligation on the defendant to answer in reply to the maxim; it does not 
request from a defendant to disprove negligence only to show that his conduct was careful. If 
the latter is done, the plaintiff is then obliged to continue to prove that a prima facie case was 
made out. They argued for fairness to all parties, as in a medical negligence case the plaintiff 
is injured by something that he cannot control, and the defendant is in a better position to 
explain what happened.  
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This thesis argues that from insufficient key facts63 (only the fact of the injury) one 
cannot infer negligence (culpa) or the element of causation. The court has to be in a position 
to be put in the position of the defendant and weigh the standard of care delivered against the 
set standard of care. Notwithstanding this premise, the thesis additionally considers, in 
constitutional context, whether the use of the maxim should not be made available to 
plaintiffs based on patients’ rights and the so-called imbalance of power between the doctor 
and the patient. But the question remains: does the maxim actually assist a plaintiff with his 
case? Considering the fact that the res ipsa loquitur maxim is an evidential presumption64 
based on facts from which further inferences may be drawn; if the maxim is applied the 
maxim calls for an answer but it is not a legal presumption from which legal conclusions can 
be drawn. This alerts one to the problem that limited facts - an incomplete picture - might 
lead to an unsupported inference of negligence (culpable conduct) without key facts being 
available. This may lead to distorted legal outcomes in South African law and a court 
deciding cases for reasons that are unjustifiable from a medical perspective. In South Africa 
the mere fact of the injury is speculation that the injury might have occurred as a result of 
substandard conduct by the defendant-doctor because of many alternative explanations that 
may not be negligent in nature. The legal effect of the incorrect use of a factual presumption 
may have bearing on how the case is decided.65 To use the facts of Van Wyk v Lewis66as an 
example, the plaintiff failed to convince the court that the facts that speak, ie res ipsa 
loquitur, were sufficient evidence to prove negligence (both culpa and legal liability). If the 
res (body of facts) is obscured, the inconclusive and unfortunate occurrence suffered by the 
plaintiff provides no information but that of a wrongful harm – the element of wrongfulness. 
It does not provide information regarding the conduct of the defendant. A factual inference 
made from the fact of the injury is insufficient to sustain an allegation of negligence (culpa or 
liability). Van den Heever and Carstens may have overlooked this criterion.67 Subjective 
evidence from the defendant to determine the element of negligence (culpa) has to be heard 
                                                 
63
Easson v L & N E Ry [1944] KB 421 at 425; [1944] 2 All ER 425 at 430. The plaintiff was injured when he 
fell out of a door on the defendant’s train. The doors were operated manually by the passengers. It could not be 
established that the defendant was in control of closing the doors. 
64
Chapter 2 para 5; see also Administrator, Natal v Stanley Motors Ltd 1960 1 SA 690 (A) 700 (occurrences 
should be such that they would not have had occurred without negligence). See Sardi (n 45) 780D; Dalion 
Materials (Pty) Ltd v Cintrust (Pty) Ltd 1978 (3) SA 599 (W) 605D. 
65
Chapter 2 para 5 on legal presumptions. 
66
Van Wyk (n 33). 
67
Van den Heever & Carstens (n 31) 171, stating that an operation on the right knee instead of the left knee 




and tested.68 Even if one should aver that the fact of the injury is enough evidence to infer 
‘careless conduct’ or breach of legal duty it would be interpreted as conjecture in the South 
African court based on the uncertainty that perhaps there may be circumstances where swabs 
are retained in medical cases. The plaintiff’s case would not even be heard as no cause of 
action has been established. When further investigation into the delictual elements and 
therefore the conduct of the wrongdoer is required (culpa)69 the maxim would be 
inappropriate in any event and besides, the court process would have advanced past its use.  
With the correct application of the maxim (in delict), all the elements of Aquilian 
liability should be satisfied, even though inferred from other facts.70 The res ipsa loquitur 
maxim, as factual inference, should indicate that the fact of the occurrence shows certain 
facts have occurred that possibly should not have occurred. For example, driving on the 
wrong side of the road caused an accident. The element of negligent conduct (culpa) is a 
value judgment that is superimposed on the primary descriptive facts of what happened. But 
no value judgment can be made if the primary facts are incorrectly understood. A court must 
decide, from the fact that the vehicle that caused the accident was unlawfully on the wrong 
side of the road, whether to infer that the conduct of the defendant was careless and therefore 
negligent (liable). Even with an ordinary everyday life experience like a road accident it is 
not necessarily a simple argument. Therefore, where things go wrong during surgery in a 
medical negligence case, it is not possible for the court to make a value judgment without 
satisfactory evidence. The descriptive facts have a certain meaning for the non-medical 
person and another meaning for the medical professional. This illustrates the argument of the 
thesis that, at best (without the medical reality setting the expected standard of care), the fact 
of the injury is simply a possibility that substandard care was delivered.  
Van den Heever and Carstens71 stated further that, to ensure that the correct inference 
is drawn, two essential rules of logic should apply: the first is that the inference (of 
negligence) must be consistent with the proved facts, and the second is that the proved facts 
should be such that they exclude every other reasonable inference (of non-negligence) that 
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can be drawn. Thus, if an alternative inference can be drawn, devoid of negligent conduct, 
then the design of the maxim would fail, as there would be doubt whether the inference 
sought to be drawn, is correct. This confirms the argument of the thesis, albeit in different 
concept. The authors interpret the fact of the injury similar to the English court as ‘lack of 
care’ which required an investigation into the principles of the law of tort in the English law. 
The thesis maintains that in South African law, in a medical case the plaintiff (without 
medical expert evidence) will almost always remain uncertain of whether there was another 
non-negligent explanation. If the case advances to court a plaintiff will always be surprised in 
a case based only on the maxim. The latter premise agrees with the minority dictum of 
Wessels AJ in Van Wyk v Lewis72 and supports the notions of the study.  
In summary, the general discourse in legal opinion indicates either an incorrect 
interpretation of legal concepts, like the rebuttable presumption as opposed to the factual 
presumption73 of the res ipsa loquitur maxim; or is confusing South African principles with 
English legal principles; or has a misperception of the medical realities of the case.74 In 
addition, it seems that those favouring the application of the maxim do not apply its 
requirements meticulously. The requirements dictate that it must be shown, foremost, that the 
injury was caused by a body of facts or a thing (res) solely under the control of the defendant 
and also that the nature of the occurrence must be such as to justify an inference of 
negligence.75 At this point, it became clear that to request from the court in a difficult case 
like Van Wyk v Lewis76 to draw an inference of negligence simply based on the fact of a 
‘retained swab’ may be a form of false syllogism77 because of an oversimplification of the 
medical realities. As said before, an unqualified act of leaving a swab behind may establish a 
wrongful act against the convictions of society, ie ‘not to harm’,78 or infringe a constitutional 
right, in which case the facts of the case call for more information and justification based on 
the norms and values of society. It raises a possibility that the defendant-doctor failed to 
exercise proper skill and care by not ensuring that the swab was not retained.79 Such a 
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scenario, although prima facie wrongful, is not prima facie negligent, as the court has to test 
the subjective actions of the defendant at the time that the swab was left behind.80 Such an 
argument has the effect that the requirements of the res ipsa loquitur maxim almost seem too 
imprecise to be met in a medical case in South Africa. This point will not be advanced any 
further as it is sufficiently addressed under the discussion of the elements in delict in general.      
The final confirmation for the rationale of this thesis is based on the judgment in 
Macleod v Rens.81This decision was made in respect of a road accident case but it epitomises 
the approach of this thesis to medical negligence cases and the res ipsa loquitur maxim in 
South Africa. The court held that the maxim– 
 
pithily states a method of reasoning for the particular circumstances where the only 
available evidence is that of the accident. It boils down to the notion that in a proper 
case it can be self-evident that the accident was caused by the negligence of the 
person in control of the object involved in the accident. As such it is not a magic 
formula. It does not permit the Court to side-step or gloss over a deficiency in the 
plaintiff’s evidence; it is no short cut to a finding of negligence: these are real dangers 
in the application of the expression. It seems to tempt courts into speculation. 
Expressions such as ‘in ordinary human experience’, ‘common sense dictates’ and 
‘obviously’ which are regularly employed in reasoning along the lines of the maxim, 
sometimes only serve to disguise conjecture. Moreover, there is a risk of false 
syllogism inherent in reasoning that, as the accident would ordinarily not have 
occurred without negligence on the part of the driver of the vehicle, the defendant, 
having been the driver, was therefore negligent. Finally, reasoning along the lines of 
res ipsa loquitur leads to the somewhat unsatisfactory finding that the defendant was 




This dictum accords with the reasoning of this thesis, in that the court cannot justify a 
decision based on a cursory explanation regarding descriptive medical facts that might be 
inconsistent with the medical reality; the court cannot arrive at a conclusion of negligence 
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(culpa or liability) without sufficient evidence regarding the conduct of the defendant-doctor, 
purely based on the fact that a swab was retained. The medical clinical course is too 
complicated to rely on a maxim that is general and unspecific regarding the cause of injury 
and conduct (culpa) to ascribe blame to a defendant-doctor (liability). If a court has heard all 
the evidence, including what caused a swab to be retained (factual causation), and there was 
no justification for the retention of the swab (wrongful and culpable conduct), only then 
would a court be in a position to say res ipsa loquitur. However, by then, the use of the 
maxim would be worthless. 
The recent judgment in Goliath v MEC for Health, Eastern Cape83 criticised the res 
ipsa loquitur maxim, stating that the maxim’s effect is that it allows for a piecemeal approach 
that fails to consider all the facts as a whole. This case too confirms the stance that 
unsubstantiated inferences without key facts cannot be made without a proper appreciation of 
the relevant medical facts; and, more importantly, that a defendant cannot be found ‘negligent 
in some general or unspecified manner’ without satisfying all the elements of Aquilian 
liability.84Furthermore, it seems unlikely that the res ipsa loquitur maxim may be adapted to 
assist a claimant in medical negligence cases as the design of the maxim is not consistent 
with delictual principles in medical cases; however, based on previous Constitutional Court 
decisions,85 it may well be that future decisions will take cognisance of the vulnerability of 
patients in trying to achieve a caring, sharing and empathetic society and the courts may 
expand some of the criteria when applying the elements of delict. Whether such changes will 
include the wider application of the maxim remains to be seen but should be disallowed. The 
use of the maxim will increase the risk of plaintiffs continuing to construct insufficiently 
prepared cases. Not only is the maxim unaccommodating, but it is also potentially 
detrimental to a plaintiff’s case in medical negligence litigation in South Africa.86 Because of 
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the English influence on South African law and evident from incorrect interpretations by 
scholars, it is perceived that the maxim assists individuals who are pursuing a claim for 
compensation by easing the difficulty of proving that a doctor was negligent and caused their 
loss. This, in turn, is thought to promote the patient’s right to vindicate his or her right to 
bodily integrity by easing the burden of establishing that he or she has been a victim of 
medical negligence. The thesis argues otherwise: in the South African context the maxim is 
potentially harmful to plaintiffs and defendants in medical negligence cases as it tends to 
generalise complex medical realities; it increases the risk that courts may decide cases for 
reasons that are not consistent in both legal and medical context which may lead to 
unreasonable prejudice and injustice. Against this background, the argument of this thesis 
was formulated. 
 
2 Explanatory notes on the descriptive title 
The descriptive title refers to a fundamental dissimilarity between the medical interpretation 
of medical facts and the legal interpretation of medical facts: ‘The incommensurability of the 
archaic perceptions of the maxim res ipsa loquitur in medical negligence litigation’. The 
maxim res ipsa loquitur may be a useful procedural aid for plaintiffs, but its use in medical 
negligence cases is discouraged. This stance accords with the decision in Van Wyk v 
Lewis87but not with some academic writers, who described the dictum of the court in Van 
Wyk v Lewis’ as untenable and out of touch with modern approaches adopted by other 
Common law countries’.88Although the court in a recent judgment, Cecilia Goliath v MEC 
for Health, Eastern Cape,89 argued against using res ipsa loquitur in future medical cases, the 
reasoning for the decision was not explained. It is argued that the res ipsa loquitur maxim 
may rarely, if ever, be useful to a plaintiff in a medical negligence case.  
Several preconceived notions90 are linked with the application and the use of the 
maxim in South Africa. The most important one is that any undesired outcome of a medical 
intervention is perceived to be evidence of negligent conduct.91 This misconception arises 
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from legal interpretations of medical facts that may be inconsistent with the medical 
interpretation of medical facts. In this regard, the writer faced a dilemma when translating 
medical scientific realities into legal arguments. The following analogy92is useful in 
describing the predicament. If one has the perfect tool, eg a screwdriver, and the task is to 
remove a nail from a piece of wood, one’s perception that the nail is a screw would most 
probably be the source of endless frustration. However, when analysing the cause of the 
problem, two elements would be discerned: the design and the use of the tool. An uninformed 
user of the wrong tool may invest futile effort because the nail and the screwdriver are 
incommensurable. However, an analyst or designer would appreciate the cause-and-effect 
relationship between the screwdriver and the screw and would simply replace the tool with a 
more effective one. The simplest solution sometimes is found to the most complex problems 
if the designer and the user reflect an intrinsic understanding of the same things. Thus, when 
two concepts are so different that they could never exist together or agree with one another, 
they are found to be incommensurable.  
The term ‘incommensurability’ is used by scientists to capture methodological, 
observational and conceptual inconsistencies between successive scientific paradigms,93 and 
therefore its use in a legal context may be criticised. However, the justification for its use is 
found in the successive and contemporaneous involvement of the disciplines of law and 
medicine in the field of medical negligence. In essence, it is a practical expression to describe 
the central underlying argument of the thesis, ie that a substantial conceptual difference exists 
between legal conclusions from legal interpretation of medical facts and medical conclusions 
based on medical facts. Clinical medicine is described as an ongoing medical diagnostic 
process that gives rise to the medical interpretation and explanation of facts, viz medical 
conclusions. As explained before, the expected medical standard must be in agreement with 
the values and norms of our society as embodied in the South African Constitution. For 
example, it is regarded as good and safe medical practice to remove as much affected tissue 
as possible from a cancerous growth, even if this results in damage to the bile duct. If these 
medical realities are not investigated and clarified, unsustainable decisions and uncertainty in 
judicial reasoning may result. The premise for the thesis was thus established: the res ipsa 
loquitur maxim is incommensurable with the medical clinical process in medical negligence 
litigation. 
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As Feyerabend94 so aptly remarked,  
 
[p]aradigms can be based on different assumptions regarding the structure of their 
domain, which makes it impossible to compare them in a meaningful way. The 
adoption of a new theory includes and is dependent upon the adoption of new terms. 
Thus, scientists are using different terms when talking about different theories. Those 
who hold different, competing theories to be true will be talking over one another, in 
the sense that they cannot a priori arrive at agreement, given two different discourses 
with two different theoretical languages and dictates.  
 
Oberheim,95 in support of Feyerabend, explains that the notion of incommensurability means 
that two theories are conceptually incompatible. He maintains that meanings, even of 
observational terms, are determined by the theories to which they belong. When there is a 
theory change there are meaning changes that could result in a new conception of reality. A 
misunderstanding of medical reality goes to the heart of the argument of this thesis, viz that 
misconceptions of medical reality in legal reasoning lead to the inappropriate use and 
application of the res ipsa loquitur maxim.  
 
3 The background to the thesis 
3.1 Rationale 
The rationale behind the title is that in a medical case the court weighs the expected standard 
of care against the delivered standard of care to determine substandard care. Therefore, it is 
important to understand medical realities before drawing juristic inferences or conclusions, 
and this ipso facto excludes the res ipsa loquitur maxim from being applied in any medical 
negligence case. The focus of the thesis is on the medical facts of several cases to determine 
the set medical standard. From the set standard the reasoning of the court is followed in 
determining the elements in delict, more particularly those of factual causation and 
negligence. The thesis clarifies, independent of the stare decisis rule, why the res ipsa 
loquitur maxim would not be applicable to the majority of medical negligence cases in South 
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African law. The thesis also seeks to qualify the conceptual differences that exist between the 
context of medicine and law in medical negligence cases in the presence of similar 
terminology, eg the term ‘causation’. The problem arises when more causes of action are 
found in any complex case, medical cases being cases in point. It is usually found that there 
may be several factors in the causal chain that significantly contributed to the undesired 
medical event. As explained before, in Michael v Linksfield Park Clinic96 a young healthy 
man underwent nose surgery that resulted in permanent brain damage. Only if this process - 
the medical reality - is understood and appreciated can factual causation and negligence 
(culpa) be determined. The medical reality is obtained from the set standard of care based on 
accepted international medical principles. The cause-and-effect medical chain provides 
medical facts that support the causal link between the occurrence and the harm. It is from this 
medical reality that factual causation is determined which, in turn is the legal nexus between 
the wrongful conduct and the injury. This approach harmonises with the argument that, if the 
res ipsa loquitur maxim is correctly applied to determine whether there has been negligent 
conduct, inferential reasoning based on medical facts should support all elements in delict, 
and in particularly the elements of negligence and factual causation, which falls outside of the 
scope of the maxim. Even if the assumption is that, usually, uncomplicated nose surgery does 
not lead to brain damage, this syllogism will lead to false inferences, which are not based on 
sound delictual legal principles ie causation and negligent conduct. It will increase the risk 
that courts may decide cases for reasons inconsistent with the true medical perspectives.  
 Because of the major influence of constitutional rights mentioned before, the thesis 
considered possible changes in the law of delict in South Africa. It is understandable that 
tension may develop between patient rights and the conventional common law of South 
Africa. The substantive approach moved away from the conservative approach. Thus, it is 
unsurprising that the courts engage directly with correcting the wrongs of the past97 and even 
require the executive powers of the country to give effect to the socio-economic claims of the 
poor and the vulnerable. The court promotes the values that underpin an open and democratic 
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society and is determined to relax some of the established legal principles when such 
departure is justified. The right to bodily integrity is interpreted to include to be treated with 
dignity. This is also seen in England and Wales where the courts are now more willing to 
challenge medical expert opinion and, where a claimant has established a breach of a human 
right, in circumstances where the law of tort has not previously assisted, the courts seem to be 
willing to reconsider the common-law position and balance the claimant’s rights and the 
defendant’s interests more carefully.98 This thesis examines the benefits of such a 
development in the South African context. 
 
3.2 The maxim of res ipsa loquitur as part of the rationale 
The court in Van Wyk v Lewis99held that ‘no doubt it is sometimes said that in cases where the 
maxim applies the happening of the occurrence is in itself prima facie evidence of 
negligence’. The thesis focuses on the premise created by the design of the res ipsa loquitur 
maxim in medical cases. If, in certain instances, this evidentiary principle should allow the 
court to draw a presumption of fact from a particular fact or cluster of facts regarding an 
unsatisfactory outcome of a medical intervention, it means that the cause of the injury has to 
be known or the cause of the injury at least has to carry a highly probability of being the 
correct cause. In addition, the subjective conduct of the defendant has to be known from the 
available facts, for example, that the defendant was reckless or omitted or neglected to act 
under specific circumstances. Furthermore, since this evidentiary inference from the facts is 
not a presumption of law, it is only a reasoning process deduced from the facts. Now, if the 
res ipsa loquitur maxim is applied to medical cases, the medical reality should be evident 
before negligence can be inferred from any facts, and if not, it cannot lead to a change in 
judicial reasoning to confer liability. In other words, if cutting a bile duct during surgery is 
not factual evidence of negligence (culpa), it cannot even be presumed as careless conduct 
from the key facts, because the element of negligence (culpa) has not been satisfied. The 
court has to be provided with the set medical standard of care and only then will the court be 
in a position to monitor whether the defendant took the required steps to prevent such an 
injury. Against the medical reality the court will be able to find this required standard of care 
to measure all the evidence.  
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The thesis seeks clarity about the use of the maxim, since the interpretation and 
function of the res ipsa loquitur maxim have been quite controversial. Concisely, the maxim 
is described by some as a type of logical reasoning that does not depend upon any rule of law, 
as it ‘propounds no principle’100 and should not even be called a maxim. Some commentators 
argue that the res ipsa loquitur maxim is merely a ‘presumption of fact’ and a way to indicate 
that, within certain circumstances, inferential reasoning is permissible.101 Therefore, the 
maxim may be applied in circumstances where accidents do not ordinarily happen without 
negligence. Often – as expressed by the minority decision in Van Wyk v Lewis102 – a plaintiff 
may produce evidence of certain facts that, unless rebutted, reasonably indicate insufficient 
care leading to a conclusion of negligent conduct (culpa); in such cases the maxim res ipsa 
loquitur is often held to apply.103 The functioning of the maxim is described in the English 
case Ballard v Northern British Railway Co104by Lord Shaw: ‘[The maxim] has its place in 
that scheme of and search for causation upon which the mind sets itself working.’ This once 
again leads to the realisation that the approach of the English court differs from that of the 
South African court. In England, the presumption of the maxim based on the fact of the injury 
is sufficient to aver lack of care in a situation completely under the control of the defendant 
that is unexpected in nature. This realisation is discussed in chapter three and also led the 
writer to examine whether the early appreciation of the medical reality plays the same role in 
England than in South Africa. The general presumption - the design of the maxim - which is 
accepted in England, does not affect the medical reality as any dispute in the medical reality 
only arises after the defendant’s explanation in rebutting the maxim was heard. In South 
Africa, any conceptual confusion in respect of the true medical reality will lead to incorrect 
assumptions and failure to show a proper cause of injury and negligence. What seems to be a 
simple situation of lack of care because a swab was retained, from the ordinary person’s point 
of view, may be completely different for a medical professional experiencing a surgical 
emergency. It is true that the function of presenting medical evidence is to set the record 
straight regarding the chain of events.  If a healthy young man underwent uncomplicated nose 
surgery105 and sustained permanent brain damage the ordinary person may want to assume 
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that negligence must have occurred. Whereas the medical chain of events is that of a 
complicated medical mechanism explained before, namely, a hypertensive crisis which was 
caused by the anaesthetist. The crisis was not managed well and caused cardiac arrest. The 
arrest was not managed well and caused hypoxia. The hypoxia was not reversed in time and 
caused irreversible brain damage. These were the medical facts that should have been 
presented to the court by way of medical expert evidence. The maxim was not pleaded in this 
case, but even if the maxim had been pleaded and accepted, it would not have made a 
difference in the South African legal context as the causal link was not explained by medical 
experts to set the expected standard of care for the court to contrast the delivered standard of 
care. The defendant-doctors indeed would have answered in rebuttal a case of prima facie 
evidence of negligence by simply stating evidence of careful conduct.106 They had no 
obligation to disprove the plaintiff’s case (there was no reverse onus on the defendant). Thus, 
had the plaintiff relied on the maxim (without proper expert evidence) it would still have led 
to an unsuccessful case for the plaintiff. Had the maxim been accepted on the general basis 
that, in the ordinary course of things, uncomplicated nose surgery does not lead to brain 
damage, therefore res ipsa loquitur, the underestimation of the medical chain of facts (set out 
above) would not have been sufficiently encapsulated in the maxim and the maxim would not 
have assisted the plaintiff in any event, as the defendant would have given the same reply of 
careful conduct and causation would not have been established.  
To proceed to court with insufficiently prepared evidence (based solely on the maxim) 
would make the plaintiff vulnerable to rebuttal by medical defendants on ‘exotic’ grounds as 
will be illustrated later107 and the South African plaintiff would not have shown a causal link - 
factual causation - or the element of negligence (culpa). In addition, the plaintiff would have 
to disprove any explanation offered by the defendant in rebutting the maxim. This is another 
hurdle for the plaintiff to overcome and it is an increased burden of proof for a South African 
plaintiff. According to a patient’s right to dignity and bodily integrity a ‘victim’ of a medical 
injury should have a remedial measure to claim an infringement of this right. As argued 
before, in South African context, if the medical reality remained obscured then justice will 
not be done even if the maxim is applied. The maxim is inappropriate in medical cases in 
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South Africa because the plaintiff has to prove all the delictual elements when advancing his 
case.  
 
3.3 Legal principles underlying the res ipsa loquitur maxim and the rationale of the 
study 
The thesis uses the practical realities of medicine to demonstrate the set standard of care 
against which the standard of care of the defendant-doctor is weighed. The underlying 
principles of the law of delict and the law of evidence that govern the maxim res ipsa 
loquitur in analysed in medical negligence cases. To briefly summarise, in the law of medical 
negligence, it is trite that the intentional or negligent causing of bodily harm to another 
without lawful justification is an actionable wrong.108 It is accepted109 that wrongfulness in the 
context of breach of a legal duty is one of the essential elements to show liability. It is also 
accepted that the legal duty of care owed to the patient can arise independently of contract,110 
namely, in delict. It is implicitly linked to the fact that the patient has submitted himself to the 
care of the doctor because of the skill and knowledge of the professional. It is the writer’s 
argument that any adverse event, in the medical context, can at best only be presumed to 
satisfy the element of wrongfulness, based on the duty of the doctor not to cause harm.111 In 
this regard a judicial enquiry into wrongfulness is determined by weighing competing norms 
and interests, in order to focus on whether it would be ‘reasonable’ to impose liability.  In this 
regard the writer explored aspects that may rebut the presumption of wrongfulness in delict. 
In South African law, the consent given by the plaintiff justifies the action of the defendant 
and the law then accepts it as lawful.  Inadequate disclosure or an absence of informed 
consent (in South Africa) forms part of the delictual element of wrongfulness. If proper and 
sufficient consent has not been given the court will find a defendant liable based on a breach 
of his duty (only with regard to the element of wrongfulness) but the other elements in delict 
still have to be satisfied. It should be noted that without the consent of the patient the doctor 
cannot justify his actions. It is also questionable if a doctor will be successful with a defence 
based on the maxim volenti non fit - iniuria translated as ‘to a willing person injury is not 
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done’ - as the defendant-doctor is required to show that the plaintiff had knowledge of the 
risk that the plaintiff appreciated the nature and extent of the risk and, notwithstanding such 
risk, freely and voluntarily assumed the risk.112 
 In England this is not the same as lack of disclosure alone may be a sufficient ground 
to prove a breach of the duty of care. In Chester v Afshar113the English court explicitly 
referred to a need, based on patient’s rights, to bend the rules on causation and thus protect 
patient’s rights and autonomy. The decision of the court was made on policy and/or moral 
grounds. The court’s stance was that every adult individual of sound mind has a right to 
decide what may or may not be done with his body (the right of autonomy) and also has the 
right to make important medical decisions affecting his life. In this regard, the English court 
found that the duty of the doctor114 is sufficiently similar in the practice of medicine to that of 
law but significantly different in its legal application. In England the duty of care of the 
medical professional is imposed by law when a doctor undertakes to diagnose, to advise and 
treat the patient. Since consent to medical treatment is essentially concerned with the right of 
autonomy of the patient to be informed and to be allowed to make a choice of whether to 
accept the risk of the operation or not, encroaching on such a right is sufficient to prove 
liability where a claimant approaches the court alleging lack of disclosure, as seen in Chester 
v Afshar.115 
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 Furthermore, with regard to the element of negligence: determining negligent conduct 
is subjective116 because the court investigates the conduct of the wrongdoer and determine 
whether the defendant could have foreseen the harm and guarded against it. The case of Van 
Wyk v Lewis is discussed throughout the thesis, because it demonstrates the stance taken by 
the South African court on the res ipsa loquitur maxim. The discussion of the Van Wyk case 
also involves the actual practice of medicine. In this case, the surgeon or hospital 
subcontracts the counting of swabs to the theatre personnel and this led to many uncertainties. 
Does this mean a swab that was left behind is still under the indirect control of the surgeon, 
as it is obviously no longer under his direct control? Some commentators were of the view 
that the plaintiff’s case was dismissed because the court was unwilling to hold a surgeon, who 
transfers the task of counting swabs to a competent sister, liable for negligent conduct117 and 
not necessarily because the requirements of the res ipsa loquitur maxim had not been 
satisfied. Several questions were raised about how this impacts on the use of the maxim. 
According to the requirements of the maxim, the medical facts should point to a high 
probability of negligence before the res ipsa loquitur maxim can be relied upon. It follows 
that it seems that a thorough understanding of the medical facts might be a prerequisite before 
the maxim can be applied, which is certainly not the function of the maxim. The purpose of 
the maxim (as factual presumption) is to complete the picture, so to speak, when direct 
evidence is not available. If one cannot complete the picture, surely no presumption can be 
made. The thesis argues that the latter scenario is exactly where the confusion arises for the 
South African plaintiff. The completion of the picture rests with the medical expert to explain 
the expected and internationally accepted standard of care to the court in order that the court 
can measure the standard of care that was delivered. For obvious reasons, this differs 
substantially from the non-medical person’s opinion regarding what is described as a high 
probability of negligence. 
 As explained before, when a plaintiff relies on res ipsa loquitur exclusively, it will 
have the effect that the interpretation of the medical facts is limited to how the plaintiff 
understands those facts. The defendant, in refuting the presumption of fact - the maxim - may 
now present any explanation, not necessarily plausible, causing the court not to be in a 
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position to decide the real issue of causation or negligence (culpa). For example, if the 
defendant offers a plausible explanation, that the operation was terminated due to equipment 
failure, this would justify leaving a swab behind. Such an explanation would clear the 
defendant of not acting in accordance with his duty, but it would not clear the hospital, as 
they should have foreseen such an event and should have taken precautions to prevent the 
equipment failure. But what if the defendant showed diligent care in counting the swabs and 
one was still left behind? Would he still be liable? This thesis argues that, according to the 
South African law of delict, the court will then look at the circumstances in order to complete 
the question of causation and negligence. Was there a reason or justification for missing the 
swab? This will effectively make the use of the maxim inappropriate. The thesis argues that 
the use of the maxim is accepted in England because of its design ie that the defendant can be 
called to answer. On the other hand, the South African plaintiff is misguided in the use of the 
maxim; its application often results in a plaintiff advancing to court on insufficient medical 
evidence leaving the court without a yardstick to determine delictual liability or worse, that 
the plaintiff has not shown a causal link between the action of the defendant and the injury. In 
addition, it places the defendant in a prime position to direct the trial, as the defendant, in 
refuting the maxim, need only offer an explanation that shows that he was not negligent eg 
that an unforeseen allergic reaction caused the harm, and so forth. It does not even have to be 
the most likely cause of the injury as long as it is an explanation that shows absence of 
negligence. The plaintiff would be caught unawares by the unexpected explanation from the 
defendant that cannot be tested against the acceptable standard of care in terms of delictual 
principles elements. It would not assist the court in its truth-finding mission. In fact, the only 
medical evidence before the court would be that offered in defence and the plaintiff’s case 
will fail. 
Apart from the fact that negligence cannot be seen as ‘negligent in some general or 
unspecified manner’,118 when analysing the element of negligence, the aspects of 
foreseeability and prevention are very specific in determining negligence. For example, if the 
patient experiences massive haemorrhaging while the surgeon is dissecting a cancerous 
growth, which leads to the patient being medically too unstable to remain anaesthetised and 
the operation being terminated, such an immediate emergency would justify leaving a swab 
behind and reopening at a later date. Such subjective information in respect of the emergency 
and the conduct of the surgeon during the emergency has to be tested to determine the 
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element of negligence. A defendant facing such a situation will not be judged too critically as 
the surgeon could not have foreseen the sudden emergency or guarded against it, but his 
management of the situation will be tested. The medical reality of circumstantial evidence 
undoubtedly does not support the use of the res ipsa loquitur maxim, and might be applicable 
to all retained-swab cases where more information is needed.  
On the other hand, if it is particularly clear from the incident that the occurrence has 
the appearance of negligence (culpa and liability) it becomes prima facie evidence of 
negligence and the need for the application of the maxim falls away. When approaching such 
a case on a prima facie basis, it means that there is enough evidence for the defendant to 
defend his case and the plaintiff, having obtained medical information from a medical expert, 
can advance to court prepared to prove his case. But relying on the fact that something went 
wrong (in general terms), and then relying on res ipsa loquitur, have the combined effect that 
the answer of the defendant in defending the maxim has to be refuted plus the plaintiff has to 
prove his case. It is a further burden on the plaintiff to overcome. The latter is investigated 
regardless that the thesis finds some discrepancies in the application of the maxim. The 
requirements of the maxim prescribe that besides the fact that the manner in which the 
accident occurred must be unknown,119 there must be a high probability of negligent conduct, 
which can be implied from the facts but if the facts are sufficiently known the maxim has no 
application.120The thesis argues that in a medical case the requirements of the maxim are not 
satisfied, as from a plaintiff’s point of view the plaintiff would rarely know what occurred 
without medical expert evidence only that the outcome was undesired. If the South African 
plaintiff follows the English example, not realizing the different legal principles, it would 
have the effect that the plaintiff be ‘blindly’ going to a court on vague and general grounds of 
negligent conduct. It does not substantiating a case brought in delict and the defendant will 
not be obliged to rebut such a case or if the court allows the maxim, will put a defendant in a 
superior position to defend his case by presenting any non-negligent alternative explanation 
to escape liability. It is trite that, in any case, if direct evidence is not available, negligence 
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may be inferred from the facts, as no court can ever eliminate every conceivable possibility.121 
However, with no other facts before the court to complete the picture, the plaintiff would be 
unprepared. The facts of a case from which an inference is deduced, if it is a reasonable 
deduction, may have the validity of legal proof as opposed to conjecture.122 Such an inference 
must be evident from the facts ie that the harm was occasioned by the defendant’s negligence. 
The thesis states that this is not possible in a medical negligence case as contrary to proper 
judicial reasoning, negligence would be inferred in a too-wide sense and in some general or 
unspecified manner.123 As stated previously, if all the facts are indeed known, the maxim is 
not appropriate and the case should simply be based on prima facie evidence. One of the 
requirements of the maxim is that the cause has to be unknown but, with sufficient other fact-
sensitive information available to infer a legal breach.124 
It seems self-evident that, in more complicated medical negligence cases, despite an 
undesirable event, a general unspecified inference of negligence (liability) cannot be 
supported by a simple factual presumption in the application of the res ipsa loquitur maxim. 
The medical reality will become clear only when the desired medical standard of care has 
been stated to the court by means of accepted medical expert evidence and a detailed analysis 
of the cause and effect of the medical injury. A proper understanding of medical information 
clarifies the elements in delict to determine, with reference to the factual chain of events, 
whether negligent conduct (culpa) can be proved. A real risk exists that the application of the 
maxim to a medical negligence case may create a misperception that sufficient information 
has been presented in order for the court to draw a legal inference of negligence from a mere 
factual presumption, when in fact that is not the case. If such an erroneous belief is answered 
by the defendant with any explanation of negligence not occurring, even unrealistic or 
unrelated to the inference on the facts, the plaintiff will lose the case, with a real risk that the 
defendant’s explanation convinced the court.125 
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3.4 Synopsis of some disputed elements for discussion 
The thesis argues that the res ipsa loquitur maxim (‘the thing speaks for itself’) is not or 
should not be part of the South African law of delict regulating compensation claims for 
medical negligence. The perception that the maxim may assist South African claimants in 
their claims by easing the difficulty of proving that medical professionals acted negligently 
and that this negligence caused their loss is incorrect. The thesis argues, on the contrary, that 
the maxim is harmful to both South African plaintiffs and defendants as it tends to 
oversimplify medical aspects. It thus increases the risk that the court may decide cases based 
on incorrect medical information. The design of the maxim allows claimants to advance a 
case to court without the support of medical expert evidence. This, in turn, allows a defendant 
to rebut such a case with ‘exotic’ explanations that are not plausible, but may nonetheless 
convince a court. 
 Bearing in mind that, the South African court today seeks to enforce patients’ rights - 
such as autonomy, dignity and bodily integrity - by providing for compensation by a 
defendant whose violation of such a right is shown to have worsened the physical and 
psychological condition of the patient. The thesis examines the value of the maxim in such a 
context. The thesis considers the arguments of Van den Heever and Carstens126 that (i) the 
maxim should apply to medical cases because a plaintiff is treated unequally if he is deprived 
of the right to use the maxim; (ii) the maxim will assist a plaintiff who is at a disadvantage 
because he has no medical knowledge of what happened; (iii) the maxim is not prejudicial to 
the defendant as it only calls for an explanation; (iv) if a plaintiff is barred from invoking the 
maxim this should be regarded as unfair discrimination; and (v) the maxim may be broadly 
translated into the right to the highest attainable standard of health with reference to processes 
and outcomes. In contrast, the thesis argues that the maxim is inappropriate for a medical 
case and of no assistance to a South African plaintiff. The thesis advocates for allegations in a 
medical case to be based on medical expert evidence indicating prima facie evidence of 
negligence. In addition, the thesis argues that because of constitutional considerations the 
South African court should be flexible when deciding whether the care that was provided 
infringed on the bodily integrity and dignity of the plaintiff. Such an approach is based on 
substantive restitution and a constitutional approach taking into consideration broader aspects 
like socio-economic conditions, discrimination and fair and just legal principles. This will 
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level the playing fields as it would protect patients’ rights and ensure treatment that is in the 
best interest of the patient.  
The thesis investigates the following issues and draws on selected case studies of a variety of 
medical procedures in the medical and legal context: 
3.4.1 the presumption of fact as opposed to a presumption of law in cases where the res 
ipsa loquitur maxim applies; 
3.4.2 the differences between relative evidence and absolute evidence in a medical 
negligence context and the impact of these differences on the maxim;  
3.4.3 the differences between ordinary facts and medical facts in the context of the 
inference of negligence underlying the application of the maxim; 
3.4.4 when an inference from the facts is sufficient to establish prima facie evidence in 
the context of the maxim and medical negligence cases;  
3.4.5 where the maxim applies, all the delictual elements should be satisfied, even if 
legal deductions are made from the facts by implication;  
3.4.6 the constitutional aspects of patients’ rights; and  
3.4.7 the possible judicial relaxation of the principles of causation. 
 
4 Legal system and concepts 
The thesis consists of three interrelated phases with an underlying theme of protecting 
patients’ rights. The first phase is an examination of the South African substantive and 
procedural law and the underlying principles of the law of delict and the law of evidence in 
medical law, as it governs the application of the res ipsa loquitur maxim in South Africa. The 
focus of the thesis is therefore on the law of delict and the law of evidence relevant to the 
function of the res ipsa loquitur maxim, with a view to deciding whether the maxim will ever 
be appropriate in medical negligence cases and, if so, when it will apply to medical 
negligence cases. The study investigates why the court in Cecelia Goliath v MEC for Health 
Eastern Cape held that ‘the time may well have come … to jettison [the maxim] from our 
legal lexicon’,127 unlike the academic authors Van den Heever and Carstens,128 who favour the 
reintroduction of the maxim in South Africa. A broad overview of the general principles of 
the law of delict is given, viz aspects of wrongfulness, negligence, factual causation, legal 
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causation and damage in general, and in respect of the res ipsa loquitur maxim in medical 
negligence cases. The law of evidence regarding presumptions is discussed as part of the 
function of the res ipsa loquitur maxim. The questions raised are investigated to decide if the 
maxim is consistently applied in accordance with legal principles. The thesis notes the 
flexibility of the court, in accordance with constitutional values, when relaxing causation 
principles in the case of Oppelt v Head: Health, Department of Health Provincial 
Administration: Western Cape.129 
The second phase of the thesis introduces research focusing on the law of tort in 
England and Wales when applying the maxim res ipsa loquitur in medical negligence cases. 
The purpose is to find answers to understand the discourse of South African jurists when 
applying the res ipsa loquitur maxim in South Africa. The decisions of the English court, 
with its historical influence on South African law, are explored to find a possible different 
approach to the use of the maxim, as the maxim is still applied in England. An investigation 
into the application of the maxim is undertaken to determine whether res ipsa loquitur 
furthers the case of a claimant in England, unlike in South Africa. The case of Chester v 
Afshar130 is discussed as it impacted on patient’s rights and placed a lighter burden of proof 
on the claimant because of the judicial relaxation of traditional causation principles. The 
thesis notes how the balance of power shifted in the therapeutic relationship between the 
doctor and the patient in England and Wales and the impact of this on the development of the 
English common law.131 The judiciary in England and Wales is now more willing to challenge 
medical opinion in medical negligence cases. 
With the basic arguments of the thesis in mind, the interconnected third and final 
phase seeks to determine whether conceptual disparity - for instance, a misguided medical 
reality or incorrect understanding of what happened - may be the reason for an incorrect legal 
interpretation of the principles of the res ipsa loquitur maxim in South Africa. The medical 
reality is scrutinised because in South African law it establishes the norm (medical standard) 
against which the defendant-doctor will be compared. The expected medical standard should 
be explained by the medical expert in addition to how the delivered treatment deviated from 
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this standard ie what went wrong. Such a medical chain of events is used to establish legal 
causation and liability. The established medical reality forms the basis from which factual 
causation is derived. Factual causation and legal causation (non-remoteness of damage) 
provide a legal nexus between the medical action or omission and the damage (injury) to the 
plaintiff. South African law differs from English law in their application of the res ipsa 
loquitur maxim. The core difference was in the management of the factual inference of 
negligence (culpa). The English court allows a general inference of negligence (based on lack 
of skill and care in a situation under the defendant’s control which is unexpected in nature) to 
prevent a defendant, who most likely knows what occurred, to avoid responsibility simply by 
not giving evidence.132 In contrast, the South African court held that a defendant cannot be 
found negligent in some general unspecified manner133 and all the facts of the case should be 
considered as a whole in testing all principles in delict.  
 
5 Substantive law versus procedural law 
Throughout the thesis the application of the res ipsa loquitur maxim is set against a 
combination of procedural law and substantive law. The most divergent or conflicting 
arguments are found within substantive law, which sets down the principles of a delictual 
action based on Aquilian liability, ie when ‘the negligent action of a wrongdoer caused 
damage to another’.134 The substantive law states that an action will be actionable only if it is 
recognised in law to be in breach of a legal duty and as such, wrongful. The element of 
wrongfulness is further linked to a legal duty owed by the doctor to the patient not to cause 
harm. The requirements of the element of wrongfulness are developed by the court based on 
the principles of boni mores expectations and on constitutional rights. The added element of 
negligence deals with the conduct of the defendant and whether he acted reasonably, in 
accordance with standards set by the medical profession ie the accepted medical standard. 
The conduct of the defendant will be seen as reasonable if it tests positively against the 
conduct of a medical professional with similar qualifications, placed in similar circumstances. 
The test for negligence is whether the defendant’s conduct is unreasonable and whether it 
falls short of the accepted medical standard ie that of a hypothetical reasonable doctor. Such a 
reasonable doctor is diligently caring for his patient in accordance with the set standards of 
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the profession. He would have foreseen the injury and would have taken preventative steps to 
avoid the injury. In addition, the elements of factual causation and legal causation are tested 
to ascertain whether the wrongful negligent conduct was the direct cause of the injury. 
Against the background of these elements of delictual liability, the function of the maxim res 
ipsa loquitur is investigated. The law of evidence dictates the function of presumptions. The 
primary role of the maxim res ipsa loquitur is that it creates an inference from the facts 
whereby a legal conclusion may sometimes be drawn from the occurrence. The law of 
evidence forms part of substantial and procedural law, but it is described as mostly that part 
of law governing, inter alia, legal inferences and presumptions, the onus of proof, the nature 
and weight of evidence presented in court, and admissible and inadmissible evidence based 
on the evidentiary rules created by the court. The questions raised by the thesis, listed in 
paragraph 3.4 above, regarding the functioning of the res ipsa loquitur maxim, will be tested 
against these relevant legal principles.  
When contrasting some of the principles of delict in the South African legal system to 
those of the law of tort in England, in order to gain a better understanding of the use of the 
maxim, it is acknowledged that the principle of breach of a legal duty in South Africa differs 
from the principle of a breach of a ‘duty of care’ in England. One finds marked similarities 
but also profound differences.135 For example, the element of wrongfulness is not 
differentiated from the element of negligence in the English law of tort, where negligence is 
described as a lack of care additional to a failure to foresee a certain risk and guarding against 
it.136 In contrast, the South African court has defined the elements of delictual liability 
collectively as a wrongful act performed negligently, that causes non-remote damage to 
another. Considering only the element of wrongfulness for the argument, the implication for 
the application of the res ipsa loquitur maxim is that the English court allows for a 
generalised inference of negligence (based on lack of skill and care under specific 
circumstances and as such incorporating the element of wrongfulness) as long as it seems 
‘just and reasonable’. In comparison, the South African court has to apply the test for 
wrongfulness based on the legal duty not to cause harm in addition, to focus on the 
reasonableness of imposing liability and taking into consideration whether it was justified 
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(justified in the sense of whether the defendant obtained the consent of the plaintiff prior to 
his actions). The difference between the systems may not have a practical implication for 
medical negligence cases in general, because of the doctor-patient relationship and based on 
proper legal arguments supported by medical expert evidence, but of extreme importance is 
the fact that, when the maxim is applied in South Africa, it tends to overlook the elements of 
negligence (culpa) and factual causation. As it stands, the inference of fact created by the res 
ipsa loquitur maxim in South African law has its equivalent in England. It is merely a 
measure of circumstantial evidence that creates a rebuttable presumption of fact which, only 
if a prima facie case has been established, may cast an evidential burden on the defendant to 
refute the facts. 
Furthermore, the civil justice system in England (and Wales) has been modified by 
changes in the Civil Procedural Rules (CPR) and contains a more inquisitorial element and 
greater judicial involvement in managing a trial. Although the fundamental framework is still 
largely adversarial in nature,137 the changes may have a considerable effect on the functioning 
of the maxim in England, since the courts are allowed to question the medical experts in its 
truth-finding goal. The legal system in South Africa is strictly adversarial: a plaintiff presents 
a medical negligence case based on substantial medical expert evidence (setting the standard) 
from which factual causation is averred and negligence concluded. The nature of such a 
system means that the parties conceal their cases from each other. The inquisitorial nature of 
the court in the English civil justice system allows for the medical experts of both parties to 
be questioned by the court in search of the medical standard of care and the medical truths 
regarding the occurrence itself.138The benefit of such a modern approach in England is more 
transparency and the approach is open and honest in declaring its resources, intentions, or 
attitude with the intention of narrowing the issues in dispute or settling the action. 
 
6 Methodology, approach and limitations 
The thesis explores the opposing views about the res ipsa loquitur maxim in South Africa. 
The judiciary rejected the application of the maxim in medical cases. However, academic 
authors appeal for the re-institution of the application of the res ipsa loquitur maxim in South 
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Africa in medical cases based on legal arguments and constitutional grounds.139 This prompts 
an investigation into the use and function of the maxim in limited South African cases.140 
These inadequate resources in South Africa directed the thesis to study the used of the maxim 
in England and Wales. Influenced by the South African medical law requirements, the thesis 
focuses on weighing the set medical standard of care against the standard of care supplied by 
the defendant-doctor. This leads to a discussion and interpretation of the medical aspects of 
most of the cases in order to understand the reasoning of the court. The purpose of the thesis 
is not to review the manner in which the English cases were decided rather to be guided 
regarding the use of the maxim in context of internationally accepted medical standards ie the 
medical reality. Seen in this light the actual medical reports of each case would not have 
substantially altered the arguments of the thesis. The English legal system is assessed and the 
use of the maxim investigated amongst other (i) to determine the procedural function of the 
maxim and the circumstances when the court accepts the maxim; and (ii) to learn from 
English experience how the court when applying the maxim interprets notions like negligence 
and causation. Several English cases demonstrate that the fact of the injury allows the 
claimant to ask for an explanation from the defendant (the function of the maxim) particularly 
when a claimant was unexpectedly injured during circumstances under direct control of the 
defendant-doctor. A factual presumption of negligent conduct is then drawn from the fact of 
the injury that compels the defendant-doctor to rebut. If he fails to defend this presumption it 
becomes conclusive evidence of negligence. It creates a rebuttable presumption of negligence 
which is not the case in South African law. It resulted in futher research regarding the manner 
in which the English court addresses elements of negligence and causation when applying the 
maxim. Taking the above into consideration the thesis examines recent English cases like 
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Lillywhite,141Thomas v Curley,142Pearce v United Bristol Healthcare NHS Trust143and 
Montgomery v Lanarkshire.144 The latter cases are also investigated to analyse the approach 
of the English court towards the res ipsa loquitur maxim in modern times as the court now 
required medical expert evidence to accompany a case based on the maxim. The South 
African case Van Wyk v Lewis145 is revisited to compare it with more recent cases like 
Ntsele,146Buthelezi v Ndaba147and Medi-Clinic Limited v Vermeulen148 in order to confirm the 
reasons why res ipsa loquitur should not find application in medical negligence cases.  
With limited cases arising in South Africa and the repeated attempts149 to use the 
maxim in medical negligence cases in South Africa, the thesis examines possible 
inconsistencies, controversies and defects in the application of the maxim. The thesis argues 
that the South African law of delict, as it stands, cannot allow for the res ipsa loquitur 
maxim. If the English system is followed it requires changing the function of the maxim from 
a presumption of fact to a rebuttable presumption of law. Apart from being against delictual 
principles in South Africa, it effectively creates a reverse onus, which may have a 
discriminatory effect with constitutional consequences as it will trespass on the rights of the 
defendant-doctor. The thesis suggests that it would be wiser to improve the medical 
negligence system by importing other measures, such as (i) to consider a broader substantial 
constitutional approach in deciding a case, based on the right to bodily integrity and dignity 
and in so doing, relax the rules of causation if it is rational and just; and ii) reforming South 
African civil procedure by introducing a greater degree of judicial inquisitorial involvement, 
or (iii) using mandatory medical court assessors.150 
The writer selected English cases based on a keyword search of ‘res ipsa loquitur’. 
The writer chose random cases but was guided to use cases with less complicated medical 
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aspects to discern legal patterns from the medical reality.151Statistical information regarding 
the method of selecting English cases is as follows. The writer obtained all data about res 
ipsa loquitur cases from the i-law website. The website yielded 41 cases, which included 
personal injury cases and slip-and-trip cases which were discarded. The number of cases was 
reduced to 29 medical negligence cases, of which 18 were finally used. Ten cases were not 
used because of their intricate medical aspects and disputed facts.152 The writer avoided using 
five cases based on legal arguments about the prescription of time periods, except in chapter 
five153 where the prescription period may have impacted on constitutional rights. Although 
some cases were not particularly relevant to the use of the maxim, they were mentioned to 
show the difference between the English and South African legal systems, for example that 
lack of informed consent is a cause of action in its own right in England and in South Africa 
it falls under the element of wrongfulness and is justification for an otherwise wrongful act. 
Additionally, the writer obtained 82 cases from the Lloyds Report database, of which some 
overlap but 29 cases were cited because it applied the requirements of the maxim. The writer 
referred to 39 cases in less detail and discussed 11 in more detail, based on the res ipsa 
loquitur maxim. Several cases were mentioned and the medical reality discussed in which the 
maxim was not applied in the actual court case. It was done to illustrate the particular 
argument. In general, minimal reference is made to non-medical cases, as the core of the 
thesis lies in the misinterpretation of medical clinical facts by the legal profession and 
judiciary when arriving at a legal conclusion. No reference is made to cases of product 
liability, as this would introduce a different element to the argument. The res ipsa loquitur 
maxim assumes fault whereas strict liability dispenses with it. As an allowance, the case of 
Wagener v Pharmacare is discussed briefly, as the facts of the case are relevant to medical 
negligence rather than product liability. 
As mentioned before, the purpose of the thesis is to understand the medical reality of 
each case. The set medical standard is determined from the medical profession in both South 
African and English cases. The standard delivered by the defendant is then assessed before 
venturing into an analysis of legal principles and reasoning. This is done because the grounds 
for liability in medical negligence context in South African delictual law are established 
against the delictual elements ie wrongfulness, negligence and causation. Although it may 
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seem to be unnecessary from an English point of view to determine causation and negligence 
because of the wider application of concepts like lack of skill and care and the assistance of 
the maxim to extract an answer in rebuttal from the defendant, in South African legal context 
the medical reality is crucial to understanding the application of all the delictual elements. 
Therefore, the particular medical information of each case was considered from the 
summaries of the case but it was investigated in detail against the accepted medical standard 
at the time of the case which was obtained from internationally published medical literature. 
This is done to understand the legal arguments and to determine the manner in which the 
court accepted elements like negligence and causation. Taking the above into consideration a 
possible limitation of the chapter discussing English cases is that detailed medical expert 
reports presented to the courts were not available. The writer relied on legal summaries of the 
cases that included a legal summary of the medical evidence. The writer was assisted by a 
medical expert in determining the true medical reality of each case. Therefore, there is a 
possibility that the medical arguments expressed in each court case may differ from the 
medical reality interpreted by the thesis. All things considered; this did not restrict the legal 
arguments of the thesis, since the principles in medical science are globally recognised. 
Furthermore, considering that the primary goal of the thesis is to learn from English 
experience and not to criticise or review the English cases, the medical reality revealed the 
difference between the legal systems and that the res ipsa loquitur doctrine developed along 
different lines in England (and Wales) than it did in South Africa. The research findings are 
consistent with the current stance of the South African court. Therefore, reliability of the 
results correlates with the reasoning of the South African court regarding the requirements 
and application of the maxim. The validity and cogency of the research is based on the 
supportive medical arguments obtained from a panel of international renowned medical 
experts, so to speak ie medical publications, which highlighted the erroneous legal reasoning 
in cases where the maxim is applied without the proper support of medical expert evidence in 
South African medical law.   
     
7 Significance of the study 
The maxim res ipsa loquitur has been the source of global legal research for centuries and 
several academic works on the subject have been published. This is, however, the first study 
that the author is aware of that has as its aim the analysis of the medical clinical aspects and 




litigation in South Africa. The thesis will contribute to the understanding and appreciation of 
the medical realities on which factual causation and negligence (both culpa and fault) are 
based, and will explain why the application of the maxim res ipsa loquitur is 
incommensurable with medical negligence cases in South African law. The thesis states that, 
a failure to establish the medical standard with the assistance of medical expert evidence 
results in a misinterpretation of medical clinical evidence in general. In accordance with 
delictual principles in South Africa a plaintiff is not assisted with the burden of proof when 
relying on the maxim. This differs from the arguments of Van den Heever and Carstens who 
argue in favour of its use.154 The argument, namely to use the maxim to uphold patients’ 
rights cannot be sustained as a reverse onus on the defendant would be seen as prejudicial and 
lacking fair and just administrative justice principles. It is suggested that the South African 
court should consider a judicial shift to an inquisitorial civil justice approach as regards 
medical law, similar to developments in the United Kingdom where the changes to civil 
litigation principles155 have allowed for greater judicial involvement in managing trials. South 
Africa can learn from English cases like Thomas v Curley156 where the usefulness of the 
maxim was disputed and where the adversarial approach was still evident with distinct 
opposing views and arguments. South Africa has followed in the tracks of the English court 
where the judicial relaxation of the rules on causation was noticeable in Chester v Afshar157 to 
protect the patient’s right to autonomy. But change in the English system does not come 
unhindered: the latter stance of the English court was criticised. It was suggested that the 
decision should be confined to its very specific context, as not only does it cast doubt on the 
proper approach to causation, but it also appears to undermine the hitherto accepted test in 
relation to a breach of duty in cases of informed consent.158 Unlike South Africa, an English 
claimant may bring a case on aspects of a breach of duty based on a lack of advice or 
incorrect diagnosis or inadequate treatment based on insufficient warning of risks or lack of 
skill and care.159  
                                                 
154
Van den Heever & Carstens (n 31) 150. The authors submit that the maxim should be invoked in the context 
of a patient’s right to the highest attainable standard of health, since it is an effective legal mechanism to 
understand whether an attending doctor has discharged his legal duty to the patient. 
155
Civil Procedure Rules and Practice Direction. 
156
Thomas v Curley (n 142), where the usefulness of the res ipsa loquitur maxim was disputed and, in addition, 
the case was argued on the interpretation of the medical facts to clarify factual causation. See the discussion in 
chapter 3 para 9.3. 
157
Chester v Afshar (n 17), discussed in chapter 2 paras 6.3; 9.5. 
158
Ibid, as reported on by Angus Moon. The court was divided in this case as the decision was based on the 
claimant’s subjective evidence; she stated that had she been warned about the complications, she would have 
reacted differently. 
159




8 Overview of the chapters 
Chapter 1  
This chapter was a general overview of the legal principles relevant to the function and 
application of the res ipsa loquitur maxim in South Africa. It touches on opposing legal 
opinions regarding the effectiveness and use of the maxim and also raises questions about the 
mechanism of the maxim. It also initiates an investigation into the possibility of using the 
maxim to assist a patient to court based on patient’s rights, alternatively, an investigation into 
how the interests of patients in the doctor-patient relationship can best be served. It sets out to 
explain the reason for the descriptive title and also explains that medical reality is foremost in 
making inferences from which legal conclusions can be drawn. This chapter lists 
inconsistencies in respect of the application of the res ipsa loquitur maxim in a medical 
negligence context and a possible confusion between a presumption of fact and a legal 
presumption. This leads to the rationale for the thesis and a synopsis of the disputed notions 
under investigation. The background to the thesis gives the reasons for the choice of legal 
system and explains some of the substantive and procedural aspects relevant to the res ipsa 
loquitur maxim. The writer explains the method used to obtain the study material, the writer’s 
approach to the aim of the thesis, and certain limitations. Finally, the proposed significance of 
the thesis is described. 
 
Chapter 2 
The purpose of chapter 2 is to provide an overview of the law of delict applicable to medical 
law, in addition to the different presumptions in the law of evidence that govern the res ipsa 
loquitur maxim. Medical negligence cases and the fundamental legal principles in South 
African law are discussed. The chapter addresses the historical legal influences on the South 
African legal system and the background to the development and status of the res ipsa 
loquitur maxim in South Africa. The chapter discusses all the delictual elements required to 
satisfy a court concerning the liability of a defendant in a medical negligence case. It aims to 
clarify the confusion between factual presumptions and legal presumptions and what 
constitutes prima facie evidence. It illustrates that it would be unwise to use a presumption of 
fact presuming it has qualities of a presumption of law when negligent conduct is 
demonstrated. A summary of the legal principles relevant to medical law is provided as a 




cases are discussed to illustrate how the South African court determines delictual liability by 
evaluating whether the standard of care delivered by the defendant was according to the 
expected medical standard of care. The chapter investigates how patient’s rights, based on 
human dignity and bodily integrity, have influenced recent Constitutional Court decisions. 
 
Chapter 3 
Chapter 3 begins with a summary of the principles of the law of tort in England and a brief 
outline of the difference between the law of tort in England and the law of delict in South 
Africa. It continues with an analysis of the relevant aspects of the application of the res ipsa 
loquitur maxim in the English court. The chapter discusses several cases and the medical 
components of the cases. The medical reality is established from the medical literature which 
sets the acceptable international standard of care for the medical profession. In this context 
the function of the maxim is analysed. The chapter addresses the extended use of the maxim 
in Ratcliffe v Plymouth & Torbay Health Authority.160The chapter ends with a discussion of 
several cases, for example, Lillywhite v University College London Hospital’s NHS 
Trust161and an observation that the change in the application of the maxim has brought about 
more careful and thorough case preparation in English medical cases. The chapter explores 
human rights jurisprudence and the awareness of patient rights in England and Wales and 




Chapter 4 introduces the medical component of the thesis by discussing the medical clinical 
diagnostic process that leads to medical interpretation and medical reasoning which specifies 
the standard of medical service delivery. This chapter creates the legal nexus between the 
medical interpretation of facts, medical cause and effect, and factual causation. The chapter 
demonstrates that medical cause and effect (aetiology and pathogenesis) emphasise different 
aspects to guide the medical professional through the diagnostic process of medicine to arrive 
at a medical conclusion regarding the cause of the injury or disease. The difference between 
medical expert opinion and factual causation from which legal conclusions are drawn is 
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investigated. The chapter discusses risks and complications, the learning curve and the 
medical use of statistics. Several cases are used to demonstrate the difficulty of determining 
the medical reality from which factual causation is determined. The case of Van Wyk v 
Lewis162 is reconstructed and discussed in medical and legal context, and cases like Ntsele163 
and Buthelezi v Ndaba are examined164 to demonstrate the medical standard of care in relation 




This chapter summarises the position of the res ipsa loquitur maxim in South Africa and 
England. It gives an overview of the basic findings and conclusions, as well as the differences 
between the legal systems. The chapter addresses the impact of the state’s lack of resources 
on the element of wrongfulness and how this limits the convictions of the community 
regarding constitutional rights. The legal questions, highlighted in chapter 1 regarding the 
burden of proof and the presumption of fact, as opposed to a presumption of law in cases 
where the res ipsa loquitur maxim applies, are explained. The difference between vague 
words like relative evidence and absolute evidence in medical negligence context is 
explained. The difference between ordinary facts and medical facts, in the context of 
inferring negligence, is demonstrated as it is the design of the res ipsa loquitur maxim. The 
chapter concludes that an occurrence of an adverse kind, in medical negligence cases, does 
not have meaning for the uninformed person without medical expert evidence that describes 
the standard of care that can be expected and whether the defendant-doctor acted within that 
set standard. It is the interpretation and explanation of the medical reality. The chapter closes 
with a discussion of patient’s rights and the right to dignity. It takes a closer look at why the 
medical and legal systems are not serving the best interests of plaintiffs and offers 
suggestions on how to balance conflicting interests. 
 
 
                                                 
162
Van Wyk (n 33), discussed in chapter 2 para 3 and 8. 
163
Ntsele (n 119), discussed in chapter 4 para 8.1. 
164




CHAPTER 2: AN OVERVIEW OF THE LAW OF DELICT RELEVANT TO 




As indicated before, the thesis proposes that the classic res ipsa loquitur maxim is 
insufficient in design and function to be of any use in medical negligence cases, which are 
complex by nature. Some explanation is necessary, at the outset, for addressing in this 
chapter the delictual principles and related jurisprudence in greater detail. It is essential to 
take into account the elements of the law of delict and the purpose of each element as they are 
inherent in the application of the res ipsa loquitur maxim.  
 Therefore, this chapter has five aims. First, it seeks to provide a brief background to 
the law of delict and historic influences on the South African legal system. The jurisprudence 
of South African medical law originates from Roman-Dutch law1 and English law, and is 
based on precedent that expands statutory law2 and, as such, develops the common law. 
Common law changes incrementally and every country develops its own over time. South 
Africa has a ‘rule of law’, which is a fundamental aspect of any constitutional democracy. If 
constitutional values and rights are properly interpreted, protected and applied, the South 
African courts are able to correct previous wrongs and prevent future transgressions.  
 Second, this chapter explains the place of the maxim in the law of delict. The law of 
delict and the law of contract in medical law are categorised under private law. The law of 
evidence regulates the admissibility of certain legal presumptions and inferences and hence 
influences the res ipsa loquitur maxim. The res ipsa loquitur maxim, if applied correctly, 
creates a factual presumption that is not a rule of law but simply an inference from the facts 
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of the case when no direct evidence is available.3 Delictual liability is proved when the 
elements4 of wrongfulness, negligence, causation and resulting damage have been satisfied. 
 Third, the elements of delict are discussed in detail but in a particular order, so as to 
be meaningful in medical negligence cases, as the focus of the thesis is distinctly medical 
law. The function of civil actions is to compensate plaintiffs for their losses based on a breach 
of a legal duty owed to the plaintiff. The legal duty of the medical professional is obvious 
from the doctor–patient relationship and it is an obligation not to cause harm other than what 
is necessary to treat the patient, provided that the patient gave his consent. From a practical 
point of view, the investigation into a possible medical negligence case will start with an 
investigation into the element of wrongfulness. The delictual element of wrongfulness 
(unlawful conduct) is discussed in the context of the legal duty5 owed to the plaintiff. The 
element of fault in the form of negligence (culpa) is then discussed to introduce its test and 
application.6 In most cases of medical negligence, the standard of care that was delivered is 
under scrutiny and the conduct of the medical professional is tested against the reasonable 
conduct expected with reference to the convictions of society and the profession. Medical 
scientific evidence is presented to the court by medical experts as an explanation of how, in 
fact, the damage occurred. A successful delictual claim depends on proving the causal link 
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between a defendant’s action and the harm suffered. Proving all the elements of a delict 
places a heavy burden of proof on an injured plaintiff, as he has to prove that the defendant-
doctor was in breach of this legal duty and thus caused harm to the plaintiff. Most of the 
actions against the medical profession are for compensation based on personal injuries or 
death. The general principle in delict is that the plaintiff should be restored to the same 
position that he would have been in had it not been for the negligent act committed by the 
medical professional. Accordingly, this part of the chapter is concerned with what a plaintiff 
must prove to establish a prima facie case against a defendant. The chapter examines the 
approach of the academic writers, Van den Heever and Carstens7 who advocate the use of the 
maxim in contrast to the decisive ruling of the South African court.  
Fourth, this chapter provides an outline of medical negligence as a separate delict as 
well as a discussion of the res ipsa loquitur maxim and its current status in medical 
negligence law in South Africa. The previous chapter listed several disputed aspects8 of the 
interpretation and use of the res ipsa loquitur maxim that inspired the decision to investigate 
the correct use of the maxim. It is important to note that for the application of the res ipsa 
loquitur maxim to be useful the factual presumption raised by the maxim must satisfy all the 
elements of a delict, even if inferences from the facts are implied.9The thesis investigates all 
the medical principles relevant to a medical negligence case, even if such a case did not rely 
on the maxim because, from a broader point of view, the fact of the injury or the undesired 
outcome of medical treatment can be perceived as a res ipsa loquitur case. The thesis 
statement proposes that the res ipsa loquitur maxim can function only under ordinary 
conditions, where the circumstances of the occurrence are part of the knowledge of the 
general public experiencing everyday life. Hence, from the available facts one can assume 
that negligence (culpable conduct) caused the harm. However, this is not the case for cases 
based on complex medical facts that do not form part of everyday life. Put differently, to raise 
a presumption of fact, which is the design of the maxim, the plaintiff must have sufficient 
understanding and evidence regarding the occurrence and the conduct of the defendant to 
claim that the facts speak of negligence ie res ipsa loquitur. At best, with sufficient evidence 
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available in a medical negligence case an action based on an adverse event may be brought to 
court based on prima facie evidence that a legal duty not to harm was breached (the element 
of wrongfulness) but such an occurrence carries only a possibility that the conduct in question 
failed to comply with the necessary standard of care10 and needs to be tested (the element of 
negligence). In the light of this reasoning this chapter investigates whether the maxim should 
be effectively excluded in medical negligence cases. This chapter aims to illustrate why the 
South African courts do not follow the example of the English courts, which see the maxim 
as a tool that enables a claimant who has no knowledge, or insufficient knowledge, of how 
the accident occurred to rely on the accident itself, thereby preventing a defendant from 
avoiding responsibility by not giving evidence.11 A further objective that emerges later is 
showing that, despite the perceived notion that the maxim is a reliable tool in England the 
English Court of Appeal confirmed that the maxim has no use when there is evidence of how 
and why the result occurred in the presence of disagreeing medical experts.12 
Fifth, this chapter considers whether upholding constitutional and particularly 
patient’s rights may involve a wider application of the res ipsa loquitur maxim or a wider 
application of strict delictual principles13 based on the substantive legal approach presently 
found in South Africa.14 
 
2 Influences on the South African legal system 
Before the time of Justinian, the actio iniuriarum had been a general remedy for any 
wrongful aggression upon the person, dignity or reputation of another.15 Roman16 influence 
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developed the delict of damnuminiuris datum, ie wrongs against the person. The wrongs were 
corrected with specific monetary penalties that benefited the victim. Although the Romans 
were under no general obligation to ensure that others did not experience material loss, they 
were required to ‘act with care’ in circumstances where their actions may cause damage.17 
The nature of the doctor and patient relationship, in medical law, is based on the Lex Aquilia 
and is tested against negligent medical conduct.18 The civil obligations even in Roman times 
were that ‘man must bear the damage he suffers’ (res perit domino).19 From res perit domino 
developed the delictual liability of modern times, namely, that loss to the owner can be 
shifted to the party who caused such loss. The Romans believed that one must take 
reasonable care to avoid acts that one can reasonably foresee will injure one’s neighbour.20 
They defined negligence as a wrongful action contrary to one’s duty of care that caused harm 
to another.21 The duty was always a negative one – to avoid causing injury to others. 
Furthermore, the Romans required that a person must have been guilty of either dolus (wilful 
conduct) or culpa (negligent conduct) to be liable. If the person did not act in accordance 
with the civil obligations expected of a citizen of Rome he would be held responsible in law. 
The responsibility would be to compensate the victim for damages sustained in the form of 
pecuniary loss.22 The term dolus, in Aquilian liability, meant a ‘wilful and conscious 
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wrongdoing’.23 It involved three elements: an intentional act, knowledge that the act will 
cause harm to the plaintiff, and a duty to refrain from committing the act.24 In an Aquilian 
action, culpa, according to Paul in the Digesta,25 is ‘not to foresee what a reasonable man 
would have foreseen’.26 In addition, lack of professional skill, lack of capacity, lack of 
knowledge and general incompetence relative to the standards that were expected of a person 
giving a service were incorporated in the rule imperitia culpae adnumeratur.27 This approach 
accords with the stance in modern times that the ignorance or incompetence of a professional 
person who presents himself as having a certain level of expertise will be regarded as 
negligent conduct.28 
During the seventeenth century, Dutch settlers, who referred to Roman law in Dutch 
legal writings,29 introduced Roman-Dutch law to South Africa. The 1580 Ordonantie op’t 
stuk van de Justitie binnen de steden en ten platte landen van Holland en West Friesland30 
later determined the civil procedural law in South Africa.31 In Roman and Roman-Dutch law, 
where patrimonial damage was caused by an injuria, the remedy available to the plaintiff was 
an action based on the actio iniuriarum for the insult inflicted, as well as an action based on 
the Aquilian action to recover compensation for the patrimonial loss sustained.32 The plaintiff 
must prove that the act complained of caused him damnum, ie patrimonial loss. This should 
not be confused with an action for pain and suffering.33 
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RG McKerron The Law of Delict (1971) 47, referring to Dernburg. 
24
For a further qualification, see the definition by the American author, OW Holmes, in Common Law (1881) 
53. He states that foresight is not enough and intent or the wish for the consequences to take place will qualify 
as a motive for dolus, rendering dolus not relevant to medical negligence cases, as no reasonable medical 
professional would intentionally harm his patient. 
25
Digesta 9 2 31. 
26
Lawson (n 17) 36–43. The author distinguishes whether culpa is subjective or objective in Roman law.  
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The phrase is described in Digesta 50 17 32 and Justinian Inst Just 4 3 7; see also PA Carstens & DL Pearmain 
Foundational Principles of South African Medical Law (2007) 613. According to these authors, ignorance or 
incompetence is regarded as negligence, ie the absence of professional skill and experience that are required and 
regulated by the medical profession.  
28
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a certain skill is expected would be wrongful, and a person is further expected to foresee that lack of skill and 
competence will harm a patient, and as such he will be negligent.  
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Grotius, Johannes Voet, Simon Groenewegen and Johannes van der Linden. De Groot defined the position in 
Roman-Dutch law that mere ignorance, lack of understanding and weakness are equal to guilt, for which the 
physician is liable. Also see Carstens & Pearmain (n 25) 616 on the role of the imperitia rule; a duty of care 
exists if the physician agrees to treat the patient. 
30
H R Hahlo & E Kahn The South African Legal System and its Background (1968) 477. 
31
Schmidt (1982) (n 3) 12.  
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Digesta 9 2 5 1; 47 10 7 1; Voet 47 10 18; 2 13 14. 
33
In Hoffa v S.A. Mutual Fire and General Insurance Co. Ltd. 1965 (2) SA 944 (C) 951–952, Van Winsen J 
expressed the view that, although the Roman-Dutch writers favoured a claim for pain and suffering together 
with patrimonial loss, this does not mean that pain and suffering forms part of an Aquilian action, as it was 




In 1860 the Cape was annexed by the British. Although Roman-Dutch law remained 
in force English procedural law was adopted, which influenced the South African substantive 
law. The developments were largely based on English legislation and, when interpreting legal 
arguments, English precedents were used. As such, Roman-Dutch law acquired a distinct 
British influence.34 Modern delictual law in South Africa has developed its Aquilian character 
to comprise, inter alia, damage that flows from unlawful competition and misrepresentation, 
damage that flows from damage to person and property, and damage indirectly caused to the 
plaintiff’s property or person.35 
 
3 The place of the res ipsa loquitur maxim in the law of delict 
Substantive law, according to Salmond,36 is that part of law that ‘is concerned with the ends 
which the administration of justice seeks; procedural law deals with the means by which 
those ends are to be attained’. Schwikkard and Van der Merwe37 explain that a factual basis is 
necessary to determine the rights, duties and liabilities that exist in terms of substantive law. 
Both substantive law and procedural law define rights and duties. Procedural law is the 
instrument to enforce the substantive law.38 The law of evidence is aligned with the 
procedural law as part of ‘that branch of the law which governs litigation’.39 Private law, and 
more particularly the law of contract and the law of delict, dictates the relationship between 
the medical professional and his patient or between the hospital and the patient.40 As the law 
of evidence is closely affiliated with procedural law, it defines, inter alia, the principles of 
onus of proof, evidence in general and judicial cognisance. It distinguishes between prima 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
fn 40. It follows that, except in the case of an injury involving physical injury to a person or property, the 
plaintiff’s only remedy will ordinarily be the actio iniuriarum. 
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There is a clear departure from English law principles in several aspects of South African law not relevant to 
this study. See R v Pillay 1945 AD 653, regarding privilege in disclosure of information; S v Lwane 1966 2 SA 
433 (A), regarding judges’ rules and Rule Board for Rules of Court, in terms of the Supreme Courts Act 59 of 
1959 (now the Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013), and regulations as published from time to time in Government 
Gazette.  
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PJ Visser & JM Potgieter Law of Damages (1993) 32; JP Neethling, JM Potgieter & PJ Visser The Law of 
Delict (2006) 37: the boni mores or general reasonableness criterion is a juridical yardstick that describes the 
prevailing convictions of the community regarding right and wrong. It ‘enables the court continuously to adapt 
the law to reflect the changing values of the community’: JC van der Walt & JR Midgley Principles of Delict 
(2005) 46; Loubser et al (n 10) 224–233, where the authors refer to pure economic harm. 
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JW Salmond On Jurisprudence (1966) para 128. 
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PJ Schwikkard & SE van der Merwe Principles of Evidence (2002) 2. 
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Ibid, where the authors explain that a factual basis, as seen from the law of contract, is necessary to establish 
the rights and obligations of the parties. The authors refer to S v Thomo 1969 (1) SA 385 (A) 394C–D. 
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Salmond (n 36) para 128, referred to by Schmidt (1982) (n 3) 6. 
40




facie evidence and conclusive evidence with its prerequisites. The res ipsa loquitur maxim is 
a presumption that asks the court to draw an inference from the facts. It is categorised under 
factual presumptions and should be separated from irrebuttable presumptions and rebuttable 
presumptions of law.41 The res ipsa loquitur maxim merely creates a presumption of fact, ie 
an inference that places an evidential burden on the defendant (to refute the presumed fact). It 
is argued that, from an incorrect perception that the res ipsa loquitur maxim functions as a 
rebuttable presumption in law and not only as factual presumption, emerges the approach of 
certain authors that the court was misguided in the application of the maxim in Van Wyk v 
Lewis.42 
There appears to be four interpretations of the maxim: 
(i) the occurrence of the injury automatically denotes negligence, ie there is no chance of any 
defence, similar to the irrebuttable presumption of law: this is incorrect; 
(ii) once the plaintiff shows the fact of the injury, ie an adverse event, the defendant must 
rebut negligence and has the burden of disproving conflicting evidence, failing which the 
court is asked to make a legal presumption ie similar to a reversed onus of proof: this is not 
correct;  
(iii)(a) once the plaintiff shows the fact of the injury, ie an adverse event, the defendant must 
rebut negligence by offering any explanation that negates negligence, but he has no 
obligation to disprove the plaintiff’s case, ie a factual presumption; the court should infer 
from the facts that the occurrence could not have happened without negligence (if this is not 
possible, the category changes to (iv) below): this is the version of the English court;  
(iii)(b) once the plaintiff shows the fact of the injury with other key facts, the defendant must 
rebut negligence by offering any explanation that negates negligence, but he has no 
obligation to disprove the plaintiff’s case, ie a factual presumption; the court should infer 
from the facts that the occurrence could not have happened without negligence and because 
this cannot be done reliably with a medical case the maxim does not apply: this is the version 
of the South African court;  
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See para 5 below. 
42
1924 AD 438. For a discussion of legal presumptions see para 8 below; for a discussion of presumptions in 




(iv) the fact of injury without other key facts raises the possibility of an implication of 
negligence, which requires the plaintiff to lead some evidence to prove his case as the formal 
burden of proof stays with the plaintiff, ie similar to prima facie evidence.  
 It should be noted that the interchangeable use of the phrase res ipsa loquitur with the 
phrase prima facie is the cause of some of the confusion. This thesis argues that the res ipsa 
loquitur maxim in South Africa falls under category (iii)(b) above, as it is only an inference 
drawn from factual evidence based on key facts within the ordinary experience of ordinary 
persons and not applicable to medical cases. 
 
4 Concepts of delictual liability in general 
Neethling et al43 describe a delict as an ‘act of a person that in a wrongful and culpable way 
causes harm to another’. Five essential elements for liability are identified: an act (actus 
reus),44 that is unlawful or wrongful45 (wrongfulness or unlawfulness), that was performed 
negligently (fault,46 in particular culpa), and that was the direct cause47 (the nexus between a 
wrongful act and harm is causation) of harm (damage) to the plaintiff.48 In South Africa,49 the 
elements to prove liability in general and in medical negligence cases are: (1) an act or a 
failure to act; (2) wrongfulness; (3) negligence; (4) causation; and (5) damage. These 
elements are of the same delict (wrongful act). Each element has its separate test and 
prerequisites. The above elements give rise to a delictual action based, for example, on 
medical negligence. For a plaintiff to prove liability against a defendant, all five elements 
must be proved. However, there is no onus upon a defendant to disprove the plaintiff’s case 
until the plaintiff has established prima facie proof that his legal right has been negligently 
infringed.50 A plaintiff’s case will fail if a defendant refutes the prima facie evidence with an 
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Neethling, Potgieter & Visser (2006) (n 35) 3; Van der Walt & Midgley (1997) (n 35) para 2. 
44
Neethling, Potgieter & Visser The Law of Delict (2010) 34, where they distinguish between a commissio (to 
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The element of ‘fault’ is divided into intent and negligence. The latter is relevant for this study. See Neethling, 
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alternative explanation that negates negligence. In medical law, when the plaintiff sustains 
physical damage, it is assumed that the damage is a wrongful act if there is not sufficient 
justification for the injury. A patient should be informed of the planned medical intervention 
and should consent to it. If not, it will be interpreted as a breach of a legal duty not to harm 
and would be prima facie evidence of wrongfulness (an element in delict).51 The action must 
infringe a legally recognised right of the plaintiff52 or constitute the breach of a legal duty 
owed to the plaintiff. In Lillicrap, Wassenaar and Partners v Pilkington Brothers SA (Pty) 
Ltd53the court held that ‘the causing of damage to property or injury to the person’ contains a 
general proposition that most delictual actions arising from damage to property and person 
are prima facie unlawful (wrongful). Any medical intervention with an adverse outcome 
(injury) is prima facie wrongful but it is not in itself proof of negligence (culpa and liability). 
The other elements of the delict, ie negligence, causation and damage, still need to be proved. 
The mere fact that a doctor acted negligently (in a culpable manner) does not mean that his 
conduct caused the harm. Additionally, the mere fact that the doctor caused the harm does not 
mean that the action was performed in a negligent manner.  
Although personal injury and medical negligence function within the realm of 
‘damage to property and person’, one has to take cognisance of the extended use of Aquilian 
liability by the court because it introduced further sub-rules to the elements of a delict. The 
extended use of Aquilian liability was evident from the judgment in Union Government v 
National Bank of South Africa, 54where it was held that ‘in our law Aquilian liability has long 
outgrown its earlier limitation to damages arising from physical damage or personal injury’. 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
directly results from the iniuria. See Country Cloud Trading CC v MEC, Department of Infrastructure 
Development 2014 (2) SA 214 (SCA) para 20ff. Brand JA relied on Santam Insurance Co v Vorster 1973 (4) SA 
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Van der Walt & Midgley (n 35) para 60; see Brand JA in Two Oceans Aquarium Trust v Kantey & Templer 
(Pty) Ltd (n 44)paras 10–11.  
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1985 (1) SA 475 (A) 497B, 498G–499A; see also Fourway Haulage SA (Pty) Ltd v SA National Roads Agency 
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This ‘extended use’ precipitated an academic debate, and a redefining and re-describing of 
the precise meaning of the element of wrongfulness55ensued. For practical purposes in 
medical negligence cases, each of the elements of delictual liability is independent of the 
others; therefore, the sequence of applying the elements, for example, to elevate negligence 
before wrongfulness or the other way round, has no bearing on the outcome. A case of a 
plaintiff will fail if any one of the elements was not proved. The fact that an act is negligent 
does not make it wrongful,56 but also, the fact that an act is wrongful does not make it 
negligent. Nevertheless, it merits a proper understanding of the requirements of the different 
elements in delict. 
 
4.1 Wrongfulness 
As briefly discussed before, the element of wrongfulness is one of the key elements to 
determine delictual liability.57 The notion of wrongfulness is described in medical negligence 
as a breach of a legal duty arising from the doctor and patient relationship. The doctor has a 
professional duty to use his skill, competence and experience to diagnose, treat and care for 
the patient.58 The element of wrongfulness is rarely a difficult concept in medical law but the 
lively academic debate59 regarding the status of the element of wrongfulness in delict, in cases 
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Telematrix (Pty) Ltd t/a Matrix Vehicle Tracking v Advertising Standards Authority SA (n 5). Harms JA 
developed a ‘new’ test for wrongfulness by stating that ‘conduct is wrongful if public policy considerations 
demand that in the circumstances the plaintiff has to be compensated for the loss caused by the negligent act or 
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J Neethling & JM Potgieter ‘Wrongfulness in delict: A response to Brand JA’ 2014 THRHR 116; A Fagan 
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the author refers to J Neethling, JM Potgieter & PJ Visser Law of Delict (2010) 39–40, 117, 141–144; Van der 
Walt & Midgley (2005) 67, 71, 155, 166; NJ van der Merwe & PJJ Olivier Die Onregmatige Daad in die Suid-
Afrikaanse Reg (1989) 51, 73 fn 62, 111 fn 91, 131; PQR Boberg The Law of Delict I – Aquilian Liability 
(1984) 33–34, 268. 
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Safety and Security v Van Duivenboden 2002 (6) SA 431 (SCA) para 12. 
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58
Buls v Tsatsarolakis 1976 (2) SA 891 (T) 893. 
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SA 428 (SCA) para 38ff. On this topic see F du Bois (ed) Wille’s Principles of South African Law (2007) 1187; 
Fagan (n 55) 90; Scott & Visser (n 55); Neethling, Potgieter & Visser (2010) (n 44) 78; J Neethling & JM 




of pure economic loss, should be mentioned for the sake of completeness. However, the 
writer does not intend to enter the debate concerning the priority and sequence of these 
delictual elements. 
 
4.1.1 Wrongfulness in general 
The question of wrongfulness is relevant to the topic of this thesis: if we assume that the 
medical professional or hospital could have prevented the death of a plaintiff, but negligently 
failed to do so due to financial constraints, should they as a matter of public and legal policy 
be held liable for the loss of support that the dependents of the plaintiff suffered because of 
the harm?60 Before one answers such a question one has to understand how the court 
interprets the issue of public policy and wrongfulness. In Minister van Polisie v Ewels,61 
Rumpff CJ authoritatively stated that harm is wrongful and actionable in delict only if the 
legal convictions of the community regard it as such. He defined the legal duty underpinning 
wrongfulness as the convictions of society, ie boni mores, which include a duty not to harm 
another. This new test for wrongfulness, ie the boni mores test, has since been widely 
accepted.62 In Administrateur, Natal v Trust Bank Bpk63the court took a significant step in 
developing the law when it recognised a claim for recovery of damages for pure economic 
loss caused by a negligent misstatement. The law has since changed; now a bank may be 
liable to the true owner of a cheque that was collected negligently.64 The court, subsequently, 
recognised other claims for pure economic loss.65 
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Several phrases describe the nature of the boni mores test, including the ‘legal 
convictions of the community’ and ‘general criteria of reasonableness’. In Administrateur, 
Natal v Trust Bank Bpk, 66Rumpff AJ stated that a legal duty (in the context of wrongfulness) 
should be a device of judicial control over the area of actionable negligence on the grounds of 
policy. The boni mores or general reasonableness criterion is a juridical yardstick that 
describes the prevailing convictions of the community regarding right and wrong. It ‘enables 
the court continuously to adapt the law to reflect the changing values of the community’.67 
Brand JA in Two Oceans Aquarium Trust v Kantey & Templer (Pty) Ltd68assumed that the 
element of negligence should be established prior to determining wrongfulness when he said 
‘negligent conduct giving rise to damages is, however, not actionable per se. It is only 
actionable if the law recognises it as wrongful’. He confirmed that, where a person performs 
a positive act and causes physical damage to the property or person of another, such an act 
would, prima facie, be wrongful.69 From the above it becomes obvious that the element of 
wrongfulness is not easily accepted with reference to liability for negligent omissions and for 
negligent cause of pure economic loss.70 It seems that one cannot ascribe a legal duty to any 
person for purposes of delictual liability; it must be a recognised wrong. In Telematrix (Pty) 
Ltd t/a Matrix Vehicle Tracking v Advertising Standards Authority SA,71Harms AJ clarified 
that, when dealing with the negligent causation of pure economic loss, one should remember 
that the act or omission is not prima facie wrongful, and the breach of a legal duty is 
needed.72 He confirmed that policy considerations must show that the plaintiff should be 
entitled to compensation, unless it is a case of prima facie wrongfulness, such as where the 
loss was due to damage caused to the person or property. It has been shown that negligently 
causing pure economic loss is generally not wrongful, but some exceptions to this rule have 
been created.73 While the material under discussion may be perceived as too arcane, the 
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Two Oceans Aquarium Trust v Kantey & Templer (Pty) Ltd (n 44) para 10. See Minister of Safety and Security 
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relevance lies in the ensuing discussion below of Soobramoney v Minister of Health 
(Kwazulu-Natal).74 The discussion shows how the court departed from the norms applicable 
to the test for wrongfulness. The plaintiff’s claim for the right to medical treatment was 
declined because of a lack of available resources, thus limiting the individual’s right to health 
services. This conflicts with the convictions of the boni mores. The thesis stated earlier that to 
invoke the res ipsa loquitur maxim in a medical case would be problematic because of the 
difficulty of drawing reliable inferences from the mere fact of an adverse medical outcome. 
The elements of negligence and factual causation are vague for a non-medical person. 
Furthermore, taking into account the complexities in determining the element of 
wrongfulness, the thesis further asserts that concluding that an act was wrongful involves the 
weighing of competing norms and interests, more particularly in a country faced with 
transformation where constitutional rights are foremost. The latter is too complex to fall 
within the ambit of the function of the maxim. 
The boni mores test is an objective test regarding what the ‘actual prevailing legal 
convictions’ are and, in South Africa at present, where a court is obliged to enforce 
constitutional rights. The test does not depend on personal views.75 The legal convictions 
should be worthy of legal protection and should be informed by the values and norms of a 
society, as is embodied in the Bill of Rights.76 The plaintiff must persuade the court to regard 
the action of the defendant as wrongful in delict and therefore actionable. The court, in 
determining wrongfulness, takes heed of the established common law and, if no similar cases 
exist, decides whether it would be reasonable to determine that the conduct of the defendant 
was wrongful under the circumstances. In Loureiro and Others v iMvula Quality Protection 
(Pty) Ltd77 the court held that–  
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[t]he wrongfulness enquiry focuses on the conduct and goes to whether the policy and 
legal convictions of the community, constitutionally understood, regard it as 
acceptable. It is based on the duty not to cause harm – indeed to respect rights – and 
questions the reasonableness of imposing liability. 
 
The Constitutional Court, in Le Roux v Dey,78 endorsed the following criteria for 
wrongfulness: (a) a judicial determination of whether, assuming all the other elements of 
delictual liability to be present, it would be reasonable to impose liability on a defendant for 
the damages flowing from a specific conduct; (b) the judicial determination of reasonableness 
would in turn depend on considerations of public and legal policy in accordance with 
constitutional norms. The court clarified that reasonableness, in the context of wrongfulness, 
has nothing to do with reasonableness in the context of negligence (the reasonable conduct of 
a defendant). Reasonableness in the context of wrongfulness is the reasonableness of 
imposing liability on the defendant for the harm resulting from his conduct.79 Conduct is 
wrongful if it infringes a legally recognised right80 or constitutes the breach of a legal duty to 
the plaintiff.81 Since Minister van Polisie v Ewels, 82it was generally accepted that, in delictual 
cases, an omission (failure to take action) might constitute wrongful conduct in circumstances 
where the legal convictions of the community impose a legal duty to prevent harm.83 Prior 
conduct that creates a situation that is harmful to another, which is then not prevented, will be 
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interpreted as an omission to act in accordance with a legal duty.84 It is understandable that 
the court should test the reasonableness of assigning a legal duty to a defendant under 
circumstances where unlawful conduct can cause harm. Fagan and Scott85 have opposite 
viewpoints regarding whether the element of wrongfulness should be determined prior to the 
element of negligence. They also alert us to the discourse of academic writers where it is 
proposed that the reasonableness test for wrongfulness which forms part of the element of 
wrongfulness (the boni mores test) should be executed ex post facto, ie ‘with hindsight’, as 
opposed to the ex ante facto approach of the diligens paterfamilias test, ie ‘with foresight’.86 
Interestingly, one sees that the ‘reasonableness’ concept has found its way to the element of 
non-remoteness of damage (legal causation) as well.87 
Seen in context, the approach followed in medical negligence is that the legal duty 
expected of the medical professional is to act with skill and competence, in accordance with 
accepted standards of care, in the best interests of the patient (boni mores), and not to cause 
harm – other than harm that is justified in terms of information provided to the patient and the 
consent88 furnished by the patient in respect of a particular medical procedure. Usually, the 
element of wrongfulness is determined before the question of fault or negligence, because a 
medical professional should first obtain ‘informed consent’89 from his patient before 
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performing a surgical operation or other medical intervention. If the medical professional 
failed to obtain the necessary consent, an operation would be unjustified and unlawful 
(wrongful),90 except in emergency situations. For obvious reasons, ‘consent to bodily harm’ is 
relevant only to the medical profession, as in the hands of a non-medical person such an 
operation would be criminal in nature.  
In the course of presenting medical evidence in a medical case, the reasonable test for 
wrongfulness may pose difficulties where the accepted standard dictated by the medical 
profession and the boni mores are in harmony, but both conflict with the applicable selection 
criteria of the South African health system and the developed common law. In Soobramoney 
v Minister of Health (Kwazulu-Natal),91 the selection criteria of the health system, because of 
insufficient resources, were legal grounds for judicial discretion92 to interfere with individual 
legal rights, contrary to the expectations of the boni mores. The Constitutional Court was 
faced with a set of facts where the ‘universal’ constitutional right to medical treatment was 
challenged by an under-resourced health care system. The plaintiff suffered from terminal 
ischaemic heart disease and cerebro-vascular disease. His kidneys failed in 1996 and his 
condition was diagnosed as irreversible. In order to overcome chronic renal failure he sought 
regular renal dialysis from the health care system. Because of its limited resources, the health 
care system had adopted a set of guidelines for dialysis treatment. The guidelines stipulate 
that only patients who fulfilled the following conditions will be treated: the condition of the 
prospective patient must be curable within a short period of time, and the patient must be 
eligible for a kidney transplant. It was common cause that the life of the plaintiff could be 
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prolonged but his condition could not be reversed. Furthermore, the plaintiff was not eligible 
for a kidney transplant because of his heart condition.  
The plaintiff based his legal action on s 27(3) (the right ‘not to be refused emergency 
treatment’) and s 11 (‘everyone has the right to life’) of the Constitution.93 The court found 
that the medical condition of the plaintiff did not qualify as an emergency, as an emergency 
was described as a ‘sudden catastrophe’. The medical condition of the plaintiff was classified 
as a chronic condition. The court found that the right to emergency medical treatment was 
independent of and could not be inferred from the right to life and section 27 of the 
Constitution deals with health care rights in the context of available health care services. The 
court found that the criteria used by the hospital to decide ‘who shall live when not everyone 
can’ were reasonable and were fairly applied. The court explained that the plaintiff, Mr 
Soobramoney, had to be given all the benefits that everyone else received and there were 
several others in his situation. The limited resources of the state cannot deal with the full 
burden, and therefore he was declined as a patient. In this context the standards were set in 
accordance with the availability of renal dialysis services and resources, and not the patient’s 
rights. The court cautioned that these executive policies should be challenged, if found to be 
unreasonable. The jurisprudence of the concept of the boni mores of South African society 
was thus judicially adapted. Any future plaintiff who was refused health care services has to 
bear in mind that part of the burden of proving wrongfulness would be the available resources 
of the state. 
 
4.1.2 The element of wrongfulness and informed consent 
As previously discussed, the medical professional has to obtain the consent of the patient 
before performing any medical intervention. The issue of ‘informed consent’ relates only to 
the element of wrongfulness. If the medical professional acted without the full consent of his 
patient, the element of wrongfulness would have been established. However, the other 
elements in delict must still be established for a plaintiff to be successful with his case. The 
issue of ‘informed consent’ as part of the element of wrongfulness in medical law in South 
Africa warrants a discussion as it differs from the use in England (and Wales). The English 
court goes one step further and in some instances allows an action in the form of the tort of 
battery, where a surgeon performs an operation without the consent of the patient even 
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though his intention is to benefit the patient.94 The English court regards non-disclosure of 
information (lack of consent to medical treatment) as one of the aspects of the law of tort ie 
failure to provide adequate warning or advice and inadequate communication. Failure to 
inform is based on the principle of patient autonomy and the right of the patient to decide 
whether he is prepared to accept the risk of an operation. A claimant may be successful in his 
case if he alleges that the defendant failed to disclose material information.95 Informed 
consent, as an aspect of giving advice, includes a warning about or an explanation of the 
material risks and complications of the planned medical intervention. In South Africa, 
informed consent forms part of the element of wrongfulness. The following case is used to 
illustrate the complexity of alleging lack of informed consent in South Africa. The court 
avoided addressing the element of wrongfulness (and informed consent) and ascertained that 
the plaintiff failed to prove the element of negligence; therefore, the court did not have to 
decide on the element of wrongfulness. The case also shows the difficulty of understanding 
the medical reality. 
In a recent South African case, Sibisi NO v Maitin,96 the High Court dismissed the 
plaintiff’s action but granted her leave to appeal. The Supreme Court of Appeal was asked to 
exercise its power to extend the common law. It seems that the reasoning of the English court 
above may have influenced the request of the South African plaintiff to plead her right to 
informed consent as the only remaining basis for her appeal. The South African Supreme 
Court of Appeal was asked to determine a case on the basis that the outcome would have 
been different had the plaintiff been granted her right to self-regulation, ie patient autonomy. 
The plaintiff’s appeal relied principally on her right to have been informed about the risk of a 
vaginal delivery, given the estimated size and actual weight of the baby. In addition, the 
plaintiff’s appeal asked whether, had a reasonable patient been given the information about 
the risk of vaginal delivery in such a case, the plaintiff would have agreed to a vaginal 
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delivery or elected for a caesarean section. This argument is similar to the argument about 
informed consent in the English court above. 
The facts of the case were as follows: Mrs Sibisi, a teacher by profession, sued Dr 
Maitin, an obstetrician and gynaecologist, for damages. The action was based on the alleged 
negligent conduct of the defendant that caused young Yandiswa to develop Erb’s palsy 
(paralysis of the shoulder as a result of injury to the brachial plexus, a network of nerve fibres 
in the shoulder) during birth. The plaintiff had consulted the defendant since the birth of her 
first child in January 2001. That delivery was normal, although the plaintiff had suffered from 
hypertension (high blood pressure) during that pregnancy. The weight of her first baby was 
2.9 kg. Her second pregnancy, in 2005, ended with a miscarriage. The plaintiff became 
pregnant for the third time in 2005. The date for the expected delivery was 7 January 2006. 
On 9 January 2006, the plaintiff consulted with the defendant, who estimated the weight of 
the infant to be 4 kg. The baby was regarded as a large baby by any standard.  
The plaintiff was admitted to hospital at 16h17 the same afternoon, and it was agreed 
that labour would be induced. At 17h55 Prandin Gel (induction medication) was inserted 
vaginally to induce labour. At 22h30 a Pethidine injection was administered. A CTG (a 
cardiotocography which monitors the impact of the maternal contractions on the foetal 
heartbeat) was performed at 02h00 the following day. At 04h00 the further use of Prandin 
Gel was advised by the defendant when the cervix of the plaintiff was found to be dilated 
only 2 cm. At 06h10 the plaintiff was in great pain and an anaesthetist was called to 
administer an epidural at 06h20. At 07h00 moderate decelerations (a slowdown of the 
heartbeat of the foetus) were noted on the CTG. The defendant was notified. He advised them 
to initiate Pitocin (a hormone administered intravenously that stimulates contractions of the 
uterus) at 08h25. At 08h30 the cervix of the plaintiff was 5 cm dilated and Pitocin was not 
administered due to the deceleration of the foetal heart rate at 09h00. At 09h25 the defendant 
ordered a further dose of Pitocin. At 10h00 the midwife administered oxygen to assist the 
distressed baby. At 11h00 the cervix of the plaintiff was 8 cm dilated with no decelerations in 
the foetal heartbeat noted. At 11h30 the midwife noticed blood in the amniotic fluid and at 
12h30 a pelvic examination revealed that the cervix of the plaintiff was fully dilated. It was 
noted that the foetal head was 3/5 above the pelvic rim. The defendant was summoned and 
arrived at hospital at 13h00. At 13h18 the defendant attached a vacuum extractor to the 
baby’s head and performed an episiotomy. The defendant noted that the anterior shoulder of 




maternal sacrum). Finally, the baby was delivered and was bagged with an ambu-bag, as she 
had an Apgar of 4/10 (a measurement of the appearance, pulse, grimace, activity and 
respiration of the infant 5 and 10 minutes after birth). The defendant requested the services of 
a paediatrician, a certain Dr K, who attended the infant. 
The pleadings averred that the defendant failed to monitor the plaintiff adequately 
when she was in labour; failed to perform a clinical examination to estimate the size of the 
baby; failed to perform an ultrasound for that purpose; failed to notice that the baby was large 
and that he should have performed a caesarean section; failed to assist the plaintiff in giving 
birth in a manner that was safe for her and the baby; failed to notice the presence of shoulder 
dystocia which necessitated the performance of a caesarean section; failed to warn her of the 
possible consequences of a vaginal delivery of a large baby; induced labour when it was 
neither safe nor necessary; failed to perform the vacuum extraction procedure properly; and 
failed to prevent injury to the baby by exercising due skill and care.  
The Supreme Court of Appeal dealt with the delictual elements in a preferred 
sequence by addressing the element of negligence before the element of wrongfulness. With 
regard to the element of negligence and therefore foreseeability, the plaintiff stated that the 
defendant should have foreseen the risks of vaginal delivery, given the size of the baby. The 
criterion of informed consent (wrongfulness) was described in more detail at this late stage; 
in the court a quo it had been only referred to as the defendant had failed to warn the plaintiff 
about the risk of proceeding with a vaginal delivery. The further allegations followed in the 
Supreme Court of Appeal, namely, a duty to warn her about the material risks and 
complications that might result from the vaginal delivery, and a duty to inform her about the 
specific alternative procedures that might minimise the risks.  
The Supreme Court of Appeal per Lewis JA noted that the plaintiff did not make an 
allegation about the fact that she had a right to be informed of any risk that was significant or 
that she would have regarded as significant. The defendant argued that the risks referred to, 
assumed to be brachial plexus injury of the infant, were not sufficiently material for him to 
have been under a duty to warn her. In the court a quo, Penzhorn AJ held that there was no 
need to develop the common law in order to recognise a patient’s autonomy and right to 
bodily integrity in making an informed decision as to whether to proceed with one course of 
action rather than another, ie in this instance to be advised of the risks of vaginal and 
caesarean section delivery respectively. The Supreme Court of Appeal avoided addressing the 




Supreme Court of Appeal concluded that there was no reason why the defendant could have 
foreseen that the baby would present with shoulder dystocia. The Supreme Court of Appeal 
found that the reasonable obstetrician would have been in the same position as the defendant 
and would not have foreseen the possibility of shoulder dystocia. The plaintiff did not 
discharge the onus of proof and the court stated that if there is no negligence found, then the 
element of ‘wrongfulness does not even arise’.  
The plaintiff argued that the common law should be extended to recognise that the test 
for whether a patient had given informed consent should be whether the reasonable patient, 
given the information about the risk of vaginal delivery in such a case, would have agreed to 
it or would have chosen a caesarean section. The court should be guided by medical opinion 
as to what a reasonable doctor would have told the patient under these circumstances, but the 
court ‘must, of course, make up its own mind’.97 The ‘reasonable doctor’ test was challenged 
in Sibisi NO v Maitin98 on the basis that the ‘reasonable doctor’ test leaves ‘the determination 
of a legal duty to the judgment of doctors appointed in their own cause’. It was argued that 
the test should be based on the right to self-determination entrenched in the Constitution and 
should be about the ‘reasonable patient’. The ‘reasonable patient’ test was previously 
discussed in Castell v De Greef,99 per Ackermann J, who followed the approach of the High 
Court of Australia in the case of Rogers v Whitaker.100 In Castell v De Greef Ackermann J 
advised that ‘for a patient’s consent to constitute justification that excludes the wrongfulness 
of medical treatment and its consequences’, the doctor is obliged to warn a patient so 
consenting of a material risk inherent in the proposed treatment. The court held that a risk 
would be material if, in the circumstances of the particular case: ‘(a) a reasonable person in 
the patient’s position, if warned of the risk, would be likely to attach significance to it; or (b) 
the medical practitioner is or should reasonably be aware that the particular patient, if warned 
of the risk, would be likely to attach significance to it’. From the above information Lewis 
JA, in Sibisi NO v Maitin101 concluded that the question of informed consent applies to the 
wrongfulness element of the Aquilian action. If the patient did not give consent the conduct 
of the defendant would not be justified and would be wrongful. The court confirmed that 
negligence is also a requirement, and if no negligence is proved, the test for wrongfulness 
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does not even arise.102 The court thereby followed the decision in Le Roux v Dey103 that, since 
the plaintiff failed to prove that the defendant was negligent, the court did not find it 
necessary to determine which test should be adopted in relation to informed consent (as part 
of the element of wrongfulness). 
To return to Sibisi NO v Maitin104in context of the thesis, the medical information 
should have described the medical reality from which factual causation is derived. In a case 
relying on the res ipsa loquitur maxim, the following discussion of the medical facts would 
have been overlooked. For example, Zamorski et al105 explain that macrosomia (large baby) is 
difficult to predict, but it is associated with an increased risk of trauma to the baby or the 
birth canal of the mother and the need for a caesarean section. The risk of an unnecessary 
elective caesarean section should be weighed against the serious risk of the delivery of a 
macrosomic (large) infant with shoulder dystocia and subsequent brachial plexus injury or 
asphyxia (lack of oxygen) and subsequent brain damage. When considering the patient’s 
obstetric history, the lack of progress during labour, the inadequacy of foetus–pelvic 
disproportion (the foetal head was 3/5 above the pelvic rim) and the distress of the baby, it 
would have been unwise for the defendant to proceed with inducing an already slow process 
and then persist with a vacuum extraction in the presence of a large infant. The plaintiff 
should have been advised that the vaginal delivery is attempted as a first option and, should 
the labour not progress as expected, the trial labour has failed and the caesarean section 
delivery is indicated.  
Medical literature indicates that the plaintiff had several risk factors that should have 
alerted the defendant to possible complications during labour. It was the plaintiff’s third 
pregnancy and she had previously had a normal delivery, which should signify an expected 
normal labour without any delay. The defendant is not faulted for his decision to attempt a 
trial labour period. However, he is faulted for not abandoning the trial labour period when it 
was evident that labour did not proceed as expected. The plaintiff was in labour for 19 hours, 
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despite being artificially induced. The defendant acknowledged that he knew that African 
women tend to have narrow and small pelvises. He should have been aware that the baby 
revealed foetal distress symptoms, although the symptoms were alleviated when oxygen was 
administered. The most important sign of an imminent complication was the fact that the 
head of the foetus remained high in the pelvic rim at a time when the cervix was fully dilated. 
The foetus–pelvic disproportion106 was evident as soon as the foetal head was 3/5 above the 
pelvic rim. This was the last reasonable chance for performing a caesarean section. Despite 
the disproportionate foetus–pelvic ratio, where the head of the foetus did not advance 
naturally into the pelvic rim (a clear indication that the trial labour is failing), the defendant 
still did not consider an alternative course of action, ie a caesarean section. He persisted with 
a vacuum extraction, deliberately forcing the head of the foetus through the narrow pelvic rim 
and through the birth canal. By doing so, he lost the window of opportunity to prevent injury 
to the baby by means of a caesarean section. The defendant created one of the most 
frightening emergencies in the delivery room, ie shoulder dystocia, by artificially forcing the 
baby through the canal when all the facts pointed to the contrary action. The result– 
struggling to release the shoulder –was indeed an emergency. However, the emergency was 
as a direct consequence of the defendant’s actions during the vacuum extraction. The 
defendant used excessive force to get the head into the pelvic rim and thereby damaged the 
brachial plexus and caused the shoulder injury. This is a known complication from pulling 
down on the head of the infant.107 
As discussed previously, it is widely accepted that any harm caused intentionally or 
negligently is not necessarily actionable, since it must be wrongful as well.108It is not 
necessary to plead ‘unlawfulness’ or that an action was wrongful, but the facts pleaded 
should be a clear indication of wrongfulness.109 The fact that an action is negligent does not 
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make it wrongful per se.110 Negligent conduct may result in damage (harm), however, it is not 
actionable if it is not recognised by law as wrongful conduct (unlawful 
conduct).111Considering the importance of constitutional rights in South Africa, one would 
expect that the principle of respect for patient autonomy and patient’s rights would be 
primary in medical cases. Every human being has the right to determine what may be done to 
him, and his bodily, mental and physical integrity should be protected, as enshrined in the 
South African Constitution. From the detailed discussion of the above case it is clear that had 
the mother been informed about the risks and complications she would have opted for a 
caesarean section as preferred form of delivery. The defence of the medical professional that 
the patient gave his consent is derived from the Roman law principle volenti non fit 
iniuria112as justification for his action, but the consent must relate to the procedure that the 
doctor performs. It should be performed with reasonable care and skill113 and should not 
exceed the consent given by the patient. Consent to the operation should also include consent 
to the risk of the operation or injury.114 The duty to disclose information to the patient is 
widely established.115 The consent from the patient should be voluntarily given, without 
undue influence and should display knowledge and understanding, ie informed consent.116 
The legal duty to disclose the necessary information rests with the medical professional, 
along with the legal duty not to cause harm.  
 
4.2 Negligence 
The thesis argues that a proper understanding of the element of negligence is disregarded in a 
case relying on the res ipsa loquitur maxim in medical negligence cases in the South African 
context. To demonstrate such a statement, the thesis intends to discuss the element of 
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negligence in greater detail. As mentioned before, iniuria117 implies the presence of either 
dolus or culpa; it refers to fault. The objective is to determine whether the defendant wilfully 
or carelessly caused the injury of the plaintiff and whether blame can be imputed to him if he 
failed to act according to the test of a reasonable person.118Culpa, in the form of negligence, 
means that the loss suffered by the plaintiff must be imputable to the defendant because of the 
conduct of the defendant. The defendant must have intended to unilaterally accept the risk on 
behalf of the patient or failed to prevent it by the exercise of reasonable care.119 The element 
of negligence does not function in isolation and is one of the elements in delict that should be 
satisfied before liability can be ascribed to the defendant. A person will not be liable if 
negligence is proved without establishing the element of wrongfulness and the other elements 
of a delict.120 A prerequisite for fault, often overlooked, is accountability. A person must be 
accountable for his actions, of sound mind, and be able to determine between right and 
wrong.121Accountability is important in medical cases because of its relevance to patient’s 
rights and the right to autonomy, privacy and bodily integrity. An infringement of any of 
these rights will be actionable in law as it forms part of all the elements in delict and 
constitutional rights and a medical professional must protect the rights of his patient. 
In 1917, in Farmer v Robinson,122 Innes AJ held that culpa is a failure to ‘exercise 
reasonable foresight’ but not a ‘failure to predict the future’.123 Negligence is the failure to 
exercise that degree of care demanded by the circumstances.124 In Herschel v Mrupe125the 
court decided that a reasonable person is neither an exceptionally ‘gifted, careful or 
developed person; nor is he underdeveloped, nor is he someone who recklessly takes chances 
or who has no prudence’. A reasonable person ‘serves as the legal personification of those 
qualities which the community expects from its members in their daily contact with another’. 
                                                 
117
See para 2 above. 
118
See Roman law, Gaius Book III sections 210–211, concerning the careless or negligent action of the 
wrongdoer. (211) He is understood to have killed unlawfully who killed with malice (dolus) or negligence 
(culpa). There is no other law that considers damage without fault (iniuria). Consequently, he who damages 
without negligence and/or malice in a certain case remains unpunished. Available at 
http://faculty.cua.edu/pennington/law508/roman%20law/ GaiusInstitutesEnglish.htm (accessed 13 September 
2014); see Kruger v Coetzee (n 9) 430E–F for a ‘modern example’ as opposed to Roman law. 
119
McKerron (n 23) 13. 
120
Gouda Boerdery BK v Transnet (n 70) 506H. 
121
Weber v Santam 1983 (1) SA 381 (A); Eskom v Hendriks 2005 (5) SA 503 (SCA); S v Campher1987 (1) SA 
940 (A). 
122
1917 AD 501 at 522. 
123
At the time the English case Donoghue v Stevenson (n 20), Lord Atkin, directed that a duty involuntary 
assumed exists that ‘you must not injure your neighbour’ and that one should use ordinary skill and care to 
prevent harm to another 
124
Cape Town Municipality v Paine (n 108) 207 and 229ff. 
125




The authoritative negligence test, formulated by Holmes AJ in Kruger v Coetzee, 126had been 
constantly applied as the prescribed test, ie that which is expected of a diligens 
paterfamilias127who (a) would have reasonably foreseen the damage; and, if so, (b) would 
have taken reasonable precautions to prevent the harm; and (c) if he failed to do so, would be 
negligent.  
Within the element of negligence, in The Premier of the Western Cape v Loots,128 the 
court was confronted with the fact that the test for negligence seems to have an abstract 
character rather than a concrete or relative one. This case is about an unsuccessful 
sterilisation operation that resulted in a pregnancy. The woman experienced complications 
during the birth process and she was severely disabled. The court took the relative approach 
or a wider approach interpreting ‘pregnancy as a dangerous condition associated with a 
myriad of potential complications’. In doing so, the court linked the negligent conduct of the 
doctor (not performing the sterilisation operation successfully) with the undesired outcome of 
pregnancy and in the end disability during the birth process. It is evident that some of the 
causal principles were relaxed and described as the relative test. The court followed the 
approach in Mukheiber v Raath129 where the relative test was used. The court in the latter case 
indicated that, for the purpose of liability, culpa arises if: (a) a reasonable person in the 
position of the defendant would have foreseen harm of the general kind that actually 
occurred, would have foreseen the general kind of causal sequence by which that harm 
occurred, and would have taken steps to guard against it; and (b) the defendant failed to take 
those steps. In an earlier case, Sea Harvest Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Duncan Dock Cold 
Storage (Pty) Ltd,130 the court recognised that a completely abstract approach would not 
always be appropriate and that the court should be flexible, as ‘in the ultimate analysis the 
true criterion for determining negligence is whether in the particular circumstances the 
conduct complained of falls short of the standard of the reasonable person’.  
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Although the test may sometimes be applied in an abstract mode,131 it is suggested that 
in medical law the test should accord with the relative approach, in order to give substance to 
patients’ rights, ie setting right a perceived injustice to a patient.132This medical standard of 
care required may be abstract in describing the expected ‘reasonable degree of skill and 
care’133if compared to the ‘reasonable person’ in ordinary civil society that has acquired 
certain skills.134 However, the approach in medical law is that the standard is that of a 
reasonable medical professional with the same qualifications as a defendant-doctor placed in 
those particular circumstances. The degree to which a court will test foreseeability will be the 
risk that a reasonable medical professional with the same qualifications in the same 
circumstances would concretely have foreseen and guarded against. A situation may arise 
where a medical professional may encounter a rare medical condition or circumstances while 
operating, and because such a rare risk may not have been foreseen (in the eyes of the 
reasonable medical professional), the defendant-doctor would not be liable.  
The determination of foreseeability may go beyond determining the element of 
negligence and may overlap with the element of legal causation (non-remoteness of damage). 
The nature of the injury that occurred, the remoteness thereof and the kind of risk 
contemplated and guarded against may have common characteristics,135 but, in addition, it has 
to be reasonable136 (in general) to impose liability on a defendant-doctor. To use an example 
where negligence impacts on legal causation, one may turn to the unreported case, 
Rademeyer NO v Minister of Defence. In this case, a young man, suffering from severe 
depression, was misdiagnosed with lymphoma (cancer in the lymph nodes and lymphatic 
system). He was asked to return to hospital to have the diagnosis confirmed by means of a 
biopsy within a week’s time. When he returned after a week for the follow-up consultation 
and biopsy, the doctor was not available. No one attended to him. Apparently severely 
distraught, he overdosed on medication. Later that same day, he was admitted to an 
emergency clinic with serious breathing problems. The clinic transferred him to 1 Military 
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Hospital. During the ensuing 24 hours, the medical condition of the semi-comatose patient 
was insufficiently managed, with insufficient resuscitation attempts and lack of follow-up 
medical treatment. He aspirated (breathing a foreign substance such as vomit into the lungs) 
and died of respiratory collapse. 
The factual causation is found in the medical facts ie that the misdiagnosis of fast-
spreading cancerous growth, not confirmed, served as a death sentence for a severely 
depressed patient. Following up with the patient and confirming the diagnosis of a dreaded 
disease was critical at the time. The overdose on psychiatric medication caused respiratory 
distress. Despite the patient being admitted in time to alleviate the respiratory emergency, 1 
Military Hospital failed to use the window of opportunity to save the patient’s life.  
The claim was against the Minister of Defence for loss of support, since the Minister 
was the employer of the deceased at the time and vicariously liable for the medical 
professionals and personnel at the clinic and at 1 Military Hospital. The lack of proper and 
sufficient care caused and/or contributed to the death. Of significance is the fact that had the 
incident occurred in private practice, the same circumstances would have meant that the tests 
for foreseeability and legal causation (non-remoteness of damage) would have been closely 
related. The first doctor, with his misdiagnosis of lymphoma, should have foreseen that any 
patient would be devastated with an unconfirmed diagnosis of cancer and, further, should 
have foreseen that an untreated, severely depressed patient may become suicidal in the face 
of such a diagnosis. However, the first doctor could not have foreseen that the treatment at 
the hospital would fall short of reasonable expected and proper care. The treatment at the 
hospital that was substandard would have qualified as a novus actus interveniens, ie an 
independent intervening act that breaks the causal link between the cause and the 
consequences.137 To this end, even where a defendant’s conduct does not break the factual 
chain, it can still interrupt legal causation.138A court would ask the following questions: Was 
the harm reasonably foreseeable or did it form part of a reasonably foreseeable harm of a 
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general kind? Is the damage too remote? Such questions constitute a juridical enquiry as the 
foreseeability criterion in the context of legal causation is not the same as that of negligence. 
Foreseeability plays a role in determining both negligence and legal causation; however, the 
role of foreseeability with regard to fault (culpa) on the one hand and imputability of harm on 
the other hand is fundamentally different.139 Legal convictions and policy considerations 
would also play a part in determining wrongfulness and the fairness of imposing liability on 
the defendant.140 The approach of the court is usually based on a flexible approach,141 where 
the court considered reasonableness, fairness and justice.  
Although the standard of care expected is part of the boni mores and the legal 
convictions of the community, it is also dictated by the medical profession. A higher degree 
of care is expected in certain fields of expertise.142 Lack of skill is seen as fault143 and a doctor 
will be found negligent if he performs an operation knowing full well that he is not 
sufficiently qualified, skilled or experienced to perform such an operation.144 In Mitchell v 
Dixon145 it was held that a professional is expected to employ reasonable skill and care. In 
‘deciding what is reasonable the court will have regard to the general level of skill and 
diligence possessed and exercised at the time by the members of the branch of the profession 
to which the practitioner belongs’. The standard is not the highest possible degree of 
professional skill, but reasonable skill and care.146 
Regarding conditions when precautionary action is significant, the court in Herschel v 
Mrupe147 held that ‘circumstances may be such that the risk of possible harm may be slight 
and the lack of seriousness may result in a situation where no precautionary action is taken, 
and then there can be no question of negligence’. In this regard, it is widely argued148 that 
preventative action is indicated when there is a high likelihood of serious harm, the 
magnitude of which outweighs the cost of prevention and utility of conduct. If a medical 
professional performs an unnecessary delicate operation with a high risk of harm, he would 
be seen as exercising a lack of care. The seriousness of the operation, with possible risks and 
complications, should be discussed with the patient to obtain informed consent, as any 
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medical intervention is not without risk (contained in the element of wrongfulness). The 
‘conduct’149 of the professional (whether his action was reasonable) forms part of the element 
of negligence, 150ie whether the defendant had foreseen and prevented the complication. It has 
no bearing on factual causation (the answer to the ‘but for’ question) or whether the 
defendant caused the harm. The failure to foresee and guard against the harm may be the 
cause of the harm in certain circumstances. In summary, the test for negligence has two 
aspects, foreseeability and preventability. Foreseeability is the degree of the risk emerging 
from the conduct and the gravity of the consequences, while preventability addresses the 
action and effectiveness of the conduct and the cost of the burden in preventing the harm.  
In conclusion, when establishing the element of negligence the test is to determine 
whether the defendant could have anticipated the harmful event in order to take steps to 
prevent it, and whether he indeed took reasonable precautionary steps to prevent it. It is a 
subjective test regarding the conduct of that particular defendant-doctor at the time of the 
injury in contrast with the expected standard of care stipulated by the medical profession 
(described as the reasonable medical professional in similar circumstances). This thesis 
argues that if the fact of the injury is the only fact available, negligence (culpa) cannot be 




As seen before, the thesis argues that the application of the res ipsa loquitur maxim is 
insufficient to integrate the complexities of a medical negligence case with regard to the 
elements of wrongfulness (in respect of public policy), negligence and causation. In order to 
determine causation, one must show that a direct link exists between the action of the 
wrongdoer and the occurrence that caused the harm.151 The element of causation consists of 
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factual causation and legal causation.152 Factual causation determines, on the relevant facts, 
whether there is a break in the chain of events that leads to the damage. Legal causation, 
sometimes described as ‘non-remoteness of damage’, determines which of the sequelae 
suffered by the plaintiff can reasonably be imputed to the defendant. The thesis argues that 
the medical reality is fact-sensitive; it explains the difference between the expected standard 
of care and the standard of care delivered by the defendant-doctor from which factual 
causation is established. 
An accepted method by which factual causation is established is the conditio sine qua 
non test,153 or the ‘but-for’ test (cause-in-fact). In Minister of Police v Skosana154a negligent 
delay in medical treatment caused the death of a man. The deceased was injured in a motor 
accident while under the influence of alcohol, and the investigation into a charge of drunken 
driving took preference over the seriousness of the man’s injuries. The court asked the 
following question: had it not been for the defendant’s action (but-for), would the plaintiff 
still have suffered the damage?155 The court analysed whether the negligent omission in 
question (the delay in treatment) caused or materially contributed to the harm suffered by the 
deceased. The court tested whether the negligent omission was linked to the harm, and 
whether it was sufficiently close or directly linked for legal liability to ensue. To be 
recognised as a ‘cause in fact’, it should pass the ‘but-for’ test. The primary cause of death 
was the accident, which caused the perforation of the small bowel and the resulting peritonitis 
(inflammation of the peritoneum typically caused by the rupture of an internal organ). 
However, the delay in treatment was the direct cause that led to the severity of the medical 
condition of the deceased at the time. Had the medical treatment begun about five hours 
earlier (the expected standard of care), the deceased would have undergone surgery and 
would have survived. The original cause (the motor vehicle accident) resulted in a treatable 
injury, but the failure to treat the injury (insufficient care) on the part of the defendant caused 
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the death (damage). The plaintiff bore the onus to prove that proper care would have resulted 
in a better outcome; put differently, if proper care had been exercised, the deceased would 
have survived.156 The medical expert evidence was clear indicating that most specialist units 
would have operated immediately. This was sufficient to establish on the balance of 
probability that, had the deceased been taken to the hospital soon after the accident, it was 
highly probable that surgery would have taken place in time, which would have saved his 
life.  
In Minister of Safety and Security v Van Duivenboden,157 the court found that–  
 
a plaintiff is not required to establish the causal link with certainty but only to 
establish that the wrongful conduct was probably a cause of the loss, which calls for a 
sensitive retrospective analysis of what would probably have occurred, based upon the 
evidence and what can be expected to occur in the ordinary course of human affairs 
rather than an exercise in metaphysics.  
 
The plaintiff should show that the defendant’s wrongful conduct was one of the factual 
causes of the harm, not that it was the only or main cause of the harm.158 Ultimately, the court 
must decide whether the harm caused by the wrongful action of the defendant would have 
been avoided if the action were lawful.159 Where there is more than one operative cause of the 
plaintiff’s damage, and both conditions could have been the result of the unlawful conduct, 
the defendant would be liable. If there are conflicting explanations regarding the cause of the 
medical accident, neither of which is certain, the plaintiff has failed to prove his case on a 
balance of probability. The defendant does not have to prove that his explanation is the 
correct or more plausible one. 
 In Lee v Minister of Correctional Services,160 the Constitutional Court followed in the 
footsteps of its English counterpart161 by relaxing the strict but-for test in cases with scientific 
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uncertainty. The plaintiff does not have to prove that he would not have suffered the damage 
but for the breach of a legal duty. He has to prove only a ‘material contribution’ to the 
injuries and he can still recover damages for the whole loss. This was a landmark case and 
deserves discussion, even though it does not deal with medical negligence, given that South 
African law follows a generalising approach to the elements of delictual liability. The case 
also underlines the state’s accountability, responsiveness and the rule of law regarding 
constitutional rights. It confirms the state’s responsibility to prisoners, whose right to 
autonomy has been taken away in terms of their physical welfare, provided that attending to 
their welfare, is attainable, given the available resources.162 Although determining the element 
of causation was difficult in this case (link between insufficient medical service and 
contracting tuberculosis), notwithstanding the fact that all the facts were admitted, the case is 
used to demonstrate the degree of legal reasoning and argument necessary to determine 
causation in a medical case. One cannot simply say ‘the facts speak for itself’ or res ipsa 
loquitur as it is not obvious to which facts one is referring. The High Court ruled in favour of 
the plaintiff, the Supreme Court of Appeal reversed the judgment of the court a quo, and the 
plaintiff took his case to the Constitutional Court. The background to this case is that the 
plaintiff was arrested on certain charges. He was detained in prison for more than four years 
and contracted tuberculosis. It was common cause that tuberculosis management in the prison 
system was ‘virtually non-existent’. The element of causation was disputed and the Supreme 
Court of Appeal found that the plaintiff had failed to prove that, had the prison system been 
more adequate in their management of the disease, he would not have contracted the disease. 
However, the majority in the Constitutional Court found that a more flexible approach was 
warranted and that our law does not require evidentiary proof of the alternative, but merely 
substitution of a notional and hypothetical lawful, non-negligent alternative.163 If a causal link 
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is found, the next enquiry is about legal liability. The Constitutional Court confirmed that the 
function of the authorities is to execute its duties in accordance with the Constitution, with an 
emphasis on human dignity and adequate health care services. The court stated that there is a 
duty on the court to be vigilant and not hesitate to ensure that the common law is developed 
to reflect the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights.164  The court held that the spirit, 
purport and objects of the Bill of Rights provide additional reasons for finding in favour of 
the applicant and imposing delictual liability.165 This approach indicates that the common law, 
but-for test for causation is an inadequate tool for securing constitutionally tailored justice in 
cases where prisoners have proved exposure to the disease because of negligence on the part 
of prison authorities. The court argued consistent with the approach of the English courts that 
such a stance is justified on simple justice principles, showing that it would be wrong for 
employers to avoid liability for wrongdoing because the causal link is inadequate. The court 
held obiter that the English courts may have adopted this approach despite the absence of a 
constitutional imperative, but in South Africa the imperative is compelling. Thus, a case is 
made for relaxing the over-rigid strictures of but-for factual inferences.166 
 It is worth diverting at this point to mention that taking into consideration the wider 
approach of the South African court regarding causational principles the court might possibly 
in future consider amending the function and use of the res ipsa loquitur maxim based on 
patients’ rights and the perceived imbalance of the doctor-patient relationship. The right to 
equality is an essential component of the transformative Constitution, because ‘the right to 
equality encapsulates the aspiration of eventually achieving a society in which all enjoy equal 
access to resources and amenities of life, and are able to develop their full human 
potential’.167 Substantive equality is understood to mean that there are structural or systemic 
reasons like socio-economic differences, why not all individuals enjoy equal opportunities 
and thus focuses on remedial actions to balance it. It is in this context that patients’ rights and 
the perceived imbalance between a doctor and his patient have to be observed.168It should be 
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observed in accordance with s 9(1) of the Bill of Rights, namely, that everyone has the right 
to the equal protection and benefit of the law, and that measures should be put into place to 
protect and advance persons who are disadvantaged in some sort of way.169It might mean to 
put systems in place and amending the function of the maxim so that it can assist a patient in 
his case, but this is not the argument at present. 
 Legal causation in medical negligence is concerned with the relation between the 
medical incident and the harm. The medical reality (clinical course as to what medically 
happened) has to be understood as the defendant cannot be liable if his conduct did not cause 
the harm. The function of legal causation or non-remoteness of damage is to qualify which 
wrongful act, closely or directly linked to the harm, is the legal cause of the consequences 
suffered by the plaintiff. Legal causation serves to limit liability because the consequences of 
an act or omission might be too general or extensive to be linked to the action. The court 
must ensure that the defendant is not (unjustly) required to recompense the total harm 
suffered by the plaintiff if it is too remote from the damage-causing action. The criterion in 
law to determine remoteness is a flexible test (sometimes referred to as a supple test) where a 
direct link is sought with the assistance of aspects of reasonable foreseeability, intervening 
actions, the presence of a legal policy, and principles of fairness and justice.170 Previously, the 
thesis has shown171 that the determination of foreseeability may go beyond the element of 
negligence and extend into the notion of legal causation. By way of example: a patient goes 
into surgery for the removal of gallstones, develops pancreatitis (unrelated to the first medical 
condition), becomes severely ill, her condition deteriorates and two weeks later she aspirates 
(inhaling vomit), leading to pneumonia and her death. The initial operation is not sufficiently 
linked with the pancreatitis that she later developed; the pancreatitis is another disease and 
the reason for her further stay in hospital and follow-up treatment. The management of the 
pancreatitis and the medical clinical course that followed should be investigated to test for 
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negligent conduct (culpa). If her condition deteriorated because of insufficient treatment the 
link would be established for negligence. A sufficiently close link must exist between the 
wrongful action and the damage to impute liability to the defendant.172 The court must 
determine the causa causans (the nearest cause of the damage) that resulted in the injury.  
 In Mafesa v Parity Versekeringsmaatskappy,173 the plaintiff sustained a fracture of his 
leg and, after being discharged, fell on a smooth surface, breaking the leg again. The court 
found that the causal link was broken between the first occurrence and the second injury and 
that the fall was an intervening cause. To reiterate, the importance of legal causation is to 
limit liability and to determine which harmful conduct should be ascribed to the wrongdoer. 
The wrongdoer cannot be held liable if the damage is too remotely related to the wrongful 
act.174 
 In Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v OK Bazaars175the court took a flexible 
approach to the test for legal causation. In accordance with the flexible test, the notions of 
legal causation are ultimately determined by broad policy considerations as to ‘whether right 
minded people, including judges, would regard the imposition of liability on the defendant 
for the consequences concerned as reasonable and fair’.176 In establishing non-remoteness of 
damage, the court looked at concepts like ‘reasonable foreseeability, directness, the absence 
or presence of a novus actus interveniens (intervening act),177 legal policy, reasonability, 
fairness and justice’.178 To determine whether it is an intervening act, the court investigates if 
the intervening act was independent and unforeseen, or if it contributed to the occurrence of 
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harm after the original harm occurred.179The thesis argues that, in a medical case, it is 
debatable whether any one of the delictual elements as set out above can be inferred from an 
unfavourable event (the mere fact of the injury) that caused harm to a plaintiff. The purpose 
of the res ipsa loquitur maxim is to infer from the facts certain unavailable facts (to complete 
the picture), which on occasion is possible in an ordinary everyday occurrence. In cases 
where a descriptive, facts-sensitive inquiry of how the harm occurred, is principally based on 
medical and scientific evidence and prescribed delictual principles, such an inference would 
rarely be justifiable. 
 
5 Legal presumptions 
On the basis of the investigation into the above delictual elements, it will be evident that the 
application of the res ipsa loquitur maxim to medical cases renders an unsatisfactory result. 
As suggested previously, further analysis may be justified to determine whether a more 
flexible application of the maxim may assist the plaintiff in a complex medical case, based on 
constitutional arguments appealing to the rights of plaintiffs. Before advancing into such an 
investigation it is first necessary to have a closer look at the mechanism of the legal use of 
presumptions in South Africa. Legal presumptions are categorised under the law of evidence. 
The law of evidence governs the proof of facts and forms part of the procedural mechanism 
in law. The weight of evidence180 that will sway the court to find in favour of the plaintiff is 
based on a balance of probability. The plaintiff may lead direct evidence or may rely on any 
legitimate inferences drawn from the proven facts. If the defendant fails to provide evidence 
to rebut that of the plaintiff, and the plaintiff has made out a prima facie case against the 
defendant, the plaintiff may succeed in the action.  
 In R v Oakes181the court distinguished between presumptions with basic facts and 
without basic facts. The latter are conclusions drawn until the contrary is proved. Therefore, 
an inference is a deduction from evidence, which may be equivalent to legal proof. 
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Schwikkard and Van der Merwe182discuss presumptions under irrebuttable presumptions of 
law,183 rebuttable presumptions of law,184 and presumptions of fact.185Factual inferences186 are 
made from evidence based on facts, as no direct evidence is available. However, a factual 
presumption is not a rule of law. An irrebuttable presumption is dictated by substantive law, 
ie praesumptio iuris et de iure187 and it is a legal presumption that is irreversible.188For 
example, there is an irreversible presumption that a child under seven years is doli incapax 
(incapable of forming the intent to commit a crime) and culpae incapax (not accountable for 
his or her actions and omissions). Rebuttable presumptions are ‘[p]resumptions of law [that] 
are arbitrary consequences expressly annexed by law to particular facts’189 and the 
presumption can be disproved by conflicting evidence. A rebuttable presumption, ie 
praesumptio iuris tantum, is a true presumption as legal presumption and leads the court to 
draw certain inferences. This legal presumption can also be described as a conclusion from 
the known facts.190 It is reversible, and if evidence is offered in rebuttal, the inference can no 
longer be made. An example of a rebuttable presumption would be that the father of a child 
born in wedlock is the child’s natural father. 
 The res ipsa loquitur maxim is simply a factual presumption, and may assist a 
plaintiff with the evidentiary burden. Its function is to ask the court to infer from the facts that 
the occurrence could not have happened without negligence.191 It is important to note that, 
from the facts alone, the court should be able to conclude that there was a high probability of 
negligence (culpa and liability). Sufficient key facts should be available to draw a conclusion 
on the facts alone, for example, driving on the wrong side of the road. A factual presumption 
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simply asks the court to draw an inference from the available and sufficient facts. The 
difference between a presumption of law and a presumption of fact is fundamental. In a 
presumption of law (rebuttable presumption), if no evidence is called to rebut the 
presumption of law a judge should allow the presumption to stand. This is different with a 
presumption of fact. There may be a presumption of fact (res ipsa loquitur), but this does not 
compel a judge, in the absence of any evidence supporting the presumption of fact, to be 
satisfied and persuaded by the presumption of fact (res ipsa loquitur) that there was 
negligence.192 Thus, a presiding judge entertains a presumption of fact (res ipsa loquitur) as 
prima facie evidence, which can be persuasive evidence, or even conclusive evidence,193 until 
it is refuted. In principle, the design of the res ipsa loquitur maxim would function only in 
circumstances where all the elements of delictual liability are obvious from the facts (even if 
it is only by drawing an inference), and where no other explanation (from the facts) can be 
made but that the defendant was negligent. In South Africa, the res ipsa loquitur maxim is 
useful, particularly in motor vehicle accident cases.194 The res ipsa loquitur maxim is used to 
‘fill in’ the complete chain of events by means of a factual inference, as happened in 
Administrator, Natal v Stanley Motors Ltd.195However, Thompson AJ decided not to apply 
the res ipsa loquitur maxim because all the evidence was available (one of the requirements 
of the maxim is that all the evidence should not be available). Instead, the judge confirmed 
this of the requirements of the maxim. He indicated that ‘if facts are sufficiently known, the 
question ceases to be one where the facts speak for themselves, and the solution is to be 
found by determining whether, on the facts, as established, negligence is to be inferred or 
not’. In other words, there is no need for the maxim to complete the picture. On the other 
hand, insufficient information regarding factual causation has the effect that there may not 
even be prima facie evidence available from the occurrence, as happened in Groenewald v 
Auto Protection Insurance Co Ltd.196Rumpff AJ pronounced that, in the circumstances of the 
case, the first collision was not a prima facie case of negligence. The mere fact that the first 
collision occurred does not create an inference of negligence on the fact of the accident. The 
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judge indicated that it is neither proper nor logical to infer negligence merely because two 
motor vehicles collided on the national road, and it is most certainly not enough to invoke the 
maxim res ipsa loquitur. It is not self-evident that because two vehicles collided the person in 
control of one of them must have been negligent. He referred to the leading case in this 
regard, Arthur v Bezuidenhout and Mieny,197 where it was held that the res ipsa loquitur 
maxim applies where it is shown that in the collision one vehicle veered to the wrong side of 
the road into the face of oncoming traffic. The court held that the occurrence would then be 
sufficiently described to determine negligence from the very nature of the facts. The 
explanation of the defendant in reply may negate the facts or may bring other information 
before the court. The court stated that the res ipsa loquitur maxim does not transfer the onus 
of proof to the defendant. It simply creates a rebuttable presumption of fact (not of law). In 
South Africa the maxim is not a general presumption of negligence and the facts per se 
should be enough to enable the court to complete the picture and to determine negligence. 
Holmes JA, in Sardi v Standard and General Insurance Co Ltd 198held that the maxim has no 
bearing on the onus of proof. It is invoked where the known facts, relating to negligence, 
consist of the occurrence itself. The important differential fact for a case based on the res ipsa 
loquitur maxim in is that the defendant is required to answer to rebut the inference; he cannot 
simply remain silent. If he remains silent he would be found liable as there is enough 
evidence to conclude negligent conduct from the incident. This is essentially the power of the 
maxim in an ordinary case. However, as shown before, it is not the same in a medical case. If 
the plaintiff relies on the fact of the injury and the defendant remains silent, the court will 
simply state that the plaintiff has not proved his case because all the elements in delict were 
not satisfied. The thesis argues that it is the search for this so-called power that motivates the 
plea to re-introduce the maxim to the medical field. But to use the maxim in a medical case 
will mislead the plaintiff into believing that he has done enough to win his case. Yet, it is not 
rational to base a difficult case, often with an intricate chain of events, on a maxim designed 
for an ordinary cause of harm in an everyday occurrence. In a medical case the accepted 
medical standard of care is unknown to the uninformed person or the unassisted court against 
which the actions of the defendant need to be assessed. Unlike a prima facie case, where a 
plaintiff is aware that he has to support his case with evidence or run the risk of losing the 
case because the court is unable to decide the case on insufficient facts, the maxim causes a 
plaintiff to present an unprepared case. 
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In Macleod v Rens199Erasmus J stated that generally one assumes that a roadworthy 
motor vehicle under the control of a skilful and careful driver will behave in accordance with 
the basic traffic rules to ensure the safety of all road users and that it will not deviate from its 
path into the line of oncoming traffic. The court, referring to the res ipsa loquitur maxim, 
warned against speculation and of finding a defendant negligent in ‘some general or 
unspecified manner’. Of interest is the fact that factual presumptions such as the res ipsa 
loquitur maxim were applied to criminal cases. Indeed, the court confirmed in S v 
Mudoti200that the test for liability is similar in both civil and criminal cases. In a later 
paragraph201 the relevance of the res ipsa loquitur maxim to medical negligence cases is 
discussed. 
 
6 Prima facie evidence 
The previous paragraph dealt with the res ipsa loquitur maxim as a presumption of fact in 
contrast with prima facie evidence. In simple terms, prima facie evidence is a weaker form of 
evidence than conclusive evidence and it falls within the ambit of the law of evidence. 
Evidence can be prima facie evidence or conclusive evidence.202 Also, it is trite that a plaintiff 
will succeed if a prima facie case has been proved against the defendant and the defendant 
failed to show that the injury was caused by something other than the defendant’s negligence. 
The weight of evidence and the nature of evidence fall under the law of evidence.203 If a 
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prima facie204case has been established, it means that there is sufficient evidence that must be 
defended. In Ex parte Minister of Justice: In re R v Jacobson and Levy, 205the court concluded 
that– 
 
if a party on whom lies the burden of proof, goes as far as he reasonably can in 
producing evidence and that evidence ‘calls for an answer’ then, in such case, he has 
produced prima facie proof, and, in the absence of an answer from the other side, it 
becomes conclusive proof. 
 
The court held that prima facie evidence need not be conclusive or irrefutable but may 
become conclusive in the absence of a defence. It should be noted that ‘conclusive’ in this 
context simply means that there is sufficient evidence to allow the court to conclude that 
there was negligence (culpa and liability). It is not ‘conclusive’ in the sense of mathematical 
proof ie leaving no other possibility open; it is conclusive because of the larger weight of the 
plaintiff’s evidence without any counterweight in rebuttal. In the early stages of a prima facie 
case, evidence rebutting the case is not considered; what is considered is whether the 
plaintiff’s case has enough merit to take it to a full trial. An objective of the doctrine of prima 
facie evidence is to prevent litigants from bringing spurious charges that simply waste all the 
other parties’ time.206 Although it is accepted that if the factual information of the occurrence 
is primarily in the knowledge of the defendant, and the plaintiff is unable to furnish evidence, 
then less evidence will suffice to establish a prima facie207case. The latter situation was found 
in Union Government v Sykes,208 where Innes AJ held that, although less evidence will suffice 
in the above circumstances, it will not alter the onus of proof that rests on the plaintiff. The 
plaintiff should present all the evidence available and the defendant then rebuts that by 
completing the factual evidence209 or chain of events. If the defendant fails to answer in 
rebuttal, the plaintiff’s version may be accepted by the court and the plaintiff will be 
successful. If the plaintiff, who carries the burden to present the evidence, does not have 
sufficient evidence to discharge the onus of proof, it would not have been a prima facie case 
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and the plaintiff’s case will fail. Although, the terms prima facie and res ipsa loquitur are 
sometimes used interchangeably and do not have a fixed usage, prima facie evidence should 
not be confused with the maxim res ipsa loquitur. The difference between the two is that 
prima facie is a term meaning there is enough evidence for a case to be answered whereas res 
ipsa loquitur means that, because the facts are so obvious, a party need explain no more. Any 
res ipsa loquitur case should be a prima facie case, yet a prima facie case is not necessarily a 
res ipsa loquitur case. The stronger the facts of the occurrence (factual causation) the more 
they can be supplemented with inferences concerning the defendant’s negligence.210To 
reiterate, if the facts of the occurrence in an ordinary case indicate that negligence is so 
obvious that a party need explain no more, the factual presumption (res ipsa loquitur) 
requires that the defendant should answer to rebut the inference. If he remains silent he will 
lose his case. However, this answer in rebuttal must show an alternative explanation without 
negligence that will be weighed against the probability of the inference. If the court cannot 
weigh the defendant’s rebuttal against the probability of the inference the court will simply 
revert to hearing the case on prima facie principles and the plaintiff will be unprepared. But 
this will only be so if a high probability of negligence was inferred with the maxim. As 
indicated before, if the plaintiff has no evidence but the fact of the injury and the defendant 
remains silent the plaintiff will lose his case based on the fact that he did not discharge his 
onus of proving a case on delictual principles and that he failed to show a proper cause of 
action.  
 A classic example of a true res ipsa loquitur case is when a barrel of flour falls from 
an open door on the upper floor and injures a passer-by. All the elements in delict can be 
inferred from the occurrence and there is a high probability of negligence which becomes 
conclusive if not defended. On the other hand, if the facts of a prima facie case are not 
answered the court will still weigh the evidence of the plaintiff to determine if the plaintiff 
has proved his case or may even rule against the plaintiff if insufficient evidence is presented. 
Prima facie evidence is not necessarily based on a probability but can be based on several 
allegations and further evidence is needed to prove that one scenario is more probable than 
another. With a prima facie case, the plaintiff would be aware that, without supporting 
evidence, his case may be rather weak. If nothing else, he would not have a false sense of 
security, assuming that he has a fail proof case relying only on the fact of the injury, as would 
be the case if he relied on the res ipsa loquitur maxim. 
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7 Understanding medical negligence 
This paragraph provides an overview of medical negligence as a separate delictual ground 
and the background to the main topic of this thesis ie the res ipsa loquitur maxim. The 
standard of care and the defendant’s failure to meet that standard is usually the core argument 
in an action for medical negligence. The essential question is whether the alleged negligent 
action of the defendant was the direct cause of the damage suffered by the plaintiff. If the 
defendant’s conduct was reasonable, he was not negligent, but, if he acted unreasonably 
under the circumstances, he would be negligent. Medical expert evidence is invariably a 
pivotal part of an action for medical negligence in providing the accepted standard of care. 
The medical expert provides the court with medical facts (evidence) to determine, inter alia, 
whether the defendant failed to keep up to date with changing medical standards, or had taken 
on a task beyond his competence and skill, or took unjustified risks, or took a risk that was 
not justified when weighed against the benefit for the patient, or failed to prevent harm that 
was foreseeable. The basic approach is determining how the defendant ought to have behaved 
under the circumstances (expected standard). Put differently, the approach determines how 
the behaviour of the defendant compares with that of the hypothetical reasonable medical 
professional under the same circumstances.  
The legal duty in delict is derived from the relationship between the doctor and the 
patient.211 The standard of care required from a medical professional is to achieve the general 
level of skill and diligence possessed and exercised, at the time, by the members of the 
branch of the profession to which he belongs.212 The relevant legislation,213 prescribed ethical 
considerations,214 constitutional rights215 and patients’ rights form part of the standard of care 
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expected by the existing boni mores.216 Moreover, the prescribed standard is also determined 
by the medical profession, based on evidence-based medicine principles, scientific clinical 
trials, international and local guidelines, professional guidelines, professional codes of 
conduct, ethical rules217 and so forth.  
As indicated earlier, South African law under the influence of Roman and Roman-
Dutch law regarded omissio (failure to act) as wrongful only when a positive duty to avoid 
harm existed.218 The medical professional is burdened with a legal duty219 to prevent and 
avoid injury to his patient. Liability for failure to act is universal in medical law. Several 
cases220 received the attention of the court based on allegations of a failure by the medical 
professional to perform a task. In Kovalsky v Krige221the patient alleged that the doctor left 
the patient in an unstable condition. In the leading case, Van Wyk v Lewis, 222the surgeon 
failed to remove a swab from the abdomen of the patient. It is perhaps not a true case of 
‘omission’, but it is central to the ensuing discussion of res ipsa loquitur principles. 
The medical professional has a legal duty to his patient both in contract and in 
delict.223 A medical professional undertakes in contract to perform an operation with skill, 
competence and due care and in accordance with prescribed medical standards. A further 
contractual relationship exists between the hospital and the patient, not relevant to the doctor, 
unless the doctor is employed by the hospital. According to the principles of vicarious 
liability,224 the hospital, expressly or tacitly, incurs liability for the negligent conduct of its 
employees.225 The terms of the agreement between the parties is based on their relationship 
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and by implication are, that the doctor undertakes to examine the patient, to arrive at a 
working diagnosis with alternative differential diagnoses, to treat the patient with 
professional skill, competence and fair judgement, or to refer a patient to another professional 
who has more skill and experience.226 Also implied in the agreement between the medical 
professional and the patient is that the medical professional should act in accordance with 
recognised and accepted practices of medicine.227 If a medical professional does not comply 
with the terms and conditions of the express or implied contract, he will be in breach of the 
contract, and liable. The rules governing breach of contract228 are different from the rules of 
delict and have no bearing on the element of negligence.229 They deal with a breach in 
accordance with the terms of the agreement. Breach of a contract, although part of a civil 
wrong against an injured party, is not classified as a delict.230 
In delict, such a legal duty arises because of a professionally assumed duty by the 
medical professional to treat the patient. Such an involuntarily assumed duty is recognised in 
law,231 is independent of the will or conviction of the medical professional, and depends on 
the particular circumstances232 of each case. The same act or omission may be relevant to a 
breach in contract or part of a delictual claim of liability,233 as ‘precisely the same facts are 
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relied upon as constituting a breach of the implied term as are relied upon as constituting a 
breach of the duty of care [legal duty]’ owed to the plaintiff.234 
Van Oosten235 proposes that the relationship of the doctor and the patient is primarily 
that of contract and that the doctor enters into a contractual relationship with his patient to 
provide the necessary skill and care in a competent and professional manner. According to 
Van Oosten, the medical professional assumes a duty to provide reasonable care to the patient 
in relation to all treatment. Consequently, the doctor attracts a duty of care (a legal duty) due 
to his professional knowledge and the reliance of the patient on that knowledge and his skill 
as a doctor. Van Oosten believes that the medical professional should inform236 his patient in 
respect of his skill and competence to perform a certain operation or medical treatment. This 
information will form the basis of the agreement.237 It seems that a plaintiff would be wise to 
entertain the allegations of breach of contract accumulatively to or in the alternative to the 
allegations made in delict.238 
The legal duty of the doctor owed to the patient is illustrated by Strauss239 as a duty of 
the medical professional to act with the required competent skill and care in accordance with 
prescribed medical standards, for the comfort, well-being and safety of the patient. The 
National Health Act240 oversees the relationship between health care providers and health care 
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users and lists the primary obligations of the parties.241 Pienaar242 summarises the relevant 
responsibilities of the medical professional: to diagnose, treat, inform and follow up on the 
patient, in harmony with the best available medical practice principles, or to consult or refer 
to another professional who is more skilled and experienced in that particular field of interest. 
In order to treat the patient, the medical professional must make a working diagnosis with 
differential diagnoses,243 in accordance with acceptable medical principles. In order to make a 
diagnosis, he has to examine the patient by means of clinical observations, a physical 
examination and by recording a proper medical and family history. Further blood tests, 
radiological examinations, ultrasounds, scans or other imaging may be needed to assist the 
medical professional in making a diagnosis. Throughout the process, the medical professional 
should consult with the patient, explain the risks and complications of the proposed medical 
interventions, and thus obtain informed consent. The medical condition of the patient should 
constantly be monitored for change and the previous diagnosis adjusted or reaffirmed.244 
As will become evident later, the issue whether a medical professional was negligent 
(culpa and liability) is resolved via the process of a fact-finding enquiry. The importance of 
this is relevant to demonstrating how inadequate the use of the res ipsa loquitur maxim is in 
relation to medical cases. Before venturing into a discussion of the res ipsa loquitur maxim in 
more detail with regard to medical cases, it is important to emphasise the difficulties with the 
notion of, and process of establishing, negligence in medical cases. Although this analysis 
may seem repetitive, the purpose here is to illustrate that the test for negligence has evolved 
from what a reasonable man would have foreseen and prevented (in everyday life) to what 
the public expects from a reasonable doctor in the practice of medicine (the acceptable 
standard of care). The test measures the behaviour of the doctor against the standard set by 
his peers in an international arena. It stipulates the medical principles for treatment or 
medical processes in a particular field, which is evidenced by current medical expertise and 
international and local medical literature. It is not usually known to the non-medical person. 
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As mentioned previously, all the elements of delict must be established for a plaintiff 
to be successful in a case of medical negligence, as well as in a case relying on the res ipsa 
loquitur maxim. Negligent conduct usually manifests itself in the form of a positive act that 
causes physical damage to the property or person of another and that is prima facie 
wrongful.245 In Stoffberg v Eliot, 246Watermeyer J held the medical position to be the 
following:  
 
Any bodily interference with or restraint of a man’s person which is not justified in 
law, or excused in law, or consented to, is wrong, and for that wrong the person whose 
body has been interfered with has a right to claim such damages as he can prove he 
has suffered owing to that interference. 
 
According to Van Oosten,247 any medical intervention would be wrongful conduct if it were 
performed without justification or without the patient consenting to the harm.248 If a patient 
consents to a medical procedure – for example, to have her uterus removed (hysterectomy) – 
the consent granted would justify the medical professional removing the uterus. However, if 
in the process of removing the uterus the surgeon transects the ureter (the tube between the 
bladder and the kidney), the action becomes wrongful, as it is presumed that in the hands of a 
skilful surgeon the uterus would be removed without further injury other than the injury 
consented to (removal of the uterus). If the surgeon encountered a distortion in the normal 
anatomy of the patient because of previous operations and adhesion formation, in certain 
instances that would be justification for the injury to the ureter.  
A closer look at the previous example will show that, when testing the element of 
negligence, the court will examine whether the adhesion formation should have been foreseen 
and prevented. Bearing in mind that negligence ‘is the failure in given circumstance to 
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exercise that degree of care which the circumstances demand’,249 the defendant would be 
found negligent if he failed to foresee and prevent harm from occurring to his patient.250 
Further to the previous example, if the defendant can show that he had foreseen that an injury 
to the ureter might occur and took reasonable action to prevent it, but despite this 
preventative action, the injury still occurred, the defendant would not be negligent. Van 
Oosten251 confirms that negligence implies that the defendant-doctor failed to foresee and 
guard against risk or harm to the plaintiff-patient and that a reasonable doctor would have 
foreseen that possibility and would have guarded against it by taking steps to prevent it. He 
writes:  
 
Fundamentally the test is an objective one in so far as the hypothetical or fictitious 
‘reasonable man’ sets the standard, but it also comprises a subjective element 
inasmuch as it requires, in addition, that the reasonable man be placed in the same 
position as the defendant or accused found himself at the time. In turn, the reasonable 
man is commonly defined not as the perfect man, but the man of average intelligence, 
knowledge, competence, care, skill and prudence.  
 
The element of negligence is established from comparing the action of the defendant with 
what a reasonable person would have done under the same circumstances.252 The standard of 
care is that which a diligens paterfamilias253 would have exercised in the same circumstances. 
This was the test concerning a reasonable man in the street in everyday life. In Van Wyk v 
Lewis, 254the court pronounced, based on Mitchell v Dixon, 255that a medical practitioner is 
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bound to employ reasonable skill and care with regard to the level of skill and diligence 
possessed and exercised at the time by the members of the branch of the profession to which 
the practitioner belongs. Claassen and Verschoor256 argue that reasonable care257 should mean 
that, should the physician fail to employ a recently developed but widely acknowledged 
method of treatment and his patient is prejudiced by the outdated method used by him, then 
the physician can be held liable for the consequences. In R v Van der Merwe258 the court held 
that, in a skilled profession such as the medical profession, negligence has a special 
application, as the professional practises a profession that requires skill, he holds himself out 
as possessing the necessary skill, and he undertakes to perform the services required with 
reasonable skill and ability. The court said further that– 
 
in deciding what is reasonable regard must be had to the general level of skill and 
diligence possessed and exercised by the members of the branch of the profession to 
which the practitioner belongs. The standard is the reasonable care, skill and diligence 
which are ordinarily exercised in the profession generally.259 
 
In R v Van Schoor,260 Steyn J held that the elevated degree of care and skill expected of a 
doctor is that the reasonable man is ‘now viewed in the light of an expert, and even such 
expert doctor, in the treatment of his patients, would be required to exercise in certain 
circumstances a greater degree of care and caution than in other circumstances’. Thus, the 
reasonable man test has been elevated to that which is expected of a reasonable doctor. 
To determine the appropriate standard of what constitutes ‘reasonable care’, the court 
in Michael v Linksfield Park Clinic (Pty) Ltd261 referred to the English case Bolitho v City 
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&Hackney Health Authority.262The court held that it is not bound by expert opinion if there is 
no logical basis for such opinion. A defendant can be held liable despite professional opinion 
sanctioning the conduct in issue. The court will have the ultimate say and not the professional 
expert. It is generally accepted263 that the standard of care required from the medical 
professional is no longer that of a fictitious reasonable person, but that of a reasonable doctor 
in the same position as the individual doctor. The standard of the medical professional will 
also be tested with reference to the legal convictions of the community and prescribed 
medical standards.264 A defence based on lack of resources would succeed, if a vital 
instrument or equipment, usually available, is not available and the patient sustains avoidable 
harm. It is argued that a lack of resources should not be confused with mismanagement of 
resources or maladministration of available funds.  
Before turning to a detailed discussion of the application of the maxim in medical 
cases, it is important to consider the effect of constitutional rights and substantive 
transformation in South Africa on medical cases. As mentioned before, the right to be treated 
with dignity and respect is a central value underlying the South African Constitution and can 
even be seen as the cornerstone of the Constitution and the rights protected by the 
Constitution.265 When interpreting and applying the various substantive rights the 
Constitutional Court bases its approach on the right to human dignity.266 The court does not 
relate to these rights in an ‘contextual or overtly formalistic manner’, but has adopted a 
substantive approach, taking into consideration the broader social, economic and political 
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context, but always remaining mindful of the structure of society and the cultural assumptions 
deeply embedded in society.267 
This approach of the Constitutional Court is evident in The Premier of the Western 
Cape v Loots268 and in Lee v Minister for Correctional Services.269 In a recent case, Oppelt v 
Head: Health, Department of Health Provincial Administration: Western Cape270a young 
man, while playing rugby, sustained spinal cord injuries that rendered him paralysed from the 
neck down. The plaintiff averred that the defendant had owed him a legal duty to ensure that 
his low velocity spinal cord injury was treated with the greatest possible urgency to prevent 
permanent damage to the spinal cord. The essence of the claim was that the said treatment 
should have occurred within four hours; because it did not, permanent damage resulted. The 
High Court found in favour of the plaintiff, the Supreme Court of Appeal reversed the 
decision of the High Court, and the plaintiff approached the Constitutional Court. The 
plaintiff (now applicant) requested leave to appeal based on constitutional issues as well as an 
arguable point of law of general public importance. The plaintiff averred that his 
constitutional right not to be refused emergency treatment was violated; that the defendant 
acted unreasonably in that he was not transferred to a speciality unit immediately; that the 
finding of the Supreme Court of Appeal ie that he failed to establish a causal link between the 
conduct of the hospital employees and the paralysis of the plaintiff was incorrect; and that the 
latter conclusion regarding factual causation was wrong because of an incorrect approach to 
the evaluation of the evidence of the plaintiff’s medical expert. The majority ruled in favour 
of the plaintiff based on a more flexible approach to factual causation principles. The court 
held that the rule is not inflexible, and ultimately it is a matter of common sense whether the 
facts established a sufficiently close link between the harm and the unreasonable omission. 
The court stated that the defendant’s employees did not give a satisfactory explanation for the 
unreasonable delay in treatment. The court accepted the more relaxed approach because the 
plaintiff was unable to show that, if he had been treated in time, the paralysis would not have 
resulted. 
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This substantive approach by the court may seem strange against the backdrop of 
previous formal and contextual legal reasoning, but it should be viewed as an obligation on 
the state to consider socio-economic aspects in all constitutional rights and a requirement to 
act rational, just and reasonable.271 In doing so, the measures must be balanced and flexible, 
taking into consideration short-, medium- and long-term effects and needs of the community.  
  
8 Res ipsa loquitur in medical negligence cases 
The thesis intends to discuss several medical cases as if the case relied on the maxim because 
of the incorrect belief that a plaintiff usually has no knowledge of what occurred and that the 
fact of the injury may be perceived as a potential res ipsa loquitur case.272 In 1916, in South 
Africa, a plaintiff sustained an x-ray burn to her hand in Coppen v Impey.273It was found, 
without referring to res ipsa loquitur principles, that the plaintiff had the onus of proving that 
the defendant had been unskilful in his application of the x-ray apparatus under his control. 
The court held that the plaintiff had to show that the defendant was the cause of the harm 
suffered by the plaintiff. The court stated that no inference of negligence would be 
entertained without sufficient expert evidence. If such a case was presented today, without 
medical expert evidence, the outcome would have been the same, because uninformed 
individuals would not have knowledge of the underlying physical principles of irradiation on 
human tissue or about the likely harm of the incorrect use of potentially dangerous equipment 
to prove the cause of the injury. Furthermore, it is unlikely that a South African court would 
have accepted the case based only on a lack of informed consent (as part of the element of 
wrongfulness) as the plaintiff undoubtedly consented to the treatment although not to 
treatment in the hands of an unskilled operator. It is the lack of skill that caused the injury. 
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In 1924, in Van Wyk v Lewis, 274South Africa saw the defining moment for the status 
of the res ipsa loquitur maxim. The plaintiff claimed damages from a surgeon who performed 
a cholecystectomy operation (removal of the gall bladder). Several months later a muslin 
swab was excreted. The plaintiff presented her own evidence. She did not make use of a 
medical expert; however, the court commissioned prominent medical experts to assist the 
court in this matter. The court of first instance ruled that a prima facie case was made out 
without having to rely on the res ipsa loquitur maxim.275 Van der Riet J rejected the maxim 
by stating: 
 
[w]hile, therefore, the leaving of a swab may be prima facie evidence of negligence 
on the part of those taking part in the operation I do not think that it could be said that 
this justifies the contention that it is a matter of res ipsa loquitur, that a finding that a 
swab has been left behind indicates negligence on the part of the operating surgeon. I 
am not prepared to state to what extent as a general rule negligence is to be presumed 
for it seems to me that this question depends on the special circumstances of the 
operation, for the degree of care which the surgeon can devote to this detail of 
detecting swabs must largely depend upon the nature of the operation and the 
expedition which had to be used. 276 
 
The defendant did not apply for absolution from the instance at that stage (an allegation that 
the plaintiff failed to prove her case), which implies that he did not dispute that the plaintiff 
may have established a prima facie case. Van der Riet J held that a swab was indeed retained; 
that the defendant adopted the standards system in use at the hospital to count swabs; that the 
defendant made a careful search before sewing up; that the theatre nurse failed to warn him of 
a missing swab; that the nurse is not an agent of the surgeon and he could therefore not be 
held liable for any failure on her part; and that the surgeon was not personally negligent. The 
court found in favour of the defendant.277 The plaintiff appealed to the then Appellate 
Division in Bloemfontein. 
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 On appeal, the matter was heard by Innes CJ, Wessels JA and Kotze JA.278 The 
majority judges, Innes CJ and Wessels JA, concurred that the maxim should not apply to this 
case, whereas the minority judge, Kotze JA, dissented and accepted the maxim. Innes CJ (for 
the majority) held279 that in certain instances the occurrence speaks for itself, ‘where the 
nature of the occurrence is such that the jury or the court would be justified in inferring 
negligence from the mere fact that the accident happened … [i]t is really a question of 
inference’. The judge continued that in cases where the maxim is relevant ‘the occurrence is 
in itself prima facie evidence of negligence’; it does not mean that the onus of proof shifts 
automatically to the defendant. The majority judgment stated that the plaintiff alleged a lack 
of reasonable care and skill and the correctness of that allegation can only be determined in 
the presence of all the facts. The majority judgment advised that ‘there is no absolute test; it 
depends upon the circumstances’. Wessels JA (for the majority) was reluctant to apply the 
maxim and stated that the ‘mere fact that a swab is left in a patient is not conclusive of 
negligence’ and that– 
 
[c]ases may be conceived where it is better for the patient, in case of doubt, to leave 
the swab in rather than to waste time in accurately exploring whether it is there or not, 
as for instance where a nurse has a doubt but the doctor after search can find no swab, 
and it becomes patent that if the patient is not instantly sewn up and removed from the 
operating table he will assuredly die. In such a case there is no advantage to the 
patient to make sure that the swab is not there if during the time expended in 
exploration the patient dies.280 
 
The majority judgment per Wessels JA determined that ‘the maxim res ipsa loquitur has no 
application in cases of this kind. He held that this does not mean that the plaintiff can stop 
when he has brought some evidence from which negligence should be inferred and then 
require the defendant to proceed until the balance has swayed in his favour. The onus of 
proof lies with the plaintiff who has the duty to discharge it, ‘from the beginning of the trial 
to the very end’.281 The minority (Kotze JA), dissenting partially, was of the opinion that 
leaving a swab in the abdomen establishes a case of negligence unless it is rebutted in 
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evidence. In the particular circumstances of this case, after hearing the defendant’s 
explanation in repeal, Kotze JA also concluded that the defendant was not negligent. 
Furthermore, the court stated that swab-counting was not under the control of the surgeon, 
since he delegated it to the theatre sister. The final dictum suggests at least three possible 
interpretations of the res ipsa loquitur maxim: 
(i) the occurrence of the injury automatically denotes negligence ie there is no chance of any 
defence (irrebuttable presumption): this is not accepted as the design of the maxim in South 
Africa;  
(ii) once the plaintiff shows the fact of the injury the defendant may rebut negligence but 
bears the burden of proving an explanation that indicates there was no negligence, or faces 
judgment against him (rebuttable presumption): this is not accepted as the design of the 
maxim in South Africa; 
(iii) the fact of the injury raises an evidential inference on the facts or an even weaker prima 
facie implication of negligence that requires the plaintiff, who carries the formal burden of 
proof, to lead adequate expert evidence to prove his case or run the risk of not discharging the 
burden of proof. In the latter situation the defendant would lead some evidence to sway the 
court in his favour but need not disprove negligence. The analysis of the above case by the 
majority judgment was in accord with this final viewpoint which is the design of the maxim 
in South Africa. 
The rejection of the maxim was reaffirmed in Allot v Patterson and Jackson282 and in 
Pringle v Administrator Natal.283 It was evident that the res ipsa loquitur principles were 
categorically jettisoned and the statement in Van Wyk v Lewis284that ‘this maxim cannot be 
invoked where negligence depends on something not absolute but relative’ later became the 
highlight of the academic debate.285 In Pringle v Administrator Natal, Blum AJ confirmed 
‘that the maxim could only be applied where the negligence depended on absolutes’.286Even if 
this appears to be judicial rhetoric, erroneously based on an extreme interpretation of the res 
ipsa loquitur maxim, and the general approach is that no court would ever apply the maxim 
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in this way, one would find it difficult to apply the maxim to a medical case in any other way. 
This supports the point that the maxim is not appropriate in medical cases in South Africa 
based on principles of legal presumptions and delictual requirements of a wrongful act. 
The facts of the Pringle case were as follows: the plaintiff had a growth in the 
mediastinum (chest) that was in close proximity to the superior vena cava (large blood 
vessel), and underwent a mediastinoscopy.287 During the medical procedure, the superior 
vena cava was perforated and massive bleeding ensued. The surgeons had difficulty repairing 
the perforation and stopping the bleeding and the patient sustained brain damage. The 
plaintiff’s allegations were that the perforation occurred as a result of the surgeon not having 
the required skill and expertise, and in the alternative that the procedure had been the 
incorrect procedure for the plaintiff’s medical condition. Blum AJ, clarified the difference 
between ‘absolute’ and ‘relative’ evidence, opposed to the design of the maxim, by stating 
that had evidence been presented to show that the mere fact of such perforation was 
negligence, the maxim would have applied. The court held that, since the question of 
negligence depended on the surrounding circumstances of the case, it no longer ‘depended on 
absolutes’, thus the maxim was ipso facto excluded. The court maintained that the maxim 
was inapplicable to this case. The court concluded on expert evidence that the surgeon used 
excessive force, which was the cause of the tear in the superior vena cava. It was indicative 
of a lack of the required skill and care. The surgeon was found liable.  
It is argued that the above judgment was correct in rejecting the application of the res 
ipsa loquitur maxim288 for several reasons. First, it appears that expert medical evidence was 
presented. Second, the court relied on circumstantial evidence. For example, if the plaintiff 
had invoked the maxim res ipsa loquitur without medical expert evidence and the defendant 
offered an alternative causal explanation in rebuttal, the court would not be able to weigh and 
test the interpretation of the medical facts of the defence without medical expert evidence on 
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the side of the plaintiff. It would have had the effect that the maxim (without the support of 
medical evidence) resulted in a strong defence from the defendant which stands unopposed 
because of an inadequately prepared plaintiff. The plaintiff would lose the case. In addition, a 
case based on expert medical evidence and substantial allegations would have called for a 
proper and relevant explanation from the defendant to rebut the specific allegations. For the 
defendant to justify the injury he would have to adduce explanations, eg that the anatomy of 
the plaintiff was distorted due to adhesions surrounding the major blood vessel and therefore 
the surgery was complicated, or that, despite exercising exceptional care to dissect the vessel 
it was torn, and so forth. A reasonable doctor would have foreseen that excessive force might 
result in a torn blood vessel with massive haemorrhaging. A reasonable doctor would have 
foreseen that failure to re-establish adequate haemostasis (fluid balance in the body) and 
insufficient resuscitation would result in hypotension (low blood pressure) which would 
result in insufficient blood supply to the brain and ultimate brain damage. A prudent doctor 
would have foreseen such an event and would have guarded against such an injury.  
The maxim res ipsa loquitur has been applied in South Africa in cases other than 
medical negligence, where it establishes a presumption289 of fact. In Klaassen v Benjamin,290 
the maxim was merely seen as ‘a short way of referring to a body of circumstantial evidence 
when considered in relation to the question whether enough has been proved by the party 
bearing the onus to put the other party on his reply’. In other words, the key facts should be 
such, at least, to establish prima facie evidence that needs to be answered by the other party. 
Although it seemed that the maxim was applied in a moderate way, this was not the case. The 
facts of the cases in which the maxim was applied, at the time, were such that they were 
known to the ordinary man. These cases were not as complex and fact-sensitive as are 
medical cases. Nevertheless, the need to standardise the requirements for the res ipsa loquitur 
maxim was addressed in Groenewald v Conradie.291The court listed the following 
requirements for the maxim to apply:  
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(a) the thing (res) must be under the management or control of the defendant and if some 
intervening incident becomes evident then the maxim cannot apply;  
(b) the accident does not ordinarily happen without negligence; and  
(c) there must be no evidence to explain the occurrence, ie an explanation must be absent.  
Rumpff JA stated that many classes of an occurrence exist where the mere occurrence of an 
accident is not sufficient to infer negligence. He referred to Murray,292 where the author 
explained:  
 
If res ipsa loquitur, then the defendant may disprove negligence, either by leading 
evidence, or by closing his case and showing the Court by argument that it ought not 
in fact to infer negligence. If he disproves negligence he may obtain judgment in his 
favour, or the Court may grant absolution from the instance. Indeed, the fact that the 
court may very well, in a given case, refuse absolution at the close of plaintiff’s case 
because res ipsa loquitur, and nevertheless grant it at the close of defendant’s case, 
brings the maxim in its true perspective. 
 
Van den Heever and Carstens293 advocate for the application of the res ipsa loquitur maxim in 
South Africa in medical negligence cases. They summarise the principles of the maxim as 
follows:  
 
(1) the occurrence does not ordinarily happen without negligence;  
(2) the occurrence should carry a high probability of negligence;  
(3) the facts upon which the inference is drawn are derived from the occurrence alone;  
(4) the presence or absence of negligence must depend on an ‘absolute’ and if the court 
had to look at surrounding circumstances for support for the maxim then the maxim 
cannot find application; and 
(5) an inference of negligence is only permissible while the cause remains unknown.294 
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It appears that to rely on the maxim, it must be more probable than not that the defendant was 
negligent ie the fact of the harm (fact of the occurrence) itself may be considered as enough 
evidence that the expected skill or care was not exercised. In such a scenario, the only facts 
available are the facts of the accident itself and the plaintiff is unable to tell how the accident 
happened. The question then arises whether, on the available facts, negligence (culpa 
grounding liability) can be inferred. The circumstances themselves must speak of negligence 
by the defendant without the likelihood of outside interference. If it is possible that other 
persons or occurrences could have interfered with the incident that caused the harm, then the 
maxim cannot apply. Finally, the design of the maxim is to complete the picture with 
inferences from available facts where further facts are not available. Where there is evidence 
as to why or how the harm occurred, it is not appropriate to draw on an inference of 
negligence without proving a specific act or omission. 
 Van den Heever and Carstens appeal for the maxim and its application to be revisited, 
basing their arguments on the misinterpretation of the court in Van Wyk v Lewis295 regarding 
certain aspects. They maintain that the judgment was ‘based on [a] fundamental misdirection 
[of the court]’.296 They express the opinion that failing to notice that a swab is missing and 
leaving it in the abdomen of a plaintiff is ‘absolute’ evidence of negligence and not ‘relative’ 
evidence of negligence. Therefore they endorse the use of maxim res ipsa loquitur in this 
matter. They advocate297 that ‘absolute’ evidence means that the occurrence itself must be of 
such nature that, if ‘the common knowledge or ordinary standard’ were applied, the 
occurrence would not have happened without negligence. It is argued that the authors’ 
statement cannot be seen to suggest that the fact of the injury constitutes proof of negligence, 
suggesting that the design of the maxim should mirror that of a rebuttable presumption, as 
then the authors are confusing legal presumptions with factual presumptions. The remaining 
alternative is that the authors’ statement should be interpreted as a plea for the application of 
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the maxim similar to that of the English court,298 where the maxim allows for a more 
generalised inference of negligence based on lack of skill and care without the restrictions 
stipulated by the South African delictual law. 
 The authors conclude that the judgment should not be regarded as ‘incontrovertible 
authority for the proposition that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur cannot be utilized [in 
medical cases]’ and argue that the court should open the door for the maxim. They aver, inter 
alia, the following: 
(i) the ruling of the court in Van Wyk v Lewis299 created prejudice because a victim of a 
medical accident is precluded from using the maxim, while a victim of a motor vehicle 
accident, in certain instances, may apply the maxim;  
(ii) the application of the maxim will alleviate the burden of proof borne by the plaintiff in a 
medical negligence case; 
(iii) the refusal of the court to allow the application of the maxim in medical negligence 
claims provided unjustifiable protection to the defendant; and  
(iv) constitutional arguments support the maxim with regard to access to courts and 
equality.300 
The view of Van den Heever and Carstens gains no support from the case of Wagener 
v Pharmacare301 where an attempt was made to re-introduce the maxim. The plaintiff 
underwent a local anaesthetic injection with an anaesthetic solution, Regibloc, in the shoulder 
to reduce on going pain. The plaintiff developed severe tissue necrosis and paralysis of the 
right arm. It was argued during the course of the case that the res ipsa loquitur maxim should 
be used in the context of ‘product liability’ in a medical context. The case went to court 
before s 61 of the Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008 came into force, which establishes 
strict liability alongside orthodox fault liability in delict at common law. The alleged 
negligence was based on the negligence of the manufacturer in producing an unsafe product. 
An inability by the plaintiff to produce other evidence of a defect during the manufacturing 
process or a defective product during the use of the product or in using the product led to the 
argument that strict liability should be imposed by the court. The plaintiff based his case on 
the application of the res ipsa loquitur maxim. It should be noted that there is a difference 
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between strict liability and the res ipsa loquitur maxim. The maxim is a mechanism to 
establish fault whereas strict liability dispenses with it. Although the effect may be similar in 
practice, it is conceptually distinct. The element of negligence could not be proved and the 
court dismissed the case. The court refused to apply the res ipsa loquitur maxim.  
Strict product liability in the context of the Consumer Protection Act falls outside the 
scope of the thesis, but Wagener v Pharmacare represents a case that arguably should have 
been based on medical negligence principles and not product liability. For example, why was 
the conduct of the anaesthetist not investigated? In accordance with medical literature, the 
inadvertent vascular injection (ie an injection into the artery or vein) of local anaesthetic 
solutions or corticosteroids can cause avascular necrosis (the dying of bone cells as a result of 
compromised blood supply).302 Alternatively, the intra-articular injection (into the joint) of a 
large dose of corticosteroid together with local anaesthetic solutions with epinephrine can 
cause rapid damage to the cartilage in the shoulder joint, which would result in paralysis 
(chondrolysis) of the shoulder. Strangely, these allegations were not investigated. This 
medical information obtained from the literature accords with the most likely cause of the 
injury and should have been presented as medical evidence from which factual causation 
emanates. The cause of the harm may have been an inadvertent injection into the wrong 
location ie the shoulder joint. The element of negligence (culpa) would then have been 
argued on the basis that the anaesthetist’s lack of skill caused the injury. The doctor ought to 
have known and foreseen that such an injection into the wrong area would cause harm and he 
should have taken precautions to prevent it. He should have been aware of the risks of 
injecting the solution into the joint or vascular structures and should have taken preventative 
steps to avoid doing so. The court was correct in finding that the maxim cannot apply, as the 
plaintiff brought his case against the manufacturer and not the anaesthetist. The plaintiff 
relied only on the maxim and failed to present any evidence of fault on the part of the 
manufacturer. The court was unable to infer negligence (culpa and liability) from the 
undesired event. Unfortunately, the anaesthetist was not party to the proceedings, hence the 
liability (blameworthiness) of the anaesthetist was not argued. 
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 In Medi-Clinic v Vermeulen303 the plaintiff did not rely on the maxim, but it appears to 
be a simple case of a patient going into hospital to be treated for cerebral malaria and leaving 
hospital  permanently disabled and dependent on a wheelchair. Any argument that this 
situation indicates that negligence has occurred is flawed. This case is mentioned in context 
of an undesired and unexpected outcome. It is used to illustrate the complexity of the medical 
reality. The plaintiff contracted cerebral malaria and was gravely ill. The nursing personnel 
could not turn him to prevent bedsores as his blood pressure remained dangerously low and it 
was too risky to turn such a patient. He developed a bedsore so severe that it damaged both 
his bilateral sciatic nerves and he became wheelchair bound. The court found for the hospital 
as the management of the medical condition of the plaintiff under these circumstances cannot 
be criticised. This case demonstrates that an adverse event is rarely indicative of negligence 
in medical cases as complications can occur at any time and if it is interpreted correctly will 
provide the explanation of how the harm occurred without negligence.304 In the ordinary 
course, the medical reality will not be obvious to non-medical persons. 
 In another recent case, Cecilia Goliath v MEC for Health in the Province of Eastern 
Cape,305 the res ipsa loquitur maxim was pleaded based on the argument of Van den Heever 
and Carstens.306 In this matter, the plaintiff had a routine hysterectomy to remove a fibroid 
uterus at an Eastern Cape state hospital. The plaintiff appeared to have recovered and was 
discharged. About two months later the plaintiff was readmitted suffering from severe pain 
and a wound abscess. She was scheduled for an operation, which was cancelled, because the 
abscess opened spontaneously. The plaintiff was discharged again. Two weeks later, the 
plaintiff was readmitted complaining of hard swelling in the abdominal scar. She was 
discharged again. Unwilling to return to the same hospital, the plaintiff attended a second 
hospital that referred her to a consulting surgeon, as she was suffering from recurring sepsis. 
The surgeon operated and removed a septic gauze swab from the wound. The plaintiff 
instituted action against the first hospital and was assisted by a medical expert who explained 
to the court the risks and effect of a retained object in an abdomen.  
Several problems with the plaintiff’s case were evident, the most important of which 
was that the medical expert did not address the potential negligence in respect of the retained 
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swab. Therefore, no evidence was led to address one of the essential elements of delictual 
liability, namely, negligence. The plaintiff failed to plead that the swab was retained due to 
lack of care (instead of breach of legal duty and insufficient care), and that the surgeon failed 
to foresee and prevent such an occurrence. No hospital or medical records regarding the 
specific operation were presented to the court. The plaintiff’s case was that there was 
sufficient evidence to establish negligence, and that the res ipsa loquitur ‘doctrine’307 should 
apply to this matter. The defendants argued that the element of wrongfulness had not been 
sufficiently established, nor had the test for negligence been sufficiently satisfied, and finally 
that the ‘doctrine’ of res ipsa loquitur was not applicable.  
The trial court per Lowe J found that it was ‘unable to find that the plaintiff has 
discharged the onus which fell upon her to establish the negligence of either surgeon or 
nursing staff in theatre relevant to the swab being left behind’.308The medical and hospital 
records were not made available by the plaintiff, except for the report of the plaintiff’s 
treating doctor who was also her medical expert. Based on the stare decisis rule and the 
ruling of a superior court309 the judge held that he could not allow the maxim. It was obvious 
that the judge was dissatisfied with the fact that several medical records were missing and 
with the defendant’s failure to take responsibility for the case, and this may have been why 
the judge considered the maxim, before disallowing it. The judge concluded310 that– 
 
had the maxim res ipsa loquitur been applicable to this matter and had I been able to 
rely thereon, the result in this matter may well have been completely different and in 
those circumstances the absence of an explanation by the defendant may well have 
been sufficient, by way of inferential reasoning, to establish negligence on the part of 
the medical staff concerned.  
 
The trial court reaffirmed the elements of wrongfulness and negligence and then discussed 
the application of the res ipsa loquitur maxim. The court criticised the decision of its sister 
court, Ntsele v MEC for Health Gauteng Provincial Government311 (where the maxim was 
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successfully applied), stating that in that case Mokgoatlheng J made an error in departing 
from the doctrine of stare decisis. The court held that the Van Wyk v Lewis decision was 
made by a court of appeal and any lower court is bound by it, as no South African authority 
had overruled the decision. The judge observed that, although Van den Heever and 
Carstens312 directed that the res ipsa loquitur maxim should be reconsidered, the stare decisis 
precedent precluded him from deciding anything other than to reject the maxim. Although the 
court confirmed the rejection of the res ipsa loquitur maxim based on the decision in Van 
Wyk v Lewis, 313the court invited an appeal on the basis of its preferred use of the res ipsa 
loquitur maxim.314 The matter was taken on appeal.  
Also of importance in this judgment is the court’s reiteration of the presumption of 
fact with regard to negligence. The res ipsa loquitur maxim is a factual presumption, not 
dependent on any rule of law; it is simply an exercise of common sense and is not a true 
presumption of law. The maxim merely creates a permissible inference of fact, which the 
court may employ if, upon reviewing all the facts, this appears to be justified.315 The 
judgment of the court a quo came before the Supreme Court of Appeal in 2014.316 The Court 
of Appeal, per Ponnan JA, said that it seemed that the sentiments of the court of first instance 
were that, had it not been bound by the stare decisis precedent created by Van Wyk v Lewis,317 
its decision would have been different. The judge said that it seemed that this was the reason 
for granting leave to appeal. The court warned against wrong terminology in law and clarified 
the clear distinction between the elements of wrongfulness and negligence.318 The court stated 
that the general reluctance of courts in South Africa to apply the maxim stems from the 
English case Hucks v Cole,319 where Lord Denning MR observed that a doctor was not to be 
held negligent simply because something went wrong. The Supreme Court of Appeal held 
that ‘to hold a doctor negligent simply because something had gone wrong, would be to 
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impermissibly reason backwards from effect to cause’.320 The Supreme Court of Appeal held 
that there is only one enquiry: namely, whether the plaintiff, having regard to all of the 
evidence in the case, had discharged the onus of proof.321 The court agreed with Lord Justice 
Hobhouse322 that ‘the time may well have come to jettison it [the res ipsa loquitur maxim] 
from our legal lexicon’.323 The court concluded in favour of the plaintiff and stated that ‘on all 
of the evidence and the probabilities and the inferences’ the plaintiff had discharged the onus 
of proof.324 
It is unfortunate that in Cecilia Goliath v MEC for Health in the Province of Eastern 
Cape325 the court did not elaborate on the reasons for the rejection of the maxim. The court 
simply avoided becoming ‘enmeshed in the evolved mystique of the maxim’326 and left the 
question ‘in the realm of inference’. Instead the court decided the case on the preponderant 
weight of the evidence.  
Because the Supreme Court of Appeal did not definitively confirm or reject the 
maxim in Cecilia Goliath v MEC for Health in the Province of Eastern Cape, 327it seemed 
that the door was left open for the re-introduction of the maxim. In 2015, in Nzimande v MEC 
for Health Gauteng,328 another case came before the High Court. The plaintiff’s claims arose 
from the manner and fashion in which the medical staff attended to her baby’s birth and the 
management of the follow-up care. The defendant (a state hospital) failed to participate in all 
the court proceedings other than to oppose the claims. The defendant failed to call any 
witnesses in support of their denial of liability. The facts of the case were that the plaintiff 
was scheduled for a caesarean section because of the diagnosis of a breach presentation. After 
the performance of the operation the plaintiff discovered that the baby had sustained cuts on 
her left arm during the caesarean process. The cuts were about four centimetres long and had 
been made into the muscle. The baby was left in an incubator that was dysfunctional or not 
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switched on. The operation to suture the cuts was performed only on the eighth day of the 
baby’s life. The wounds became infected and took three months to heal. The plaintiff also 
developed complications as her wound began to bleed three days after the operation and she 
required a further operation. Eventually, both plaintiff and her baby were discharged and the 
plaintiff consulted a private medical professional. The plaintiff made use of medical experts 
ie a plastic surgeon and a clinical psychologist, but unfortunately not a gynaecologist. The 
plaintiff initially asserted that her evidence was sufficient to establish negligence on the part 
of the nurses and the doctor. The court held that, whereas the res ipsa loquitur maxim ‘might 
not find general application, especially in matters in which conflicting expert evidence is 
called by all parties to the suit, it may well have to be considered in unusual situations such as 
the present.’329 The court stated that the factual allegation regarding the operation performed 
on the mother did not necessarily establish a prima facie case of negligence against the doctor 
as the bleeding may not have been a result of negligence. However, a failure to attend to the 
problem expeditiously and ‘to subject the plaintiff to days of pain, suffering, worry and 
disability while being parted from her child does not require expert evidence to establish a 
strong prima facie case of grave negligence by doctors and nurses alike.’330 The court held 
erroneously that ‘[a]gainst the factual backdrop the defendant has only itself to blame that the 
application of the maxim res ipsa loquitur is justified’. This is contrary to the binding stare 
decisis rule. The court held that the ‘strong prima facie case becomes proof on a balance of 
probabilities once it remains unanswered.’331 The court ruled in favour of the plaintiff. 
 Although the court confirmed the use of the maxim, the court applied factual 
presumption principles to justify its reasons for the decision. Sufficiently strong 
circumstantial evidence on a balance of probability assisted the plaintiff’s case, together with 
a complete lack of response from the defendant. This discharged the onus in favour of the 
plaintiff. Whether the maxim was correctly applied is contentious, as the factual allegation in 
respect of the negligence of the surgeon was not satisfied. It was not evident from the facts 
that the surgeon was negligent in performing the caesarean section. However, this presented 
no difficulty as the doctors were employed by the hospital and were in any event vicariously 
liable regarding the follow-up treatment and overall management of the patient. Had this been 
a case against a surgeon in private practice, based on the fact of the operation alone, the 
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plaintiff would have lost her case because ‘the bleed may not in itself be ascribed to 
negligence’.332 The writer submits that sufficient factual information was available to 
establish a prima facie case of negligent conduct with the support of medical evidence and 
there was no need for the plaintiff to rely on the maxim. If the nature of the maxim should 
change to a rebuttable presumption of negligence in law, thereby placing a reverse onus on 
the defendant to disprove negligence, not only would it interfere with the defendant’s right to 
equal treatment and to justice it might open the floodgates for frivolous claims that are not 
supported with medical expert evidence. 
 
9 Conclusion 
When testing whether the essential elements of liability are present in a case where the 
maxim res ipsa loquitur is applicable, each one of the elements of wrongfulness, negligence, 
causation and damage must be established from the defendant’s action (or omission).To use 
the previous case as an example, the following becomes evident: First, the mere fact that the 
cuts on the baby’s arm occurred is wrongful conduct, as it is in conflict with the legal duty of 
medical professionals and medical personnel to act with skill and competence and not to 
cause harm or further harm. In simple terms, it is unusual for babies to be injured in such a 
manner during uncomplicated caesarean section operations. It is contrary to what is expected 
from prudent and diligent medical professionals and personnel in performing their duty to the 
patient, because reckless actions and neglecting a patient will cause harm.333 Second, with 
regard to the element of negligence, it is evident from the facts that the medical professionals 
and personnel should have foreseen that their neglect would cause harm to their patients and 
it should have been prevented. However, in the above example, there was no input from the 
hospital or its personnel. Such an inquiry could not take place and therefore there was no 
explanation for the conduct of the medical professionals regarding the cuts into the baby’s 
arm in theatre or the post-operative bleed of the wound of the mother. This should have been 
investigated with the assistance of a medical expert to determine substandard care 
(negligence) by setting the expected standard of care for the court to understand the 
difference. The study of medicine is a specialised profession, and regardless of the fact that 
the plaintiff had some medical expert assistance, the expertise needed was that of a 
gynaecologist. The court was not familiar with the particular procedures leading up to the 
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surgical cuts of the baby’s arm or the post-operative bleed of the mother and the specific 
manner in which the defendant-gynaecologist managed and prevented these. The court seeks 
medical information to set the acceptable standard and only then the court is able to weigh the 
actions of the defendants when performing a caesarean section against the set-standard. It 
shows how the process is usually managed – so as to decide how far the process is 
controllable – and ‘as soon as such circumstances are to be taken into consideration there is 
no room for the maxim’.334 It is argued that in all disciplines of technical expertise, eg 
engineering and aviation, the courts would have a similar difficulty in determining the 
element of negligence and causation and be unable to infer that negligent conduct caused the 
loss (the design of the maxim). Lastly, it follows that the design of the maxim allows a 
plaintiff to proceed to court without medical expert evidence.335Therefore, neither the medical 
information about the risks and complications of a neglected duty (like leaving behind a 
swab) nor an explanation of whether the wrongful act caused the harm (an explanation of 
how a swab can migrate from the intestines through the gastric tract to be excreted336) nor an 
explanation why it was not prevented (culpa) is available to the court. Furthermore, there is 
no obligation on the defendant to answer the above questions; he only has to offer his 
version, which cannot be verified. When relying on the maxim a plaintiff presumes that the 
incident of a retained swab is sufficient evidence to prove the element of negligence. This is 
not so, at least not regarding the element of negligence, as the conduct of the defendant can 
only be tested by hearing his subjective testimony of how the injury occurred under his 
control. With regard to the element of causation, the writer argues that the manner in which 
the injury occurred or the cause of the injury can rarely be established without the assistance 
of a medical expert. Factual causation and negligence cannot be implied from the fact of the 
injury in South Africa. It differs from England (and Wales) where the fact of the injury can 
lead to a general inference based on lack of skill and care in circumstances under the control 
of the defendant which are unexpected in nature.337 In South Africa factual causation is only 
established when alternative (non-negligent) causes of the incident or injury are ruled out and 
one of the most likely direct causes of the damage suffered by the patient338 has been proved. 
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In this light, the application of the res ipsa loquitur maxim would rarely be relevant to a 
specialist field. It certainly is true that the medical field and other specialist fields are 
separated from other delictual actions when applying the maxim, as is the criticism of the 
authors, Van den Heever and Carstens,339 but it is simply because in specialist cases the 
maxim overlooks all the elements in delict. 
At best, in Van Wyk v Lewis340and Cecilia Goliath v MEC for Health in the Province 
of Eastern Cape,341 a prima facie case was established, indicating a probability of breach of a 
legal duty. In Van Wyk v Lewis342the defendant was challenged with a very difficult 
emergency operation (diagnosis changed from routine operation to emergency operation) 
together with sepsis in the abdomen. This called for immediate action from the medical team 
to save the patient’s life.343 Under these circumstances, detail regarding the normal way of 
managing an emergency operation is needed to determine whether the elements of negligence 
and causation have been met. Considering this, the court was correct not to apply the res ipsa 
loquitur maxim in the presence of indeterminate circumstances, regardless of the retained 
swab. In Cecilia Goliath v MEC for Health in the Province of Eastern Cape,344the defendant 
performed a routine hysterectomy operation in ‘a modern surgical theatre in circumstances 
where there was no suggestion that the plaintiff’s life was in danger’,345 without the defendant 
presenting any information regarding any ‘counting of swabs prior to sewing-up the patient’. 
The judge remarked that ‘although the procedure performed on [the plaintiff] was under the 
control of the [defendant’s employees], and what they did or did not do was exclusively 
within their direct knowledge, none of these employees were called to testify’. The court 
referred to the English case Ratcliffe v Plymouth and Torbay Health Authority, 346quoting 
Lord Justice Brook, that ‘it is likely to be a very rare medical negligence case in which the 
defendants take the risk of calling no factual evidence, when such evidence is available to 
them, of the circumstances surrounding a procedure which led to an unexpected outcome’. 
The court stated that– 
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in a civil case it is not necessary for a plaintiff to prove that the inference that she asks 
the court to draw is the only reasonable inference, it suffices for her to convince the 
court that the inference that she advocates is the most readily apparent and acceptable 
inference from a number of inferences.347 
 
The defendant failed ‘to adduce any evidence, whatsoever, accordingly [taking] the risk of a 
judgment being given against him’. The success of the plaintiff’s case was not based on any 
general presumption of fact but on insufficient evidence provided by the defendant to rebut 
the plaintiff’s prima facie case of negligence. The plaintiff discharged her onus on a 
preponderance of probability. Of significance, and to be welcomed, is the reluctance of the 
court to apply the res ipsa loquitur maxim and to discourage the use of the maxim in any 
future medical cases. It can be argued that the plaintiff discharged her onus of proof simply 
because of the defendant’s failure to offer an explanation which then became part of the case 
against him, but it is more likely that the balance of probability was in the plaintiff’s favour. 
The facts in Goliath are similar to the facts of the Nzimande348 case where, with the assistance 
of a medical expert, it was prima facie evident from the hospital’s disregard for the proper 
management of the medical condition of the patient that it was negligent conduct (culpa). 
As it stands, the South African court in Van Wyk v Lewis349 rejected the maxim. 
However, Cecilia Goliath v MEC for Health in the Province of Eastern Cape350 and even 
Nzimande v MEC for Health Gauteng351 show that the rejection of the maxim is not accepted 
by all legal practitioners. As the law stands the perception remains that the res ipsa loquitur 
maxim is an easy way for a plaintiff to get his case to court in South Africa. However, the 
thesis has been arguing that applying the maxim tends to oversimplify medical realities and 
increase the risk that a court may decide cases for reasons that are unjustifiable from a 
medical perspective. It remains significant that the availability of the maxim encourages 
plaintiffs to advance to court with insufficiently prepared evidence. It is possible that the 
South African court’s continued general reluctance to entertain the res ipsa loquitur maxim in 
medical cases has contributed to the development of medical law where prima facie cases are 
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supported by proper medical expert evidence against defendants, based on evidence-based 
medical principles. 
For these reasons, the writer agrees with Van den Heever and Carstens,352 albeit in another 
context:  
 
Thus, if the aforegoing assessment cannot be made by having regard to the occurrence 
alone, so that the surrounding circumstances must also be considered in order to arrive 
at a conclusion, res ipsa loquitur does not find application. This appears to be the 
reason why South African courts decline to apply the doctrine to medical negligence 
cases, based on the notion that the medical interventions that form the subject of the 
dispute do not fall within the ordinary experience of mankind, because a court would 
usually be unable to draw a conclusion without the benefit of expert medical evidence. 
 
These writers state that the use of the maxim in medical law will alleviate the burden of proof 
for the plaintiff; that the defendant is adequately protected, provided we endorse the principle 
of ‘honest doubt (that even if due care is taken, untoward results do sometimes occur); that 
constitutional arguments appeal to equality, access to courts, access to health care and 
information; and that medical ethics, post-constitutional legislation and policy also support 
the acceptance of the maxim in medical law. This thesis argues that the maxim will not 
alleviate the plaintiff’s burden of proof if the plaintiff bases his or her claim on the fact of the 
injury alone and relies on the maxim alone. The court will be in the exact same position as 
was the court in Van Wyk v Lewis353ie unable to determine causation of fact and whether the 
conduct of the defendant fell within acceptable standards. Although the writer agrees that the 
courts, in the spirit of constitutionalism, should address the plight of the plaintiff by, for 
example, relaxing strict liability principles in exceptional cases, such as the rules of factual 
causation, this approach does not support the use of the maxim. 
 The goal of the study is to illustrate that medical facts and medical conclusions, ie the 
medical realities, are determined from the explanation of the medical experts before making 
legal inferences; therefore, the reason for the inadequacy of the application of the maxim in 
medical cases is obvious, as the maxim always depends on an approach that in the ordinary 
course of events (as understood by non-medical persons), harm does not occur without 
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negligence. In a medical case, to raise a presumption of fact, ie the nature of the res ipsa 
loquitur maxim, the conduct of the defendant needs to be clear from the available facts, 
which is rarely the case, as the management and control of a medical process is part of 
medical science and not part of everyday life. A plaintiff who depends only on the maxim 
runs a high risk of not being able to prove his case, because there is no obligation in law on 
the doctor-defendant to disprove such a case (or event to complete the picture), but only to 
explain that his conduct was not negligent. This would require a South African court to 
accept the fact of the injury as the cause of negligent conduct, which is contrary to delictual 
principles. Thus the thesis argues that the maxim res ipsa loquitur is not, and should not be, 
part of the South African medical law regulating claims for compensation for medical 
negligence.  
 It was also clear, from the above survey of cases that the maxim was not consistently 
applied and leads to uncertainty. In essence it should allow a factual presumption to be drawn 
from the key available facts. The court was constantly faced with a situation where the fact of 
the injury did not explain the conduct of the defendant and therefore failed to satisfy the 
delictual element of negligence (culpable conduct). In many cases, the maxim was actually 
used as a means of getting to court based on the injury alone, which should have resulted in 
an application requesting absolution from the instance as no cause of action was shown, but it 
was simply rebutted with a doctor-defendant explaining his conduct was not negligent. This 
is not the correct use of the maxim as it elevates the maxim to a rebuttable presumption and 
not a presumption of fact. As discussed before, the maxim lends itself to different incorrect 
interpretations: an irrebuttable presumption of law, a rebuttable presumption, and similar to 
English law354, a presumption where the fact of injury may raise an inference of lack of care 
in circumstances under the direct control of the defendant. In South African law where the 
maxim allows for a mere factual presumption drawn from other facts, the unwise use of the 
maxim then puts a plaintiff in a position to prove his case without evidence or it obliges a 
defendant to defend the unsubstantiated allegation of negligence based on no other facts. It is 
significant to note that where the fact of the injury does not have key facts to explain the 
occurrence and where it requires the plaintiff to lead some evidence to prove his case, then 
the maxim is inappropriate. If the maxim is allowed it places the maxim on a par with the 
manner in which prima facie evidence355 is addressed in South African law, the presumption 
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of fact (the maxim) is then raised to a rebuttable presumption in law which is inconsistent 
with the law of evidence principles. 
 In conclusion, the thesis argues against the use of the maxim in medical cases. The 
argument that the court may consider allowing the maxim in the light of the duty of the South 
African court to uphold constitutional rights and more particularly patients’ rights356 and 
because the court has a duty to respect, protect, promote and fulfil human rights, is rejected. 
The thesis argues that the use of the maxim is contrary to South African delictual principles 
as well as principles in evidence even if the use of the maxim is done similar to the approach 
in England, 357where the maxim is now used with expert medical evidence. The argument in 
South African law remains that all the elements in delict should be established from the 
medical expert evidence which leaves no place for the maxim. However, the South African 
court should be open to relax delictual principles on a case by case basis, such as factual 
causation, as is already evident from previous cases. The thesis further suggests that the 
South African court should move towards a more inquisitorial approach in medical cases as 
this will allow the court to investigate the medical information presented to the court by both 
plaintiff and defendant. To avoid possible fallacies in reasoning, the thesis now turns for 
clarification to the English court, because of its wider experience in the application of the 
maxim. 
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CHAPTER 3: THE RES IPSA LOQUITUR MAXIM IN ENGLAND 
 
1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter the law of delict in South Africa was analysed with reference to 
medical negligence cases and the application of the res ipsa loquitur maxim. It was found 
that, notwithstanding the rejection of the maxim for medical cases previously,1 the court was 
recently requested to re-introduce the maxim to South African medical law.2 Regrettably, the 
court avoided being drawn into a discussion of the maxim, only, discouraged its use. The 
court relied on an English case, Ratcliffe v Plymouth and Torbay Health Authority, 3where the 
English court suggested that the time had come to drop the maxim from the litigator’s 
vocabulary and replace it with the phrase ‘prima facie evidence’. This approach is the same 
as that of this thesis: that the res ipsa loquitur maxim cannot be applicable in medical 
negligence cases as an appreciation of the medical facts explained against the acceptable 
standard of care is indispensable before a legal presumption, ‘the facts speak for themselves’ 
can be entertained. The previous chapter demonstrated that, in South Africa a plaintiff has to 
prove the elements of wrongfulness, causation, fault (culpa) and harm4 to prove liability. The 
argument of this thesis is that the South African court cannot determine from the fact of the 
injury whether a defendant caused the injury of whether the conduct of the defendant –doctor 
fell below the expected standard of care without medical experts. This argument contrasts 
with the approach of scholars who support the use of the maxim in England (and Wales), 
stating that the maxim should be introduced ‘in a medical negligence action if the negligence 
can be derived from a so-called absolute without any dependence on the surrounding 
circumstances’5.The thesis argues that determining negligence in such a generalized manner 
is contrary to delictual principles in South Africa. Against this background that thesis first 
investigates the acceptable and international standard of care to determine the medical reality 
of each case before analysing the way the English court addresses legal principles like 
causation and liability. 
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This chapter analyses the use of res ipsa loquitur in English cases6 because of the 
historical influence of English law on South African law and its substantially more available 
data. The appeal for the use of the maxim and to follow the English example and other 
Commonwealth countries7 justified the research into English case law. The objective of this 
chapter is to understand the use8 of the res ipsa loquitur maxim by the English court, as a 
procedural aid to assist a plaintiff with getting to court in a medical negligence case. The 
English court, in accepting the maxim, because of the presumption of negligence created by 
the maxim, also seems to accept that a prima facie case has been made out (based on the fact 
of the injury under the control of the defendant-doctor) and then requests an answer from the 
defendant. Without medical expert support for a plaintiff in presenting his action, the use of 
the maxim in its simplest form compels the defendant to explain whether he exercised the 
necessary care. If the court accepts the defendant’s explanation, the plaintiff’s case will be 
defeated. If the plaintiff relies on the maxim in its wider form9 and produces medical expert 
evidence in support of lack of care by the defendant, the defendant must rebut the maxim and 
the plaintiff’s expert evidence. The maxim has then run its course and the court will then 
decide whether the plaintiff has discharged the burden of proving negligence. This differs 
from the legal principles in the law of delict in South Africa.10 
If the mere occurrence of an undesirable medical accident is accepted by the English 
court as prima facie evidence of alleged negligence based on insufficient care, then the 
function of the res ipsa loquitur maxim is to compel the defendant to explain the presumed 
lack of care. Interestingly, it appears that the medical evidence of medical experts describing 
the nature of the medical error11 becomes relevant only after the maxim has been accepted by 
the court. In this regard, it seems that an initial understanding of medical facts or factual 
causation is not needed for the res ipsa loquitur maxim to be evoked in England. The fact of 
the injury or thing (res) tells a story, which might not be the whole story, but the presumption 
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of lack of care in a situation directly under the control of the defendant where an unexpected 
injury occurs. It is sufficient to be prima facie evidence to get the plaintiff to court. The rest 
of the story is then told by the defendant in defending the presumption of lack of care created 
by the maxim. If the defendant presents an explanation that shows proper care without 
negligence, the plaintiff is still left with the initial burden of proving his case.12 The 
evidentiary burden then shifts back to the plaintiff13 (not the onus of proof), who has to prove, 
on a balance of probability, that the defendant caused the injury. The thesis intends to 
investigate these differences, since it is evident that the law of tort in England is different 
from the law of delict in South Africa. In South Africa, a plaintiff cannot rely on the fact of 
the injury as a presumption of negligent conduct. As explained in the previous chapter, the 
element of negligence is only one of the elements in delict that has to be established to prove 
liability. Determining causation turns upon evaluating the actions of the defendant against the 
medical standard of care set by the profession. The medical reality has to be clearly 
understood to decide whether the wrongful act caused the harm (factual causation) or to infer 
negligence. In other words, proof of causation rest inevitably on the drawing of an inference 
of fact. In South Africa, in a medical case, the elements of causation and negligence cannot 
be inferred from the injury alone because the medical reality is not known to an uninformed 
person. These material differences between the functioning of the law of delict in South 
Africa and that of the law of tort in England, warrant further investigation. It would be the 
obvious answer to why the maxim is more successful in England than in South Africa. 
 
2 The principles governing the law of tort in England 
Before examining the use of the res ipsa loquitur maxim, it is necessary to conceptualise the 
rules of tort that determine the professional liability of a medical professional in England. In 
general, in the English law of tort,14 a person may owe a duty of care15 to another to ensure 
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Ballard v North British Railway Co (n 8). 
13
Glass v Cambridge Health Authority [1995] 6 Med LR 91 (QB) 107. 
14
The English legal system differentiates between personal injury matters and medical negligence matters: see 
Civil Procedure Vol 1 (2008) (The White Book Service,2008) C2-001. 
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Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562 at 580, where the claimant was successful in establishing a duty of care 
between the consumer and the manufacturer of ginger beer. See chapter 2 regarding South African law, where a 
legal duty does not naturally exist between legal parties and should be established by the relationship between 
the parties. See A Fagan ‘A duty without distinction’ (2000) Acta Juridica 49. The author explains the 
difference between the English ‘duty of care’ and the legal duty referred to in South African courts. The author 
refers to Administrateur, Natal v Trust Bank Bpk 1979 (3) SA 824 (A) where the court acknowledges 




that he does not suffer any unreasonable harm or loss. The claimant16 must determine that a 
possible legal duty of care17 was owed by the defendant. In medical cases, such a duty arises 
from the doctor–patient relationship.18 It has been held that whether a doctor is under a duty 
of contract or a duty in terms of the law of tort, there is no rational basis for a distinction, 
because the general obligations undertaken and owed to the patient remain the same.19 The 
duty imposed by law is an undertaking by the doctor to provide advice, to diagnose, and to 
treat the patient with reasonable skill and care. The English court held that, where a defendant 
is in a situation where others would reasonably rely upon his advice and judgment or he has 
taken it upon himself to give advice or allows it to be passed on, and he knew that a person 
will rely on this advice, a duty of care will arise.20 The breach of that duty may be any one of 
the following: failure to furnish the required advice; failure to warn the patient about material 
risks and complications; failure to take a full medical history; failure to perform tests and so 
forth and to arrive at a proper diagnosis; and failure to exercise the necessary skill and care in 
providing the treatment in accordance with the required standard.21 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
where the court stated that there must be a legal duty to take reasonable steps to avoid harm, which was also 
confirmed in Mukheiber v Raath 1999 (3) SA 1065 (SCA).  
16
In England and Wales the term ‘claimant’ replaced the term ‘plaintiff’ after the Civil Procedure Rules 1998 
came into force on 26 April 1999. The writer uses the terms ‘claimant’ and ‘plaintiff’ interchangeably as 
dictated by the case under discussion. 
17
Fletcher v Rylands [1866] LR 1 Exch 265, where a legal duty was described as follows: ‘those who go 
personally or bring property where they know that they or it may come into collision with the persons or 
property of others have by law a duty cast upon them to use reasonable care and skill to avoid such a collision’; 
Caparo v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 60, where Lord Brown-Wilkinson identified several instances of policy 
considerations relevant to the element of ‘duty of care’. The tripartite test states that the harm must be 
reasonably foreseeable; that a requisite degree of proximity between the claimant and defendant exists; and that 
it will be fair, just and reasonable to impose such a duty on the defendant, taking public policy into 
consideration. 
18
R v Bateman (1925) 94 LJKB 791 at 794, where Lord Hewart said that if ‘a person holds himself out as 
possessing special skill and knowledge and he is consulted, as possessing such skill and knowledge’ he owes a 
duty to the patient to use due caution, diligence, skill and care.   
19
Sidaway v Bethlem Royal Hospital Governors [1985] AC 871 at 904. 
20
Hedley Byrne & Co. Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd [1964] AC 465; Chester v Afshar (2004) All ER (HL), where 
the defendant was found negligent because of his failure to warn the claimant of a material risk of the operation. 
The court departed from traditional causation principles. 
21
Sidaway v Bethlem Royal Hospital Governors (n 19) regarding failure to warn; Smith v Salford Health 
Authority [1994] 5 Med LR 321, QBD, where it was held that the doctor should have sent the patient for a CT 
scan prior to performing a spinal fusion; Cassidy v Minister of Health [1951] 2 KB 343 at 349, where the 
medical professionals ignored the claimant’s complaints of excessive and intense pain; Dillon v Le Roux [1994] 
6 WWR 280, BCCA where the doctor made a diagnosis of reflux esophagitis instead of myocardial infarction; 
Jones v Manchester Corporation [1952] QB 852, where it was found that the doctor was inexperienced and 




In order to establish a breach of the duty of care, the claimant has to show that a 
defendant failed to comply with the standard of care expected from a ‘reasonable man’.22 The 
standard of ‘the reasonable man on the Clapham omnibus’ is the general standard of care, 
while the standard applicable to medical professionals is that of a ‘reasonable professional’,23 
eg a surgeon. If the doctor did not comply with the expected standard, his care would be 
regarded as below standard and negligent. Of importance for medical negligence cases is the 
fact that novices in a particular field of expertise must be of the same standard as the 
specialist in that field, as no allowance is made for lack of experience.24 A breach of duty will 
show that a reasonable person or reasonable professional fell short of the standard expected 
by the community and the profession. In Roe v Minister of Health25it was held that the 
defendant will be liable only if the reasonable person would have foreseen the loss or damage 
in the circumstances prevailing at the time of the alleged breach. It was shown in Bolton v 
Stone26 that the greater the risk that serious harm can be incurred, the greater the precautions 
needed to prevent such harm. In addressing the expected standard of care, the court considers 
the following questions: What did the defendant know? What was the degree of the risk? 
How practical were the precautions? Was the standard in conflict with the prevailing legal 
convictions of the community? It is a question of fact and for the claimant to prove that the 
defendant’s conduct did not meet the requisite standard of care.27 
Lord Justice Denning, in Lamb v Camden LBC,28 stated that ‘duty, remoteness and 
causation’ are all useful devices that the court uses to determine the range of liability for 
negligence. He continued that ‘ultimately it is a question of policy for the judges to decide’. 
He stated that it is a weighing and evaluation process rather than a rule of law. Causation in 
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Blyth v Birmingham Waterworks (1856) 11 Exch 781. Also see Hall v Brooklands Auto-Racing Club (1933) 1 
KB 205, where the defendant failed to comply with the standard of a reasonable man; and MacFarlane v 
Tayside Health Board (1999) 3 WLR. 
23
See Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 2 All ER 118. The Bolam principle is the rule 
that a medical professional is not negligent if he or she acts in accordance with a practice accepted at the time as 
proper by a responsible body of medical opinion. The rule was changed in Bolitho v City & Hackney Health 
Authority [1997] 3 WLR 1151. A child suffered cardiac arrest and subsequent brain damage as a result of 
pneumonia and airway obstruction. The doctor indicated that she would not have intubated the child even if she 
had attended to the child. The court held that the method adopted as the standard of practice of medical 
professionals must be demonstrated to be a method based on logic; otherwise it will not be defensible. See also 
n 262 in chapter 2. 
24
Wilsher v Essex Area Health Authority (1986) 3 All ER 801, where a junior doctor was expected to perform 
according to the standard of a competent and skilled doctor working in the same post. This topic is addressed in 
chapter 4 para 4.2, ‘learning curve’, below. 
25
(1954) 2 QB 80. 
26
[1951] AC 850; [1951] 1 All ER 1078. 
27
Bolitho v City & Hackney Health Authority (n 23), where the court stated that expert opinion should be used to 
determine the breach of duty of the defendant but it should be based on logical principles. 
28




the tort of negligence, in English law, addresses the elements of remoteness, causation and 
foreseeability.29 The plaintiff has to prove that the occurrence was the direct cause of the 
harm suffered. A direct link between the defendant’s negligence (breach of the duty of care) 
and the plaintiff’s loss or injury is established to prove causation. The basic test for causation 
is whether, ‘but for’ the negligence of the defendant, the plaintiff would have suffered the 
damages. The defendant will not be found negligent if the damage could have occurred in 
another way.30The English court relaxed some of the causation aspects and assisted the 
claimant with the difficulty of the burden of proof;31 however, this was not accepted in 
Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services.32 In Bonnington and Fairchild the court showed that 
if the defendant’s breach of duty increased the risk or materially contributed to the harm, then 
the rules relevant to causation should be relaxed. The latter cases contributed to the question: 
under which circumstances will the court allow an inference of fact (to overcome an 
evidential gap) based on the claimant’s allegation of negligence? 
In certain cases it seems obvious that an occurrence could not have taken place but for 
the defendant’s lack of care,33 even if the claimant does not have direct evidence to prove that 
the defendant was liable. In such a case, the claimant may want to ask the court to infer a lack 
of care from the available facts. This is also the design of the res ipsa loquitur maxim. 
Without evidence to the contrary, the claimant may well have sufficiently proved that the 
required standard of care was not met and the defendant had been careless. 
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Robinson v Post Office [1974] 2 All ER 737, where a doctor did not follow up on a test-dose for an anti-
tetanus vaccination and the claimant developed a serious allergic reaction to it. 
30
See Bolitho v City & Hackney Health Authority (n 23) for a discussion of two elements of causation ie (i) what 
would the doctor have done had she attended the claimant? (ii) if she did not do what was expected, was that 
negligent? The court found that the fact that the defendant did not intubate the child was the focal point of the 
doctor’s negligent conduct. 
31
Bonnington Castings Ltd v Wardlaw [1956] AC 613, where the court found that a material contribution to the 
harm established a breach of duty. The claimant developed pneumoconiosis as a result of inhaling contaminated 
air at his workplace, Also compare McGhee v National Coal Board [1972] 3 All ER 1008; [1973] 1 WLR 1, 
where the court found that a material contribution to the risk is sufficient evidence to indicate a breach of duty.  
32
[2002] UKHL 22; [2003] 1 AC 32, where three consolidated appeals followed because workers developed 
mesothelioma as a result of negligent exposure to asbestos fibres at work. Unlike pneumoconiosis, 
mesothelioma is not a ‘cumulative’ disease. If there has been more than one employer there is no means of 
identifying the fibres that caused the disease. Therefore there was an evidential gap. The House of Lords relaxed 
the ‘but for’ causation principles and concluded as follows: If the conduct of the employer or other agents doing 
substantially similar operations created an unreasonable risk of harm to the claimant, it would be difficult for the 
claimant to establish causation from an exact risk. However, the breach of duty of all the agents materially 
increased the risk of harm to the claimant, and the defendants should be held accountable. 
33
Bull v Devon Area Health Authority (1989) [1993] 4 Med LR 117 at 131 CA, where a delay of obtaining a 
specialist obstetrician at the birth of twins caused injury to the second twin. The court doubted where all the 
facts that are ever going to be known are before the court, but in the absence of a proven explanation for the 




3 A synopsis of the development of the res ipsa loquitur maxim in England 
The first benchmark case where the maxim of res ipsa loquitur was implicitly applied was 
Byrne v Boadle in 1863.34 Although the maxim was not specifically discussed, the occurrence 
was sufficient to allow the court to infer negligence from the facts. A barrel of flour fell from 
a second-storey loft onto the head of the claimant, who was injured. The claimant had no 
knowledge or direct evidence of the prior whereabouts of the barrel or how it came to fall 
from the loft. The lower court dismissed the claim on the grounds that the claimant did not 
prove his case. On appeal, the court held that the facts of the accident provided sufficient 
evidence to establish a breach of duty of care. The judge found in favour of the claimant and 
said that, beyond all doubt, such facts are sufficient prima facie evidence that a presumption 
of negligence arose out of the careless management of the barrel. The judge declared that it 
was clear that the barrel was under the control of the warehouse management, who were 
responsible for the acts of the servants, and their failure to prevent careless conduct 
constituted negligence. The maxim was intended to assist a claimant who was harmed 
through no fault of his own and who was unable to prove how the accident occurred. In Scott 
v London & St Katherine Docks Co, the court found that– 
 
where the thing is shown to be under the management of the defendant or his servants, 
and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those 
who have the management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the 




It is significant that if the thing was under the total control of the defendant and injury occurs, 
the lack of care could be inferred from the fact of the injury or the very nature of the 
incident,36 even if there was no direct evidence of how the accident occurred or how the 
defendant acted. 
The use of the maxim was confirmed and the principles underlying its application 
were established. At the time, the simple justification for the use of the maxim was that, in 
the ordinary course of events, bags and barrels do not usually fall onto bystanders without 
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Byrne v Boadle [1863] 159 ER 299; [1863] 2 Hurl & Colt 722 159. See Scott v London & St Katherine Docks 
Co (1865) 2 Hurl & Colt 596. 
35
Scott v London & St Katherine Docks Co (n 34) 601. 
36




someone being negligent. In 1923, in Ballard v North British Railway Co,37 a claimant was 
injured when a railway wagon struck him. Lord Justice Shaw said that had the phrase not 
been in Latin, nobody would have given it any thought. If the defendant does provide 
evidence of an alternative cause of the accident, then the claimant has to adduce positive 
evidence that the defendant acted carelessly to attribute liability to the defendant. However, it 
was later established that the facts of the accident must satisfy the presumption that the 
accident occurred as a result of lack of care; such a reasonable inference made from the 
proven facts may then have the weight of legal proof.38 In Caswell v Powell Duffryn 
Associated Collieries39 the court warned that one must not confuse inference with conjecture 
or speculation. His Lordship stated that there can be no inference unless there are objective 
facts from which to infer the other facts that are sought to be established. If there are no 
positive proven facts from which the inference can be made, the method of inference fails. 
The prerequisites for such an inference depended on whether the incident occurred in an 
inexplicable fashion,40 that the incident would not have occurred in the ordinary course of 
events, and whether the defendant had control41 of the incident that caused the injury. The 
effect of the inference must be that it supported the claimant’s claim that negligence had 
occurred.42 The accident must, in itself, indicate that the harm was caused carelessly. In a case 
of a retained swab,43 the court found that the leaving behind of a swab during surgery 
indicated that the doctor had been careless and breached his duty of care. However, contrary 
to the perceived natural flow of the application of the maxim in the latter scenario, the court 
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Ballard v North British Railway Co (n 8) 45–53, where the claimant claimed damages following an injury 
caused by a runaway railway wagon. 
38
Jones v Great Western Railway Co [1930] 47 TLR 39, per Lord Macmillan. Such a deduction from the 
evidence must show that it is more probable than not that negligence occurred; it cannot be conjecture as this 
will have no value as in essence it will then be a mere guess. 
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Caswell v Powell Duffryn Associated Collieries [1940] AC 152–169. 
40
Barkway v South Wales Transport Co. Ltd (1950) 1 All ER 392, when a vehicle veered to the wrong side of 
the road. It was known that the accident was caused by a flat tyre. The res ipsa loquitur maxim could not apply 
as all the facts were known. The claimant had to prove that the flat tyre was caused by a failure to maintain the 
vehicle, using ordinary tort law principles. 
41
Easson v L & N E RY [1944] KB 421 at 425; [1944] 2 All ER 425 at 425, 430, where the requirement of 
control was not satisfied in an incident where a child fell off a train. As the train left the station, it was 
determined that the door of the train was not sufficiently under the sole control of the railway company. It could 
have been opened by somebody for whom the railway company was not responsible. 
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Barkway (n 40) 392; Byrne v Boadle (n 34) 159; also see Scott v London & St Katherine Docks Co (n 34) 601; 
Ballard v North British Railway Co (n 8) 45; Moore v R Fox & Sons [1956] 1 QB 596; Caswell v Powell 
Duffryn Associated Collieries (n 39) 152–69. The list is not exhaustive.  
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James v Dunlop [1931] 1 BMJ 730 (CA), where the husband of the claimant underwent a gallstone operation 
during which a swab was retained. The formation of a fistula as a result of the retained swab eventually caused 
the death of the husband. The court found the doctor to be careless and negligent. Strangely, the court altered its 




was inconsistent in holding that the res ipsa loquitur maxim applied in all retained-swab 
cases.44 
The locus classicus with regard to the application of the res ipsa loquitur maxim is 
Cassidy v Minister of Health. Denning LJ explained the inference of negligence: if a claimant 
went into hospital with two stiff fingers and came out of hospital with four stiff fingers and a 
useless hand, this is a prima facie case of negligence. One would generally not expect it to 
happen if due care was used, and the claimant needs an explanation. However, the hospital 
failed to explain how this could have happened without negligence. Denning LJ held that the 
lack of care on the part of the medical personnel rendered the hospital vicariously liable:  
 
[W]henever they accept a patient for treatment, they must use reasonable care and 
skill to cure him of his ailment. The hospital authorities cannot, of course, do it by 
themselves: they have no ears to listen through the stethoscope, and no hands to hold 
the surgeon’s knife. They must do it by the staff which they employ; and if their staff 
is negligent in giving the treatment, they are just as liable for that negligence as is 
anyone else who employs others to do his duties for him.45  
 
He continued that ‘where a person is himself under a duty to use care, he cannot get rid of his 
responsibility by delegating the performance of it to someone else, no matter whether the 
delegation be to a servant under a contract of service or to an independent contractor under a 
contract for services’. Although this approach does not mean that, if a patient came out of 
hospital in a worse condition than he went in, this constitutes negligence, the approach does 
confirm that such an incident raises a prima facie inference of negligence that should be 
explained.46 In Colevilles Ltd v Devine47 it was established that the burden of proof did not 
shift to the defendant if the maxim was applied. The defendant was not obliged to show that 
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Mahon v Osborne (n 43) 23, where a swab was retained following a complicated operation and the court found 
that an ordinary reasonable man could not determine what precautionary measures the surgeon would have 
taken and medical expert evidence was needed; Cooper v Neville [1961] UKPC 12, where the plaintiff 
underwent an emergency operation and a swab was retained.  
45
Cassidy v Minister of Health (n 21) 574, where the claimant was suffering from Dupuytren’s contracture of 
the third and fourth finger of his left hand. It is a defect that occurs when the hand is kept in a splint for too long 
without physiotherapy. A layer of skin that lies under the skin of the palm of the hand develops knots of skin, 
forming a thick cord that pulls the fingers into a bent position. The Court of Appeal held that prima facie 
evidence of negligence was shown in respect of the persons in whose care the claimant was. The defendants 
were found liable, regardless of which individual was negligent. See discussion in para 4.2 below. 
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Cf also Holmes v Board of Hospital Trustees of the City of London (1977) 81 DLR (3d) 67 at 78; Girard v 
Royal Columbian Hospital (1976) 66 DLR (3d) 676 at 691 BCSC. 
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his explanation was more likely than the inference of negligence created by the maxim. If it 
was equally probable that the accident could have occurred with careless conduct than with 
careful conduct, the claim would not be successful. This interpretation was confirmed in1970, 
in Lloyde v West Midlands Gas Board, where Megaw LJ discussed the status of the maxim. 
He said: 
 
I doubt whether it is right to describe res ipsa loquitur as a ‘doctrine’. I think it is no 
more than an exotic, although convenient, phrase to describe what is in essence no 
more than a common sense approach, not limited by technical rules, to the assessment 
of the effect of evidence in certain circumstances.48  
 
He maintained that applying the maxim means that a plaintiff prima facie establishes 
negligence where (i) it is not possible to prove exactly what caused the accident; and (ii) on 
the evidence as it stands, it is more likely than not that the effective cause was an act that 
constitutes a failure to ensure the plaintiff’s safety. The English Court of Appeal confirmed 
the substantive status of the maxim, ie that it was no more than a convenient phrase that is 
evidentiary in nature. The successful application of the res ipsa loquitur maxim will have the 
effect that the plaintiff has established a prima facie case that needs to be rebutted.49 
 Controversy existed50 about the procedural advantage of the res ipsa loquitur maxim 
and whether res ipsa loquitur had been elevated to a principle of substantive law. Supporters 
of the maxim argued that the maxim reverses the burden of proof51 and that the defendant has 
to establish that the accident was not caused by him.52 In Ng Chun Pui v Lee Chuen Tat, the 
court a quo held that the evidence was insufficient and that the defendant failed to discharge 
his burden of proof.  
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(1971) 2 All ER (CA) 1242–1246, where the court found that if the plaintiff is unable to explain the cause of 
the accident, the fact of the accident is sufficient to establish negligence in the absence of an explanation from 
the defendant. This stance of the court was followed in Bergin v David Wickes Television [1994] PIQR 167 at 
168. 
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Moore v Worthing District Health Authority [1992] 3 Med LR 431–434, where the plaintiff underwent a 
mastoidecktomy and suffered bilateral nerve injury. 
50
Henderson v Henry E Jenkins & Sons [1970] AC 282, where Lord Reid and Lord Donovan stated that, 
following the res ipsa loquitur maxim, the burden of proof turned to the defendants; Ward v Tesco Stores Ltd 
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of yoghurt on the floor on which the claimant slipped; and Mahon v Osborne (n 43) 50, where the court held 
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596, referred to by Van den Heever & Carstens (2011) (n 5) 44. 
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Henderson v Henry E Jenkins & Sons (n 50) 596. 
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Moore v R Fox & Sons (n 42) 596, where the court found that it was not necessary for all the events of the 





The matter went on appeal. The appeal judge, Lord Griffiths, explicitly stated: 
 
[I]n an appropriate case the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case by relying upon the 
fact of the accident. If the defendant adduces no evidence there is nothing to rebut the 
inference of negligence and the plaintiff will have proved his case. But if the 
defendant does adduce evidence that evidence must be evaluated to see if it is still 
reasonable to draw the inference of negligence from the mere fact of the accident. 
Loosely speaking this may be referred to as a burden on the defendant to show he was 
not negligent, but that only means that faced with a prima facie case of negligence the 
defendant will be found negligent unless he produces evidence that is capable of 
rebutting the prima facie case.53  
 
The court confirmed that the burden to prove negligence rests throughout the case on the 
plaintiff. The court warned that it is misleading to talk of the burden of proof shifting to the 
defendant in a case where the maxim applies, as it is merely an evidentiary burden. The court 
of appeal set aside the decision of the court of first instance, and stated that there is no legal 
burden on the defendant to disprove negligence. 
In more recent times, the court in Jacobs v Great Yarmouth and Waveney Health 
Authority was of the opinion that an inference of negligence should be drawn from the facts 
presented and in such instances, res ipsa loquitur– 
 
means no more than that, on the facts that the plaintiff is able to prove, although he 
may not be able to point to a particular negligent act or omission on the part of the 
defendants, the fair inference to draw is that there has been negligence of some sort on 
the part of the defendants; but that is an inference to be drawn upon the facts 
presented by the plaintiff. If there is further evidence presented by the defendant, 
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Ng Chun Pui v Lee Chuen Tat [1988] RTR 298 (PC) 298–301, where the defendant’s vehicle veered to the 
wrong side of the road. The plaintiffs relied on the maxim, and the defendant explained that he had to swerve 
away from an unidentified vehicle causing the accident. The court stated, regarding the shifting of the burden of 
proof, that the res ipsa loquitur maxim is no more than the use of a phrase to describe evidence from which it is 




those facts may be shown in an entirely different light and may be that at the end of 
the day it is not possible to draw the inference of negligence.54  
 
Thus, any substantive importance that was given to the res ipsa loquitur maxim has been 
reduced to the maxim being a mere procedural and evidentiary tool55 to extract an answer 
from the defendant. 
 
4 A detailed discussion of the elements of the res ipsa loquitur maxim 
In the previous paragraph it was evident that the English court has developed the res ipsa 
loquitur maxim since Scott v London & St Katherine Docks Co56 from two elements: that the 
defendant was in control of the instrument or incident when the occurrence took place; and 
that the occurrence must have been such that in the ordinary course of events it would not 
have occurred without negligence. In Barkway v South Wales Transport Co Ltd,57 the court 
explained that the maxim is intended to assist the plaintiff who suffered damages and is 
unable to adduce evidence regarding the cause of the accident. The court held that if all the 
facts of the accident are known the maxim cannot be applied and the plaintiff should then 
proceed with a trial based on tort law. The effect of the res ipsa loquitur maxim is that in 
some cases, because of the circumstances, it is possible to infer negligence from the fact of 
the injury.58 Thus, the maxim calls for a presumption to be made that the defendant caused the 
injury and was negligent in doing so,59 ie causation and negligence. Therefore, the 
requirements for the maxim, before Ratcliffe v Plymouth & Torbay Health Authority,60 were: 
(i) the defendant had to be in control of the instrumentality;  
(ii) the occurrence should strongly suggest negligence; and  
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Jacobs v Great Yarmouth and Waveney Health Authority [1995] 6 Med LR 192, where the judge rejected the 
plaintiff’s case that she was conscious during an operation. Even if the plaintiff could establish a prima facie 
case of being conscious during the operation due to negligence, the defendants can answer that all proper steps 
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Scott v London & St Katherine Docks Co (n 34) 596. 
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Ballard v North British railway Co (n 8). 
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(iii) the cause of the occurrence must be unknown.  
Notwithstanding the clear requirements of the maxim, it appears that various courts applied 
the maxim differently. Cases in which swabs or instruments were left behind by surgeons, 
seemingly ‘obvious-mistake’ cases or blatant blunders,61 are not interpreted by the court as 
constituting a lack of care or negligent conduct.62 The res ipsa loquitur maxim in a medical 
negligence case is not based on ‘objective facts’,63 but only on an inference of negligence 
derived from the facts. If negligence cannot be inferred from the facts and additional 
information64 is called for, the res ipsa loquitur maxim cannot be applied. It is the thesis 
statement that in all medical cases in South Africa negligence cannot be inferred from the 
facts and additional medical expert evidence is almost always needed to determine liability 
by showing what precautionary measures the medical professional should have taken in 
accordance with the standard of care. The latter deduction, namely that it seems that in 
England the res ipsa loquitur maxim can also not apply if negligence cannot be inferred from 
the facts and where additional information is necessary to infer negligence, needs further 
analysis. 
 
4.1 The instrument should be under the control of the defendant 
Although ‘control over the instrument’ is a prerequisite for the use of the res ipsa loquitur 
maxim, this criterion indicates that the defendant causing the accident must have been in total 
control of the instrument65 without the involvement of other role players. The principle is that 
the damage to the claimant would not have occurred ‘but for’ the action of the defendant-
doctor who was in control of the situation, and it addresses the notion of causation. Control 
suggests a direct link between the action (negligence) of the doctor and the injury to the 
claimant. If the claimant cannot determine who caused the injury, but the surgeon was in 
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Obvious-mistake cases are also referred to as ‘blatant blunders’: see R Dahlquist ‘Common knowledge in 
medical malpractice litigation: A diagnosis and prescription’ (1982) Pacific LJ 133 and chap II A.  
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control of the operation, then the maxim applies.66 If more than one person was in control of 
the treatment of the patient, the maxim cannot apply.67 
 To prove negligence the claimant must show the existence of a duty of care that was 
breached by the defendant in a situation under his control and that the breach caused the 
injury to the claimant. The standard of care is determined with the assistance of an objective 
test of what a reasonable person would have done under similar circumstances. In Roe v 
Minister of Health,68 the court held that the standard of care required to satisfy the obligation 
of reasonable care is the same standard as in the tort of negligence. The surgeon contracts to 
perform an operation with reasonable care. If the instrument or situation is under the control 
of the defendant and the nature of the occurrence is such that it would not have occurred but 
for the lack of proper care, then the defendant is presumed to have been negligent. The 
inference of negligence may be refuted with evidence explaining that the accident occurred 
without the defendant being negligent. His Lordship Justice Morris said that there is no magic 
in the phrase res ipsa loquitur (‘the thing speaks for itself’), as it is simply a submission that 
the facts have established a prima facie case against the defendant. Hence, he accepted the 
presumption created by the res ipsa loquitur maxim ie that it can be inferred that someone 
had been negligent as the claimant had made out a prima facie case.69 The facts of the case 
illustrated that regardless that the defendant was in total control of the situation, he cannot be 
held liable if he could not reasonably have foreseen the danger. 
 The facts of the case were that during 1947 Mr Roe and another patient underwent 
surgery in a hospital under the management of the Minister of Health. Before they entered the 
operating theatre, an anaesthetic agent containing Nupercaine was administered by means of 
a lumbar puncture or spinal block. It was the usual practice to leave the anaesthetic agent in 
glass ampoules immersed in a phenol solution in order to reduce the risk of infection. In 
1954, seven years later, it was discovered that the glass had micro-cracks that were invisible 
to the eye; these cracks allowed the phenol to penetrate the glass. The phenol contaminated 
the anaesthetic agent and the latter, after being injected as a spinal block, caused permanent 
damage to the nerves of the claimant, which resulted in paraplegia.  
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The matter was taken on appeal to the court of appeal of England and Wales. On 
appeal, Lord Justice Denning overruled the decision of the court a quo and pronounced that 
the maxim res ipsa loquitur was applicable, as the facts did speak for themselves and the 
hospital and anaesthetist should provide an answer. He explained that, if a person is admitted 
for surgery for a minor complaint and is discharged as a paraplegic, this calls for an 
explanation. The defendant-hospital offered an alternative explanation in defence (in 1954), 
which was that, although the micro-cracks in the vial had indeed allowed for the 
contamination of the anaesthetic, it was not foreseeable that such an incident might occur, 
given the prevailing scientific knowledge in 1947. During 1947, the reasonable anaesthetist 
would have stored the anaesthetic agent in a similar manner and therefore the hospital 
management could not be held liable for failing to take precautions. The fact that the 
profession had changed its practice in the light of experience proved that the profession was 
responsible in its self-regulation.70 Denning LJ rejected part of the claimant’s arguments that 
‘we must not look at the 1947 incident with 1954 spectacles’, and he accepted that no breach 
of duty occurred, as the risk was unknown at the time and as such not foreseeable. Of interest 
is that the court found that the maxim applied, which allowed an inference of negligence 
because the severe outcome called for an explanation. No other explanation was offered save 
for the contaminated vial seven years later. Whether this was the true cause of the injury is 
arguable among medical professionals; a plausible alternative cause of the injury, not 
presented to the court, was the inadvertent spinal injection71 into a blood vessel, which most 
likely was the cause of paraplegia. 
Nevertheless, Puxon72 argues that the maxim remains an important adjunct to justice, 
where a plaintiff is unable, in the nature of things, to hold either the technique or the operator 
responsible for an injury. Without the assistance of the maxim to draw an inference of 
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negligence, the court would be denied the evidence of the defendant and would be powerless 
to investigate the case fully. Puxon73 explains that it is clear that two escape routes are usually 
available for the defendant to avoid liability after the maxim is accepted by the court: first, to 
furnish an explanation that shows there was no negligence, ie that there was a plausible 
alternative cause of the injury to the claimant over which the defendant had no control, and 
second, to show that all reasonable care was exercised during the incident. The author 
remarks that, due to the profound difficulty of producing an explanation that shows there was 
no negligence, some ‘exotic’ explanations have been offered by the defendants. Since there is 
no obligation on the defendant to disprove negligence; he needs only furnish an explanation 
to show that he was careful in his actions and that, according to his explanation in rebuttal, 
his actions were not the cause of the injury. It can be argued that the resourceful answers of 
the defendants, in rebuttal, focus on disproving negligence rather than concentrating on truth-
finding principles that should explain the acceptable standard of care to the court. In 
furnishing a possible but improbable explanation, not necessarily relevant to the real cause of 
action in the case, the defendants over-complicate the medical negligence matter, as the court 
now not only has to entertain the alternative cause of injury presented by the defendant in 
rebuttal, but also has to determine the sometimes hidden and real cause of the injury. It seems 
that the maxim puts a further burden on the claimant to refute the defendant’s answer in 
rebutting the maxim, in addition to proving causation. 
 
4.2 Negligence has to be obvious from the facts 
The second element of the res ipsa loquitur maxim, that negligence has to be deduced from 
the facts, should be a significant cause of indecision, because of the specialised field of 
medicine. However as seen before, in contrast to South African law an inference of 
negligence can simply be derived from the undesired outcome of a medical incident under the 
control of the defendant which is then attributed to the lack of care exercised by the 
defendant. If used in its strict sense and in a technically correct manner, it was argued that all 
medical negligence cases, except for the obvious mistake cases, would be excluded74 from the 
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maxim, as the facts of a medical negligence case are not easily understood by a non-medical 
person. In this regard Jones75 explains that the circumstances and control over the instrument 
should be such that ‘in the ordinary course of things’ accidents do not happen unless someone 
was negligent. The statement is based on ordinary life experiences and on the usual 
experiences of humans. Barrels76 and sugar bags77 do not fall from second storeys, and the 
amputation of the left leg instead of the right leg is an objective fact from which anyone can 
infer that a lack of care and negligence were likely. However, not every medical adverse 
event may constitute negligence – this depends on what information or objective facts are 
available – but a medical adverse event under the control of the doctor nevertheless may 
create a legal presumption of negligence in England.  
The English court recognises the difficulty it has in drawing an inference of 
negligence based on the facts in complicated cases. In certain cases there would be equally 
possible explanations and it would be equally likely for an occurrence to have occurred 
whether there was negligence or not. In Jones v Great Western Railway Co,78 a certain 
Murray had to put on the brakes of a railway carriage to control its speed. The brake-handle 
was defective and Murray was thrown off balance as a result of the defective brake and was 
killed. The court had to determine whether the facts furthered the case beyond conjecture into 
a legal inference. Lord MacMillan held that the test to establish whether there exists a 
presumption of negligence is the dividing line between conjecture and inference. He stated 
that a conjecture may be plausible but is of no legal value, as in essence it is a mere guess. A 
legal inference is deduced from the facts and, if it is a reasonable deduction, it may have the 
validity of legal proof. He said that to attribute a certain cause to the occurrence is always a 
matter of inference. The cogency of a legal inference of causation may vary in degree 
between practical certainty and reasonable probability. Where the coincidence of cause and 
effect is not a matter of actual observation, there is necessarily an interruption in the direct 
evidence, but this may be legitimately bridged by an inference from the facts actually 
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observed and proved. His Lordship referred to Lord Penzance in Parfitt v Lawless79 who 
pronounced that from every fact that is proved, legitimate and reasonable inferences may be 
drawn, and all that is deducible from the evidence is as much proved for the purpose of a 
prima facie case as if it had been proved directly.  
The presumption of negligence in a medical case was tested in Cassidy v Minister of 
Health.80 Mr Cassidy suffered from Dupuytren’s contracture81 of his third and fourth finger 
and underwent an operation. Following the operation, his hand was put in a rigid splint. 
Subsequently, Mr Cassidy experienced severe pain, so he consulted Dr Rolandson and Dr 
Fahrni. They decided not to remove the splint. About 14 days later the splint was removed 
and Mr Cassidy presented with four fingers that were stiff and virtually useless. The Court of 
Appeal held that the hospital was responsible for all persons who treated the claimant, and, 
after treatment, the claimant was in a worse condition than before. The plaintiff raised an 
inference of negligence based on res ipsa loquitur. The court decided that it was impossible 
to reach a clear conclusion about the cause of the injury because the defendant did not call a 
medical expert. The defendant failed to defend the prima facie case of negligence and the 
court ruled in favour of the claimant. 
Two aspects of the incident influenced the court’s decision: that the surgeon was 
employed by the hospital and that the defendant presented no evidence in rebuttal. First, if the 
control of the medical intervention was in the hands of more than one professional person, all 
under the supervision of the employer, a general assumption of negligence may be possible, 
in accordance with the prima facie case. Had the surgeon been in private practice, factual 
causation would have presented a problem. To draw an inference of negligence might not 
have been possible, as specific evidence regarding the operation and follow-up treatment 
would have been essential, based on the fact that not everything was under the control of the 
surgeon. Second, the defendant’s failure to refute the evidentiary burden, created by the res 
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ipsa loquitur maxim, led to the defendant being found liable. In order for the court to accept 
the inference of negligence the court relied on the assumption that the condition worsened as 
a result of the failure to treat. The only information before the court was evidence of a bad 
outcome. It appears that the plaintiff’s success was based on a legal procedural mechanism. 
The plaintiff’s prima facie evidence became conclusive evidence because of the defendant’s 
silence. This supports the notion that any medical accident is prima facie evidence of 
negligence, and when the res ipsa loquitur maxim is accepted by the court, the defendant 
should rebut the inference of negligence with evidence showing that he took proper care in 
the circumstances or with an explanation of alternative cause of injury that negates 
negligence. If such an explanation is not presented, the claimant’s case will remain 
unchallenged. Jones82 warns against the oversimplification of medical matters. If a claimant 
came out of a hospital in a worse condition than when he was admitted, this does not ipso 
facto mean that there was negligence; the situation is merely prima facie evidence of 
negligence that can be refuted.  
Some of the intricacies involved in the application of the res ipsa loquitur maxim 
under circumstances where negligence should be obvious from the facts are illustrated in 
Mahon v Osborne.83 In this case, Mr Mahon underwent duodenal (small bowel) surgery for a 
duodenal ulcer. The surgeon used surgical packs to absorb bleeding and the bowel contents. 
This difficult emergency operation was performed by the surgeon alone. The surgeon 
conducted a swab count with the theatre sister. The wound was sutured but a swab was 
retained. The medical condition of Mr Mahon deteriorated and he had to undergo emergency 
surgery; the missing swab was discovered during surgery. The swab had already formed an 
abscess. The condition of Mr Mahon deteriorated further and he died. The mother of Mr 
Mahon instituted legal action. The majority per Lord Justice Scott pronounced that, without 
the assistance of medical experts to explain to the court ‘the ordinary course of things’ in the 
practice of medicine in a complicated surgical operation, the court was unable to say that the 
occurrence indicated negligence. His Lordship was unwilling to draw the negative inference 
required by the res ipsa loquitur maxim and explained that there might be surgical reasons 
for ending an operation as rapidly as possible. His Lordship held that the required medical 
care and treatment are unknown to the normal person in the street and the ordinary judge. His 
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Lordship concluded that the surgeon is only bound to display the sufficient skill and 
knowledge of his profession. If an accident occurs, or there is some variation in the frame of 
a particular individual, and an injury happens, it is not the fault of the surgeon. 
Dissenting from Lord Justice Scott, his Lordship Goddard held that the res ipsa 
loquitur maxim should undoubtedly apply, as there can be no question that, if a swab is 
retained, there can be no other inference than that it was left behind due to negligence. The 
surgeon should be called to explain his actions. The surgeon need not necessarily explain 
why he failed to detect the retained swab, but he should at least explain whether he exercised 
due care to prevent it being left behind. His Lordship expressed the opinion that if the 
claimant could not call on the surgeon for an explanation, then an unwarranted protection 
would be given to carelessness. His Lordship stated that information was needed from the 
surgeon, because with sufficient explanation all the facts of the cause of the accident would 
become known, and the court would be in a proper position to determine whether there was 
negligence or not.  
From the conflicting opinions of the judges, it seems that swab cases are more 
complicated than they need be. The majority per Scott LJ stated that it is not every slip or 
mistake that imports negligence and it is necessary to consider the different circumstances 
that may present themselves for urgent attention.84  A presumption of negligence is designed 
to infer lack of care from the objective facts. In the Australian case Elliot v Bickerstaff85 it 
was held that the res ipsa loquitur maxim could not apply in a swab case in which the 
surgeon was cited and not the hospital, because the surgeon delegated the task of counting 
swabs to the theatre staff. The surgeon would at some stage seek confirmation from the 
theatre staff that all the swabs had been accounted for.  This similar stance of the English 
court is seen in the later application of the maxim, explicitly expressed in Ratcliffe v 
Plymouth & Torbay Health Authority,86 namely, that the maxim allows a plaintiff to come to 
court with prima facie evidence of negligence that should be answered, and that the plaintiff 
should obtain medical expert evidence to support his case once the maxim’s function has run 
its course. Evidently, the retention of swabs or surgical instruments inside the patient, 
following a surgical operation, does not constitute negligence, only prima facie evidence of 
negligence. If, after an operation where a swab was retained, a surgeon is found not to be 
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negligent in leaving the swab behind, it is almost certain that the nurse responsible for the 
swab count will be found negligent.  
 
4.3 The actual cause of the accident should be unknown 
The value of the res ipsa loquitur maxim is that it enables a claimant who has no knowledge 
or inadequate knowledge about how the undesired medical incident occurred to rely on the 
accident per se and the circumstances of the accident as objective facts to infer negligence. It 
prevents the defendant, who most probably knows what occurred, from avoiding having to 
provide an explanation. This simply means that the law allows a presumption of negligence 
from the mere fact of the injury under the control of the defendant and that such a 
presumption will become conclusive evidence of negligence if not defended. It is important 
to make a fundamental distinction between not understanding the medical facts and not 
having any information available regarding the medical incident to determine the inferred 
cause of the injury.  
 It was established in Barkway v South Wales Transport Co Ltd that if all the facts are 
known but the uncertainty lies with the fact that more than one causes of the accident exists, 
then the question whether negligence has been established will be determined as the most 
probable cause and the maxim is not applicable.87 The inference of negligence will suffice 
only if nothing more is put to the court and it is shown that ‘in the ordinary course of things’ 
it is more likely than not that the occurrence occurred without due care. The court held that 
the maxim is based on common sense, and the purpose of the maxim is to enable justice to be 
done when the facts bearing on causation and on the care exercised by the defendant are at 
the outset unknown to the plaintiff and ought to be within the knowledge of the defendant.88 
In Hay v Grampian Health Board89 the court confirmed that the res ipsa loquitur maxim is 
not applicable when all the facts are known. In this case, the plaintiff suffered from a 
depressive illness, had previously attempted suicide at the same hospital, and then hanged 
himself with a scarf. He was resuscitated, but suffered permanent brain damage. The court 
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was asked to consider whether the res ipsa loquitur principles were applicable. The court 
found that where all the facts are known, the case fails to be one where ‘the facts speak for 
themselves’ and the plaintiff must establish on the principles of tort that the defendant 
breached his duty to the plaintiff. The court followed the principles laid down by Ballard v 
North British Railway Co.90 
The status of the maxim was reaffirmed in Delaney v Southmead Health Authority.91 
The plaintiff sustained an unexplained injury to her brachial plexus (the junction of nerves in 
the shoulder) following a cholecystectomy (an operation to remove the gall bladder). The 
claimant argued that the only real explanation was that the arm had been hyper-abducted 
and/or extensively over-rotated but there was no direct evidence available. Lord Justice 
Stuart-Smith held92 that the maxim was not applicable. The judge said that, even if the maxim 
could have been applied to this matter, it was always open for a defendant to rebut a case by 
giving an explanation that was inconsistent with negligence, or for the defendant to show to 
the court that he had exercised all reasonable care. In rebuttal, the defendant-anaesthetist said 
that he took all reasonable care to insert the needle into the arm to administer the anaesthesia, 
which could not have caused the injury to the shoulder. His Lordship Stuart-Smith explained 
that the defendant should in his defence show that he took all reasonable care and that the 
unfortunate occurrence was due to a misadventure or that some other cause existed to explain 
the injury. A satisfactory explanation will allow the defendant to escape liability. The court 
found that the anaesthetist had exercised all due care in carrying out the procedure, even 
though the injury remained unexplained. Although the court entertained a presumption of 
negligence that the defendant was called to answer, the court held that in medical negligence 
cases, where full evidence, including evidence from experts on both sides, has been heard it is 
only in a rare case that the res ipsa loquitur maxim will assist the court. Lord Justice Stuart-
Smith said that he was ‘doubtful whether it is of much assistance in medical negligence at 
any rate when all the evidence in the case had been adduced.’93 
The court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s appeal cannot be faulted, but for different 
reasons. First, it seems that a more credible alternative cause of injury was not accepted by 
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the court. Available and more credible medical information94 presented to the court would 
have explained the traction injury to the brachial plexus. The injury was the result of pulling 
the patient by her arms when transferring her from the theatre bed to another bed. It seems the 
court was indecisive because of a lack of direct evidence. Second, the insertion of the needle 
into the arm of the plaintiff had no bearing on her shoulder injury. As such, the claimant 
possibly identified the wrong tortious actor in that the anaesthetist may not have assisted with 
moving the patient from one bed to another; it was uncertain who transferred the patient. The 
defendant was called to rebut the presumption of negligence based on prima facie evidence 
(the undesirable result) of lack of care. The anaesthetist had no duty to explain to the plaintiff 
the true facts (medical reality) of the case. He discharged his initial duty owed to the plaintiff, 
ie that the anaesthesia was performed with the proper skill and care. He therefore only had to 
refute factual causation allegations, ie that the anaesthetic agent or the administration thereof 
did not cause the injury. He simply explained to the court that he took reasonable care to 
insert the needle and that any injury during the anaesthesia was not related to the actual 
injury. Doubt as to the cause of the injury and failure to cite the correct defendant caused the 
plaintiff to lose the case. Adequate knowledge of the medical facts would have ensured that 
the correct parties were cited. The injury could have been caused by any one of the doctors, 
theatre personnel or general staff who transferred the claimant from one bed to another 
without taking proper care. Third, like Cassidy v Minister of Health,95 mentioned previously,96 
the claimant in Delaney v Southmead Health Authority97 emerged from an operation with an 
injury to a body part unrelated to the initial medical complaint. If the function of the maxim is 
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correctly understood one can argue that, based on the established principles of Cassidy v 
Minister of Health,98 Delaney v Southmead Health Authority99 it should have been a res ipsa 
loquitur case against the hospital and the doctor, because the plaintiff went into hospital to 
have her gall bladder removed and came out with a severe injury to her left shoulder. The 
hospital should have been called to explain how this could have happened under their control 
without negligence. However it is argued that the facts in Delaney v Southmead Health 
Authority100 give rise to the court’s failure to distinguish between not understanding the 
medical facts and not having any information available to determine what caused the injury. 
Furthermore, it appears that an insufficient understanding of the medical reality resulted in 
the claimant failing to present a case against both hospital and doctor based on ordinary tort 
principles with a high probability of success.  
In Bouchta v Swindon Health Authority,101 based on Delaney v Southmead Health 
Authority,102 the court demonstrated the judicial reluctance to apply the res ipsa loquitur 
maxim to medical negligence cases. The plaintiff suffered damages when the ureter (tube 
between the bladder and kidney) was damaged during a hysterectomy. Four weeks after being 
discharged from hospital the claimant presented with a ureter leak and further correctional 
surgery was needed. The judge held that he was ‘reluctant to apply such a test [res ipsa 
loquitur] to issues of medical judgment unless [he was] compelled to do so’, and that the 
plaintiff had to satisfy the court that there was in this instance no good or satisfactory 
explanation for the injury. Accordingly, the defendants explained that it was a difficult 
operation because of the obesity of the plaintiff; they confirmed that they exercised the 
necessary care when removing the uterus in two phases, and ensured that they could palpate 
the ureter all along. They offered no explanation as to why and how the ureter had been 
damaged. The court found in favour of the plaintiff. The reluctance of the court to accept the 
application of the res ipsa loquitur maxim was noticeable. The court avoided any decision 
concerning the maxim. It can be argued that, perhaps in the light of all the information 
presented to the court, there was no need to justify the use of the res ipsa loquitur maxim.  
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Puxon,103 in her comments on Bouchta v Swindon Health Authority,104 advises that the 
application of res ipsa loquitur principles should be put to rest as there is no room for such an 
evidential device in cases of medical negligence. She says the application of the res ipsa 
loquitur principles depends on the plaintiff showing that there is no explanation for the 
accident other than negligence. Once it is shown that the damage was not the result of 
negligence, the burden of proof will remain with the plaintiff.105As indicated before, the 
defendant-doctor will be more inclined to furnish a possible but not necessarily plausible 
explanation to defend his case than to assist the court to find the cause of the injury, thereby 
complicating a medical negligence case, and more so where the maxim is used. This seems to 
mean that the claimant will bear the burden of disproving the defendant’s rebuttal arguments, 
together with having to prove that the injury was the result of negligence (the initial burden of 
proof). 
 
5 Inconsistent application of the res ipsa loquitur maxim 
In summary, after the cases of Scott106 and Byrne,107 it was found that the res ipsa loquitur 
maxim can be invoked where an incident occurred in circumstances under the control of the 
defendant where such occurrences do not usually happen108 ‘but for’ the lack of proper care. 
The main function of the maxim is to permit an inference of negligence based on the fact of 
the accident. In the event that the defendant fails to rebut the inference of negligence, he will 
be found liable. From the objective facts, it should be evident that the finding of negligence is 
based on whether the defendant, who is in control and owed a duty of care to the claimant, 
breached that duty because he fell short of the standard of care expected. In order to meet the 
requirements of the res ipsa loquitur maxim, the facts of the case should be such that they 
allow an inference of negligence.109 In a situation where the plaintiff relies only on the res 
ipsa loquitur maxim without medical expert evidence, the court will test the defendant’s 
medical evidence in explanation to determine whether the conduct occurred with the 
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necessary prescribed care. If the court rejects the defendant’s explanation, the plaintiff’s 
prima facie case will stand and the plaintiff will be successful. If the court accepts the 
explanation of the defendant, however, as an alternative non-negligent action that was 
performed with the prescribed care, the case of the plaintiff will fail in the absence of other 
medical expert evidence.  
It was not consistently applied as was evident from Saunders v Leeds Western Health 
Authority,110 where a four-year-old girl went for surgical repair to a congenital defect of the 
hip (Colonna’s capsular arthroplasty).111 She suffered cardiac arrest during anaesthesia and 
was not adequately resuscitated. She suffered permanent brain damage because she was 
without sufficient oxygen for a long period.112 She was mentally incapacitated, suffered from 
spastic quadriplegia and had severely defective vision, thus requiring full-time medical 
assistance. The plaintiff relied on the res ipsa loquitur maxim, stating that– 
 
fit children do not suffer cardiac arrest when under anaesthetic if proper care is taken 
by those undertaking the administration of the anaesthetic, and control the condition 
of the child during the operation. [It is further said that] if the defendants cannot 
explain how the arrest occurred without negligence, then they are liable in that those 
who had the management of the anaesthetic process must inevitable have failed to 




The defendant’s explanation, in rebuttal, was rejected by the court. The defendant stated that 
the cardiac arrest occurred as a result of an unforeseen paradoxical air embolism114 that 
blocked the coronary artery, and as a result thereof deprived the brain of oxygen. The medical 
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information was discussed. The two anaesthetist-defendants prepared a memorandum in 
which the exact medical process was explained. In their version, the child’s pulse was 
constantly monitored but her blood pressure was not monitored. The pulse was monitored by 
palpation. The one anaesthetist controlled the ventilator with his right hand and with the left 
they monitored the left radial and the temporal pulse. The other administered an analgesic, 
Pethidine (known for its hypotension-effect), and a neuromuscular blocking agent, 
Tubocurarine,115 to produce paralysis and maintain anaesthesia. The court did not find the 
explanation convincing and decided in favour of the plaintiff. 
The monitoring of the child’s pulse without a cardiac monitor was challenged and the 
court questioned whether this constituted acceptable reasonable practice. The court stated that 
proper monitoring would have revealed different signs and might have included a 
forewarning of the cardiac arrest.116 If such monitoring was not undertaken adequately it 
could have caused or contributed to the cardiac arrest. The court based its decision on its 
rejection of the defendant’s explanation in rebuttal and an acceptance that the pulse was not 
monitored sufficiently. The judge (interpreted the maxim as a rebuttable presumption) held 
that ‘the plaintiff’s reliance upon res ipsa loquitur made it unnecessary for her to suggest a 
specific cause or causes for the cardiac arrest. She did not do so’.117 It is not clear whether the 
court established factual causation, but once the alternative explanation as to how the heart 
stopped without negligence was rejected, the only conclusion remaining was that the cardiac 
arrest was the result of negligence. 
 In Ritchie v Chichester Health Authority,118 the plaintiff received epidural anaesthesia 
during labour and as a result she contracted cauda equina syndrome. She suffered damage to 
the nerves in the lower part of her spine feeding the saddle area. She suffered from permanent 
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lower back pain, lower limb weakness, bowel and bladder dysfunction, and sexual 
dysfunction.119 The plaintiff relied on the res ipsa loquitur maxim, alleging that a neurotoxic 
substance was administered during the epidural that caused the symptoms. Thompson J 
referred to Delaney v Southmead Health Authority120 and said that in his opinion the maxim 
was not precluded from being used in medical cases, and that medical negligence is not a 
special category that puts it outside the ordinary English law of negligence. However, the 
maxim may not help if sufficient medical evidence is available. A medical article was 
presented to the court showing the incidence of a wrong drug being administered causing 
similar symptoms. The judge held that ‘it would be wholly unrealistic to assume that it could 
not and does not happen here’. The article assisted the finding that the accident should not 
simply be attributed to a ‘medical mystery’, which was the argument advanced by the 
defendants. The article supported the conclusion that the anaesthetist had injected a 
neurotoxic substance when administering the epidural anaesthesia. The court held that the 
plaintiff’s account of the pain that she experienced at the time when the epidural was set up 
was accurate or substantially accurate. The defendants were held liable on the basis that the 
anaesthetist injected this neurotoxic substance. Thompson J explained that there is no 
obligation on the defendants to set up a positive case in an endeavour to show how the 
damage to the plaintiff occurred without any fault on their part. If they do, it adds to the 
burden on the plaintiff. The court continued that for the plaintiff to succeed she must first 
disprove the defendant’s positive case and then show that the defendants were negligent, 
unless the principle of res ipsa loquitur worked for her in that the defendants’ explanation 
was rejected. The judge dismissed the two positive defences advanced by the defendants (as 
an alternative explanation negating negligence) and accepted that the plaintiff discharged the 
onus of proof. It is evident from the facts that the court was able to establish a probable cause 
of the injury, which is different from Saunders v Leeds Western Health Authority,121 where 
the reason for the cardiac arrest was not established but the claimant was successful, simply 
based on the fact that the defendant’s explanation was rejected. 
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In Howard v Wessex Regional Health Authority122 the plaintiff underwent a surgical 
operation of a sagittal split osteotomy to correct mandibular prognathism (protruding jaw). 
The plaintiff returned from theatre suffering from tetraplegia123 (complete paralysis of the 
body from below the jaw) and averred that she was injured during surgery. The claimant 
relied on the res ipsa loquitur maxim. The claimant averred that an over-extension of her 
neck caused the injury, whereas the defendants argued that the claimant had suffered from a 
rare condition called fibro-cartilaginous embolism (blockage in a blood vessel in the spinal 
cord). The court held that the plaintiff has to show that the objective facts are indicative of 
and infer negligence and that negligence was the probable and likely cause of the injury. The 
plaintiff carries the onus of proof throughout the case, and the plaintiff did not discharge the 
onus resting on her to show that she suffered the tetraplegia as a result of the initial surgery. 
The res ipsa loquitur maxim was found to be inappropriate. The defendant’s explanation that 
a fibro-cartilaginous embolism caused the tetraplegia was accepted, rather than the plaintiff’s 
allegation that trauma caused her injuries. The judge concluded that there was no over-
extension of the claimant’s neck in theatre because no one in theatre noticed such an 
occurrence. It is important to note that, generically, the facts of this case should be similar to 
a res ipsa loquitur case: the plaintiff went into theatre able to walk and came out suffering 
from tetraplegia from the jaw down. Yet, as in Mahon v Osborne,124 the inadequate medical 
expert evidence presented to the court by the claimant resulted in her defeat. If a claimant 
relies on the maxim without medical expert evidence to explain the expected standard of care, 
the maxim seems to be an unsatisfactory vehicle to discharge a burden of proof, especially if 
evidence of a careful and not careless action is offered. The claimant relied on the maxim in 
the Howard case without medical expert evidence and the court remained unconvinced 
because the surgeons testified that they took the appropriate care during the operation. This 
was the situation despite the fact that the most likely cause of the injury was before the court 
(in the form of the presumption created by the maxim), namely, that well-known trauma to 
the neck through over-extension of the neck for a prolonged period (the exact position of the 
claimant during surgery) caused the injury. The writer argues that the court was convinced to 
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accept an unchallenged explanation of a very rare event of fibro-cartilaginous embolism (only 
29 documented cases in the world over the last 30 years), which was advanced as a defence 
10 years after the above operation.125 The explanation in rebuttal was presented by medical 
expert evidence, and the former, more probable cause of the injury was presented only in the 
form of a presumption. This is a paradigm example of the dangers posed by the res ipsa 
loquitur maxim. 
In Glass v Cambridge Health Authority,126 the plaintiff went for an exploratory 
laparotomy, because he sustained an injury to the abdomen. Under anaesthesia he suffered 
cardiac arrest and permanent brain damage. The anaesthetist failed to monitor the patient’s 
medical condition during the transition from automatic to spontaneous ventilation. Rix J 
allowed the res ipsa loquitur maxim and thus placed an evidential burden on the defendant to 
refute the inference created by the maxim that the cardiac arrest was caused by hypoxia due 
to a lack of proper care. The defendant offered an explanation that during surgery a gas 
embolism entered the major blood vessels when the wounds of the plaintiff were disinfected 
with hydrogen peroxide. The court held that the defendant did not have to show that their 
explanation in rebuttal was more likely than not. It was sufficient for the defendant to show 
that the assistance to the patient during the transition from automatic ventilation to 
spontaneous ventilation was done with due care. This, in turn, displaced the prima facie 
inference created by the res ipsa loquitur maxim. However, the plaintiff had shown, on a 
balance of probability, that the defendant’s lack of care in monitoring and supporting 
spontaneous ventilation caused the cardiac arrest, hypoxia and brain damage. The court found 
that the defendants failed to show an alternative cause of the injury, as the gas embolism 
theory was not accepted. They failed to refute the allegation that the inefficient transition 
from mechanic ventilation to spontaneous ventilation caused a period of hypoxia (lack of 
oxygen) that was allowed to deteriorate to such an extent that it caused cardiac arrest and 
ultimately brain damage. The court found for the plaintiff.  
Ostensibly, when the res ipsa loquitur maxim is raised by the plaintiff, the court 
seems to look at two aspects. First, the question whether the facts or undesired incident 
support prima facie evidence of negligence that demands an answer; and second, whether 
there is an alternative explanation for the occurrence that negates negligence. The latter 
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places a burden on the defendant to show an alternative cause of the harm in order to refute 
the res ipsa loquitur maxim. Unfortunately, this function of the maxim gave rise to 
implausible, ingenious and ‘exotic’127 explanations being offered by defendants.128 Once the 
res ipsa loquitur maxim is accepted, the claimant has convinced the court that he has a prima 
facie case of negligence. This compels the defendant to rebut the claim; if he fails to do so, 
the court will find for the claimant. Based on the fact that the defendant only has to convince 
the court that there is another explanation (but not discharge an onus), the defendant may rely 
on any fanciful explanation.129 If the claimant relied on the maxim in addition to presenting 
expert evidence, the fanciful explanation from the defendant will be refuted with convincing 
medical expert evidence regarding the true or more probable cause of the injury. Without 
medical expert evidence explaining the defendant’s actions against the set standard of care 
and with only the presumption of negligence from the maxim, the claimant would be at a 
disadvantage to convince the court in his favour. The res ipsa loquitur maxim may assist a 
plaintiff in getting to court to compel an answer from the defendant, because a prima facie 
case was made out, based on an adverse medical error, but without medical expert evidence 
to support the plaintiff’s case, the defendant can offer any explanation as an alternative cause 
of the harm and it may satisfy the court. Thus the risk for the plaintiff using the res ipsa 
loquitur maxim is twofold. First, if the plaintiff proceeds to court using the res ipsa loquitur 
maxim without medical expert evidence, the court may accept the defendant’s explanation, 
and the plaintiff’s case will fail. Second, in relying on the maxim the plaintiff attracts a 
further burden, ie disproving the defendant’s explanation in reply to the res ipsa loquitur 
maxim. It is thus evident that it is safer for a plaintiff to proceed to court with the assistance 
of medical expert evidence when relying on the maxim for the reason that the defendant is 
now directed to refuting a particular allegation and will hardly present some exotic 
explanation. Furthermore, if the court decides that the plaintiff’s reliance on the maxim is 
inappropriate, the plaintiff’s case is supported with evidence to prove his case in any event, 
but this time with substantial medical evidence. 
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6 Explanations in rebuttal 
As discussed above, some creative explanations have been offered by defendants as 
alternative causes of harm to escape a finding of negligence. Most cases relied on the maxim 
because of an inadvertent error, eg retained swabs and surgical instruments;130 or neglectful 
care during the postoperative recovery period;131 or administration of the wrong medical 
substance;132 or damage to nerves as a result of unskilful or careless conduct and so forth. In 
an action for medical negligence the test for a breach of duty is to determine whether the 
defendant’s conduct was reasonable in the specific set of circumstances. The court seeks to 
draw a balance between proper care and negligent care. A strict application of the maxim 
denies the process of justice to find such a balance. Medical evidence informs the court how 
the defendant ought to have behaved or the acceptable medical standard expected of the 
defendant: Did he fail to keep up with developments in his field of expertise? Did he take an 
unjustified risk at the time of the incident? Was the harm foreseeable at the time? Did he 
perform a task beyond his competence? When the res ipsa loquitur maxim is accepted 
without medical expert evidence from the plaintiff, the court acknowledges that the facts of 
the case support prima facie evidence of negligence. The court tacitly accepts that the 
hypothetical reasonable doctor would not have acted as the defendant did. The defendant has 
to offer an alternative explanation that shows that there was no negligence, but does not have 
to disprove negligence. It is argued that in these cases the court seems to find the standard of 
care (the hypothetical reasonable doctor standard) from the testimony of the defendant or the 
defendant’s medical expert who may not be an independent witness and who may not testify 
whether the defendant’s action was in accordance with internationally accepted standards 
dictated by the profession or that the defendant was not competent in his service delivery.133 
 
6.1 An explanation offered by the defendant of an inherent risk or complication 
In O’Malley-Williams v Governors of the National Hospital for Nervous Diseases,134 the 
claimant underwent an aortogram135 after stenosis of the right carotid artery was diagnosed. 
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The anaesthetist’s first attempt to insert the stent through the femoral artery in the groin 
failed, and another attempt was performed to enter through the axilliary artery (under the 
arm). The plaintiff suffered a nerve injury, which resulted in paralysis of the right hand. His 
Lordship Justice Bridge rejected the inference of negligence and therefore the res ipsa 
loquitur maxim. The court found that nerve injury is a recognised complication of the 
medical procedure involved. The court held that a sufficient reasonable explanation for the 
injury had been furnished. The court also found that the failure to warn of such a remote 
risk136 did not constitute a breach of the anaesthetist’s duty of care. The court dismissed the 
plaintiff’s claim. 
Evidently the court allowed the ‘remote risk’ to be a reasonable and acceptable 
explanation for the nerve damage. It remains unclear how the test of ‘reasonable care’ was 
determined. The defendant’s conduct with regard to sufficient and reasonable care was not 
clarified. The defendant should have been aware of the innate risks and complications of such 
a medical intervention and should have taken steps to avoid it. A reasonable physician would 
have stayed in touch with developments in the field and would have been aware that the 
axilliary artery carries a higher risk of injury than the femoral artery.137 A reasonable 
physician would have performed the arteriogram via the femoral artery in the other leg, as it 
carries a lower risk of injury to the nerves. A reasonable physician would have consulted a 
more competent and experienced professional for assistance. In fact, the defendant-doctor 
had two previous failed attempts to insert the stent, which indicated a lack of skill and 
competence. Sufficient medical information offered, for example, by Erikson and Jorulf138 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
135
Radiography of the aorta after insertion of contrast material. 
136
See discussion of risks and complications in chapter 4 para 4.1. Also note that complications of a well-known 
inherent risk of an operation should be qualified. A defendant should not escape liability merely because the 
dreaded occurrence becomes a reality. This argument is inherently flawed. To walk across the street among the 
traffic carries the inherent risk of being hit by a car and suffering injury. Evidence is needed to indicate a 
cautious or careless action by the pedestrian or the driver. The careful or careless manner in which the 
pedestrian or the driver acted will render him blameless or liable. The fact that a complication is well known is 
no support for the argument that proper and adequate care was foreseen and guarded against while exercising 
the procedure. The same argument goes for the expression that it was simply ‘bad luck’. 
137
See J Erikson & H Jorulf ‘Surgical complications associated with arterial catherization’ (1970) 4 Scand. J. 
Thoracic & Cardiovascular Surg. 69–75;AF AbuRahma et al ‘Complications of arteriography in a recent series 
of 707 cases: Factors affecting outcome’(1993) 7(2) Ann Vasc Surg. 122–129, where the writers conclude that 
the trans femoral approach (groin area) when performing an arteriogram is substantially safer than the trans 
axillary route (arm), because of the high risk of nerve injury in the arm (the artery runs in close proximity to two 
nerves). 
138
Ritchie v Chichester Health Authority (n 74) 187ff, where the plaintiff sustained cauda equina syndrome 
following an epidural, as discussed in para 5 above. See Erikson & Jorulf (n 137).They argue that the 




would have provided a different perspective to the defence of ‘a known complication’. It 
appears that the court was distracted by the defendant’s explanation that this medical 
intervention carried a high risk of injury. The reliance on the maxim, without medical expert 
evidence in support of the claimant’s case, had the effect that the answer in rebuttal obscured 
the allegations of negligence. It is also worth mentioning that one aspect of the claimant’s 
case was the failure to warn of the risk of injury. This aspect was rejected by the court in 
O’Malley-Williams on the basis that the risk was too remote. In Bolam v Friern Hospital 
Management Committee139 McNair J applied the same test to the question of warning the 
patient as was applied to treatment and diagnosis namely: did the standard of the defendant 
fall below the standard of competent and diligent medical professionals in deciding whether 
or not to warn a patient? 
 
6.2 An explanation offered by the defendant based on statistical medical evidence 
Statistical evidence, reported in the medical literature, should be interpreted in the medical 
context for which it was created. In a research article the abstract sets out specific scientific 
questions from which a conclusion is drawn at the end of the research study.140 In addition, 
these scientific medical conclusions are limited to strict protocols. The interpretation of data 
from such medical literature should be presented by a medical expert, well-versed in the 
particular discipline addressed by the statistical field, who can direct the court to a sound 
explanation and interpretation of the data. Conclusions should be relevant, substantiated and 
drawn from the material tested, and not drawn out of context.141 
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In Vadera v Shaw,142 the Court of Appeal accepted that the trial judge had been right 
to accept the findings of a statistical study. The case is about the alleged negligence of a 
general practitioner who prescribed contraception,143 Logynon, to a 22-year-old Asian 
woman. She suffered a stroke and severe consequences. The court accepted scientific 
statistical evidence on the basis that it standardises legal and scientific evidence. This 
approach assisted the judge in coming to the conclusion that a reasonable medical 
professional would have considered the statistical evidence and would not have prescribed 
the drug. It is concerning to note that the possibility of using such evidence to determine 
factual causation in the future was raised.144 The reluctance of the court to rely on statistical 
evidence is based on the wish to protect the independence of the judiciary and not to allow 
the scientist to usurp the role of the court. Statistical evidence should be seen and interpreted 
in the context of the purpose for which it was created, namely, to assist the medical 
profession in determining safety aspects, reliability, efficacy and so forth.  
In Demery v Cardiff and Vale NHS Trust,145 the plaintiff alleged that a delay of six 
days caused the on-going instability of her ankle and delayed healing. She based the 
allegations on medical expert evidence that showed a better outcome and success rate in a 
majority of cases where surgery was performed promptly. The trial judge indicated that the 
statistical rarity of such failures was of no assistance to him in showing the nexus between the 
delay and the prolonged disability. Evidently the statistical information was not presented in a 
clear and unbiased manner. Statistical evidence would have provided evidence, based on 
international medical scientific data, by way of clinical trials and meta-analysis. Such 
evidence would have led to the conclusion146 that the longer surgical treatment is delayed, the 
higher the risk of complications, ie insufficient healing and resultant disability. A probable 
causational nexus was found in the medical literature between ankle instability and the later 
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development of osteoarthritis. This addresses the element of ‘lack of care’. A medical 
professional’s duty is to provide sufficient care to prevent further harm to his patient. 
Ignoring the higher risk of non-healing and complications relevant to a six-day delay in 
treatment is indicative of not complying with acceptable standards of care and constitutes a 
lack of care.  
The court’s view was that a statistical figure does not by itself give a claimant a cause 
of action.147 However, it is argued that a material increase in the risk of a particular outcome 
is equivalent to a material decrease in the chance of escaping an undesired outcome or bad 
result. 
 
6.3 An explanation offered by the defendant of a remote risk or rare medical condition 
As discussed before,148 the duty imposed by law is an undertaking by the doctor to provide 
advice, to diagnose, and to treat the patient with reasonable skill and care. Furthermore, since 
the doctor is in a position where others would reasonably rely upon his advice and judgment, 
he must inform the patient about significant risks and complications. Such a duty gives rise to 
a duty to warn the patient of material risks. In 2004, in Chester v Afshar,149 the claimant 
claimed that the defendant failed to warn her about the risk of a cauda equina injury150 
following a spinal block injection that was administered to alleviate lower back pain. The 
claimant sustained injuries that involved dysfunction of the bladder, perineum, bowel, lower 
limbs and buttocks. The House of Lords pronounced that the claimant’s injury was the 
product of the very risk that the claimant should have been warned about when she gave her 
consent. Accordingly, the injury was to be regarded as having been caused, in the legal sense, 
by the breach of the defendant’s duty of care or failure to warn the patient. 
                                                 
147
Hotson v East Berkshire Area Health Authority [1987] AC 750 at 769. In Bonnington Castings Ltd v 
Wardlaw (n 31), the House of Lords held that the claimant does not have to establish that the defendant’s breach 
was the main cause of the damage, provided that it materially contributed to the damage. In McGhee v National 
Coal Board (n 31), the House of Lords took the Bonnington argument one step further. The court interpreted 
‘material increase’ in the risk as equivalent to a ‘material contribution to the damage’. 
148
See para 2 above. 
149
Chester v Afshar (n 20). Arguments that convinced the court were that for the claimant it was a significant 
occurrence; for the defendant it was one of several; the claimant was clearly reluctant to undergo surgery and 
would have avoided it; the operation was not an emergency; it was unlikely that had she been informed about 
the risks that she would have agreed to the surgery; and the surgery was scheduled only three days after the 
consultation, which effectively prevented her from obtaining another opinion. The defendant did not appeal 
against the finding that he breached his duty to the claimant. 
150
Cauda equina syndrome (CES) is a serious neurological condition in which damage to the lumbar plexus 
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 When the doctor, Mr Afshar, accepted Miss Chester as a patient he became subject to 
a legal as well as professional duty to exercise reasonable care and skill in examining her, in 
assessing her case, and in advising her on the need for surgery to alleviate her condition. If 
she consented to surgery, he was bound to exercise reasonable care and skill in operating and 
in supervising her post-operative recovery. However, in addition, the surgeon was subject to a 
further duty: to warn the claimant of a small but unavoidable risk that the planned operation 
might lead to an injury known as cauda equina syndrome. If it was found that, had the 
claimant been warned, she would probably not have agreed to the surgery, she would be 
entitled to recover damages from the defendant. The claimant argued that, had she been 
warned, she would have minimised the risk of surgery by consulting a well-qualified surgeon 
in that specific field or she would have undergone alternative form of surgery. 
 With regard to a rare medical condition, Jones151 argues that greater attention should 
be paid to the medical literature than to the personal experience of the individual expert 
witnesses, who may have little knowledge of the claimant’s medical condition. He warns, 
however, against the scientific approach of the medical literature rather than a legal approach. 
If the consequences of the risk have far-reaching effects for the plaintiff, the medical 
professional has a duty to warn against this risk, whether it is a remote risk or not. The 
claimant enters into an agreement with the defendant because of the latter’s skill and 
knowledge and his ability to weigh the risks of treatment against the risks of no treatment. 
The defendant should not influence the claimant in making a decision, as the ultimate 
decision, after being fully informed, lies with the claimant.  
In the above case, unfortunately neither the background medical information nor the 
likely causes152 of the injury were scrutinized. Although informed consent is fundamental 
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before any kind of surgery or medical intervention, it bears no relevance to the cause of the 
injury. One would have expected a detailed investigation into the causes of such an injury and 
the exclusion of medical error. Inquiry about the reasonable steps taken to prevent such an 
injury would have been useful in assisting the court to arrive at a conclusion. Nevertheless, 
the importance of this case is twofold: the patient has a right to be appropriately warned and 
informed about the risks of a medical intervention, and, in some instances, the court is willing 
to depart from established principles of causation. In order for the claimant to establish 
causation, regarding the risks and complications, he has to show that he would have acted on 
the warning. In other words, he would not have consented to taking the relevant risk or, even 
if he had consented to taking the risk, he would have made decisions that would have altered 
the outcome of the risk. The court found that a modified approach to prove causation was 
justified, since causation was not established using conventional principles. This case is listed 
under the judicial relaxation of the burden of proof in medical negligence cases based on 
constitutional values.153 
 
7The res ipsa loquitur maxim is extended 
Before Ratcliffe v Plymouth & Torbay Health Authority154 the accepted requirements for the 
res ipsa loquitur maxim were: (i) the cause of the injury or damage must be unknown;155 (ii) 
the occurrence carries a high incidence of negligence;156 and (iii) the instrument must have 
been under the defendant’s control.157 The res ipsa loquitur maxim was applied in an 
unpredictable manner. Sometimes the maxim was applied158 and sometimes it was rejected.159 
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choice but to find the defendant liable. In Lindsay v Mid-Western Health Board [1993] 2 IR 147, the patient 
went into a routine medical procedure, underwent anaesthesia, and failed to regain consciousness. To say that 
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exhaustive. 
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Considine v Camp Hill Hospital (1982) 133 DLR (3d) 11, where the claimant became incontinent after a 




A few courts160 expressed their reluctance to use the maxim in medical negligence cases, yet 
continued to apply the maxim as a procedural aid to get the matter to court and, following an 
explanation by the defendant, allowed the plaintiff to prove his prima facie case. 
In 1998, there was a move to change the English legal system.161 The new Civil 
Procedure Rules in England came into existence and the approach of the court leaned to 
change from an adversarial system to an inquisitorial system. Although the system now 
contains a more inquisitorial element with greater judicial involvement, it is fundamentally 
still adversarial in nature, especially regarding the burden of proof. Thus far, the system 
allowed the presiding officer to participate in investigating a case. The medical evidence 
presented by either the plaintiff or defendant could be examined by the court in order to 
determine causation. These changes had an effect on the application of the res ipsa loquitur 
maxim. According to Jones, the purpose of the maxim– 
 
is that it enables a claimant who has no knowledge, or insufficient knowledge, about 
how the accident occurred to rely on the accident itself and the surrounding 
circumstances as evidence of negligence, and prevents a defendant who does know 
what happened from avoiding responsibility simply by choosing not to give any 
evidence.162 
 
He goes on to state163 that in the absence of such evidence from the defendant, the defendant 
will be found liable. If the defendant does give evidence, showing no negligence, then the 
inference of the maxim is rebutted, but now the claimant has to present positive evidence to 
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prove his initial case.164 Jones explains that in practice this would be unlikely as the claimant 
would not have relied on the maxim in the first place if he had positive evidence of the 
defendant’s carelessness. He refers to Ratcliffe v Plymouth & Torbay Health Authority165 
where the Court of Appeal indicated that the maxim would rarely be relevant in medical 
negligence cases because, in practice, parties would have obtained expert medical opinion. 
The author departs from previously accepted practices concerning the res ipsa loquitur 
maxim. He indicates that once the court needs more information to determine the 
presumption of negligence the maxim should strictly speaking be excluded,166 yet if the 
evidence is such that the defendant should offer a credible explanation the maxim applies. 
Although there is no duty on the defendant to explain how the accident occurred, it seems to 
be accepted practice to request such an explanation. The justification for extracting such an 
explanation is given by Buxton LJ in Lillywhite v University College London Hospitals NHS 
Trust.167 The judge said that a case of professional negligence can only be concluded by a 
finding of lack of care and in cases168 where the facts are of an unusual nature like those in 
Ratcliffe and Delaney, there are only two explanations: either the doctor was physically 
careless in performing the operation or there was some underlying disease unknown to 
medicine. It is argued that this seems to be an over-simplification of the medical reality and 
its cause-and-effect intricate medical principles, particularly in view of the fact that 
sometimes there is a chain of events that ultimately led to or caused the harm. However, seen 
in this context, it seems that the only remaining use for the maxim is to facilitate an answer 
from the defendant in rebutting the prima facie inference ie effectively giving the maxim a 
status of a rebuttable presumption. 
Using the maxim without the assistance of medical expert evidence is discouraged. 
Yet, the English court allowed a narrow and wider approach of the maxim as evident in 
Ratcliffe v Plymouth & Torbay Health Authority.169 In this case, the court extended the 
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application of the res ipsa loquitur maxim170 to include a res ipsa loquitur case based on 
simple facts and a res ipsa loquitur case based on complicated medical facts. In Ratcliffe the 
claimant underwent surgery to his right ankle171 after a previous injury to his ankle. He 
underwent general anaesthesia during surgery as well as a spinal anaesthetic to ease the pain. 
He emerged with a serious neurological defect, on the right side, from his waist downwards. 
He still had the general use of the leg, but had lost all superficial sensation in it. He 
complained of continuous, severe, deep-seated pain throughout the affected area. He suffered 
from anal sphincter and ejaculation disturbances. On an MRI, the medical experts identified 
an elongated lesion.172 The medical experts had a lengthy discussion about possible disease-
related explanations for the cause of the lesion. The court was unable to determine how the 
damage occurred173 and rejected a most probable cause of injury by accepting the explanation 
of the defendant who claimed being precise and methodical in his conduct, and that he had 
taken special care during the administration of the spinal injection.174 The anaesthetist-
defendant maintained that he inserted the spinal needle at L3 to L4 with great care and 
precision and that the lesion was revealed as between T8 or T9. The scientific information 
presented to the court,175 of an inadvertent subarachnoid injection of anaesthesia or analgesic 
causing the injury, was rejected. The incidence of ‘neurologic complications of lumbar 
epidural anaesthesia and analgesia’176 explained the consequences of such an inadvertent 
spinal injection into the subarachnoid space. The explanation of the medical experts, in reply 
to the res ipsa loquitur maxim, indicated a rare condition of non-systemic vasculitis,177 which 
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they alleged may have been the possible underlying disease and cause for the neurological 
damage. It describes a possible weak area in the central nervous system brought about by 
surgical intervention and that maybe the cause of the non-systemic vasculitis. 
The court found that the medical professional who administered the spinal anaesthesia 
performed it with the appropriate care, although he was unable to explain the cause of the 
injury (factual causation). The claimant’s case was dismissed. On appeal, the claimant argued 
that the application of the res ipsa loquitur maxim raised an inference of negligence, which 
was not addressed by the court of first instance. The claimant argued that it is accepted 
practice that once the maxim is accepted, the burden to rebut the inference rests with the 
defendant. The defendant failed to discharge the burden of refuting the inference, as the 
defence they offered was a mere possibility of an alternative non-negligent cause of harm. 
This defence did not discharge the onus on the defendant. The court of appeal dismissed the 
appeal of the claimant and held that the finding was that the defendant performed the spinal 
anaesthesia with all proper care. The latter conclusion rendered the maxim of no effect, and 
the remaining inferences of negligence fell away. The claimant did not discharge the burden 
of proving that the defendant was negligent, as he failed to prove that his injury was as a 
result of the elongated lesion178 caused by an inadvertent subarachnoid injection during spinal 
anaesthesia. 
Lord Justice Brook stated179 that in a very simple situation the res may speak at the 
end of the layman’s evidence presented by the claimant, which is then buttressed by expert 
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evidence from the defendant. If the defendant were to call no evidence, the judge would be 
deciding the case on inferences he was entitled to draw from the whole of the evidence, 
including the expert evidence, and not on the application of the maxim in its purest form. 
Lord Justice Hobhouse summarised the mechanism of the res ipsa loquitur maxim180 and 
explained that the claimant has to adduce some expert evidence to pass the prima facie test. 
The claimant may rely on ‘some fairly broad based inference of negligence’, but by the time 
he gets to trial, he should be able to make some more specific allegations, supported by 
expert evidence. His Lordship continued that the essential role of res ipsa loquitur is to 
enable a claimant who is not in possession of all the material facts to plead an allegation of 
negligence in an acceptable form, and to force the defendant to respond to it. However, once 
the defendant has responded then the question for the court is whether, in the light of that 
response and all evidence that has been placed before the court at the trial, both by the 
claimant and the defendant, the defendant has been negligent. His Lordship offered that in a 
case based on the maxim res ipsa loquitur, the acceptable response from the defendant would 
be to prove that the incident occurred without negligence. The claimant’s prima facie case 
would now not be justified, unless a more specific case has been made out. If the defendant 
shows a legitimate basis for the injury but adduces that in the specific instance he exercised 
reasonable care, notwithstanding the outcome and his inability to explain the claimant’s 
injury, he would succeed with his defence. His Lordship was of the opinion181 that even the 
wisest among medical professionals would sometimes have to say: ‘I simply do not know 
what happened’. He stated that the practice of medicine would be done a disservice if a 
careful doctor were ordered to make compensation as if he had been negligent.  
His Lordship Justice Brooke provided a synopsis of the res ipsa loquitur maxim in 
Ratcliffe v Plymouth & Torbay Health Authority:182 
 
(1) In its purest form it is when the plaintiff relies on the res (the thing itself) to raise 
the inference of negligence, supported by ordinary human experience, with no need 
for expert evidence; 183 
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(2) In principle the maxim could be applied in that form in simple situations in the 
medical negligence field;184 
(3) In contested medical negligence cases, the evidence of the plaintiff (which 
established the res) is likely to be buttressed by expert evidence to the effect that the 
matter that was complained about did not ordinarily occur in the absence of 
negligence;185 
(4) By the close of the plaintiff’s case, the judge must be able to infer negligence on 
the defendant’s part, unless the defendant adduces evidence that discharges this 
inference;186 
(5) The evidence might be that there is a plausible explanation of what might have 
happened which did not connote any negligence on the part of the defendant;187 
(6) The defendant’s rebuttal might satisfy the judge on a balance of probabilities, and 
reveal that the defendant exercised proper care. If the untoward outcome was 
extremely rare or was impossible to explain, the prima facie evidence would be 
rebutted;188 
(7) In a very simple situation the res may speak for itself at the end of the lay 
evidence. In practice the inference is then buttressed by expert evidence adduced on 
the plaintiff’s behalf and, if the defendant were to call no evidence, the judge would 
be deciding the case on the inferences he was entitled to draw from the whole of the 
evidence (including the expert evidence) and not on the application of the maxim in 
its purest form;189 
(8) In the present case in which much expert evidence had been presented on both 
sides, the judge made the positive finding that the anaesthetist had performed the 
spinal injection in the appropriate place with all proper care. In those circumstances 
any possible inference of negligence falls away, and unless that finding is set aside, 
the plaintiff’s case will fail;190 
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(9) The finding that the injection was inserted in the correct space at the chosen level 
was inevitable and the judge’s approach to the applicability of the doctrine res ipsa 
loquitur could not be faulted. 191 
 
Lord Justice Hobhouse concurred with Lord Justice Brook that the appeal should be 
dismissed. He reiterated the function of the maxim by stating that the plaintiff may or may 
not need to call evidence to establish a prima facie case. But, if the defendant chose not to 
call evidence, the court will have to decide whether the evidence adduced by the plaintiff 
suffices to satisfy the court that the defendant was negligent and that his negligence caused 
the plaintiff’s injury. He commented ‘there is no rule that a defendant must be liable for any 
accident for which he cannot give a complete explanation’.192 The essential role of the res 
ipsa loquitur maxim is to enable the claimant who does not possess all the material facts to be 
able to allege negligence. A claimant, in pleading his case, will be expected to particularise 
his allegations of negligence only in a way that is appropriate to the state of his knowledge of 
what happened. By the time that case comes to trial the claimant should involve medical 
expert evidence due to the technicality of factual questions. He expressed the view that 
leading cases about the res ipsa loquitur maxim give sufficient guidance to litigators and 
judges about the proper approach to the drawing of inferences and said: ‘[I]f I were to say 
anything further it would be confined to suggesting that the expression res ipsa loquitur 
should be dropped from the litigator’s vocabulary and replaced by the phrase “a prima facie 
case”.’193 
The court’s dismissal of the claimant’s appeal can possibly be faulted on factual 
causation principles. It is questionable why the court of first instance declined the more 
probable medical explanation of causation, ie the inadvertent spinal injection into the 
subarachnoid space. The court accepted that the spinal injection was done into the correct 
space and correct place, simply based on the defendant’s evidence. This stands in contrast to 
international medical standards set by the medical profession that was peer reviewed and 
published as accepted medical principles, where such an injury was explained. Such medical 
literature should have formed part of the medical evidence before the court. The explanation 
in rebuttal, in response to the res ipsa loquitur maxim, made a few days into trial, explained a 
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very rare and unexplained complication of surgery.194 But the explanation in rebuttal was 
simply an alternative cause of injury, inconsistent with negligence. The court’s acceptance 
that the defendant acted with proper care and its acceptance of an alternative cause of harm 
exculpated the defendant. The medical expert evidence on behalf of the claimant should have 
shown that the injury was consistent with an anaesthesia-related traumatic spinal cord injury 
with migration of the lesion to another level.195 Nevertheless, the confirmation of the extended 
role of the res ipsa loquitur maxim implies that the maxim no longer has the exclusive 
meaning of the ancient Latin phrase (the facts speak for themselves) in simple cases; it also 
includes a generalised inference of negligence (lack of care) in more complicated cases, 
which is, in any event, consistent with prima facie evidence of negligence in English cases. It 
seems that in the uninformed mind, the unusual outcome of a medical incident under the 
control of the defendant-doctor indeed indicates prima facie evidence of negligence (lack of 
care) that can raise an inference in need of an answer. The court establishes factual causation 
and negligence from the medical evidence of the defendant in rebuttal if the claimant relied 
on the maxim without medical evidence. This is not useful to a South African plaintiff who 
even with such e wider application of the maxim still has to comply with delictual principles 
in law when inferring negligent conduct. 
The above case reiterated the decision in Delaney v Southmead Health Authority,196 
where the court was satisfied with the explanation of the defendant exercising reasonable 
care. However, in Delaney v Southmead Health Authority,197 the defendant was not the 
correct defendant and his explanation probably convinced the court of the uncertainty of the 
claimant’s suggested cause of harm. It confirms that if the principles of res ipsa loquitur 
apply, the defendant’s explanation may refute the inference of negligence with an 
explanation,198 stating a cause of harm that excludes negligence, together with an assurance 
from the defendant that he exercised proper care. The judgment of the court in Ratcliffe v 
Plymouth & Torbay Health Authority199 further confirms that the maxim has two applications: 
either it is applied in its purest form, ie where the negligence is so apparent that no further 
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explanation is needed, and or in its wider form where detailed allegations are needed to 
support the inference of negligence. The claimant may initiate proceedings with the 
assistance of the maxim, but then needs to make specific allegations supported by medical 
expert evidence. The court effectively developed an extension of the maxim according to the 
nature of each case. 
Foster200 believes that Ratcliffe v Plymouth & Torbay Health Authority201 is an 
example of a case where in certain circumstances the court will be sympathetic to a defendant 
who states that ‘an untoward result’ occurred, the explanation of which is unclear to him. If 
the ‘untoward result’ is extremely rare,202 or cannot be explained by current medical 
knowledge, a judge may, on those grounds and after evaluation of all the evidence, dismiss a 
claimant’s case. If the defendant can offer an explanation that excludes negligence, the 
claimant’s case will fail. Alternatively, with an allegation of lack of care, the defendant only 
has to show that he exercised proper care to prevent injury and he will thus be able to avoid 
liability.203 Accordingly, it is not essential for the defendant to explain how the accident 
happened, provided he gives evidence that he exercised reasonable care.204 The defendant 
does not have to prove that his explanation is more probable than the plaintiff’s version, but 
only that that he acted without negligence.205 In this regard it is questionable whether the 
claimant will find the defendant’s explanation of any assistance, as it may not even assist 
with establishing factual causation. 
 
8 Limited use of the res ipsa loquitur maxim 
According to Jones,206 Ratcliffe v Plymouth & Torbay Health Authority207 and Delaney v 
Southmead Health Authority,208 demonstrate how limited the use of the res ipsa loquitur 
maxim is in medical negligence cases. The author argues that the use of the maxim provides 
no other certainty to the claimant; it only attracts a reasonable explanation from the defendant 
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to show that reasonable care was exercised. Although the court appeared to have been strict 
in not accepting theories and hypothetical alternatives as explanation, the court was 
nevertheless persuaded to accept explanations that were not always based on ‘the ordinary 
course of medical and scientific principles’.209 As it stands, the acceptance or rejection of the 
defendant’s explanation in rebuttal remains at the court’s discretion, with the court being 
assisted by expert medical evidence. The court will look for a ‘reasonable’ explanation from 
the defendant that is an alternative cause not involving negligence, or the court will assess 
whether the defendant acted with the necessary care.210 These alternatives seem to stand in an 
inverse correlation; thus, as the court suggested in Ratcliffe, the less plausible the defendant’s 
explanation regarding the cause of the claimant’s injury, the more the court will need to be 
satisfied that the defendant took due care. It is central for the claimant to prepare a prima 
facie case with the assistance of medical expert evidence based on tort law principles to 
determine a proper cause of action. It is widely accepted that a medical accident that caused 
harm to a plaintiff raises prima facie evidence of negligent conduct, which is sufficient to 
proceed to court with or without the maxim. Evidently, in the light of some of the inventive 
explanations offered by the defence, it is doubtful whether the maxim indeed assists a 
claimant. Although the maxim extracts an explanation from the defendant, clearly the 
explanation of the defendant sometimes may mislead the court,211 as the latter fails to 
establish the accepted standard of care against which the defendant’s actions can be assessed. 
It is the basis for factual causation. As there seems no logical reason for this other than a 
defendant set on providing an explanation devoid of negligence rather than providing a true 
cause of the injury, it may have to do with underestimation of the intricacies of the practice of 
medicine. 
 
9 An analysis of the use of the res ipsa loquitur maxim in recent case law 
In Ratcliffe v Plymouth & Torbay Health Authority,212 the use and function of the res ipsa 
loquitur maxim was expanded and was applied in its broader form, because of complex 
medical negligence cases. The claimant relied on the maxim to get to court and to extract an 
explanation from the defendants, and then relied on medical expert evidence to proceed to a 
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full trial. The issues were mostly what weight the court should give to the evidence or 
whether the presumption of negligence should be allowed. It seems that, sometimes the cause 
of the injury remained a mystery to the court where the court was unable to determine factual 
causation. The basic standard of care test is an assessment by the court of how the defendant-
doctor ought to have behaved and the court was usually convinced that a medical professional 
acted with reasonable care. However the court became attentive to the answers of the 
defendants in rebuttal and seems to requests more detail. In Lillywhite v University College 
London Hospital’s NHS Trust, 213the court held that a defendant was obliged to exercise 
reasonable care in performing a scan, but also to exercise reasonable care in interpreting the 
results of the scan. The court said that the defendant did not ‘pass the test of plausibility or 
possibility and she [Prof Rodeck] did not succeed in adducing explanatory material that put 
the initial assumption of negligence under question’. 
 
9.1 Lack of care as part of the maxim: Lillywhite v University College London Hospital’s 
NHS Trust 
Lord Justice Buxton stated that this case was not a case of res ipsa loquitur, but a case in 
which the outcome that the defendant attributed to his medical interpretation or reading of a 
scan called for an explanation. The reading of images requires not only care, but also skill 
and judgment. The complaint in this case was that the requisite level of skill and judgment 
simply could not have been exercised given that the results produced were so disastrously 
wrong. In addition, an earlier reader in the person of Mrs Wright (radiographer) had not made 
the same errors. 
 The court was determined to qualify the defendant’s explanation in rebuttal. In 
Lillywhite v University College London Hospital’s NHS Trust214 the claimant sought damages 
for loss, pain and suffering in consequence of the birth of her baby who suffered from 
holoprosencephaly, a severe malformation of the brain. During 1992, Mrs Lillywhite, the 
claimant, a 36-year-old woman went for an abnormality ultrasound scan when she was 18 
weeks pregnant. The radiographer, a certain Mrs Wright, found that she could not see a part 
of the brain of the foetus called the cavum septum. When testifying in court she mentioned 
that she recalled this case as the ‘case of the absent cavum septum’. She took multiple views 
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from different angles and remarked in her notes her inability to visualise septum pelucidum 
and normal anatomy in the anterior brain. She spoke to the obstetric consultant, as she was 
uncertain about the seriousness of the situation. They explained the serious situation to the 
plaintiff and referred her to Prof Rodeck at University College Hospital for a consultation 
five days later. As the claimant and her husband wanted to terminate the pregnancy in the 
event of an abnormality, she consulted a private radiologist the next day, a certain Dr Meire 
(first doctor). Dr Meire concluded that the foetal head was high in the fundus and imaging 
was not easy with reverberations partially obscuring the proximal hemisphere. He also stated 
that the ultrasound scan was rather less satisfactory than it might have been, yet he reassured 
the claimant and her husband against any abnormalities. Five days later, they consulted with 
Prof Rodeck (second doctor), who performed an ultrasound scan. She measured the different 
ventricles and spaces in the brain, revised her measurements, and found the distances 
between certain structures to be normal. She did not record pictures of the scan. Baby Alice 
was born 4 months later on 26 April, with semi-lobar holoprosencephaly towards the severe 
end of the spectrum (the forebrain of the embryo fails to develop into two hemispheres215). 
The child therefore had what is known as a mono ventricle. These abnormalities were present 
at the time when Prof Rodeck performed her ultrasound scan.  
The portrayal and recognition of the abnormalities lie at the centre of the case. The 
claimant’s case was simply that Prof Rodeck could not have exercised the standards of care 
that were expected in concluding that the brain showed no signs of abnormality. The 
claimant’s experts were of the opinion that Mrs Wright (the radiographer who performed the 
test initially) had not been able to visualise the relevant brain structures because they were 
not there. The claimant called three experts in the field. The defendant’s version was that two 
distinguished radiological experts had, within days of each other, concluded that there were 
no abnormalities and that they had identified structures that were consistent with normality. 
Prof Rodeck had carried out the examinations with due care.  
On appeal His Lordship Latham stated that the task of the trial judge in evaluating the 
medical expert evidence was intrinsically difficult. Expert evidence indicated that 
holoprosencephaly was undetected in 40 to 60 per cent of scans.216 He continued that there 
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was no dispute about the standard of care exercised by Prof Rodeck. However, unlike the 
cases of Ratcliffe and Delaney, that was not the complete answer to the test. The 
interpretation of the scan should also have been done with reasonable care and, had Prof 
Rodeck exercised skill and care, she would have recognised the echoes from the scan as 
mimics (artefacts and not reliable). Prof Rodeck failed to identify or explain anomalies on the 
scan. The appeal was upheld217 and the claimant’s case succeeded. His Lordship Latham 
explained that, although the claimant referred to the maxim res ipsa loquitur, the claimant 
conceded that the maxim in itself provided no solution to the case. His Lordship said, that 
given the way the trial judge approached the evidence218 and the conclusion that was reached, 
one should look with care at the extent to which the trial judge properly reflected on the 
strength of the claimant’s argument. This argument was based on the simple proposition that 
Prof Rodeck purported to identify structures that were simply not there. Lord Justice Buxton, 
in agreeing with Latham LJ, stated that the trial judge found that Prof Rodeck performed the 
sonar with reasonable care. He explained that a professional man is required in the law of 
negligence and contract to display not only care, but care and skill.  
He referred to His Lordship McNair’s statement in Bolam v Friern Hospital Management 
Committees: 
 
How do you test whether his act or failure is negligent? In an ordinary case it is 
generally said you judge it by the action of the man in the street. He is the ordinary 
man ... But where you get a situation which involves some special skill or 
competence, then the test of whether there has been negligence or not is not the test of 
the man on top of the Clapham omnibus, because he has not got this special skill. The 
test is the standard of the ordinary skilled man exercising and professing to have that 
special skill.219  
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Latham LJ and Buxton LJ agreed that the explanations advanced by the defendant220 ‘were 
neither possible nor plausible,221 and so did not discharge the inference referred to in the 
Ratcliffe formulation’. The majority decided that the defendants did not succeed in adducing 
explanatory material that questioned the initial assumption of negligence. 
 
9.2 Comments on Lillywhite v University College London Hospital’s NHS Trust 
In non-medical terms, the Lillywhite case seems to be a clear-cut case of negligence. The 
claimant alleges that ‘but for’222 the incorrect interpretation of the scan and the failure to take 
care in confirming crucial medical structures in the brain, the foetus would have been 
aborted. In essence, the negligence lies in the defendant’s lack of care in failing to exclude 
certain material doubts about the true medical condition of the foetus. The writer agrees with 
the court’s approach that the presumption created by the maxim is unhelpful in this case, even 
with the extended use of the maxim, because the core aspects of the case revolved around 
testimony223 regarding the required standard of care. The accepted standard of care was higher 
than the ordinary standard of care because of existing records of abnormalities in the brain 
that has to be ruled out. It was clear that the ultrasound scan performed by a radiographer 
raised much concern about the normality of the brain of the unborn foetus. This was the 
existing medical diagnosis at the time that had to be confirmed or excluded. More 
particularly, the defendant’s duty (Prof Rodeck) was not only to interpret the images, but to 
weigh her findings against the suspicion of abnormalities and to rule that out. Furthermore, 
the consequences of a misdiagnosis or of failing to rule out abnormalities of the brain of the 
foetus were so severe that, the defendant ought to have requested assistance from other 
medical experts. This cannot be interpreted as showing an accepted standard of care; it is 
evidence of a lack of care ie substandard care. In other words, it was part of the defendant’s 
duty of care to accept her lack of skill or simply to request confirmation of an uncertain 
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diagnosis by referring the patient to more skilled and experienced colleagues. A court would 
be reluctant to find this particular defendant in breach of her duty had she referred the patient 
to another specialist even if he also missed the diagnosis.  
 In the leading case regarding res ipsa loquitur, Ratcliffe v University College London 
Hospital’s NHS Trust,224 the court made it clear that, in addition to using the maxim, the 
claimant should obtain medical expert evidence to support her case. One would have 
expected, therefore, in Lillywhite v University College London Hospital’s NHS Trust225 that, 
although the claimant succeeded with her action, the medical expert evidence would have 
been more detailed. From the concessions made by the court226 in Lillywhite it is evident that 
the maxim res ipsa loquitur has perhaps not lost its appeal to claimants in spite of the 
ineffective use of the maxim for some time. It seems that with the move to a more 
inquisitorial system and the definitive principles of the maxim set out in Ratcliffe v Plymouth 
& Torbay Health Authority227 in respect of a requirement that the claimant should obtain 
adequate medical expert evidence it may possibly have levelled the fields between claimants 
and defendants in medical negligence cases in England in its own context. 
 
9.3 The effect of the maxim on Thomas v Curley 
In a recent case, Thomas v Curley, 228the application of the maxim came under attack. The 
maxim was pleaded in the trial court and the Court of Appeal had to decide whether the judge 
had incorrectly applied the res ipsa loquitur maxim. The court found that the trial judge 
correctly directed himself to assess the weight of the evidence and to decide whether the 
defendant was liable in circumstances where there was no explanation for the claimant's 
injuries. The claimant was diagnosed with a single gall stone in the gall bladder. The 
defendant advised her to undergo a laparoscopic cholecystectomy. During the operation the 
defendant found that the gall bladder was not inflamed and he found only a single stone. He 
also noted an abnormality in the anatomy of the claimant: instead of the cystic duct 
originating in the common bile duct it came from the right hepatic duct. The gall bladder was 
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removed. The claimant was discharged. A few days later she developed severe pain and was 
re-admitted. The diagnosis suggested an intra-peritoneal leak with appearances in keeping 
with a biliary leak from the region of the stump of the cystic duct. The defendant inserted a 
stent (tube inserted into a vessel to keep it open for drainage). The defendant arranged for 
follow-up in-hospital care with another surgeon as he left on vacation. The claimant’s 
condition deteriorated and she developed acute renal failure. She was admitted to the high 
care facility where she consulted a hepato biliary surgeon. The latter performed an open 
laparotomy and repair operation during which 7 litres of bile were drained from the peritoneal 
cavity. She made a slow recovery and several months later were re-admitted for the removal 
of the stent. In the proceedings she alleged that the defendant was negligent in two respects. 
First, he caused an iatrogenic injury to the common bile duct of the claimant during 
laparoscopic surgery. Second, he failed to require fluid balance and renal monitoring of her 
condition when he went on vacation. The trial judge held that she discharged her onus of 
proof with regard to the first ground and awarded damages to the claimant. 
On appeal the defendant claimed that the trial judge was incorrect in applying the 
maxim by drawing an inference of negligence (based on the res ipsa loquitur maxim only) 
where there was evidence as to why and how the result occurred,229 and that there is doubt 
whether the maxim is of much assistance.230 The defendant averred that since the claimant’s 
case relied entirely on the res ipsa loquitur maxim the judge was wrong to conclude that the 
injury suffered was caused by the negligence of the defendant. It was the defendant’s case 
that the maxim was incorrectly applied. The further background to the case was that the 
medical experts could not agree on certain medical aspects. The defendant’s expert stated that 
the bile duct injury was an unavoidable bile duct injury whereas the claimant’s expert stated 
that in a case of uncomplicated surgery (such as the case of the claimant) such an injury was 
avoidable. The defendant’s appeal was based on the following: the claimant presented no 
evidence about whether the defendant exercised proper care during the operation; the injury 
was a well-recognised complication of the operation; the trial court should not have inferred 
and concluded from the fact of the injury (alone) that the defendant had been negligent; and 
the trial court’s judgment was based on a mistaken reversal of the burden of proof. 
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The Court of Appeal found that the trial court based its findings on conclusive 
evidence of negligence: First, the abnormal anatomy of the claimant (ie the cystic duct was 
off the right hepatic duct and the injury was in the common bile duct) made negligence more 
likely because there was no reason why the surgery should have been in the region of the 
common bile duct where the injury occurred.231 Second, the defendant could not explain such 
an injury and once the judge established that the injury was not in the area of the operation, 
evidence of the leak was compelling evidence that supported the claimant’s case.232 It became 
clear that the judge was not relying on the res ipsa loquitur maxim as he was not drawing an 
inference from the mere fact of the injury. It seemed that the maxim was initially used to get 
to court but with the exchange of medical expert opinion,233 the claimant averred in addition 
that the most likely explanation for the injury was a diathermy injury, alternatively a tractions 
injury. None of this was refuted by the defendant. From this case, it seems that the change in 
procedural system motivates the claimant to furnish proper allegations for the injury other 
than a presumption of negligence based on the fact of the injury. It also seems that in the 
presence of medical expert evidence the court is reluctant to admit that a claim was based on 
the maxim only, since the court tested the actions of the defendant against the expected 
standard of care or medical reality. The writer argues that it seems that the maxim is no 
longer useful, because had the claimant argued that the defendant was prima facie careless, 
because he caused an injury in an area unrelated to the operation, the outcome would have 
been the same because the defendant could not (or perhaps he was unwilling) to explain the 
injury. 
 
9.4 Pearce v United Bristol Healthcare Trust 
 An earlier case Pearce v United Bristol Healthcare Trust234 was not based on the res ipsa 
loquitur maxim, however it is discussed because of the writer’s argument that had the 
claimant followed the ruling in Ratcliffe v Plymouth & Torbay Health Authority235 the 
outcome would have been different. As seen before,236 the English court recognises the right 
of the patient to be informed about risks and complications in order to choose whether to 
allow the proposed treatment or to refuse the treatment and seek alternatives. Therefore, the 
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doctor has a duty of care to disclose material information to the claimant before treatment. 
However, the duty of the doctor is wider than mere disclosure because it also involves a 
discussion regarding treatment and diagnosis. The question inevitably addresses the prospects 
of the success or failure of the treatment; to what extent the doctor can override the decision 
of his patient and whether these cases will also have an impact on the use of the res ipsa 
loquitur maxim. In Pearce v United Bristol Healthcare Trust,237 the Court of Appeal heard a 
case for negligence brought by the claimants in respect of a stillbirth. At the time when the 
claimant consulted the defendant the baby was 14 days overdue. The mother begged the 
doctor for an induction or caesarean section but the defendant-doctor was of the view that the 
proper way to proceed was to have a normal birth without any form of medical intervention. 
The claimant was discharged. The claimant testified that she was upset but accepted the 
advice of the doctor. The expert medical opinion was overwhelming that it would have been 
risky to induce the birth at that stage. Such an option was therefore, ruled out. From the 
pathologist’s evidence, the baby died approximately five days later in the uterus. 
The issues before the court were: should the defendant have advised the claimant 
about any increased risk of the baby being stillborn as a result of the passage of time? Had the 
doctor advised the claimant in this regard, would the outcome have been different? The court 
per Lord Woolf held that the ‘but for’238 test about the giving of advice or the failure to give 
advice should be applied. Lord Diplock stated that even in a case where (as here) no expert 
witness condemns the non-disclosure as being in conflict with accepted responsible medical 
practice, a judge can in certain instances conclude that disclosure was needed and that no 
prudent doctor would have failed to make it. Lord Templeman was of the opinion that the 
doctor should have an overriding duty to act in the best interests of the patient and to provide 
the patient with all necessary information to make a balanced judgment. Lord Woolf 
concluded that if there is a significant risk that would affect the judgement of a reasonable 
patient then in the normal course of events it is the responsibility of a doctor to inform the 
patient.239 The court found that there was no significant risk and dismissed the claimant’s 
case. The writer argues that had this case been argued on failure of inadequate treatment 
and/or diagnosis instead of lack of advice the outcome would have been different. 
Furthermore, in the light of the design of the maxim to presume negligence based on the fact 
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of the injury itself, without investigating the medical reality, it seems that the outcome would 
have been the same if this case had relied on the application of the maxim. But, if this case 
had been based on balancing the standard of care against the reality of the doctor’s conduct, 
the court would have found in the claimant’s favour. It was well-known at the time that the 
risk of injury to a baby increases with overdue babies.240 It is unclear why the claimant did not 
follow the judgment of Ratcliffe v Plymouth & Torbay Health Authority241 and base her case 
on the res ipsa loquitur maxim (for no other reason but a long standing tradition), and in 
addition, presented medical evidence in accordance with tort law principles based on a lack 
of care. Although the writer argues that the maxim does not assist a claimant, the thesis 
statement is that with expert medical evidence a claimant can substantiate allegations based 
on a lack of care. The medical reality of this case is complex but the standard of care required 
for the management and treatment of a post-mature pregnancy is obvious. From the above 
literature it is clear that the medical condition of the unborn baby must be closely monitored 
by looking for any signs of foetal distress, regular foetal movement, and heart rate in relation 
to the contractions of the uterus, and to perform repeat ultrasound scans to monitor the 
medical condition of the unborn baby. Any signs of foetal distress would indicate the need for 
a caesarean section (as induction was ruled out). The placenta supplies the baby with 
nutrients and oxygen but after 40 weeks it starts to wear out due to age, and will eventually 
stop functioning. If the baby remains in utero he will not be constantly supplied with 
sufficient oxygen and nutrients and will become distressed. Foetal distress is clear if the 
baby’s heart rate shows signs of acceleration or deceleration and he passes faecal matter 
(meconium) in the womb. If the baby breathes this in, he will suffer from aspiration of 
meconium syndrome.242 The baby will not survive on going distress. Had this information 
been presented to the court it may have concluded that the defendant failed his duty of care to 
the claimant and her unborn baby and was the direct cause of the death of the unborn foetus.    
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9.5 Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board 
The English court traditionally applied the Bolam243 test to cases where a duty to disclose was 
established and where such a duty was breached because of a negligent non-disclosure of 
risk. The court in Chester v Afshar244 focused on the issue of causation and in fact favoured a 
reasonable patient approach. The application of the reasonable patient approach was 
confirmed in Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board.245 It is submitted that although the 
claimant was successful with her case, the medical reality of this case was underestimated. 
The facts of this case are similar to the facts in the South African case, Sibisi NO v Maitin,246 
where the plaintiff was unsuccessful. In Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board, the 
claimant sued the defendant, alleging that the doctor who was responsible for her care during 
the ante-natal care should have informed her about the risk of shoulder dystocia and should 
have sufficiently managed the labour process. The claimant was a small woman and was 
expecting a larger than normal baby. The claimant suffered from diabetes. Women suffering 
from diabetes are more likely to have larger than normal babies and have a 9 to 10 per cent 
risk of shoulder dystocia occurring during vaginal delivery (because the shoulders of the baby 
are too wide to pass through the pelvis). The labour was induced by the administration of 
hormones. The process was slow and after several hours the labour became arrested. When 
the head of the baby descended during the labour process, the baby’s shoulders became 
impacted and the defendant used forceps to deliver the baby. It took some time to deliver the 
baby and the baby was deprived of oxygen for more than 12 minutes during birth, which 
resulted in permanent brain damage. 
 The defendant testified that she did not routinely advise diabetic women of the risk of 
shoulder dystocia, because it was her opinion that they then almost always opt for a caesarean 
section. The claimant testified that had she been told about the risk of shoulder dystocia she 
would have opted for a caesarean delivery. The trial court interpreted the shoulder dystocia 
risk as significant, but not conclusive evidence of a breach of duty of care, because the same 
risk in vast majority of cases is dealt with by simple procedures and the chance of severe 
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injury to the baby was tiny.247 The trial court held however that there had been no breach of 
duty by the defendant. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal based on several aspects:248 
the shift in the doctor-patient relationship now allows for the fundamental value of self-
determination; there is no reason to perpetuate the Bolam test in this context any longer as 
this test may allow the sanctioning of different medical practices without addressing patients’ 
rights and values; the assessment of whether a risk is material is fact-sensitive and cannot be 
reduces to percentages and should be conveyed adequately to the patient; the doctor’s 
advisory role involves proper dialogue to explain anticipated benefits and risks to the patent; 
and the lower court should have concentrated on the claimant’s likely reaction if informed 
about the risk. The court is concerned not only with the risks to the baby but also with the 
risks to the mother. The court found that once the arguments departed from the medical 
considerations the Bolam test was inappropriate. The claimant was successful with her 
appeal.  
 The law requires the doctor to inform the patient of any material risks involved in 
medical treatment, as well as any alternative options available. However, it is obvious that the 
defendant also failed to take into account the possibility that shoulder dystocia might occur. 
As an obstetrician she ought to have been prepared for such an emergency. She could have 
allowed the claimant to start with a trial-run regarding the natural delivery and if the process 
was not progressing as planned, a caesarean section could have been performed. The 
defendant ought to have known that, the single most common risk factor for shoulder 
dystocia is the use of a vacuum extractor or forceps (used in this case) during delivery.249 In 
other words, she ignored the signs of obstruction and tried to force the head of the baby 
through the birth canal with a forceps delivery of the head. The defendant was the creator of 
the emergency. This was the medical reality of the case and was contrary to the expected 
standard of care. It is commended that the English court appreciates the role of the patient 
when consenting to any medical intervention as is evident from the decisions250 in Pearce v 
United Bristol Healthcare Trust and Chester v Afshar. The courts held that the need for 
proper informed consent was part of English law. The patients’ interest in their own physical 
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and mental health is protected as well as their right to autonomy and their freedom to decide 
over their bodily integrity. 
 
10 Conclusion 
The English cases that are analysed above establish a pattern for the use of the res ipsa 
loquitur maxim. A presumption of negligence is made based on the fact that a medical 
intervention under the control of the defendant went wrong and the claimant sustained 
unnecessary injuries. If the claimant relies on the res ipsa loquitur maxim, the defendant is 
compelled to furnish an answer to defeat the rebuttable inference of negligence. Furthermore, 
some cases251 illustrate that because the plaintiff relied simply on the res ipsa loquitur maxim 
and failed to present evidence, the court focused on the defendant’s explanation, unaided by 
evidence to the contrary. The result was that the court had to determine factual causation 
from a biased defendant refuting the action of the claimant. The defendant’s response 
effectively dictates the next step in the process. If the court accepts the defendant’s 
explanation and his assurance that the medical intervention was performed with proper care 
and skill, the plaintiff’s case will be defeated. The obligation on the defendant to reply with 
an answer that shows there was no negligence resulted in the defendant sometimes presenting 
explanations that were exotic252 and imaginative to escape liability, with a focus on avoiding 
liability rather than on explaining the medical reality. As far back as 1939, with Mahon v 
Osborne,253 the court prompted the plaintiff to present medical expert evidence, even with the 
use of the maxim, in order for the court to establish causation from the medical evidence. 
Some applications and interpretations of the maxim gave the claimant a false sense of 
security, and inaccurate and insufficient medical evidence254 resulted in an unwarranted defeat 
for the claimant. Sometimes the maxim did not encompass causation when the wrong 
defendant255 was sued. Various conceptualisations of the maxim were observed,256 but it 
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became clear that the court was reluctant to oversimplify the medical aspects of a medical 
accident.257 
In 1998, with the move towards a more inquisitorial system, the court established 
strict rules for the future use of the maxim.258 Ratcliffe v Plymouth & Torbay Health 
Authority259 formally widened the scope of the res ipsa loquitur maxim. The maxim was not 
only relevant in its purest form, but was also used in cases where the negligence was not 
patent from the objective facts. But the court held that this should be done in addition to 
presenting expert medical information. It also appears that the court remained lenient towards 
medical professionals under circumstances where they stated ‘I simply do not know what 
went wrong’.260 In Lillywhite v University College London Hospital’s NHS Trust,261 the 
English court explicitly rejected the res ipsa loquitur maxim, although this might have been 
in respect of this particular case, however, the court agreed that the inference of negligence 
called for an explanation from the defendant clarifying how she missed the diagnosis. The 
court accepted a prima facie inference of negligence and sought answers regarding the 
subjective reasoning of the defendant at the time, in explaining the steps taken to prevent the 
injury. The case turned on the court qualifying ‘lack of care’ to include ‘lack of skill and 
competence’ and whether the defendant provided a ‘plausible explanation’ for her failure to 
recognise the absence of images on a brain scan. In Thomas v Curley262 the defendants 
challenged the use of the maxim and argued on appeal, that the res ipsa loquitur maxim was 
incorrectly accepted and applied by the trial judge. Regarding the application of the res ipsa 
loquitur maxim, the Court of Appeal noted that– 
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the judge was not drawing an inference of negligence from the mere fact of injury to 
the common bile duct during an operation. He was addressing the particular 
circumstances of this particular case in the round, having regard to all the evidence 
and having assessed its weight. This is apparent from his reference to the fact that this 
was an uncomplicated procedure some distance removed from the site of the common 
bile duct injury.263 
 
It appears that the English court was relying on medical literature and medical information 
presented by the medical experts, and questioned whether the care of the defendant was in 
accordance with the accepted standard of care. The court was also reluctant to accept a 
blanket statement from the defendant that the surgery was complicated and there was a 
known risk of complications. The court looked particularly at the cause of the leak in the 
abdomen in relation to the location of the bile leak.  
It is possible that the English court at present regards res ipsa loquitur as a phrase that 
represents an evidentiary principle that belongs to the past. It seems that any medical accident 
which is unexpected in nature, will lead to an inference of lack of sufficient care in a situation 
completely under the control of the defendant-doctor as this would be interpreted as prima 
facie evidence that calls for an explanation from the defendant-doctor.264. This thesis argues 
that the maxim gives the court a further burden in determining the medical reality; first, 
determining whether the maxim is applicable; second, giving effect to the presumption and; 
third, testing causation from the defendant’s answer in rebuttal as well as from the facts and 
evidence of the case. Not only does the court have to find the cause of the injury, it also has 
to examine all the complex notions relevant to the maxim to determine if the injury supports 
an inference of negligence. Nevertheless, the writer argues that the plaintiff should pre-empt 
the creative responses of the defendant by presenting medical evidence that constitutes the 
medical reality and causation in accordance with the decision in Ratcliffe, thus preventing the 
defendant from sending the court on a course that does not serve the plaintiff’s case. The 
English court’s approach towards a more inquisitorial system is admired as it means that, in 
spite of any presumptions or public expectations that an injury occurred because of an alleged 
lack of care, negligent conduct will be tested on a preponderance of probability in accordance 
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with tort law elements and with the involvement of the court to request medical expert 
testimony to clarify certain medical principles. In other words, whether the plaintiff relies on 
a presumption or not, the court will test whether the defendant breached his duty of care 
against acceptable medical principles and whether the defendant exercised his duty in a 
careful and skilful manner in accordance with the expected standards.  
From its first appearance in the law of negligence, the res ipsa loquitur maxim 
inspired the court to prescribe various limitations. The plaintiff has to show that the res (that 
caused the injury) was under the exclusive control of the defendant, and then establish the 
defendant’s liability by presenting direct evidence. Where direct evidence is not available, the 
plaintiff asks the court to draw an inference of negligence that constitutes prima facie 
evidence from the fact of the injury that calls for an explanation in rebuttal. The plaintiff has 
the benefit of the maxim as a defendant is called to answer in rebuttal when the maxim is 
accepted. But, when a defence is presented showing a cause without negligence, the plaintiff 
continues with his case by presenting evidence to negate the response from the defendant and 
to prove his initial case. A wise plaintiff in England would rely on the maxim in addition to 
presenting medical expert evidence as that would direct the defendant’s defence in rebuttal 
and minimise the chance of exotic explanations.  
The next chapter demonstrates the mechanism of medical aetiology,265 based on 
principles of evidence-based medicine recognised in the international arena. The medical 
scientific principles or management of injuries and disease are acknowledged throughout the 
world. The medical profession publishes its research findings for the benefit of all members 
of the profession and as such sets a medical and scientific standard. The purpose is to 
correlate its findings for the better good of society and the medical profession. It is the 
accepted standard of care set by the medical profession. It is proposed that medical facts and 
reasoning are based on the process used by a medical professional to make a diagnosis or 
identify a disease. This is done to prescribe the correct treatment plan for the patient. Medical 
experts should interpret and explain an adverse event or injury to the court based on their 
medical knowledge and reasoning using the medical facts available. This is the basis for 
factual causation from which legal conclusions can be drawn but it has the potential for 
misinterpretation if not perceived from a medical point of view. It is argued that if a general 
inference of negligence is based on the fact of the injury alone, then the sometimes complex 
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process of determining the aetiology of the injury, otherwise known as a medical reality, is 




CHAPTER 4: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE MEDICAL CLINICAL 
PROCESS AND FACTUAL CAUSATION 
 
1 Introduction 
The previous chapters addressed the medical law principles in South Africa and England, as 
well as the different applications of the res ipsa loquitur maxim in South Africa and England. 
In South Africa, the courts have been precluded from applying the res ipsa loquitur maxim in 
medical negligence cases since 1924.1Academic authors2 have argued that the decision in Van 
Wyk v Lewis3case was misdirected and that the maxim should be applied in South Africa. 
Recently, the orthodox stance of the court was contested,4 but the court explicitly discouraged 
any further use of the res ipsa loquitur maxim in medical negligence cases, thus leaving the 
1924 decision in Van Wyk v Lewis5untouched.  
 Further investigation into the application of the res ipsa loquitur maxim in England 
demonstrated that the English law of tort functions differently from the law of delict in South 
Africa. Both the South African and the English courts faced a dilemma in resolving factual 
causation, which stems from the standard set by the medical profession and the interpretation 
of the facts. The court decisions demonstrate that the misinterpretation of the medical facts 
led to inappropriate legal conclusions regarding factual causation and liability. However, 
English law allows for a generalised presumption of lack of care of a defendant-doctor based 
on the fact of the injury in circumstances unexpected in nature, which were particularly under 
his control. This will call from such a defendant-doctor to explain the injury, whereas the 
South African delictual law principles dictate that the maxim is simply a factual presumption 
and key facts should be available to infer negligence (culpa and fault) from the facts alone. 
This thesis argues that in South Africa, key facts should include information regarding the 
defendant’s conduct and standard of service delivery, before the court can presume 
negligence (culpa) from the facts. Furthermore, determining whether the defendant’s conduct 
fell below the standard of care expected (the element of negligence) depends on the testimony 
of medical expert evidence so that the court can evaluate the care provided to the plaintiff. 
This is why the maxim would seldom apply to medical negligence cases in South Africa. 
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The thesis argues that the science of medicine is complex as the expected medical 
standard and processes have to be explained and tested against internationally accepted 
medical standards described in the published literature in order to appreciate the medical facts 
in the context of each case. The mechanism and functioning of the human body expressed in 
medical context, as cause and effect, will establish the medical reality from which factual 
causation is determined. With the movement in medical practice towards evidence-based6 
medicine principles, medical information has become freely available, as medical research 
studies are published or reviewed to benefit the medical profession in its decision-making and 
to contextualise medical facts. Medical scientific research studies are performed to assist 
medical professionals in determining the risks and complications of particular medical 
procedures. These studies maintain that scientific medical evidence should be objective, free 
from bias, real, logical and rational. The medical scientific research conclusions are 
population-based,7 and it is the obligation of the medical professional to interpret the 
scientific studies in the light of the specific patient. The medical research studies and 
conclusions are specific to a particular population with a specific set of characteristics to test 
a particular result, but are not specific to a particular individual. The medical research is 
probabilistic not deterministic, ie it is not a finding of fact or a search for proof but it is rather 
a refutation of a hypothesis. In other words, its aim is to find the best available treatment for 
the particular patient or the best available medicine to halt or prevent a disease. Because the 
body reacts differently to certain things, for example, an allergic reaction or inflammatory 
reaction, the practice of medicine is aimed at excluding several diagnoses and treating the 
most probable diagnosis. A diagnosis is never exhaustive and is always on going and 
changing, in accordance with new medical evidence that becomes available. Medical expert 
evidence in court should be based on evidence-based medicine principles that are published 
globally for comments from peer medical professionals. The medical expert should base his 
medical conclusions about the facts of a medical negligence case on published medical 
literature and not only on his personal opinion. If the medical condition or occurrence falls 
outside the scope of the research study and no similar study is available, the medical expert is 
allowed to use his professional knowledge to hypothesise the relevance of the study to the 
case in point. Undoubtedly, the premise and function of the law is significantly different from 
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that of medical science, as medical negligence is based on attributing fault to a particular 
entity or individual for the injuries sustained or the adverse outcome of a particular 
individual. Adjudication is based on the stare decisis rule to ensure legal certainty and the 
decision can be altered only by the authority of a higher court. The previous two chapters 
illustrated that insufficient medical evidence can lead to incorrect legal inferences and 
conclusions. 
The objective of this chapter is to demonstrate that in medical negligence cases the 
legal conclusion of negligence cannot be made without an adequate understanding of the 
medical facts (the medical reality) from which factual causation emanates. This chapter 
provides an overview of the process of medical diagnosis, treatment and prevention. It 
explains from a medical perspective the variety of considerations to take into account in 
ascertaining the standard of care expected from a reasonable medical professional. The 
expected standard of care for a medical professional8 is determined by the legal convictions 
of the community, the accepted standard dictated by legislation and the medical profession. 
The medical professional has a legal duty to use his skill, competence and experience to 
diagnose, treat and care for the patient without causing further injury to the patient. The study 
demonstrates with selected case studies the importance of having a proper understanding of 
the medical reality in South African law, before making presumptions based on medical facts 
or arriving at legal conclusions. The selection of medical cases is based on previous discussed 
case law except for reference to the laparoscopic procedure. This procedure was selected 
because of the frequency of injuries related to this procedure. It carries a high risk of 
complications associated with it and the more experienced the surgeon is with these high 
technological procedures, the lower the occurrence of injury ie the level of the surgeon on the 
learning curve. The latter is more discussed in this chapter. 
 
2 The composition of a medical diagnosis 
A medical diagnosis9 is the temporary result of the medical diagnostic process and can 
change depending on the treatment or status of the disease. The patient consults with the 
medical professional, who listens to the medical history provided by the patient about specific 
complaints. After the initial diagnostic impression the clinician forms a working diagnosis. 
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The clinician examines the patient and may initiate further diagnostic tests to support or reject 
his working diagnosis. Any abnormalities detected in the patient are considered within the 
clinician’s knowledge of anatomy (the structure of the human body), physiology (the function 
of the human body) and pathology (the causes and effects of disease). The signs and 
symptoms direct the clinician to the area of concern. The physiology of the relevant 
anatomical structure may or may not indicate an underlying pathology (something that is 
wrong with the anatomy or physiology). Further diagnostic studies, such as imaging, ie 
radiological studies, magnetic resonance imaging and ultrasound scans, and biochemical 
blood tests, may be performed to find support for the working diagnosis. The clinician will 
consider psychological issues (human behavioural aspects) in the process of reaching a final 
diagnosis of a disease or disorder. The term, ‘medical diagnosis’, refers to a process of 
elimination that starts with a critical diagnosis and proceeds through the alternative 
diagnoses. The clinician classifies the medical condition into different categories that have 
been described by medical opinion regarding the treatment or prognosis. 
If the working diagnosis is ruled out, the clinician considers alternative differential 
diagnoses with the same signs and symptoms. The diagnostic process works towards 
eliminating the differential diagnoses. The diagnostic process should not be seen as a linear 
process but rather an iterative one, whereby a process is repeated in order to find a desired 
goal. Once the disease or disorder has been identified, the clinician investigates the 
aetiology10 of the disease, which might be useful for the treatment plan. The diagnostic 
process leads to a diagnostic opinion and a proposed management plan. The clinician 
explains the patient’s medical condition to the patient before embarking on the proposed 
management plan. The explanation should entail information regarding the aetiology of the 
disease or condition, the progression of the illness, the prognosis of the medical condition, the 
possible outcome, and alternative treatment options. The treatment plan should include 
suggested therapy, alternatives if the patient has a reaction to therapy and treatment, follow-
up consultations, and proposed possibilities regarding the general evolution of the disease. 
Any resistance to the treatment observed by the medical professional or an insufficient 
response from the patient to the treatment should warrant a second look at the working 
diagnosis. If incidental findings are made that did not form part of the original diagnostic 
process, the more serious condition should take priority over a less serious condition. The 
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clinician should involve other specialists as necessary. Unexpected results will affect the 
initial hypothesis of the diagnosis or will be discarded, based again on the gravity of the new 
finding. The clinician uses his medical knowledge and clinical experience to determine 
whether a pattern exists in the signs and symptoms; this is called ‘pattern recognition’. 
Clinical signs and symptoms are associated with disorders or disease patterns. The clinician 
should consult medical literature regarding the latest information on diagnosis, medication or 
management of a medical condition, ie evidence-based medicine. One of the basic reasons for 
evidence-based medicine principles is to ensure recognised and safe measures of treatment 
for patients.  
 
3 Safety aspects in medicine and their nexus with a standard of care 
In South Africa the practice of medicine is regulated by legislation11 and regulations, which 
are developed or changed from time to time and published in the Government Gazette. The 
Health Ministry, in accordance with the National Health Act12 and other relevant statutes, 
dictates the standard of the practice of medicine. Hospital policies and protocols are based on 
legislation and guidelines published by the Minister of Health and parastatals13 to set the 
standards. Medical schools and universities, while complying with the legislation and 
regulations, also provide an educational standard for medicine based on safe medical practice 
in accordance with international standards, research principles and evidence-based medicine 
principles. The Health Professions Council of South Africa (HPCSA)14 publishes guidelines 
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for medical professionals that describe a safe practice of medicine. These guidelines provide 
an overview of the ethical standard of care15 that can be expected by a patient.16 The above 
standards are pertinent to the understanding of medical malpractice in medical negligence 
litigation. A medical professional should comply with the prescribed standard of care17 to 
avoid liability. A medical professional has a legal duty18 to use his skill, competence and 
experience to manage the medical condition of the patient and not to harm him. This means 
acting in accordance with prescribed standards, foreseeing risks and complications, and 
taking steps to prevent such risks19 and complications by exercising reasonable care under the 
circumstances. A medical professional is not measured by the standards of the most skilled 
member of the profession,20 or by the standards of the least skilled member of the profession. 
He is governed by the standard of the reasonably21 competent medical professional in that 
particular field of practice.22 The expertise of a novice surgeon is developed under the 
supervision of an experienced surgeon, because students have to learn their craft and are in 
the early phase of their career (learning curve).23 A medical professional in his capacity as 
manager or supervisor (academic and clinical), moreover, has a legal duty to the patient to 
ensure that qualified, skilled medical professionals are appointed to perform any surgical 
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operation.24 Public safety aspects include safety25 in the preparation and use of medicine, the 
prescription of medicine, and the practice of medicine.  
 
3.1 Clinical trials for the registration of medication 
The regulatory control of medication in South Africa is performed by the Medicine Control 
Council26 in accordance with regulations describing health research, in terms of the National 
Health Act and the Medicines and Related Substances Act 101 of 1965.27 In 2006 the 
Department of Health published ‘Guidelines for Good Practice in the Conduct of Clinical 
Trials’28 for investigators, ethics review committees and pharmaceutical manufacturers. The 
Guidelines give directions regarding the study rationale and motivation, the study designs, 
and the data management of the study used to arrive at a conclusion.29 
 
3.2 Evidence-based medicine for efficacy of medical procedures 
The thesis argues that the jurist should familiarise himself with the concept and content of 
evidence-based medicine, as the published literature explains the latest available medical 
information in a particular field, as well as risks and complications of treatment plans. It 
describes the standard of care set by the profession. Medical procedures and medical 
treatment plans should be designed to ensure patient safety and ensure that medical 
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recommendations are valid and reliable.30 Evidence-based medicine is defined31 as the 
‘conscientious, explicit and judicious use of current best evidence in making decisions about 
the case of individual patients. The practice of evidence-based medicine means integrating 
individual clinical expertise with the best available external clinical evidence from systematic 
research’. The clinician uses evidence-based medicine information to update his knowledge 
in a certain field and to keep up with new research and developments. Furthermore, he 
accumulates information that enhances his own knowledge and clinical experience, which 
should improve his communication with his patients. Peter Yellowlees32 proposes that 
evidence-based medicine can be the third person in the consultation rooms and can assist 
doctors to communicate effectively with their patients. According to Mayer,33 evidence-based 
medicine may be seen as an attempt to standardise the practice of medicine. The author 
cautions that even if the approach suggested by evidence-based medicine is the best approach 
to a clinical problem, the clinician should test if the individual patient will benefit from that 
treatment. In this regard, Swinglehurst et al34 express their concern that when a clinician 
follows, for example, a template-driven diabetes check-up, ‘serious non-diabetes related 
symptoms that the patient mentions in passing’ may not be documented or taken into account. 
Greenhalg et al35 suggest standardisation and compliance with real evidence-based medicine 
principles, because the ‘ethical care’36 of the patient should be the first concern; 
‘individualized evidence should be in a format that clinicians can understand’;37 decisions 
would be ‘shared with patients through meaningful conversations’;38 and evidence-based 
principles would be applied at ‘community level for evidence based public health’.39The 
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thesis previously illustrated, with reference to the South African case of Sibisi NO v Maitin,40 
how the medical reality was overlooked, regardless of evidence-based medicine principles, 
and where research studies were undertaken with the explicit goal of reducing medical costs 
and with no emphasis on patient care. In the English case of Montgomery v Lanarkshire,41 the 
trial court was initially also misdirected because the defendant testified that she did not 
inform the claimant of the risk of shoulder dystocia because, had the claimant been told of the 
risk, she would have inevitably chosen to have a caesarean section. The defendant also 
mentioned that if she felt that it was ‘fair to allow somebody to deliver vaginally’ and then 
complications occurred a caesarean section would be performed. The writer argues that the 
defendant failed to act according to her own good intentions and failed to avoid the 
complications in accordance with good medical practice principles. 
 In conflict with the nature of evidence-based medicine principles, managed health 
care organisations prescribe medical treatment plans to curtail medical costs.42 Such an 
approach is seemingly in accordance with clinical trial studies to assess the risks.43 In this 
regard, Kruger states that evidence-based medicine has its limitations. There may be a 
potential for bias when research is conducted where there is ‘commercial value involved’ for 
what is tested, as it might ‘generate good return on investment’. She states that another 
potential for bias is ‘publication bias’, as only positive results are published, which leaves a 
gap in the data on outcomes that cause harm to patients. She continues that evidence-based 
medicine is a–  
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shared value in the sense that we all want to be treated with the best proven 
intervention and therefore we do expect health care professionals to practice their 
profession by combining their individual skill with evidence-based medicine.44 
 
The gold standard for evidence-based clinical information is the double-blind randomised 
controlled trial, according to Slowther et al.45 The authors confirm that the value of such trials 
is that they limit the use of inefficient treatment and promote effective treatment. Pienaar46 
summarises the essentials of evidence-based medicine and the value that it might have for 
lawyers. She describes the different grading of clinical trials with different reliability levels, 
viz randomised controlled studies, controlled studies, cohort studies, case control studies, 
cross-sectional studies, review studies, systematic review studies and meta-analysis studies. 
She proposes that evidence-based medicine consists of research, such as clinical trials that are 
reported and published, but it also includes groups of specialists that do systematic reviews 
on clinical trials and provide a collective opinion. A third strand of evidence-based medicine 
consists of the meta-analyses of clinical data that have been published. This is an expansion 
of the database and a very effective way of re-analysing available material. It is therefore a 
scientific overview of the clinical data of the clinical trials. The process of systematically 
appraising and classifying the research material is done in an attempt to assist the clinician 
with a summarised version of available evidence. The Cochrane Centres,47 founded by the 
epidemiologist Archie Cochrane, are a group with offices worldwide who study and grade 
scientific research studies. They acknowledge the difference between a systematic review 
study and a meta-analysis, as these studies do not have the same grading. The systematic 
review study is a collective opinion based on a subjective interpretation of scientific material 
by a panel of experts, whereas the meta-analysis consists of conclusions made from 
combining and re-analysing existing scientific data, ie extending the database. Guidelines48 
published by an organisation49 are usually a special case of a systematic review, but may be 
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biased towards a particular treatment modality, and their recommendations should therefore 
be approached with circumspection. Modern medical guidelines should be within the 
paradigm of evidence-based medicine and based on an examination of current evidence.  
Conclusions in the medical research literature report on the risks and complications 
for that particular group of patients chosen for the study, in accordance with the study design 
and rationale. The study material reveals a level of complication or the complication rate as 
well as statistical evidence regarding the learning curve.50 The learning curve is calculated as 
the risk of injury relevant to that study design. For example, suppose evidence-based 
medicine literature reports that the risk of surgical injury in a particular surgical intervention 
is between 0,04 and 4 per cent. This difference in complication rate may indicate, among 
other possibilities, that a novice medical professional still in the beginning stages of his 
learning curve will have a higher risk of causing injury to the patient (ie a 4 per cent chance 
of causing injury), whereas a more experienced medical professional has a 0,04 per cent 
chance of causing injury to the patient. The clinician should discuss the risks, complications 
and proposed treatment plan with the patient. Evidence-based medicine dictates the collective 
medical standard of care and gives a good overview regarding a medical disease, disorder or 
injury. Even if some of the medical professionals have their doubts about the true value of 
evidence-based medicine in general, the law certainly needs a collective medical standard. 
The court will use such a standard as the standard expected from the hypothetical reasonable 
medical professional and will measure whether the conduct of the defendant-doctor was 
adequate and according to this standard at the time of the incident. It follows that a medical 
professional, when offering an explanation in rebuttal of the res ipsa loquitur maxim should 
be tested and asked for reasons for not following such a ‘collective standard’. 
 
4 Understanding certain concepts of the medical process 
Certain complex concepts in medicine have an impact on the legal process, which is 
effectively unrecognised when using the res ipsa loquitur maxim. Frequently, the medical 
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process is a chain of events leading to the injury and such a sequel of events cannot be 
described as a thing (‘res’) unless the res is the presumption of lack of care based on the fact 
of the injury . This concept was not accepted in South Africa51 but accepted in England52 if an 
unexpected injury occurs in a situation under the control of the defendant. In South Africa 
appeals were made for the re-introduction of the maxim and for its application in medical 
negligence cases. Support for the request was based on the English court’s use of the maxim. 
It is argued that the maxim will rarely find application in South Africa in intricate medical 
negligence matters, as it satisfies only part of the element of wrongfulness,53 namely that of 
unjustified harm to the patient and not those of negligence (culpa) ie factual causation and 
legal causation.54 In South Africa, when from the facts the conduct of the defendant cannot be 
determined without further evidence then the maxim cannot be applied. This was evident in 
Van Wyk v Lewis55 when the court was reluctant to find the defendant negligent based on the 
fact of that a swab had been left behind.  
 The following concepts, inherent in the science of medicine, are extracted from 
previous chapters to explain some of the medical facts relevant to factual causation. First, a 
patient has the right to be fully informed regarding the risks and complications of a medical 
procedure before consenting to it.56 Informed consent is a prerequisite and makes an 
otherwise wrongful act lawful. It is justification for the harm done by the medical 
professional in performing a surgical operation. Any material risk and complication should be 
communicated to the patient and should form part of the consent obtained from the patient. 
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Therefore, informed consent is part of the legal duty owed to a patient and has a bearing on 
the element of wrongfulness.57 Second, a missed opportunity or loss of chance relates to the 
effect of a breach of duty on an individual with compromised health who has been deprived 
of a better chance to live longer or a better chance to enjoy better health. It has a bearing on 
the determination of factual causation, legal causation and damages. Lastly, as seen from 
previous examples, the interpretation of statistical information in the medical literature is 
directly related to the medical research study for which it was designed and should not be 
misconstrued as having any bearing on causation in law. These concepts will be discussed 
below to place them in the context of medical negligence litigation. 
 
4.1 Risks and complications in medicine 
The medical professional is aware of the risks and complications of a planned procedure. It 
should be discussed with the patient as the patient has the right to bodily integrity and self-
determination. A risk is defined by Kausek58 as a combination of the likelihood of an 
occurrence of a ‘hazardous event or exposure’ and the ‘severity of the injury or ill health’ that 
can be caused by the event. The risk of any medical intervention is the likelihood that a 
known complication can occur. Each medical procedure has its own known risks. Each 
medication has risks, as displayed in the package insert. Each prescribed medical treatment 
plan has its own known risks, usually documented in medical educational books and medical 
literature based on scientific studies. The general definition of a complication59 is that it is an 
unfavourable evolution of a disease, a health condition or therapy. The following errors may 
result in injury to the patient:  
 wrong diagnosis;  
 failure to attend to the more serious differential diagnosis first;  
 insufficient information conveyed to the patient;  
 failure to warn the patient about risks;  
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 failure to communicate with other health professionals about the patient when such 
communication was required;  
 errors during surgical intervention, eg perforation of an organ; and  
 failure to monitor the condition of the patient under anaesthesia or in the recovery room.  
 
An error either exacerbates the medical condition of the patient or creates new health 
problems due to the medical complications that occurred. A complication may be iatrogenic, 
meaning ‘brought forth by the physician’, or independent of the initial treatment, for instance, 
a pre-existing condition. A risk that was foreseen that became a reality is the occurrence of a 
known complication in the medical process.60 For a practical illustration of risks and 
complications, laparoscopic surgery is used as an example. Laparoscopic surgery is also 
known as ‘button-hole surgery’, whereby surgeons operate through a small incision in the 
body using specially designed instruments. Injury to certain body parts when entering the 
abdominal cavity with the instrument during the performance of a laparoscopic surgical 
process is a risk of the operation; an injury that occurs is described as a complication of 
laparoscopic surgery. In a laparoscopic gall bladder removal operation (laparoscopic 
cholecystectomy) a complication of the operation could include any injury to the biliary tract 
(common bile duct or common hepatic duct or cystic duct injuries)61 or injury to the small or 
large intestines or any other organs.  
Understandably, an explanation by a defendant ‘that it is a known complication’ of 
that particular surgical procedure62 offered in his defence may not be sufficient to avoid 
liability.63 The patient should be informed not only about the risk of the operation but also 
about any serious consequence of such an injury. Furthermore, the risks of an operation 
should be narrowed down to that particular patient. For example, if a patient has a history of 
previous surgery to the same area as the planned surgery, such a patient has an increased risk 
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of complications like bowel obstruction due to adhesion formation.64 The surgeon has to 
obtain a full medical history from the patient to be in a position to anticipate complications. 
The patient relies on the professional knowledge of the medical professional to act in the 
patient’s best interest. The details discussed with the patient about the known risks and 
complications of a particular operation will support the defendant in rebutting allegations of 
negligence.65 The court will investigate whether the defendant foresaw the risk and whether 
he guarded against that risk for that particular operation.66 For example, if the incidence of a 
laparoscopic injury is 2 per cent (ie the risk of such an injury occurring is 2 out of 100 
operations), the defendant should disclose the steps he took to prevent the plaintiff being one 
of the 2 per cent. The assessment of the defendant’s actions will determine whether the 
defendant exercised sufficient care.67 If no steps were taken, or the steps taken to avoid any 
risks or complications do not appear in the medical professional’s operation notes, an 
inference of insufficient care could be drawn and the defendant could be found liable. A 
thorough analysis of a laparoscopic cholecystectomy operation is addressed at a later 
stage.68As discussed previously, in contrast with South African law, the English system 
allows for a claimant to advance to court on allegations based on a breach of the duty of 
disclosure,69 where the court evaluates whether the adequate information would have made a 
difference to the patient’s subjective decision and the outcome. In South African, lack of 
informed consent can be argued by a plaintiff to show a defendant breached his legal duty in 
terms of the element of wrongfulness, but does not assist with the determination of the rest of 
the elements like causation and negligence (culpa). A plaintiff should include allegations 
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based on the management of the risks and complications and whether the defendant-doctor 
guarded against it in terms of the delictual principles.70 
 
4.2 Learning curve 
The term ‘learning curve’ usually describes the increase of proficiency following a number of 
trials and is also called the ‘experience curve’, the effect of which for different industries 
ranges from 10 per cent to 25 per cent, according to Hax.71 Magrina72 writes that risks and 
complications of a specific procedure in medicine and the incidence of injury during a 
specific procedure are directly related to the position on the learning curve attained by the 
surgeon. It can be said that in the medical profession, a clinician inexperienced in a specific 
procedure is placed in the initial phase of the learning curve.73 It follows that difficult 
operations carry a high risk, or a high complication rate, depending on the position that a 
surgeon occupies on his own learning curve. To illustrate, during 2014, in the United States, 
750 000 laparoscopic surgery operations were performed.74 According to Afdhal et al,75 the 
study yielded an ‘overall serious complication rate that remains higher than that seen in open 
cholecystectomy, despite increasing experience with the procedure’.76 The authors suggest, as 
a possible reason, that the complication rate of open cholecystectomy has increased because 
of declining experience in open surgery, as ‘this approach is now reserved for the most 
complicated and challenging cases’.77 
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 The learning curve becomes relevant in determining the skill and competence of a 
doctor (surgeon)78 and forms part of the required standard of care expected from the medical 
profession.79 It would be wise for the patient to request particulars from the surgeon regarding 
his skill and experience80 before consenting to surgery. This should form part of the required 
informed consent obtained from the patient, especially in private health care institutions 
where the doctor does not work under supervision. Furthermore, with a complicated 
operation, it is appropriate for a patient to consult with more than one specialist before the 
operation. Such a complex situation is discussed below with regard to laparoscopic 
operations.81 
 
4.3 Loss of chance 
The phrase ‘loss of chance’82 is not recognised in South African law, although it is well 
known in principle. If an attorney fails to bring a medical negligence claim against a 
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defendant-doctor within the time prescribed by statute,83 the attorney will attract liability. The 
plaintiff can now claim compensation from the attorney. The case will be based on 
negligence of the attorney, as he failed to honour his professional legal duty owed to his 
client, whereby the client lost the chance to be compensated for his injury. The amount of 
compensation, however, will be similar to that which the plaintiff would have claimed from 
the defendant-doctor. The causation of the latter action needs to be established in court before 
the case against the attorney can continue. The design of the loss of chance legal argument is 
based on circumstances in medical negligence cases where the plaintiff is unable to use the 
‘but for’ argument to show causation, because he was likely to die from the medical condition 
even before the negligence and the negligence increased the risk of death or accelerated the 
risk. 
The English case Gregg v Scott84 is a good example of where a missed diagnosis can 
give rise to a claim based on the ‘loss of chance’ of a better outcome. In South Africa such a 
claim would be based on negligence, ie a doctor neglecting his legal duty to the patient, and 
thus increasing the risk of harm to the patient. In Gregg v Scott, the claimant developed non-
Hodgkin’s lymphoma, which presented as a lump under his left arm. The lump was 
incorrectly diagnosed as a benign collection of fatty tissue and the medical professional failed 
to refer the claimant to another specialist. Therefore, treatment was delayed for nine months. 
The delay in treatment significantly reduced the claimant’s chances of survival from 42 per 
cent to 25 per cent. The trial judge dismissed the claim on the basis that for a person with this 
condition the chances of a cure were in any event less than 50 per cent, so it was more 
probable than not that the claimant would have been in his present position even if treatment 
had started promptly. The case went to the Court of Appeal and then to the House of Lords. 
The majority in the House of Lords confirmed the decision and dismissed the claimant’s 
claim.85 In the House of Lords the claimant advanced two arguments: first, the 
‘quantification’ argument (the delay in diagnosis had caused physical damage, as the 
treatment was now more severe and the claimant was therefore entitled to be compensated 
based on his reduced life expectancy as a matter of assessing the quantum of damages); and 
second, the ‘loss of chance’ argument (the reduction in the claimant’s chances of survival 
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from 42 per cent to 25 per cent was something of value and the claimant was entitled to be 
compensated for that loss. Despite significant disparity in the respective opinions of the 
House of Lords, the majority dismissed the claimant’s action.  
Turning to the medical information86 available, one sees that survival rates87 are based 
on a treatment study of people who had the disease for a given period. But such a study 
cannot predict what will happen in the case of an individual.88 Many other factors have an 
influence on the outcome (prognosis), namely, the type of lymphoma, the stage of the disease 
at the time of the diagnosis, and the treatment received. The five-year survival rate for people 
with non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma is 69 per cent and the 10-year survival rate is 58 per cent. An 
international prognostic index shows that the outlook or prognosis depends on the patient’s 
age, the stage of the lymphoma, the spread of the lymphoma outside the lymph system, how 
well the patient can complete normal daily activities, and the blood serum level of lactate 
dehydrogenase (LDH), which increases with the amount of lymphoma in the blood. A 
distinction is made between different types of the disease as a particular type of lymphoma 
has different stages. For purposes of explanation, the disease follicular lymphoma is used. 
The Follicular Lymphoma International Prognostic Index (FLIPI)89 revealed that early 
detection in this group has a survival rate of 91 per cent (first 5 years) and 71 per cent (10 
years) and late detection in this group has a survival rate of 53 per cent (first 5 years) and 36 
per cent (10 years). Treatment options also depend on the type of lymphoma and the stage of 
                                                 
86
See http://www.cancer.org/cancer/non-hodgkinlymphoma/detailedguide/non-hodgkin-lymphoma-factors-
prognosis (accessed 15 June 2014). 
87
A Carroll Survival rates are not the same as mortality rates (2010), available at 
http://theincidentaleconomist.com/wordpress/survival-rates-are-not-the-same-as-mortality-rates/ (accessed 15 
June 2014). Carroll explains survival rates with the following hypothesis: if there was a new cancer of the thumb 
killing people, from the time the first cancer cell appears, one has nine years to live with chemotherapy. From 
the time one can detect a lump, one has four years to live with chemotherapy. In the event that there is no way to 
detect the disease until one feels a lump, the five-year survival rate for this cancer is 0, because within five years 
of detection, everyone would die, even on therapy. If a new scanner is now invented that can detect thumb 
cancer when only one cell is there, ie early detection, everyone will still be dying four years after they feel the 
lump. But since the new scanner is making the diagnosis five years earlier, the five-year survival rate is now 
approaching 100 per cent. Everyone is now living for nine years with the disease. Meanwhile, in England, they 
believe the scanner does not extend life and decided not to pay for it. Their five-year survival rate is still 0 per 
cent. The initial mortality rate is unchanged as the same number of people is dying every year. 
88
The statistical numbers for a survival rate are part of a survival analysis. They are the number of people in a 
treatment group or study group alive for a given period (five years). These figures are important to determine 
prognosis and treatment value. It is not specific for individuals, as treatment options might be different since the 
study or the general health of the individual might be different to the study group. The medical expert will take 
into account the net survival rate which is disease specific and which filters out mortality from other causes. The 
disease-free survival rate, metastasis-free survival and progression-free survival will also form part of the 
analysis of the medical expert in respect of the individual patient. 
89
See http://www.cancer.org/cancer/non-hodgkinlymphoma/detailedguide/non-hodgkin-lymphoma-factors-




the disease. Follicular lymphoma is usually treated with chemotherapy, radiation, 
immunotherapy and stem cell transplants. 
Although there is an inherent problem in deciding a case90 on statistical information, it 
is acceptable to use it in context. The statistical information reveals an early and late 
detection group: to summarise, in the early detection group there is a 91 per cent survival rate 
and in the late detection group there is a 53 per cent survival rate.91 It means that in a certain 
segment of the population tested for follicular lymphoma, 91 per cent survived the first five 
years when the disease was detected in the early stages, and only 53 per cent of the group 
survived the first five years in the advanced stages of the disease.  
In applying the statistical information to Gregg v Scott92 several arguments are 
relevant. First, one has to determine if the study is relevant to the specific individual with 
regard to the type of cancer, the age of the individual and the stage of cancer. This 
determination will be made by a medical expert who will ascertain if the individual fits the 
study design. Without taking any detailed medical analysis into consideration, the court found 
that the claimant’s chances of survival were reduced from 42 per cent to 25 per cent, ie a 
reduction in the prospects of a successful outcome. Second, the failure to arrange for follow-
up tests of the lump under the claimant’s arm is a complete93 failure (the defendant entirely 
missed the opportunity). The defendant should have foreseen the increased risk if the test was 
not done and should have prevented this risk. He was 100 per cent negligent and thus failed 
in his duty to the plaintiff. The defendant failed to prevent further harm to his patient as he 
failed to ensure that the claimant remained in the survival rate category of 42 per cent. By 
failing to do so he directly contributed to the claimant’s reduced life expectancy (factual 
causation) and accelerated pain and suffering (or accelerated death). Because of the onset of 
more radical treatment, the pain and suffering was worsened by the anguish of knowing that 
the disease could have been detected earlier. Third, the statistical evidence serves only to 
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‘quantify the damages’94 of the plaintiff. It has a substantial bearing on general damages like 
pain and suffering and loss of amenities of life. Further, it has a bearing on the future medical 
costs: the medical expert for the claimant should outline the most probable treatment in the 
given circumstances needed for the individual to remain part of the survival statistics. The 
latter will entail the optimum medical treatment required for this specific individual to give 
him optimum chance to remain a survivor. The statistical period relevant to the individual’s 
health will affect the period for which future medical treatment is claimed and may be 
adjusted by the medical expert based on the individual person’s health status (life 
expectancy). Furthermore, the loss of income and income capacity will also depend on the 
statistical period used and may possibly be adjusted by medical experts. Lastly, when medical 
negligence reduces a less than probable chance of survival but there still remains a residual 
chance of survival after the negligence, the quantifying claim should not be the product of the 
reduction in the chance of survival and the full value of the loss, but only the residual value 
of the loss.95 For example, if the full value of the loss is R100 000 and the chance of survival 
before the negligence was 42 per cent and after the negligence it was 25 per cent, the 
damages comprise 17 per cent (42per cent less 25 per cent) divided by the residual value of 
the loss, 75 per cent (100 per cent less 25 per cent), which equals R22 666.66. The defendant 
was not the cause of the claimant’s medical condition and therefore can only be liable for the 
reduction caused by his negligence. 
 
5 Medical accidents 
The standard of care is usually contested in medical negligence cases, as the plaintiff alleges 
that the defendant breached his legal duty96 by not adhering to the expected standard of care. 
The test for negligence97 is whether a reasonable medical professional in similar 
circumstances would have foreseen the risk and guarded against it. In addition, questions of 
factual causation are compounded further in surgical procedures, where the patient consents 
to a physical injury to alleviate a medical disease or condition. Medical expert evidence has 
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to provide an explanation of the anatomy of the patient, the purpose and expectations of the 
surgery, the risks and complications of the surgery, and any medical alternative options for 
the patient to establish the medical realities from which factual causation is derived. In 
surgical alternatives, a distinction is made between open surgical techniques and laparoscopic 
surgical techniques, as the risks and complications of these procedures are different. Medical 
accidents, such as surgical errors, are often described as iatrogenic injuries98 (caused by 
medical professionals). Surgical procedures are the cause of many medical injuries and 
therefore the res ipsa loquitur maxim seems an easy option to get past negligence and 
causation. As discussed before, according to the non-medical person, an undesired and 
unfortunate outcome to a surgical intervention may ipso facto speak of negligence. It was 
evident from previous chapters that South African law acknowledges a surgical accident as a 
breach of a legal duty and part of the element of wrongfulness in delict, but the incident per 
se is not sufficient to establish negligent conduct. All the elements99 of delictual liability 
should be satisfied. On the other hand, the English court100 acknowledges that an adverse 
event unexpected in nature even such as a surgical accident under the control of the 
defendant-doctor allows for an inference of lack of care (prima facie evidence) and the 
inference of negligence will become conclusive evidence of negligence if the claim is not 
rebutted by the defendant.101 
Surgery is a medical field that has many subdivisions. Abdominal surgery, as part of 
‘general surgery’,102 is the focus here because of the controversial legal arguments in Van Wyk 
v Lewis.103 As seen before, Van den Heever and Carstens104 believe that the medical facts in 
Van Wyk v Lewis105 were incorrectly interpreted.106 They indicate that the act of leaving a 
swab in the abdominal cavity of the plaintiff should be interpreted as an ‘absolute’ and not a 
‘relative’, as required by the res ipsa loquitur maxim. It is not disputed that swabs or 
instruments are not ordinarily left in the patient’s body and may indicate a lack of care. It 
appears that the authors suggest that the English system be followed in respect of the maxim 
and that the mere fact of the retained swab under the control of the defendant-surgeon should 
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be enough to infer of lack of care and negligence on the part of the surgeon. It contrasts with 
the law of delict in South Africa.107 If no information is available regarding the conduct of the 
surgeon during surgery (element of negligence) or circumstances that link the surgeon’s 
actions with the unfortunate outcome (causation) or the patient’s medical condition during 
surgery, the maxim is not applicable. In this regard, a retained swab case is inconclusive 
evidence of negligent conduct, which does not allow allegations of negligence without 
additional information. It is argued that, in South Africa medical negligence is only 
established when a court is in a position to weigh the defendant’s action against the expected 
standard of care described by the medical expert. Therefore, it almost always has the effect 
that the fact of the injury is inconclusive evidence of negligence (culpa or liability), because 
the circumstances relevant to the harmful occurrence necessitate an analysis to establish 
factual causation, culpable conduct and, finally, liability. 
 
5.1 Reconstruction of Van Wyk v Lewis 
In order to demonstrate the complexity of establishing factual causation in a seemingly 
simple medical negligence case, the study turns to the locus classicus Van Wyk v Lewis.108 
The plaintiff presented with the signs and symptoms of an inflamed appendix109 and 
underwent surgery for the removal of the appendix. When the abdomen was surgically 
opened the surgeon discovered that the gall bladder was also affected by the overt abdominal 
infection. Furthermore, the surgeon perceived signs of superficial necrosis. The surgeon 
decided to drain the gall bladder. When the surgeon made an incision into the gall bladder110 
septic matter gushed out. The surgeon struggled to suture the gall bladder because of the 
friability111 of the organ. In order to increase visibility he packed the wound with several 
swabs. Subsequently, the swabs were removed and the wound closed. A swab was retained in 
the abdomen. A few months later the plaintiff evacuated a piece of muslin (swab) from her 
rectum, and the plaintiff instituted action against the surgeon. The matter was heard in the 
Appeal Court in Bloemfontein and His Lordship Justice Wessels explicitly rejected the 
maxim. He stated that ‘the mere fact that a swab is left in a patient is not conclusive of 
negligence’. His Lordship envisaged cases where it would be better to suture the patient in an 
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emergency and deal with the swab-finding at a later stage. To further complicate that matter, 
the surgeon delegated the swab counting to the theatre sister, who was not a party to the legal 
action.  
 
5.2 Medical features related to abdominal surgery in Van Wyk v Lewis 
The medical facts of Van Wyk v Lewis112 seem to be simple to the uninformed person: 
negligence (and thus liability) should be obvious from the fact that a swab was left behind. 
However, the case illustrates a different medical reality ie a complicated set of medical facts. 
Not only did the plaintiff suffer from a perforated appendix, but the overt infection in the 
abdomen affected the gall bladder as well.113 Several factors contribute to the intricacy of this 
matter: an intra-abdominal infection; the treatment and the complications thereof; a gall 
bladder infection (cholecystitis); the operation in respect of the gall bladder itself; and the 
mechanism that caused the swab migration from the intra-abdominal cavity into the intestines 
in order to have it excreted. The medical literature, provided by Pieracci et al114 and 
Menichetti et al,115 states that the procedure to treat intra-abdominal infection depends on the 
anatomical site of infection, the degree of peritoneal inflammation, the patient’s underlying 
condition, and the available resources of the treatment centre. It appears that the medical 
condition of the plaintiff would have been classified as complicated because ‘the infectious 
process proceeds beyond a single organ, causing either localised or diffuse peritonitis’. The 
suggested treatment should include both surgical and antibiotic116 therapy. Pieracci et al117 
state that abdominal sepsis is a complex condition that consists of many factors that can 
progress to conditions of ‘varying severity’. It may impair the functioning of vital organs, 
which could lead to multiple organ failure and death. If the septic conditions remain 
untreated, they can lead to global tissue hypoxia, tissue damage and death. If a surgeon 
discovered such a condition after opening the abdomen, he would appreciate the gravity of 
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the medical condition of the patient. In the above instance, he found a perforated appendix 
and sepsis in the abdomen in addition to the diagnosed cholecystitis. Such a medical 
condition is still currently interpreted as ‘complicated’.118 The medical condition of the 
plaintiff in Van Wyk v Lewis119 would most probably have been classified as an emergency 
due to the perforated organ and overt sepsis. Once a medical situation is classified as an 
emergency another set of rules is established.120 The surgeon probably took general 
precautions to prevent the further spread of the septic material by packing the swabs into the 
abdominal cavity. It is argued that, if the surgeon had pleaded that it was an emergency 
situation to justify his neglect in leaving the swab behind, he would have been faulted for not 
following up on the medical condition of the patient.121 
In addition to the infection in the abdomen, another complication that the surgeon 
discovered was the presence of cholecystitis. Cholecystitis (infection of the gall bladder), 
according to Vollmer et al,122 occurs when bile is trapped in the gall bladder because of the 
cystic duct being blocked by a gallstone. This can occur repeatedly. It leads to swelling and 
irritation that cause the gall bladder to become thick and hard so that it does not function as 
before. Without treatment to eliminate the gallstones, it is likely that gall bladder perforation 
may occur, which can be life-threatening. The surgeon in Van Wyk v Lewis123 found overt 
sepsis as a result of a perforated appendix, which affected the gall bladder and signs of 
superficial necrosis of the gall bladder, which in turn created a higher risk of perforation. 
When considering the technique used for the gall bladder removal operation, the thesis 
looked at the literature provided by Rothlin et al124 and Rice et al.125 These authors state that 
with an acute inflamed gall bladder the spillage of bile into the abdomen has an incidence of 
between 10 per cent and 40 per cent, and spillage of gallstones into the abdominal cavity has 
an incidence of between 6 per cent and 30 per cent. Spillage of bile or gallstones into the 
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abdomen can cause abdominal wall abscesses or other intra-abdominal abscesses. Such a 
spillage into the abdomen is a further complication of the operation. The surgeon appears to 
have contained the spillage of bile by using the swabs to prevent further bile spillage into the 
abdominal cavity to manage the associated sepsis.  
A further medical complexity relevant to this case is directly related to factual 
causation. How did a swab, left either on the outside of the gall bladder cavity or that of the 
abdominal cavity, cross into the gastrointestinal tract to be evacuated? When considering this 
migration of the swab that was left behind, the formation of a fistula (duct into the gut) was 
investigated. Pal126 defines an intestinal fistula as an abnormal connection between two body 
cavities, for instance, from the abdominal cavity to the small intestine. A fistula that closes 
will form an abscess with infection inside. Pal emphasises that a large number of fistulas heal 
without surgical intervention; the location and symptoms created by the fistula determine the 
next medical step. It is probable that an asymptomatic fistula was formed between the 
abdominal cavity and the intestines of the plaintiff. The retained swab was likely excreted 
from the abdomen to the intestines and out via the gastro-intestinal route. No evidence was 
presented regarding symptoms like pain, fever, tenderness and a general feeling of ill health. 
These symptoms would have been an indication of the severity of the complication. None of 
these symptoms and further sequelae was recorded and seemingly the retained swab was 
excreted by means of fistula formation and the plaintiff recovered completely. 
For completeness of the discussion and simply to understand the medical reality, a 
brief overview of the prognosis of a similar plaintiff reveals that, according to Ali et al,127 
leakage of fluids such as bile into the peritoneum may lead to minimal generalised peritonitis, 
which in turn may lead to fibrotic adhesions. In young people the mortality rate will be less 
than 10 per cent, but in older people the mortality rate will be as high as 40 per cent. The 
adhesions might cause the obstruction of the small bowel which will lead to surgical 
correction, which in turn will increase adhesion formation. Although the record of Van Wyk v 
Lewis makes no mention of these serious complications, it is mentioned here in an attempt to 
show the standard of care at the time of the occurrence and clarify the complexity of the long 
term effects that such a complication may have on a similar plaintiff. 
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5.3 Legal opinion regarding Van Wyk v Lewis 
The majority judgment in Van Wyk v Lewis128 rejected the res ipsa loquitur maxim. Some 
South African authors disagreed with these findings.129Their approach was similar to that of 
the English court:130 the fact that an object is retained in the abdomen of a patient during 
surgery (unexpected nature of the event) and under the control of the surgeon should create a 
factual inference of negligence based on the fact of the injury that calls for an explanation 
from the defendant. They were of the opinion that the retained swab is ‘absolute’131 evidence 
of negligence (prima facie evidence of breach of a legal duty), and that regardless of the 
circumstances of the operation the surgeon should have foreseen the harm of a retained swab 
and should have guarded against it (culpable conduct). In other words, res ipsa loquitur132 
‘the facts speak for themselves’. To assess this argument, the requirements of the maxim133 
should be tested against the facts in Van Wyk v Lewis134 in the light of the complex medical 
reality discussed above.  It is evident that at least two requirements of the maxim were not 
met. First, negligence must be inferable from the occurrence without requesting more 
information and, second, the occurrence must be under the surgeon’s control. In accordance 
with the law of delict135 in South Africa, delictual liability is proved when the elements of 
wrongfulness, negligence and causation are established. From the medical information 
available136 it is clear that the element of wrongfulness would be established,137 but it is not 
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possible to determine whether the surgeon was negligent138 without hearing further 
evidence.139 Furthermore, the management of the swab-count in theatre was not under the 
surgeon’s control,140 but was delegated to the theatre sister. This information was not 
available to the plaintiff when relying on the maxim. It is argued that the lack of information 
for determining negligence (culpa) is the most likely reason for the court’s reluctance to 
accept the maxim. The argument supports the idea that the maxim was rejected on two 
counts: (i) de lege lata as all the elements of the law of delict were not satisfied in applying 
the maxim; and, even if the maxim could apply, (ii) de facto, taking into consideration the all-
encompassing medical intricacies of a medical negligence case. There is not enough 
information available for a court to ascertain whether there was reason for leaving the swab 
behind at the time. Medical expert evidence should explain to the court the standard of care 
essential to similar circumstances and this will put a court in a position to determine whether 
the conduct of the defendant-surgeon was substandard.141 
In a case of negligence, based on the same facts, the plaintiff would have had 
difficulty in proving liability. First, the plaintiff has to adduce that the defendant acted 
wrongfully by breaching his legal duty to the plaintiff, ie the surgeon left a swab in the 
abdomen and therefore failed to adequately treat and care for the plaintiff in accordance with 
expected standards. Second, the plaintiff has to prove that the defendant was negligent by not 
acting in accordance with the standard of a hypothetical, reasonable medical professional in 
the same circumstances (culpable conduct), ie foreseeing certain complications and taking 
reasonable steps to prevent foreseeable risks and complications. The court would also 
consider whether it was an emergency as in a medical emergency the legal duty of the 
defendant becomes less onerous because that particular medical emergency could not have 
been foreseen and prevented. The manner in which the defendant manages the emergency 
will be scrutinised, considering his ability to plan in advance. Lastly, the plaintiff has to prove 
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that the wrongful and negligent action of the defendant was the factual cause of the 
damage,142 which was not too remote so as to ascribe liability to the defendant.  
As an afterword, from the facts it is clear that sepsis was found when opening the 
abdomen. The perforated appendix was the source of the sepsis and was removed. The gall 
bladder was affected by the inflammation and, when it was opened, according to the standard 
at the time; septic contents contaminated the abdominal cavity. The septic contents were 
contained with swabs, one of which was misplaced. The further emergency management 
would have been to prevent the severe medical condition, ie peritonitis (inflammation of the 
abdominal cavity). It is also clear that the defendant was successful in preventing peritonitis, 
a very serious condition, as the patient was discharged after a period of time. Furthermore, in 
claiming damages, the plaintiff refused to pay for the defendant’s medical services but she 
did not claim for future medical treatment or expenses.
143
 Currently, the medical literature 
shows that the sequelae of such a medical condition, inflammation of the intestines, may 
result in adhesions that may lead to long-term effects like obstruction of the small bowel or 
colon, which can be an emergency situation in itself. There is no evidence of such an 
occurrence. It is argued that the plaintiff should have been unsuccessful against the 
defendant, and would again be unsuccessful if a similar case were to arise today in South 
Africa, based on insufficient evidence regarding the elements of negligence and factual 
causation with or without the assistance of the res ipsa loquitur maxim. 
 
6 Laparoscopic procedures in general 
A further problem in determining factual causation arises from different surgical techniques. 
The risk and complications of a laparoscopic procedure is different from those of open 
surgery. The thesis discusses laparoscopic procedures because of the misconception that it is 
a potential case for the uninformed to use the application of the res ipsa loquitur maxim, 
based on the fact of the injury (perforation) that occurred as a result of the surgical technique. 
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 (also called minimal invasive surgery) can be performed on 
different areas of the body. In general this type of surgery is known as endoscopic surgery, 
but is usually named for the area, eg if performed in the chest or thoracic cavity it is called a 
thoracoscopy. The benefit of a laparoscopic process is that the patient experiences less pain 
and less bleeding, as the incision is smaller, and the patient has a shorter hospital stay. The 
risks145 of entrance injuries are injury to blood vessels, intestines and other organs. Perforation 
of the major blood vessels can result in severe haemorrhaging and death, and the perforation 
of intestines can result in infection of the abdominal cavity (peritonitis) and ultimately death. 
An added risk for laparoscopic operations is previous surgery146 in the same area, as this may 
result in dense adhesions (scar tissue) that may complicate the surgical field. The adhesions 
often distort the anatomy of the patient and limit visibility through the laparoscope. 
 
6.1 Therapeutic laparoscopic procedure for endometriosis – a case study 
Medical information about the relevant anatomy and underlying disease provides the 
background and circumstances of a particular patient in a particular scenario. Although it 
seems obvious that injury to organs other than the proposed aim of the laparoscopic surgery 
should lead to an inference of negligence, it is more complicated than that. In order to 
demonstrate the medical complexity from which factual causation emanates, the therapeutic 
laparoscopic procedure is analysed. In an unreported case, 147 a 27-year-old woman, Ms A, 
consulted with Dr B, a specialist gynaecologist, as she was suffering from severe pelvic pain. 
About three months before this consultation, Dr B confirmed, with a diagnostic laparoscopy, 
that Ms A was suffering from endometriosis. No histology report was available. Ms A was 
treated conservatively for 18 months. Ultrasound investigations did not reveal any 
abnormality in the kidneys or other organs. Ms A underwent a therapeutic laparoscopic 
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procedure in order to treat the endometriosis. Dr B damaged Ms A’s ureter while inserting a 
stent to assist with urine drainage from the kidney to the bladder. Three days later Ms A was 
discharged with an indwelling catheter. A month later Ms A was readmitted and a ureteric re-
implantation operation were performed. The stent was removed two months later. Ms A then 
presented with constant bladder infections and pelvic pain. She claimed compensation based 
on the negligence of Dr B. In rebuttal Dr B claimed that the adverse event is a known 
complication of laparoscopic surgery in the presence of endometriosis, and denied liability. 
 
6.2 Medical information about endometriosis 
Research148 indicated that endometriosis149 is a gynaecological condition where the 
endometrium (inner lining of the uterus) grows outside the uterine cavity. It occurs during the 
reproductive years in about 6 to 10 per cent of women. Symptoms depend on the site of 
activity and are common in women who are infertile. Endometriosis cannot be cured but is 
treated using pain medication, hormonal treatment and/or surgery. 
The lesions150 are hormone-sensitive and pain sometimes correlates with the menstrual 
cycle. Recurrent, intense pelvic pain is one of the major symptoms of endometriosis. Other 
symptoms151 are chronic fatigue and constipation. Pain can occur at any time during the 
month and can be caused by adhesions or inflammation in the pelvic cavity. Complications 
like pelvic cysts, cysts of the ovaries, ruptured cysts and abdominal obstruction may occur 
because of the abdominal adhesions. Cysts can occur on the fallopian tubes, ovaries, front or 
back of the uterus, uterine ligaments, back of the intestines (ie back of the sigmoid colon), 
bladder and ureter (the tube between the kidney and bladder). Cysts may spread to the cervix 
(mouth of the uterus) and vagina. 
The cause or pathophysiology of endometriosis152 is likely to be ‘multifactorial’ and 
an ‘interplay’ between several factors, viz predisposing factors like ageing and genetics, 
metabolic changes, inflammation and formation of ectopic endometrium. Uncertainty exists 
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about the cause and the effects of the condition and this is so regarding any of the 
pathophysiology of endometriosis. Inflammation153 plays a primary role in the aetiology and 
causes pain. 
The medical history of the patient and physical examination will lead the 
gynaecologist to suspect154 endometriosis. Ultrasound may or may not show the lesions, 
depending on their size, and is mostly used to determine the effect of the adhesions on other 
organs. Lesions show histology features similar to endometrial tissue. Frequently, lesions are 
overlooked during a diagnostic laparoscopy due to their location. The only way to confirm a 
diagnosis of endometriosis is with a laparoscopy or other form of surgery, whereby a biopsy 
of the lesion is taken and sent for a histological examination (a pathologist will confirm the 
pathology of the specimen through a microscope). This will be done with circumspection 
because of the risk of haemorrhage and the hidden nature of the lesion formation. 
Endometriosis155 has been graded in order to facilitate decisions about surgery and the 
type of surgical intervention. Stage I endometriosis may have little disease and severe pain, 
and Stage IV may have little pain and severe disease or vice versa. In young women surgical 
treatment aims to restore the normal pelvic anatomy as far as possible. Laparoscopic surgery 
is considered due to minimal scar tissue formation. According to Liakakos,156 ‘55–100% of 
women develop adhesions following pelvic surgery which can result in infertility, chronic 
abdominal and pelvic pain, and difficult re-operative surgery’.  
Efficacy studies157 depend on the initial complaint of the patient. Both medicinal and 
surgical interventions produce roughly equivalent pain-relief benefits. Pain recurs in 44 per 
cent of women with medicinal treatment and in 53 per cent with surgical interventions. Each 
approach has its advantages and disadvantages. Surgical intervention is more effective than 
medicinal intervention in attempting to address infertility.  
From the above medical information it is evident that in the case under discussion:  
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(1) Ms A was a young person, thus Dr B had to determine the extent of the endometriosis 
because it can affect fertility and may cause haemorrhaging;  
(2) Dr B should have been aware that ultrasound is not reliable for detecting lesions, but 
may reveal the obstruction or occlusion of tubes and any abnormal accumulation of 
fluid in the pelvic cavity;  
(3) Dr B opted for a period of conservative treatment by prescribing certain medication, 
but this was unsuccessful;  
(4) Dr B considered surgery as a last option, presumably based on the severity of the 
disease; and 
(5) Dr B considered laparoscopic surgery in order to restore normal pelvic anatomy, 
because it involves minimum scar tissue formation, minimum adhesion formation and 
minimum haemorrhaging.  
 
6.3 Legal considerations regarding a laparoscopic procedure for endometriosis 
Van den Heever and Carstens158 would regard the above case study as a potential case for the 
application of the res ipsa loquitur maxim, based on the iatrogenic159 injury to the ureter. The 
same arguments regarding the res ipsa loquitur maxim in Van Wyk v Lewis160 are relevant to 
this matter.161 The element of wrongfulness is not disputed, because the defendant owed his 
legal duty to the plaintiff not to cause harm. The elements162 of negligence (culpa) and factual 
and legal causation are left unsatisfied. Further evidence regarding the conduct of a 
reasonable professional providing reasonable care as well as medical information explaining 
the circumstances of the injury or steps taken to prevent injury to the plaintiff would have 
excluded the maxim. 
The maxim in South Africa requires that the key facts have to be so obvious that all 
the elements in delict can be inferred. The medical reality is intricate and potentially far 
removed from the observations of the uninformed person. Several issues need to be clarified 
by the medical expert: (i) perhaps the laparoscopic operation should not have been the 
operation of choice because of the high probability of a distorted anatomy as a result of 
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adhesion formation in the pelvic area163 caused by the disease and because of the limited 
visibility with the laparoscopic instrument; (ii) surgical intervention, without the indication of 
an emergency, is the last choice of treatment option because of the propensity of the disease 
to form adhesions and adhesions distort the anatomy; (iii) there is a real possibility that the 
previous diagnostic laparoscopy to confirm the diagnosis was contraindicated because a 
clinical diagnosis is usually made without surgical intervention; (iv) the level of skill of the 
surgeon, ie his place on the learning curve, should be ascertained because of the high level of 
complication of this particular operation; and (v) the reason for not requesting the assistance 
of a urologist during surgery to discern the ureter should be established. In summary, the 
medical condition of endometriosis forms adhesions when the lesions are healed. This has a 
high risk of injury during a laparoscopic operation because the scar tissue distorts the 
anatomy of the patient. With limited visibility through the laparoscope the inexperienced 
surgeon may not be aware of the changed anatomy and thus such an operation carries a 
higher risk of causing injury to organs. The need for laparoscopic surgery should only be 
undertaken in extreme or emergency circumstances to justify such a high risk to the patient. It 
is negligent (culpable conduct) to foresee a material risk and fail to take steps to prevent it. 
Therefore the steps taken by the defendant to avoid the risk should be weighed against the 
complications that occurred. Seen in context of the medical facts, it is clear that an inference 
of negligence on the fact of the injury (the design of the maxim under circumstances under 
the control of the defendant even if it was unexpected in nature) does not explain the 
expected standard of care under similar circumstances and does not address the medical 
reality. Without the evidence of a medical expert, it is not possible to appreciate all the risks 
involved. From a medical point of view, when applying the maxim in South Africa, there are 
at least three grounds for possible negligence: first, the reason for the operations if it was not 
an emergency; second, the fact that conservative treatment was not considered and that the 
operation was most likely not the correct choice of operation and perhaps even contra-
indicated; third, the level of expertise of the surgeon or the fact of the injury (what occurred 
during surgery) that caused the perforation. From a legal point of view, the non-medical 
person unfamiliar with the medical reality will simply state res ipsa loquitur without any 
appreciation for the complexity of the case. If the court for some reason allows the maxim, 
the surgeon may simply rebut the maxim by stating that he took all reasonable care but the 
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adhesions distorted the anatomy and visibility and that was the (non-negligent) cause of the 
injury. Furthermore, if one involves the services of a medical expert informing the court 
above the medical reality, the need for the maxim falls away. The mere fact that non-medical 
persons often do not understand the intricate medical facts does not mean that the court can 
revert to the maxim. As opined previously, an inability to interpret medical facts is not the 
same as insufficient medical facts (medical facts not available). 
Turning to the facts of the case, Ms A consulted with Dr B as she was suffering from 
severe pain. Further investigation was clearly needed, as the lesions (cysts) may have 
involved the ovaries or may have ruptured. Perforation of the cysts may advance to peritonitis 
and, if peritonitis is untreated or the treatment is unsuccessful, peritonitis may lead to 
subsequent multi-organ involvement.164 The high risk of injury due to the nature of the 
disease from intra-pelvic adhesions should be weighed against the temporary relief offered by 
surgery and the surgical outcome. 
The above example of laparoscopic procedures in a patient suffering from 
endometriosis illustrates the importance of the involvement of the medical expert to give a 
medical explanation of the facts that are also the basis for factual causation. Each individual 
case is different. A surgeon who decides to perform a laparoscopy on a woman suffering 
from endometriosis has to furnish reasons in the presence of the high risk of injury.165 
 
7 Laparoscopic cholecystectomy 
A second case of laparoscopic injury is discussed to establish the elements of factual 
causation in delict, from the medical facts of the case. The previous case of a laparoscopic 
procedure in relation to endometriosis demonstrated the medical intricacies and aetiology of a 
disease that can affect the decision of performing the procedure. It shows that a medical 
professional should discuss the risks and complications of the procedure with the patient. 
However, the decision to perform laparoscopic surgery on a patient suffering from gall 
bladder disease is sufficiently different because it is based on the surgical history of the 
patient.  
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7.1 Laparoscopic cholecystectomy procedure – a case study 
In an unreported case166, a 40-year-old woman was admitted with upper abdominal pain 
associated with nausea and vomiting. The hospital record reflected that she had a surgical 
history of previous abdominal operations. Haematological investigations showed a raised 
white cell count (13.4) and neutrophil count (10.4).167 An ultrasound of the abdomen 
revealed– 
 
[that] no obvious masses or lesions [were found], no obvious duct dilatation [was 
found], [that the] gallbladder appears distended with multiple calculi present, [that 
the] gallbladder wall [was] thickened and measures 9 mm – [it was] suggestive of 
acute or chronic cholecystitis with gall stones.  
 
The patient was diagnosed with cholecystitis and was advised that a cholecystectomy was 
indicated. It was agreed between the doctor and the patient that a laparoscopic 
cholecystectomy should be the choice of operation, and it was performed. The surgical notes 
of the doctor indicated that– 
 
the entrance of three ports were done supra umbilical, sub costal was under vision, 
that the gallbladder was mobilized, but after clipping cystic bile duct it was decided to 
convert the repair operation to open surgery. A small traction injury was found next to 
junction of cystic duct and common bile duct. It was repaired. Wound closed with 
corrugated drain and skin clips. 
 
On the first post-operative day the patient complained of severe pain, nausea and vomiting, 
and was initially kept under observation.168 She constantly complained of pain and feeling ill. 
She was discharged on the fourth day. Twenty-two days later the patient presented with 
cramping, abdominal pain, abdominal distension, weakness, dizziness and fainting. Her vital 
signs revealed a raised blood pressure and raised pulse rate. She developed spiking 
temperatures. She was diagnosed with ascites and mild jaundice and a CT scan revealed– 
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fluid collection in sub hepatic space, extending to the lesser sac and Morrison’s 
pouch. Intra-hepatic bile ducts are normal and proximal common bile duct is in 
continuity with the collection in the GB fossa, distal common bile duct and pancreatic 
ducts are normal. Extensive free fluid noted in the rest of the abdomen. Highly 
suggestive of proximal common bile duct transection with biliary ascites. 
 
She was transferred for an emergency ERCP169 operation and the ERCP revealed a complete 
transection of the common bile duct. She recovered well in High Care and later in the ward. 
Further repair surgery was scheduled. She remained weak with compromised health.  
 
7.2 Medical information relevant to the laparoscopic cholecystectomy 
The rate of bile duct injury remains as high as 1.4 per cent during laparoscopic 
cholecystectomy operations. In order to understand the extent of the above injury a closer 
look at the anatomy170 of the gall bladder is necessary. The gall bladder is found under the 
lower surface of the liver. Bile is conveyed from the liver to the small intestine by means of 
ducts. The gall bladder, where bile is stored, lies between the liver and the small intestine. 
From the common hepatic duct the bile is carried by the cystic duct to the gall bladder. The 
common hepatic duct forks into the cystic duct and the common bile duct. When the gall 
bladder and cystic duct are removed, the only remaining duct is the common hepatic duct, 
which then is named the common bile duct and which conveys the bile to the small intestines. 
The latter duct is vitally important as it is the only channel that conveys the bile from the liver 
to the small intestines. Injury to the bile-passages can lead to occlusion or narrowing, 
blocking the flow of bile from the liver and causing subsequent liver damage. Injury to the 
bile-passages leads to leakage of bile into the abdominal cavity which leads to covert 
infection and life-threatening peritonitis (infection in the abdominal cavity). Sepsis can affect 
any of the organs and lead to ‘fatal sepsis’.171 
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Correctional surgery is complicated. Sicklick et al172 explain that widespread 
laparoscopic operations like laparoscopic cholecystectomy lead to a higher incidence of 
major bile duct injuries. They opine that proper early diagnosis and appropriate treatment are 
‘paramount in preventing life-threatening complications like cholangitis, biliary cirrhosis, 
portal hypertension, end-stage liver disease and death’. Their data suggests that primary 
surgeons attempt to repair the injury themselves against the odds, as data revealed ‘that only 
17% of primary repair attempts are successful and no secondary repair attempts performed by 
the laparoscopic surgeon are successful’. The expertise of an experienced hepato-biliary 
surgeon is needed to repair these complex injuries to ensure optimum short-term and long-
term outcomes. They state that the control of sepsis is via radiological intervention and any 
ongoing bile leaks are managed with the use of biliary stents. Reconstruction surgery should 
be delayed until all infection has been resolved.173 The rate of bile duct injuries increased after 
the introduction of laparoscopic cholecystectomy according to Archer et al.174 Once a bile 
duct injury has occurred another set of statistics becomes relevant. The management of bile 
duct injuries has a complication rate of 42,9 per cent according to Sicklick et al,175 with a 
postoperative mortality rate of 1,7 per cent. The authors explain that of the 175 patients who 
were researched and who underwent biliary reconstruction surgery, three died 
postoperatively, of whom one had overwhelming sepsis and consequential multiple organ 
failure. He succumbed on day 57. They opine that early referral to centres with ‘experienced 
hepato-biliary surgeons and skilled interventional radiologists’ are crucial for optimum 
results. The seriousness of the consequences of bile duct injuries was confirmed by 
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Gentileschi et al,176 who revealed that 33 bile duct injuries were reported from the total of 
13 718 operations, which gives an incidence of 0,24 per cent. Of the 33, nine (27,3 per cent) 
had no ‘clinico-pathologic justification’.177 The authors reported that of the 33 injuries, 4 
deaths (12,1 per cent) were reported. Furthermore 24 (72,7 per cent) of the bile duct injuries 
resulted from a direct injury, 7 (21,2 per cent) from electro-cautery thermal injury, and the 
remaining 2 (6,1 per cent) from the misplacement of clips.  
 
7.3 Legal discussion of the laparoscopic cholecystectomy 
Once again Van den Heever and Carstens178 would argue that the res ipsa loquitur maxim 
should apply. They could argue that the transection of the common bile duct injury in itself a 
sufficient basis for inferring negligence, as it was performed without the necessary care, 
based on the approach of the English court.179At most, according to South African delictual 
principles, the injury to the common bile duct could be seen as evidence of a breach of the 
legal duty not to harm and as such wrongful in nature, yet the elements of negligence 
(culpable conduct) and factual causation cannot be justifiably established on that basis alone. 
Because the element of negligence (culpa) addresses information about the conduct of the 
defendant (foreseeability and prevention of harm), the defendant should not have performed 
surgery or dissected in an area where his visibility was impaired. It is inferred that the 
inability to see his instruments caused him to transect the common bile duct. In the above 
matter the defendant redeemed himself and corrected his surgical error by converting to open 
surgery. He performed a repair operation and, had everything gone well after the corrective 
surgery that would have been the end of it. But the further conduct of the defendant renders 
him liable. With full knowledge of the injury, the defendant should have monitored the 
medical condition of the plaintiff and should have been sensitive to any signs and symptoms 
indicating a leak from the repair operation. Since signs of a leak became evident, he should 
have performed an investigative (re-look) operation earlier, which would have detected the 
leak. He should have then obtained the services of a more experienced surgeon to repair the 
damage ie a hepato-biliary surgeon.  
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The defendant would have been negligent in performing the initial laparoscopic 
operation only if such a procedure was contraindicated. From the above medical information 
it is clear that previous surgery to the same area causes the formation of adhesions, which in 
turn may cause bowel obstruction and other complications. Laparoscopic surgical 
intervention in such circumstances may lead to reduced visibility as a result of these 
adhesions and may contribute to the injury of other organs. At all material times the 
defendant should have been aware of the possibility of such an injury and should have 
monitored the medical condition of the plaintiff for signs thereof; any failure to do so would 
be classified as a breach of his legal duty. The plaintiff bears the onus of proving his case 
with sufficient medical information for the court to arrive at a conclusion of negligence 
(liability). It is argued that the maxim in complex medical cases would significantly increase 
the risk of the court being unclear as to what occurred during the medical incident. For this 
reason it is argued that no legal conclusion or inference can or should be drawn without an 
appreciation of the medical reality and by comparing the expected standard of care against 
the delivered standard of care. This effectively excludes the maxim.  
 
8 Reappearance of the res ipsa loquitur maxim in South Africa 
It was previously argued that medical causes and effects are too complex to allow for the res 
ipsa loquitur maxim because the medical reality should be appreciated before arriving at a 
legal conclusion. This argument is demonstrated in a recent case, Ntsele v MEC for Health 
Gauteng Provincial Government,180 where the South African court re-visited the maxim, 
based, inter alia, on the recommendation of Van den Heever and Carstens.181 As previously 
indicated,182 the authors argue that the court’s decision in Van Wyk v Lewis183 is based on a 
material misdirection.184 This misdirection was analysed by the court in Ntsele v MEC for 
Health Gauteng Provincial Government.185 In Buthelezi v Ndaba,186 the elements of factual 
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and legal causation were overlooked and the maxim rejected based on the conclusion that the 
medical reality is too complex. The application of the maxim is discouraged in Goliath v 
MEC for Health in the Province of Eastern Cape,187 based on the decision of the English 
court in Ratcliffe v Plymouth and Torbay Health Authority,188 as it clashes with the law of 
delict in South Africa. Ntsele v MEC for Health Gauteng Provincial Government189 and 
Buthelezi v Ndaba190 are discussed to demonstrate how far the medical reality is from the 
general perceptions of negligence in uninformed persons. A real understanding of the medical 
facts will allow for the determining of factual and legal causation and the element of 
negligence. 
 
8.1 A discussion of Ntsele v MEC for Health Gauteng Provincial Government 
In Ntsele v MEC for Health Gauteng Provincial Government191 the baby of the plaintiff 
suffered severe brain damage after a substantial delay in the delivery of the baby. The 
plaintiff had had a previous caesarean section. The new pregnancy was uneventful. The 
plaintiff attended a prenatal clinic where all prescribed prenatal pregnancy tests were 
conducted, which appeared to be normal. On 7 September 1996 the plaintiff experienced 
labour pains. She arrived at the clinic at 05h00. She was attended by two nurses who failed to 
monitor the foetal heart rate and labour contractions. The membranes of the uterus of the 
plaintiff were ruptured to accelerate birth. No progress was made and the plaintiff was 
transferred to hospital. It is unclear by whom and why the decision was made to transfer her 
to hospital. She arrived at the hospital at 08h00. No doctor was available to examine the 
plaintiff, and the nurses provided no follow-up treatment. The plaintiff was given her clinic 
file and instructed to register her admission. The registration took two hours. She was 
thereafter transferred to a ward. She informed the nurses at the hospital that her membranes 
were ruptured at the clinic. A cardiotocograph (CTG) was applied to her abdomen for 20 to 
30 minutes to monitor the impact of the contractions on the foetal heart. Later, at an uncertain 
time, a doctor arrived, spoke with the nurses and examined the mother. The doctor instructed 
her to push down. She ‘pushed’ for a long time but the birth process did not progress. The 
doctor decided to perform an episiotomy. After an uncertain time, which according to the 
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plaintiff seemed like an eternity, she gave birth. The plaintiff immediately noticed that the 
baby was not crying or breathing properly. The nurses took the baby to the theatre where he 
was resuscitated. It was confirmed that the baby suffered from cerebral palsy. The baby was 
discharged 20 days later. 
The plaintiff’s case was based on allegations that the nursing personnel at the clinic 
and at the hospital did not monitor the unborn baby’s condition adequately. Insufficient 
hospital records were available to explain the circumstances during birth. This absence of 
evidence led the judge to conclude that the event should be interpreted as having an 
‘unknown cause’.192 Mokgoatlheng J referred to Van den Heever and Carstens193 and stated 
that the nature of the case was indeed such that the plaintiff had established a prima facie 
case of negligence which, according to the court, cast an evidential burden on the defendant 
to rebut the probability of negligence. Quoting Van Wyk v Lewis194 and Van den Heever and 
Carstens,195 the judge suggested that, in the alternative, the plaintiff has to show that the event 
happened in a manner that inferred a high probability of negligence on the part of the 
defendant’s employees. The judge was of the opinion that the cause of injury was unknown to 
the plaintiff and that it was exclusively within the defendant’s knowledge. The judge held 
that, as a result of the ‘unknown cause’,196 the court was allowed to draw an inference of 
negligence by applying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. According to the court, the inference 
of negligence was based on the res ipsa loquitur maxim because the court was presented with 
‘exceptional circumstances’.197 
The defendants argued in rebuttal that the plaintiff had not proved her case and the 
court should grant absolution from the instance. They cautioned that the court should not be 
swayed to favour the plaintiff because it was understandably sympathetic.198 The defence 
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referred to Macleod v Rens199 and stated that the maxim, if applied correctly, merely creates 
an inference of negligence and is not ‘a magic formula [that] permits the court to side-step or 
gloss over a deficiency in the plaintiff’s evidence’. The defendants in rebuttal disputed 
evidence based on causation. The defendants averred that a possibility existed that the brain 
damage (cerebral palsy) occurred in the womb before the birth process. This alternative 
explanation, if accepted by the court, would lead to the conclusion that the birth process, even 
if it occurred without the necessary care, could not have caused the injury to the child, as the 
damage occurred during pregnancy.  
The judgment is flawed from the outset, based on the stare decisis rule of law. The 
majority in Van Wyk v Lewis200 rejected the application of the res ipsa loquitur maxim, which 
precluded a lesser court from ruling differently. Furthermore, even if this court was not 
precluded from applying the maxim based on the stare decisis rule, the facts do not support 
the application of the maxim. In South African law an adverse event does not allow for an 
inference of negligence (culpable conduct). All the elements of delictual liability should be 
satisfied by the key facts of the case. There was no evidence to support the allegation that the 
care provided by the nursing personnel was below standard. 
Allegations determining factual causation and negligence (culpa) are complicated and 
should at least have addressed the following:  
 
(i) The fact that the doctor and nursing personnel failed to provide the required 
standard of care relevant to obstetric procedures. From a non-medical viewpoint this 
aspect seems obvious but from a medical perspective information was lacking 
information regarding previous pregnancies, the management of and problems 
during prenatal care, whether the plaintiff was full term when the membranes were 
ruptured and labour initiated, whether the head was still high during the initial delay 
in labour progress; whether the readings of the CTG were normal or indicative of a 
baby in distress, whether the cervix of the mother was dilated when she was asked to 
push, and so forth;   
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(ii) The fact that they should have been aware that foetal distress during previous 
pregnancies may repeat itself;  
(iii) The fact that they should have been aware that natural delivery following a previous 
caesarean carries a high risk of complications due to the formation of scar tissue in 
the uterus;201 
(iv) The fact that the premature rupture of membranes carries a high risk of injury to the 
foetus;202 
(v) The fact that it is vital to monitor the foetal heart rate203 to determine the status of the 
foetus, especially with a history of a previous caesarean;  
(vi) The fact that a failure to monitor the foetal heart rate constitutes substandard care, as 
it allows the unborn baby to remain in distress without any medical assistance;  
(vii) The fact that poor progress204 in the labour process when there is a history of a 
previous caesarean section is indicative of complications;  
(viii) The fact that, without competent, experienced and skilled personnel to perform the 
cardiotocogram (CTG),205 the diagnostic aid becomes ineffective. The decelerations 
and accelerations seen on the CTG illustrate the reaction of the foetal heart of the 
unborn baby during contractions and the birth process, and should not be ignored 
but followed up with the medical professional;  
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(ix) The fact that inducing and thereby augmenting206 natural birth, in the presence of a 
previous caesarean section, increases the risk of foetal distress and the risk of uterine 
rupture; and 
(x) The fact that inducing and augmenting the birth process, in the presence of foetal 
distress, may cause inadequate or over-stimulated uterine contractions or an irritated 
uterus, with a serious possibility of lack of oxygen for the baby (birth asphyxia), 
which may result in cerebral palsy of the baby.  
 
The aforementioned medical expert evidence was available at the time the case went to court 
to establish factual causation and negligence. On a preponderance of probability, the weight 
of the evidence presented by the plaintiff was incomplete. The plaintiff relied on a 
generalised allegation that a delay in treatment and the failure to monitor the status of the 
foetus caused the injury to the baby. This is not a reliable form of reasoning, as such an 
allegation assumes a causal chain and a general inference of negligence without medical 
expert evidence, from which it remains impossible to draw a reliable legal conclusion. The 
court’s determination should depend on an analysis of the cogent reasoning of medical expert 
evidence, which for all purposes excludes the application of the maxim. The element of 
wrongfulness is not problematic, but in order for the court to determine the element of 
negligence (culpa) the court has to hear evidence regarding the conduct of the nursing 
personnel and the doctors weighed against the expected standard of care. Assuming that the 
CTG readings did not show a baby in distress, the initial actions of the nursing personnel 
would have been inadequate and not according to accepted medical standards, but they would 
not have been liable as these actions did not cause of the harm. Every medical aspect of this 
case forms part of the medical chain of events that should be analysed to determine 
negligence, causation and then liability. 
 
8.2 A discussion of Buthelezi v Ndaba 
Soon after Ntsele,207 another attempt to reintroduce the maxim followed. In Buthelezi v 
Ndaba,208 the defendant performed a total abdominal hysterectomy209 on the plaintiff. About 
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six weeks after the operation the plaintiff began to suffer from urinary incontinence, as urine 
was leaking from her vagina. The medical professionals determined that a vesicovaginal 
fistula210 had developed, which caused the problem. The fistula did not develop right after the 
operation but only about six weeks later. The plaintiff underwent a number of urological 
repair operations. Relying on the aforementioned medical facts, the plaintiff instituted legal 
action against the gynaecological surgeon who performed the hysterectomy. Although the 
medical experts agreed that the fistula did not start spontaneously and was triggered by 
something that occurred during the hysterectomy, they did not agree on the cause of the 
fistula. Medical experts for the plaintiff maintained that damage occurred to the blood supply 
of the wall of the bladder during dissection of the bladder from the uterus or when stopping 
the blood oozing from the vaginal vault while removing the cervix. Medical experts for the 
defendant argued that no one knew how the fistula developed, as it occurred six weeks after 
the operation and whatever reason was provided to the court was speculative. The plaintiff’s 
case was dismissed on appeal. 
From the medical literature211 it is evident that an abdominal hysterectomy is the 
surgical removal of the uterus and the cervix through an abdominal incision. The cervix is 
removed from the upper part of the vaginal vault and then the vaginal vault is sutured closed. 
The bladder lies in front (anterior) of the uterus and, although the uterus and the bladder are 
in close proximity, they do not share a wall. At the beginning of the operation the bladder is 
separated from the uterus. Previous surgery in the area, for example, caesarean section 
operations, might cause adhesions to form between the uterus and the bladder. Furthermore, 
medical literature provided by Hilton and Cromwell212 investigates the rates of vesicovaginal 
and urethrovaginal fistula formation among women undergoing hysterectomy. They found 
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that the risk of a urogenital fistula was associated with the type of hysterectomy and the 
indication for the hysterectomy. They observed that the risk was lower immediately after 
hysterectomy for benign conditions in women aged 50 years or over and increased during the 
further period of the study. Tancer,213 in a retrospective study, found that total abdominal 
hysterectomy was the most common procedure to precede a vault fistula.  
It is essential that medical expert evidence is based on available medical literature to 
provide an overview of the points under discussion. In the above case the plaintiff presented 
with a predisposing risk factor for a vesicovaginal fistula:214 the plaintiff was diabetic, HIV-
positive, had had a previous caesarean section and had been struggling with chronic pelvic 
infection at the time, all of which have an effect on the bladder wall. Allegations relevant to 
factual and legal causation and negligence relate to information such as: 
(i) the defendant ought to have been aware that the plaintiff had a high risk of vesicovaginal 
fistula because of her medical history and should have taken steps to prevent such an injury;  
(ii) the bladder wall may have been friable as a result of predisposing factors, and so special 
care should have been taken when dissecting the bladder from the uterus;  
(iii) a simpler operation to remove the uterus without the cervix might have carried a smaller 
risk of vesicovaginal injury and fistula formation;  
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(iv) several alternative hypotheses existed that could have been the cause of the fistula, of 
which the most obvious were leakage from the vaginal vault and injury to a friable bladder 
wall during dissection;  
(v) the defendant should have been aware that the plaintiff was predisposed to develop a 
vesicovaginal fistula and should have followed up and re-examined her with tests such as a 
cystoscopy or sonography; and  
(vi) although the occurrence of a fistula per se might not be an indication of negligence 
(culpa), the lack of follow-up care to detect the injury may indicate substandard medical care.  
Undoubtedly, the complicated medical concerns provide for legal questions, of which 
the most difficult would be factual and legal causation. The injury occurred six weeks after 
the medical intervention. On the one hand, assisting the plaintiff’s case, the medical condition 
of the plaintiff carried a high risk of such injury, which called for an examination of the 
manner in which this was managed. On the other hand, several alternative causes of injury 
were identified, which counted against the plaintiff’s case: damage to the wall of the bladder 
during surgery, a leak that weakened the wall and developed later, and even the presence of 
HIV compromised the immunity of the plaintiff, resulting in infection at the surgical site. The 
medical causes and effects should be based on logical medical principles.215 If an alternative 
cause of injury is suggested by the same facts and it obscures a most probable explanation for 
the injury it constitutes conjecture and the plaintiff’s case must fail. The plaintiff’s case was 
dismissed on the strength of Van Wyk v Lewis216 with the court stating ‘that the maxim could 
rarely, if ever, find application in cases based on alleged medical negligence’. The court 
explained that the human body and its reaction to surgical intervention are very complex. It 
cannot simply be said that, because there was a complication, the surgeon must have been 
negligent in some respect. The court held that– 
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logic dictates that there is even less room for the application of the maxim in a case 
like this, where it has not even been established what went wrong; where the views of 
experts are all based on speculation – giving rise to various, but equally feasible 





Only when one properly understands the medical realities of a particular harmful incident is 
one in a position to judge whether the doctor-defendant acted unreasonably or failed to take 
reasonable steps to guard against foreseeable harm, and whether the injury was caused by the 
medical professional’s culpable actions. With reference to several case studies, this chapter 
illustrated the depth and intricacy in medical reasoning and showed that the diagnostic 
process is a process of elimination that attempts to determine the most probable cause of 
illness, running in parallel with initial provisional treatment, if necessary, and eventually 
overflowing into definitive treatment. For example, a recording of a high temperature is a 
sign of a possible underlying disease or infection. Further blood tests may confirm or exclude 
evidence of an infection, eg the white cell count may be raised. Further radiological 
investigation may point, for example, to an abscess in the abdominal cavity. Diagnosis is a 
constant process that is analysed and re-analysed with several changes if need be to the 
diagnosis, until the medical condition of the patient improves. A vast amount of medical 
literature is available globally for the medical professional to keep abreast of the best 
available medical evidence in the field. The medical professional’s search for the underlying 
cause and effect of a disease or illness forms the basis for factual causation in law. The 
particular conduct of the professional during that particular time and in those circumstances is 
measured against that of a reasonable medical professional in the same field.  
The delictual elements of factual and legal causation218 link the defendant’s action 
directly with the injury. First, it is a medical question that asks the medical expert to furnish 
the court with a medical explanation regarding what occurred ie setting the expected standard 
of care for the court. Second, if the medical reality is appreciated, the elements of factual and 
legal causation will be investigated to link the defendant’s action ie the delivered standard of 
care, with the injury and then to determine whether liability can be attributed to the 
defendant. Third, from the evidence led by the defendant in defending the allegation of 
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negligence the court determines whether his conduct was consistent with the expected 
standard of care or whether it was negligent. For example, in Ntsele v MEC for Health 
Gauteng Provincial Government,219 the defendant in his defence presented an alternative non-
negligent cause of injury, viz that the foetus suffered injury (asphyxia) in the womb220 during 
the antenatal period and before the mother went into labour. If that scenario was accepted by 
the court, the harm was caused by something other than the defendant’s management of the 
labour process as the foetus was injured whilst in the womb and before any medical 
involvement of the defendant. On the same facts, the plaintiff would not have proved factual 
causation as the injury was then unrelated to the defendant-doctor’s management of the 
labour process. The plaintiff would have lost her case. In order for the plaintiff to be 
successful, she has to show evidence of lack of care during the birth process. This will show 
the legal nexus between the inadequate actions and the health status of the foetus during birth. 
On the other hand, if the plaintiff has prima facie proved her case and the defendants have 
failed to provide medical expert evidence showing that the injury to the baby occurred before 
the birth process, the defendant would not be successful in his defence. It is argued that 
negligence and causation cannot be determined without a proper evaluation of the expected 
care against the delivered care and so understanding the medical reality. This ipso facto 
excludes the application of the maxim for the vast majority of, if not all, medical negligence 
cases. 
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CHAPTER 5: SYSTEMATIC ANALYSIS AND FUNDAMENTAL OBSERVATIONS 
 
1 The current legal status 
Paul Feyerabend stated that paradigms are based on different assumptions regarding the 
structure of their domain which makes it impossible to compare them in a meaningful way. 
This thesis argues that the application of the res ipsa loquitur maxim in medical law leads to 
false impressions because medical paradigms are significantly different from legal 
paradigms. The research was based on a subsection of the law of evidence, namely, the 
factual presumption of negligence and causation evoked by the res ipsa loquitur maxim 
within the ambit of medical negligence litigation. The research material from South Africa 
comprised case law and conflicting legal arguments. These inconclusive findings resulted in 
the introduction of material from the United Kingdom and Wales in search of clarification. 
English cases were selected based on less complicated medical principles although the study 
gravitated towards cases where legal principles eg causation and negligence with reference to 
the application of the res ipsa loquitur maxim were demonstrated. The thesis (i) discussed the 
legal position of the maxim in South Africa and in England; (ii) addressed the application of 
the maxim in medical negligence cases in both jurisdictions; and (iii) focussed largely on the 
medical reality of each case to determine how the English court deals with the elements of 
negligence and causation when accepting the maxim. The latter investigation was required 
because the South African court, unlike the English court, does not allow for a presumption 
of negligence based on lack of care - in the wider sense - when an unexpected injury occurred 
under the control of the defendant. Since 1924, the South African court has excluded the 
application of the res ipsa loquitur maxim for medical cases. Recent cases attempted to re-
introduce the maxim, with uncertain results. The study explored academic arguments that 
favoured the application of the maxim, stating that the South African court should follow the 
English example1 and should allow for the res ipsa loquitur maxim to be invoked in all 
medical cases in South Africa. The thesis discovered that, according to South African law, a 
retained swab is only subjective evidence of negligence in the uninformed mind and that the 
South African court should be presented with enough evidence to balance the actions of the 
defendant against the globally accepted medical standard dictated by the profession. The 
study argued that the South African court’s rejection of the maxim in medical law is 
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defensible. In a medical negligence case the elements of factual causation, legal causation 
and negligence can only be determined once the medical principles are explained. The 
delictual elements are disregarded when the res ipsa loquitur maxim is pleaded causing a 
plaintiff to be insufficiently prepared in a medical case. 
Since English law has influenced South African law, it is unsurprising to see some 
similarities between the English system of tort law and the South African law of delict. Both 
the South African court and the English court experienced problems with determining 
causation ie the conditio sine qua non of a medical case. As the element of factual causation 
stems from the medical chain of events explained in the medical reality, this notion in the 
determination of liability is the source of much confusion, particularly if a plaintiff is not 
assisted by a medical expert. Furthermore, it seems from the contemporary use of the res ipsa 
loquitur maxim in England that the court encourages the use of the maxim, but with 
supporting expert medical evidence in complex cases.2 Both the English3 and the South 
African4 courts seem to hold that sufficient medical expert evidence should be presented in 
support of medical cases. The thesis argues that it indicates that the courts need to understand 
medical reality to allow the prima facie test. Both legal systems dictate that the defendant has 
to comply with the expected standard of care determined by common law, the community 
and the profession. The conduct of the defendant is weighed against the conduct of a 
reasonable doctor from the same branch of the profession who exercises skill and care in 
following the accepted standard of care. The satisfactory standard of care is more than mere 
skill and care. It describes the method or safe practice or standard to follow in order to avoid 
risks and complications in a medical intervention. It is explained to the court by the medical 
experts in context of medical principles.   
It was noteworthy to find that the legal jurisprudence governing the law of tort in 
England and the law of delict in South Africa has developed along different lines, evident 
from the incrementally changing common law of both countries. The intention of the English 
court to move to a more inquisitorial system in 1998 and the change in the practice directives5 
certainly allows the court to participate in the medical fact-finding duty, even if it still 
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remains predominantly adversarial in nature. On the other hand, the South African court 
remains adversarial in nature, revealing a substantial and procedural difference in the 
presentation of medical negligence cases between the countries. The South African court is a 
trier of fact and a trier of law, and does not enter the litigation arena. The court ultimately 
decides whether the plaintiff has discharged his onus of proof on a balance of probabilities 
based on all the elements in delict, namely, factual and legal causation, wrongfulness and 
negligence. The court weighs all the evidence and determines the most probable cause of the 
harm. In South Africa the Rules of Court6 allow for exceptions to pleadings and applications 
to have the matter dismissed where the plaintiff’s allegations lack the averments necessary to 
sustain an action. If a South African plaintiff is relying on a presumption of negligence based 
on the fact of the injury, then there is a considerable risk that the case will be dismissed 
because the plaintiff failed to allege a proper ‘cause of action’. An English claimant, with the 
use of the res ipsa loquitur maxim (where he presented expert medical evidence), gets a 
preview of the alternative cause of injury explained by the defendant before advancing to 
trial. This rebuttal is in reaction to a presumption of lack of care – the function of the maxim - 
because of the unusual nature of the injury in circumstances under the control of the 
defendant. The English parties may appoint a joint medical expert but may also instruct their 
own experts to present their cases. Although the English court actively participates in pre-trial 
case management procedures the medical cause of the injury is still presented independently 
to the court. When the maxim is applied, the court has to be convinced that the defendant’s 
explanation in rebuttal of the res ipsa loquitur maxim is plausible but, without medical expert 
evidence to evaluate the evidence of the defendant, this would be very difficult. This was 
evident in Saunders v Leeds Western Health Authority7 where a four-year-old child went for a 
hip-repair operation and suffered cardiac arrest. The extremely rare complication of 
paradoxical embolus was offered as an explanation in rebutting the claimant’s claim of 
insufficient skill, care and management of her medical condition. If this case was presented to 
the South African court, the plaintiff would have to provide adequate medical evidence to 
show that, the defendant ought to have foreseen certain risks and complications and guarded 
against it - such as cardiac arrest; That his failure to act with the required skill and care - 
below standard - when weighed against the actions of a hypothetical reasonable doctor (the 
accepted standard), caused the injury. 
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The two legal systems show further differences when one ventures into the legal 
technicalities. In accordance with the law of delict in South Africa,8 if a defendant owed a 
legal duty to the plaintiff not to cause harm to the plaintiff and he failed in his duty to the 
plaintiff, the actions of the defendant would be wrongful. The South African court accepts 
that a medical accident or adverse event may be grounds for satisfying the element of 
wrongfulness in cases of injury to property or person, but without establishing the further 
elements of delictual liability the South African plaintiff will not be successful with his 
action. A South African court requires a proper understanding of the medical reality as the 
basis for determining the cause of injury - factual causation - as an element in delict. The 
notion of legal causation is then determined from the sequence of events deciding which is 
the more operative cause in law of the claimant’s damage. In addition, the element of 
negligence (culpa) is tested when the conduct of the defendant is investigated to determine 
his role in the cause of the injury and whether it was in accordance with accepted medical 
practice. It would be unproductive to test for negligence, which the defendant should have 
foreseen and guarded against, without understanding the risks and complications of a medical 
intervention (what to foresee and prevent). Potential risks and complications of a medical 
event, obtained from the set standard of the profession, alert a doctor to the dangers of the 
planned medical intervention and the appropriate steps to avoid them. For example, if there 
was a risk of bleeding during surgery, the court would test whether the defendant (aware of 
the risk) took certain measures to avoid such a risk. If he did not, his conduct would be below 
standard and he would be liable. If any one of the elements in delict is not addressed and 
satisfied the plaintiff’s case will fail. The South African court does not accept the application 
of res ipsa loquitur in medical negligence cases. It was held that in order to be placed as near 
as possible in the same position of the defendant-doctor, the court need to be provided with 
the accepted standard of the profession. A court cannot decide a case in the abstract without 
considering the medical evidence explained by a medical expert in context with the 
surrounding circumstances. The court in Van Wyk v Lewis stated that in medical negligence 
cases more evidence is needed to determine negligence (culpa) than what an inference based 
on the fact of the injury (the res ipsa loquitur maxim) allows. The court held that such an 
inference is not even prima facie evidence of negligence,9 as there are cases where negligence 
cannot be inferred from the accident itself. The South African court is reluctant to arrive at a 
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legal conclusion following an inference of a general kind of negligence,10 as found in the 
design of the res ipsa loquitur maxim. It is argued that the res ipsa loquitur maxim does not 
discharge all the requirements of a claim based on delictual liability in South African medical 
law. As it stands, a plaintiff has to bring an action for negligence (fault) based on all the 
elements of delictual liability. The plaintiff has to make particular allegations that the 
defendant breached his legal duty owed to the plaintiff by not acting with the necessary skill 
and care in accordance with the expected standard of care. These allegations will meet all the 
elements of the delict based on expert medical evidence where the medical expert explained 
the medical reality and the cause of injury. The plaintiff’s cause of action is thus based on the 
elements of wrongfulness, negligence, factual causation, legal causation and damage. 
In England, according to the law of tort,11 negligence is proved if a duty of care owed 
to the claimant by the defendant was breached and it caused the damage suffered by the 
claimant. The element of duty of care includes foreseeability and prevention of possible 
harm. The English court allows for a general form of an inference of negligence based on the 
unexpected nature of the injury that occurred in a situation under the control of the defendant. 
An adverse event is interpreted (in its broader sense) as prima facie evidence of a lack of care 
and a breached duty of care that calls for an answer from the defendant. The English court 
accepts the use of the res ipsa loquitur maxim as an evidentiary principle functioning as a 
rebuttable inference of negligence. Although in a medical case the English court discourages 
the use of the maxim without supporting expert evidence, a claimant might succeed, based on 
the alleged lack of care of the defendant, without addressing the element of factual causation 
in particular.12 In other words, the cause of injury may be perceived as rather basic ie the 
unusual nature of the undesired outcome of the incident under the control of the defendant 
invokes a presumption that the defendant’s lack of skill and care caused the claimant’s injury. 
This is enough to seek an explanation from the defendant. Several English cases13 illustrate 
such a general inference of negligence without a particular medical explanation about the 
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exact cause of the injury.14Because England has adopted a more inquisitorial model and in 
complicated medical cases claimants in England almost invariably present expert evidence 
and no longer rely on the maxim without expert evidence the need for the maxim might, in 
principle, disappear. It is concluded that in complicated cases the English court if relying on 
the maxim without presenting expert evidence will experience all the same risks which is 
argued as the basis for justifiably rejecting the maxim in South Africa. 
 
2 Historical insights 
The thesis found that the history of the South African law of delict has developed but has in 
principle remained strongly rooted in its historical past. The influence of Roman law is seen 
in the legal systems of England and Wales as well as in the South African legal system, and 
has provided the basis for tort law principles and the principles of the law of delict 
respectively. In Roman law there existed a number of civil wrongs of which the more 
important ones were damnum injuria datum and injuria.15 Mason16 explains that the Romans 
decided upon a ‘practical remedy’ by which they ‘extended the doctrine of civil obligations’ 
to cover the realm of personal property; one recognises the basis of recent civil law principles 
in this approach. Mason states that the ‘punitive vengeance’ of the Twelve Tables evolved 
into legal sanctions to compel compensation when private property was damaged. Frier17 
argues that, while the ancient Romans ‘were under no general obligation’ to ensure that 
others did not experience material loss, they were required ‘to act with care’ in circumstances 
where their actions risked causing such loss to another. Citizens of Rome were obliged to 
understand the ‘prerequisites of social life’ and were expected to tailor their actions to avoid 
causing loss to others.18 It is for this reason that Ulpianus ‘construes iniuria as loss inflicted 
by culpa’ even when ‘the wish to harm’ was absent, for one has a duty to be careful and 
aware of the consequences of one’s actions. The civic obligations implicit in the notions of 
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culpa and dolus imply the existence of an unwritten standard of care; Frier even describes the 
adherence to the aforementioned obligations as a ‘duty of care’. This led to an extension to 
Aquilian liability, which often included liability for individual omissions of duty. The 
principle of boni mores was established, which forms part of the determination of 
wrongfulness in delictual liability.19 Although South African law is based on the Roman-
Dutch law introduced by Dutch settlers who dictated the procedural law in South Africa,20 the 
annexation of South Africa by the British during 1860 influenced South African law. 
Currently, the South African court is still strongly influenced by the English court in medical 
negligence matters21 but the common law developed in different ways. The South African 
court remains reluctant to apply the maxim and the English court regards the maxim as an 
important measure to assist the claimant in getting to court. The variances between the legal 
systems were investigated with regard to the constitutional right to bodily integrity and fair 
administrative principles, namely, whether the maxim should not be considered as a tool to 
assist a plaintiff to court. Because s 39(1)(b) of the South African Constitution dictates that a 
court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights, a 
future South African court may allow a substantial departure from its historical principles, by 
bending the principles of the rule of law when considering a medical negligence case. Some 
of these constitutional considerations are discussed below. 
 
3 Principal findings 
The thesis adopted the approach that when perceptions are based on assumptions made from 
elements within a domain (the law) it becomes difficult to compare it in a material way with a 
different domain (medicine).22 When the res ipsa loquitur maxim is applied in medical law in 
South Africa, it causes confusion because of the different paradigms, law and medicine. An 
adverse outcome for a patient has different meanings for the legal profession than it does for 
the medical profession, and therefore the fact of the injury in a medical case in South Africa 
cannot lead to an inference of negligence - not even a rebuttable presumption of negligence. 
It is merely a possibility of negligence, as the basis (medical reality) from which the 
conclusion (culpa and/or liability) is to be drawn is abstract and uncertain. If the medical 
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standard cannot be determined then the elements of negligence and factual causation remain 
indeterminable for the South African plaintiff. The purpose of the maxim is to request the 
court to draw a negative factual inference from the available facts, which cannot be done 
reliably in the South African law, if the facts are not meaningful. The cause of the injury is 
usually not easily determinable to an uninformed person and for that matter, the court. Put 
differently, the application of the maxim, as the law stands in South Africa, should have all 
the key facts to allow the court to infer a high probability of negligence (culpa and liability) 
from the occurrence of an unexplained fact of the injury. It is argued that, in South Africa, 
this is similar to asking the court to discount a deficiency in the plaintiff’s evidence or even to 
allow the unsatisfactory finding that the defendant was negligent in some general or 
unqualified manner and then put a reverse onus of proof on the defendant. The maxim 
remains inappropriate for medical negligence cases in South Africa or any other field of 
specialisation, for that matter, because the elements in delict cannot reliably be determined 
from the fact of the harm (injury) alone. The English court clearly places more weight on the 
maxim and this becomes evident when a defendant does not rebut the presumption. It is then 
perceived as a prima facie case. It has a reverse-onus effect because, if an English plaintiff 
advances to court based on the maxim alone and the defendant does not rebut the maxim, the 
plaintiff will be successful without knowing exactly what caused the injury or why the 
defendant’s conduct was perceived to be negligent (careless); the only fact that would be 
known, is that the injury was probably caused by the defendant. Once it was recognised that 
the common law of the two systems developed differently – the reason why the maxim can be 
applied in England and not in South Africa - the writer considered whether a relaxation in 
legal principles eg causation, could level the balance in the doctor-patient relationship. 
 
3.1 Overview of the conclusion of the study 
In conclusion, the thesis emphasises that the South African court has to appreciate and 
understand the medical scientific principles of a medical case in order to weigh the set 
standard of the profession against the standard delivered by the defendant. This makes the 
design of the maxim inappropriate for South African medical law. The writer’s approach was 
substantiated with discussion throughout the study of clinical medicine explaining the causes 
of injury against the expected standard of care ie the management of a patient to diagnose, to 
treat and to prevent further injury or disease. The clinician examines the patient and by means 




lessor serious diagnoses. The medical professional, being aware of research in his specific 
field of expertise, uses it to find the best available information and treatment for his patient, ie 
the standard of care against which he will be measured. The patient makes an informed 
decision based on the clinician’s assessment of the risks of the planned treatment against its 
benefits. Evidence-based literature is perceived and interpreted as the collective opinion of a 
body of medical experts. Departure from an acceptable standard of care and medical practice 
may be evidence of negligence, unless it is justified. A medical expert reports on information 
obtained from nursing notes, hospital records, diagnostic results and clinical notes of the 
defendant-doctor to establish whether the care was in accordance with accepted standards or 
whether it was substandard. The medical course is a chain of events and the South African 
plaintiff has to establish whether the defendant-doctor exercised the same reasonable care as 
a hypothetical doctor in accordance with the prescribed standard. For example, if a clinician 
failed to make a correct diagnosis the court will look at the information that was available to 
the defendant-doctor at the time, and how he eliminated other causes to arrive at the 
diagnosis. The thesis illustrates within medical context that, an unaware South African 
plaintiff would undoubtedly fail to show causation and negligence, in most cases, without the 
assistance of a medical expert.  
The reconstruction of medical scenarios from previous case law was used to 
demonstrate that, once the medical cause of the injury/disease/illness becomes 
comprehensible, the basis for factual causation is established. If a cause of action is presented 
that is corroborated by medical expert evidence, the plaintiff has a prima facie case of 
negligence which means it is sufficient evidence to call for an answer in rebuttal. The 
defendant now has to refute the evidence or his case will fail because of the evidence against 
him. The previous chapter showed that the process of testing the elements in delict against the 
medical reality is multifaceted and based on legal reasoning. For example, the conduct of the 
defendant is established by hearing his subjective evidence namely, that he was aware of a 
complication and how he took steps to prevent it. This cannot be inferred by the use of the res 
ipsa loquitur maxim in South Africa. The weight that the South African court gives to the 
maxim is not enough to compel an answer from the defendant. This is not the result of a 
misdirection by the South African court, but rather a result of ascribing functions to the 
maxim that are not consistent with the South African law of delict. To reiterate the stance of 
the South African court: the court is unable to impose liability on a defendant if insufficient 




been and to allow for an evaluation against the prescribed standard of care. A South African 
plaintiff would be unwise to use the maxim based on an unsupported and superficial 
acceptance that an adverse outcome typically arises from negligence (culpa or liability) in 
medical negligence cases; besides being inconsistent with delictual principles, the unfortunate 
outcome may be because of an underlying disease and completely unrelated to negligence.  
In the cases involving retained swabs, one sees that the English court, as far back as 
1939 in Mahon v Osborn,23 was reluctant to attribute negligence to the defendant based on an 
obvious case of a retained swab, because of the court’s incapability to understand the 
‘ordinary process’ of medicine. More recently, the English court discourages the use of the 
maxim without the support of medical expert evidence, but has not excluded the use of the 
maxim.24 Without medical expert evidence, the English claimant may rely on the maxim to 
compel an explanation from the defendant, but then carries the risk that the defendant’s 
explanation may be accepted by the court. The mere fact that the defendant has to rebut the 
presumption of negligence against no other evidence from the claimant puts the claimant at a 
disadvantage. The court now has to find the medical reality without the benefit of weighing 
the expert evidence against the accepted standard of care, based on the fact that the defendant 
might concentrate on defending his case rather than providing the required standard of care. 
The evidentiary presumption of negligence of the maxim carries more weight in the English 
court than in the South African court. The function of the maxim, in England, creates a prima 
facie inference of negligence based on the fact of the unusual injury (lack of care) in 
circumstances under the control of the defendant. The defendant has to explain why he 
should not be found in breach of his legal duty of care. In his defence, he has to provide 
evidence that he acted with the required skill and care. The maxim is given the weight of a 
rebuttable presumption, which effectively creates a reverse onus of proof at least to discharge 
the presumption and the defendant has to provide a non-negligent explanation of the injury. It 
is argued that this is one of the main reasons why the maxim is successful in England and not 
in South Africa. Furthermore, the English court has the benefit that the move towards a more 
inquisitorial system may place the presiding officer in a better position to determine the lack 
of care and the origin of the cause of harm from the medical facts, either from the defendant’s 
medical expert in rebuttal or the claimant’s medical expert evidence. The risk for the claimant 
remains: the defendant’s creative explanations may be accepted by the court if the claimant 
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presents no further scientific medical evidence. Perhaps the English court acknowledges the 
extended status of the res ipsa loquitur maxim for no other reason than to compel an answer 
in rebuttal from the defendant early in the case. The problem is that any explanation from the 
defendant in rebuttal cannot be discharged by the claimant if accepted by the court. The use 
of this evidentiary tool available to the claimant may have a procedural advantage – giving a 
claimant a preview of the defendant’s explanation of the cause of the injury. However, such 
an argument is not convincing in the light of the exotic explanations that was given in rebuttal 
by the defendants, for example in the Saunders case discussed above.  
In South Africa it was found, at best, in Van Wyk v Lewis25 and Goliath v MEC for 
Health in the Province of Eastern Cape,26 that there was evidence indicating a possibility of 
insufficient care, because of a perceived lack of preventing foreseeable harm – the element of 
wrongfulness. Indeed, in Van Wyk v Lewis27 the defendant was faced with a very difficult 
operation in order to save the patient’s life,28 and testified regarding the care he took to 
establish whether a swab was retained. Of importance is that the court was correct not to 
apply the res ipsa loquitur maxim in the presence of inconclusive circumstantial evidence, 
regardless of the retained swab. In Goliath v MEC for Health in the Province of Eastern 
Cape29 the defendant performed a ‘routine hysterectomy operation’ in ‘a modern surgical 
theatre in circumstances where there were no suggestions that the plaintiff’s life was in 
danger’, with no information to refute the allegation of negligent conduct. No information 
was led regarding the careful or careless conduct of the defendants’ actions eg ‘counting of 
swabs prior to sewing-up the patient’ and so forth. In this case, the defendant failed to refute 
the allegations of negligence and, ‘although the procedure performed on [the plaintiff] was 
under the control of the [defendant’s employees], and what they did or did not do was 
exclusively within their direct knowledge, none of these employees were called to testify’. In 
the latter case, the court30 referred to the English case Ratcliffe v Plymouth and Torbay Health 
Authority,31 stating that ‘it is likely to be a very rare medical negligence case in which the 
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defendants take the risk of calling no factual evidence, when such evidence is available to 
them, of the circumstances surrounding a procedure which led to an unexpected outcome.’ 
Ponan J continued, arguing from the English case, that– 
 
in a civil case it is not necessary for a plaintiff to prove that the inference that she asks 
the court to draw is the only reasonable inference, it suffices for her to convince the 
court that the inference that she advocates is the most readily apparent and acceptable 
inference from a number of inferences.32 
 
The defendant failed ‘to adduce any evidence, whatsoever, [and] accordingly took the risk of 
a judgment being given against him.’ The success of the plaintiff’s case was not based on any 
general presumption of fact but on insufficient evidence provided by the defendant to rebut 
the plaintiff’s prima facie case of negligence. The plaintiff, on a preponderance of 
probability, discharged the onus of proof, which rested on her. Of significance, and to be 
welcomed, is the reluctance of the court to apply the res ipsa loquitur maxim and to 
discourage the use of the maxim in any future medical cases.  
As it stands, assessed, argued and reconfirmed, the South African court’s approach in 
Van Wyk v Lewis33 is firmly in place as before, and the res ipsa loquitur principles are de lege 
ferenda not accepted in medical negligence cases. Although the court in Goliath v MEC for 
Health in the Province of Eastern Cape34 did not explicitly reject the maxim, it discouraged 
any further use of the res ipsa loquitur maxim in medical negligence cases. It is argued that 
the South African court’s continued rejection of the maxim has contributed to the 
development of using proper medical expert evidence to provide prima facie evidence against 
defendants. To reiterate, the study agrees with Van den Heever and Carstens,35 but from 
another perspective:  
 
Thus, if the aforegoing assessment cannot be made by having regard to the occurrence 
alone, so that the surrounding circumstances must also be considered in order to arrive 
at a conclusion, res ipsa loquitur does not find application.  
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This is indeed the reason why the maxim should not apply to medical negligence cases in 
South Africa as the uninformed person and court, for that matter, cannot make legal 
conclusions without the benefit of appreciating medical reality based on medical expert 
evidence.  
 
3.2 The difference in the use of the maxim between South Africa and England 
The core dissimilarity between the application of the res ipsa loquitur maxim in England and 
in South Africa lies in the difference between the two legal systems, the management of the 
design of the maxim and the interpretation of the inference of negligence created by the 
maxim. The English court allows the maxim, to ‘prevent a defendant who does know what 
happened from avoiding responsibility simply by choosing not to give any evidence’.36 In 
Mahon v Osborne Goddard LJ stated that the surgeon is in control of the operation and ‘[i]f, 
therefore, a swab is left in the patient’s body, it seems to me clear that the surgeon is called 
on for an explanation’.37 The South African court said that, according to the principles of 
delict, a presumption of negligence (fault) cannot be attributed to the defendant simply based 
on a retained swab. All the delictual elements should be established before inferring 
negligence or determining negligent conduct. The court in Macleod v Rens38 stated that the 
application of the maxim leads ‘to the somewhat unsatisfactory finding that the defendant 
was negligent in some general or unspecified manner’. In Van Wyk v Lewis39 the court held 
that the maxim only allowed for an allegation of lack of care and skill, and the correctness of 
such an allegation can be determined only after considering all the facts. It is not an absolute 
test and depends on the circumstances of the case. The court has to be placed as closely as 
possible in the position of the defendant to test for negligent conduct. Sufficient medical 
information is needed for the court to weigh all the evidence on a balance of probability. 
Blum AJ confirmed this stance in Pringle v Administrator Natal.40 Van den Heever and 
Carstens41 argue that the occurrence of a retained swab is presumed negligent conduct until 
proven otherwise. The defendant should explain his actions similar to the English system. 
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The thesis argues that this cannot be a plea to introduce a legal presumption in the place of a 
factual presumption created by the maxim, as it would elevate the maxim to a rebuttable 
presumption in law. It is not the accepted function of the res ipsa loquitur maxim or factual 
presumptions in South Africa. It is unsatisfactory to suggest that the element of negligence 
(culpa) should be overlooked when raising a presumption of negligence based on the injury. 
It is not possible to determine from the circumstances - a retained swab - whether the 
defendant could have foreseen and prevented the occurrence. There may be countless 
alternative explanations for why a swab was retained, for example the patient went into 
cardiac arrest (heart failure) during abdominal surgery and they had to abort the operation or 
the surgeon becoming ill and so forth. Such circumstances will justify the wrongful act of 
leaving a swab behind, and such reasons were mentioned by the court when it rejected the res 
ipsa loquitur maxim. The thesis also demonstrated that a medical emergency42 may justify 
apparently negligent conduct (culpa), as the medical professional may not have been in a 
position to foresee the injury. However, the accepted standard suggests that he should 
manage such an emergency with skill and competence to alleviate the injury (the element of 
negligence).  
 The South African delictual law does not allow a general allegation of negligence 
based on lack of care, even in a situation where the injury occurred under the control of the 
defendant-doctor. The South African court interprets it as a mere possibility of lack of care if 
all the circumstances are not known. In the latter situation, the elements of negligent conduct 
(culpa) and factual causation are not evident from the available facts of the particular 
occurrence. Therefore, it does not give rise to a prima facie case of liability or an obligation 
on the defendant to answer in rebuttal. The South African court was very clear that the 
standard of care against which the defendant should be weighed cannot be determined 
without the assistance of medical experts. Thus, the argument is not whether the maxim 
should be interpreted as meaning conclusive evidence of negligence (irrebuttable 
presumption of negligence) or even prima facie evidence of negligence (rebuttable 
presumption of negligence), the true issue is that the fact of the injury in South Africa, is a 
mere possibility of negligence that needs to be tested. If the court does not have enough 
evidence from the fact of the injury to place itself in the position to ascertain whether the 
defendant delivered the required standard of care, the court cannot request the defendant to 
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defend the action. The court would not even recognise the fact of the injury as a cause of 
action without sufficient medical evidence to support such an allegation. 
 
3.3 General constitutional considerations 
The thesis considered the statement that the application of the maxim may level any 
imbalance in the doctor-patient relationship that results from the fact that the patient 
sometimes does not even know what occurred under anaesthesia and is therefore at a 
disadvantage. The thesis celebrated the South African court’s relaxation of legal principles of 
causation in circumstances where the element of negligence was proved and linked with the 
injury suffered by a South African plaintiff. It showed the court appreciates and recognises 
the constitutional rights of a patient to be treated with bodily integrity in a dignified and fair 
manner. The Constitution of South Africa43 is the overriding law of the country, and is the 
legal foundation for the rights and duties of the citizens of the country. It also defines the 
government’s duties to its citizens. Chapter 2 of the Constitution - the Bill of Rights - 
provides for civil, political and socio-economic rights, and applies to all law, including the 
common law. The Bill of Rights binds Parliament, the government and the judiciary. Sections 
10, 11, 27 and 3344 of the Constitution are relevant to medical law.  
The Constitutional court continues to develop the common law as held in Carmichele 
v Minister of Safety and Security45 where the court dictated that there is a general obligation 
on the court to develop the common law to promote the values enshrined in the Constitution. 
Section 27 deals with health rights in the context of the limited resources of the state: 
 
(1) Everyone has the right to have access to– 
(a) health care services, including reproductive health care;  
(b) sufficient food and water; and  
(c) social security, including if they are unable to support themselves and their 
dependents, appropriate social assistance. 
(2) The state must take responsible legislative and other measures, within its available 
resources, to achieve the progressive realization of each of these rights.  
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(3) No one may be refused emergency medical treatment. 
 
In 1997, the South African Constitutional Court adapted the convictions of the community.46 
The constitutional rights concerning health care delivery were restricted because of limited 
public resources.47 The right to health care is now a qualified right because of the economic 
limitations of the state. In certain instances, eg with renal dialysis, the state cannot assist all 
chronic patients, even though they may be the neediest and terminal patients. It was 
demonstrated that the court did not take into consideration general principles about ‘who 
shall live when not everyone can’ or was not dictated to by ethical determinations, but 
allowed the state to restrict such a right because of economic decisions.48 This restricted right 
to health resources (an adapted constitutional right) has affected the law of delict as the court 
tests the element of wrongfulness against the expectations and convictions of the community. 
In addition, the court considered the ‘reasonableness’49 of the change in public policy 
considerations with its impact on the community. The Constitutional Court approved the 
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limited rights of citizens and changed the common law regarding public policy because of the 
limited resources of health care delivery.  
One may criticise the court in Soobramoney v Minister of Health (Kwazulu-Natal)50 
for failing to distinguish between resources made available and resources that ought to have 
been made available. For no apparent reason, the court avoided scrutinising the allocation of 
resources. One would have expected an investigation into the allocation of funds and the 
possible misappropriation of funds, in the light of the ongoing mismanagement and findings 
of fraudulent misappropriation in government funding. One also would have expected an 
adequate analysis regarding the ethical rationale behind the set of rules that was adopted,51 as 
medical principles conflict with utilitarian principles. Is it good policy for medical 
professionals to have to decide on social principles? If the decision is based on utilitarian 
principles, one should look into doing the greatest good for the greatest number, or adopt the 
do-no-harm principle, or make a decision on the ‘who shall live when not everyone can’ 
principle. If the decision is based on clinical medical principles, the worst-off patients would 
be treated first, as they are the neediest and the most urgent cases, and have the lowest 
prospects of recovery. Maybe the poor and disenfranchised are the worst off. Does that mean 
wealth determines certain rights? The aforementioned questions are some of the controversial 
issues that one would have expected to see in the court’s reasoning, before it limited the 
constitutional rights of the poor. Remarkably, the South African Constitutional Court opens 
the door to another form of discrimination as it differentiates between the poor and the 
wealthy in respect of the right of access to medical treatment. One is alarmed at the prospect 
that in the future the court might confuse limited resources with a lack of resources due to 
mismanagement. Soon, limited resources will equal lack of intensive-care beds, lack of 
vaccination, lack of anti-retroviral and tuberculosis medication, lack of medical facilities and 
so forth. Despite understanding and applying the aforesaid medical standards and principles 
and notwithstanding the properly presented legal arguments, certain rights may never be 
protected or the breach thereof enforced for the poor, until the court reconsiders its position 
or the state addresses the issue of inadequate resources.  
It was argued throughout the study that the res ipsa loquitur maxim was rejected 
because in medical negligence cases the maxim does not satisfy all the elements of delictual 
liability. In the light of the developing common law regarding the restricted constitutional 
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rights of poor patients, it is clear that res ipsa loquitur is too plain a term to even include the 
extent of the element of wrongfulness. Public policy considerations have been redefined and 
no longer support the ‘feeling’ of the general boni mores, as the expected right to health care 
has been confined to a qualified right against available resources. Information in this context 
has to be provided to the court, which ipso facto excludes the application of the maxim.  
As discussed previously52 the South African Constitution not only protects individuals 
against the state, it also applies to the legal relationships between citizens. The South African 
courts must develop the common law and customary law by promoting the spirit, purport and 
objects of the Bill of Rights. All constitutional rights of human beings should be 
acknowledged and respected. The constitutional court moved towards a substantive approach 
that incorporates aspects eg socio-economic and even environmental circumstances, when 
deciding whether a right had been infringed. This transforming purpose of the Constitution is 
placing the emphasis on human right values and embracing the spirit of the Constitution. In 
the context of medical law and the res ipsa loquitur maxim, if, for constitutional and policy 
considerations, the South African court should decide to depart from established principles 
and imposes a genuine reverse onus on a doctor-defendant to show cause why he should not 
be negligent (rebuttable presumption), it would, in turn, encroaches on a defendant’s right to 
fair and administrative justice. Such a change could also encourage litigation for the wrong 
reasons based on unrealistic expectations that lack merit. It is, however, commendable to see 
the new constitutional approach of the South African court in Premier of the Western Cape v 
Loots NO,53 Lee v Minister for Correctional Services54 and the recent case, Oppelt v Head: 
Health, Department of Health Provincial Administration: Western Cape.55 In the latter case, 
the court applied a more flexible approach of factual causation principles and ruled in favour 
of the plaintiff, despite the fact that the plaintiff was unable to show that, had he been treated 
in time, he would not have been paralysed. Similar to the English court in Chester v Afshar56 
where patients’ rights and a lighter burden of proof on the claimant were seen to bend 
traditional causation principles, the South African judiciary is now more willing to challenge 
medical opinion in medical negligence cases. 
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The arguments of Van den Heever and Carstens57 were considered. They argue that: 
(i) the maxim should apply to medical cases because a plaintiff is treated unequally if he is 
deprived of the right to use the maxim; 
(ii) the maxim will assist a plaintiff who is at a disadvantage because he has no medical 
knowledge of what happened; 
(iii) the maxim is not prejudicial to the defendant as it only calls for an explanation; 
(iv) if a plaintiff is barred from invoking the maxim, this should be seen as unfair 
discrimination; 
(v) the maxim may be broadly translated into the right to the highest attainable standard of 
health with reference to processes and outcomes. 
The thesis argues that the suggested use of the maxim, ie similar to the English system’s use 
of the maxim, would elevate the maxim to a level not consistent with legal principles in 
South Africa. The maxim is a mere factual presumption that might in certain circumstances 
call for an answer in rebuttal, which would rarely happen in a medical case. The South 
African court is clear58 that in order for the court to apply the maxim in the first place the 
court must be convinced that the fact of the injury indicates a high probability of negligence. 
This is not possible in a medical case as the information before the court (the fact of the 
injury) has no meaning for the court without the medical context and the circumstances of the 
case being explained. The South African court held explicitly59 that sufficient evidence 
should be available for the court to place itself in the exact same position as the defendant-
doctor. If this is not possible, the maxim is not appropriate. The thesis argues that a medical 
case must be based on prima facie evidence of negligence supported by medical expert 
evidence. In addition, the thesis argues for the South African court to continue to be flexible 
in its application of legal concepts, such as factual causation, in order to properly consider the 
autonomy of persons and the dignity of patients. This approach may assist the plaintiff by 
levelling the playing fields and by making the doctor more aware of patients’ rights.  
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3.4 Specific constitutional considerations  
The introduction of these specific constitutional considerations at this late stage is obiter but, 
it is included because of its impact on the doctor-patient relationship, particularly that of the 
patient. As indicated above, the new constitutional considerations towards human dignity and 
human worth and the court’s aim to protect and promote constitutional values in a fair and 
just manner may eradicate certain perceived injustices in future. The following case 
highlights the manner in which patients’ rights can be affected when a court is insensitive to 
the plight of the patient. The Prescription Act60 states that the period in respect of any 
delictual claim - including a claim for damages for personal injury - is limited to three years. 
Reducing the time period for an action to be brought to court would be wrongful if it limits an 
existing right or deprives an individual of a remedy to bring a legal action to court, unless it is 
reasonable and justifiable.  
In Truter v Deysel61 the plaintiff challenged the Prescription Act as the six surgical 
interventions on which the claim was based occurred over a period of seven years. The 
plaintiff lost the sight in one eye as a child and then developed a cataract (clouding of the 
lens) in the remaining eye. The fact that he lost his eyesight in his remaining eye and 
eventually the eye itself gave rise to the plaintiff’s claim. In July 1993, the first defendant, 
who was in her seventies, performed a cataract operation with a lens implantation on the 
plaintiff. The medical expert information (only explained in 2000) revealed that the removal 
of a cataract involves the removal of the natural lens of the eye by means of a high frequency 
ultrasound device that breaks the cloudy lens into small pieces which are then gently 
removed. All the remnants of the cloudy lens have to be removed and then replaced with an 
artificial lens. The artificial lens is positioned behind the iris and pupil of the eye in the same 
location as the natural lens. The operation is performed through a small opening in the 
peripheral cornea (side of the front part of the eye) to gain access to the lens. Much of the thin 
clear membrane that surrounds the natural lens is left intact to receive the artificial intraocular 
lens. In the plaintiff’s case the posterior clear membrane (capsule) of the lens remained hazy. 
This occurs as a result of clouding of the part of the lens covering that remains after surgery, 
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and is called posterior capsule opacification.62 The cloudiness affects the vision of the patient 
and it is corrected by means of a YAG laser capsulotomy, whereby a laser is used to cut a 
hole in the clouded back lining of the lens capsule. This allows light to pass through the 
membrane to the retina at the back of the eye and improves the vision of the patient.  
The YAG laser capsulotomy performed by the first defendant was not successful. 
Residual natural lens material was left behind and the natural lens covering (capsule) was 
damaged to such an extent that there was no natural ‘bed’ to receive the artificial lens. 
Furthermore, the plaintiff developed corneal oedema (swelling of the front covering of the 
eye) and a prolapse of the iris of the eye that needed correction. The plaintiff still could not 
see and further removal of residual lens material was needed. The plaintiff, having lost all 
trust in the first defendant, consulted the second defendant, who found that the first lens had 
slipped into the vitreous material of the eye because of the damaged ‘bed’. He also had to 
remove the vitreous material from the front part of the eye as it had seeped through the gap 
caused by the capsule damage. He furthermore had to remove the residual lens material. He 
inserted a new intraocular lens and had to secure it by placing a stitch through the sclera of 
the eye as the natural cover (capsule) had been damaged. The plaintiff’s eyesight remained 
compromised and, in addition, he suffered from decompensation (deterioration) of the cornea. 
He consulted another eye surgeon who performed a corneal graft. A stitch became septic and, 
after a long battle with the sepsis, they had to eviscerate the plaintiff’s eye. The plaintiff 
wrote to the Health Professions Council (HPCSA) to complain that a simple cataract 
operation had resulted in such a severe consequence. The plaintiff failed to obtain a medical 
expert report that indicated that the medical intervention was not done according to the 
required standard of care and only obtained such a report seven years later in 2000.  
The court of first instance ruled that, in terms of s 12(1) of the Prescription Act, 
prescription is initiated when a debt becomes due and a debt becomes due, in terms of 
s 12(3), when the creditor acquired knowledge of the identity of the debtor and of the facts 
from which the debt arose, provided that he would be deemed to have such knowledge63 if he 
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could have acquired it through reasonable care.64 The court a quo held that prescription can 
begin to run only when the plaintiff acquired ‘meaningful knowledge’ of the wrong against 
him. The court ruled in favour of the plaintiff. On appeal the decision was reversed. The 
Supreme Court of Appeal stated that a conclusion of negligence can be drawn from a 
particular set of facts, which is not itself a fact but rather evidence, and, as such, the presence 
or absence of negligence is not a fact; rather, the presence or absence of negligence is a 
conclusion of law to be made by the court in the presence of all the circumstances of the 
specific case. The court held that s 12(3) of the Act does not require knowledge of the 
relevant legal conclusions or of the existence of an expert opinion that supports such 
conclusions. Therefore, the cause of action of the plaintiff is complete as soon as damage is 
suffered, not only in respect of loss sustained by him but also in respect of all loss sustained.  
Van den Heever and Carstens65 suggest that the Supreme Court of Appeal in Truter v 
Deysel66 effectively opened the door for the res ipsa loquitur maxim to be reintroduced to 
medical negligence cases. Together with Carstens and Pearmain67 they argue that the fact that 
the court stated that the plaintiff should institute an action against the defendant as soon as 
there is any indication of harm sustained, even if the plaintiff has no supporting expert 
medical opinion that the harm or damages sustained are a result of alleged medical 
negligence, may imply that the res ipsa loquitur maxim has ‘slipped in through the back 
door’. 
It is argued in support of Van den Heever and Carstens68 and Carstens and Pearmain69 
that the court in Truter v Deysel70 erred in holding that the plaintiff should advance to court 
without understanding the medical reality from which the cause of action is derived. The 
court failed to appreciate that a legal conclusion is based on an understanding the merits of 
the matter; therefore, the study disagrees that the res ipsa loquitur should have applied. The 
special plea of prescription should have been heard in the context of the medical reality 
obtained from the medical expert. The legal arguments should have illustrated to the court 
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how ineffective such a judgment was in a medical negligence case. During the course of six 
surgical operations over a period of seven years, not only did the plaintiff lose his eyesight 
but also his eye. Without the support of medical expert evidence, the elements of factual 
causation, legal causation and negligence have been lost to the plaintiff and, for that matter, 
the court. In retrospect, if the plaintiff complied with the direction of the court and brought an 
action for negligence based on generalised allegations of negligence, should he base the 
allegations on the fact that his eyesight initially deteriorated, that he later lost his eyesight, or 
that he lost his eye eventually, or on all three of the incidents? Such information is not in the 
plaintiff’s knowledge. Furthermore, what is the cause of action on which these allegations 
should be based? If based on a vague, unidentifiable wrongful act that may or may not have 
caused the plaintiff’s loss of his eyesight and later his eye, the Rules of Court make it 
possible for the defendant to take exception that the claim is ‘vague and embarrassing and 
lacks averments necessary to sustain an action’, and the plaintiff would have his action 
dismissed in any event. 
To follow the arguments of Van den Heever and Carstens71 although not supported by 
the law of delict in South Africa,72 yet allowed by the English court,73 if the allegations of 
negligence could hypothetically be based on the adverse outcome alone (the design of the res 
ipsa loquitur maxim), the plaintiff could have chosen any one of the undesired outcomes as 
the basis for generalised negligence or a lack of skill and care. Assuming the court allowed a 
general allegation of negligence in support of the plaintiff’s case (an inference of fact created 
by the res ipsa loquitur maxim); the defendants (having full knowledge of factual causation 
and negligence) would have been in a superior position to rebut the plaintiff’s allegation. The 
case of the plaintiff would have been unsuccessful or dismissed based on the lack of a cause 
of injury. Assuming that the court allowed the case on the fact of the injury, any alternative 
explanation from the defendants (consistent with the facts or not) would have turned the 
argument in favour of the defendants. It is argued that, even if a general allegation of 
negligence was allowed in South African law, like the extended res ipsa loquitur maxim in 
England, it would not have been of any assistance to the plaintiff, but would rather have 
added to the plaintiff’s burden to defend the response from the defendant in rebuttal and then 
to prove the case. 
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The Prescription Act,74 the foundation of the Supreme Court’s approach in Truter v 
Deysel,75 is relevant to the element of wrongfulness, as it changes the common law of the 
country and the convictions of the community (the boni mores). After a period of three years 
a plaintiff loses the right to enforce any delictual claim against a defendant. This limit is 
regarded as reasonable for a potential defendant as records are not kept indefinitely.   
One might be able to argue that the solution for the plaintiff in the latter case may lie 
in challenging the constitutionality of such a statute of limitations in medical negligence 
cases where the medical condition or disability is ongoing (as was the case of Mr Deysel). 
One might also be able to dispute the interpretation of the Act, based on the plaintiff’s 
inability to navigate the intricacies of medical science, but it is proposed that the answer lies 
with the medical professionals. In Truter v Deysel the medical professionals neglected their 
duty to inform the plaintiff about the medical facts and merits of the matter. As demonstrated 
throughout the thesis, the true medical clinical course explained by a medical expert forms 
the basis from which factual causation (and the other delictual elements) can be determined. 
Mr Deysel consulted several medical experts who simply failed to provide the medical 
reality. Mr Deysel requested assistance from the HPCSA, who failed in their duty to 
determine the medical reality of the case.  
To request the court to reintroduce the archaic res ipsa loquitur maxim because of 
arguments of constitutional fairness or justice is avoiding the true issue. It is not the answer to 
introduce concepts that are not compatible with the South African law of delict, and there is 
doubt about their effectiveness in other jurisdictions. The answer should rest with the 
substantive approach of the Constitution of South Africa. In recent times, the South African 
court would take into consideration the right to bodily integrity and patient autonomy and the 
fact that the patient was not fully informed about the risks and complications. The court 
would, in accordance with the right to equality principles, balance the prejudice for the 
defendant against the prejudice for the plaintiff. The court may well consider the appointment 
of an independent medical assessor for the plaintiff, in the absence of proper medical expert 
evidence. 
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The different approaches and opinions of legal analysts have been tested and the final 
conclusion of the thesis is in direct conflict with the recommendations of Van den Heever and 
Carstens in respect of the res ipsa loquitur maxim.76 The thesis answered the questions raised 
in chapter 1.77 The thesis found that the maxim is applied differently in South Africa and 
England, which effectively does not advance the argument to reintroduce the maxim to South 
African medical law. The South African function of the maxim, as a factual presumption, is 
allowed where facts can be inferred from other key facts. This was confused with a rebuttable 
presumption that creates a legal duty that should be answered by the defendant. The South 
African plaintiff, relying on the maxim in a medical case without supporting evidence, will 
have his case dismissed because he has not shown a cause of action. The South African court 
requests a plaintiff in a medical case to present sufficient evidence in order for the court to 
weigh such evidence against the conduct of the defendant in testing whether the standard of 
care fell below the requisite standard. In a medical case the evidence of an adverse event can 
never be interpreted as ‘absolute’ evidence that attracts a rebuttable presumption of 
negligence. It will always be relative evidence that attracts a possibility of negligence that 
still needs to be proved. This is as a result of the difference between the medical context and 
an ordinary occurrence of everyday life. When applying the res ipsa loquitur maxim in a 
medical negligence case, the facts of an occurrence (a medical adverse outcome) do not have 
meaning for an uninformed person without medical expert evidence. Therefore a presumption 
of fact cannot be made without understanding the medical reality, which would be the 
situation in all medical cases. The approach of the South African court is defensible: the court 
cannot test the alleged breach of a legal duty based on abstract evidence or on an unspecific 
or ill-defined allegation of negligence. The finding of liability should be based on a balance 
of probability taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances of the case, thus 
disqualifying the maxim res ipsa loquitur for all medical negligence cases in South Africa. In 
the rare situation where sufficient facts are available to establish a prima facie case then, in 
accordance with the rules of the maxim per se, the maxim is inappropriate as all the evidence 
is available to run the case on prima facie evidence. Most importantly, it was found that all 
the delictual elements should be deduced from the key facts for a court to accept the maxim. 
Throughout the analysis it was found that in medical negligence cases, when the application 
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of the res ipsa loquitur maxim was invoked, it was done in a ‘general and unspecified 
manner’,78 neither substantiated by medical facts and medical interpretation nor in terms of 
delictual law requirements. The res ipsa loquitur maxim in a medical case creates an 
ambiguity similar to that found in the original use of the maxim in Cicero’s speech79 in 
defence of his friend Milo. Today one can appreciate that Cicero did not refer to particular 
facts but to general unspecified facts that led to the event. As it stands, the application of the 
maxim in medical negligence cases in South Africa has not been permitted since Van Wyk v 
Lewis80 and this decision remains unaffected. The court in Goliath v MEC for Health in the 
Province of Eastern Cape81 categorically discouraged the use of the maxim in any future 
medical negligence case. Although it is sometimes difficult for plaintiffs to obtain justice 
given this difficulty of establishing medical negligence that caused the injury, the res ipsa 
loquitur maxim is no solution to this problem, for all the reasons given before. In South 
Africa the maxim is a false friend, to both plaintiff and defendant. The res ipsa loquitur 
maxim has become de facto and de lege ferenda redundant in medical law in South Africa. 
Lastly, the right to equality is guaranteed in the South African Constitution and 
everyone has the right to the protection and benefit of the law. Equality includes the full and 
equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms for its people. The South African court now takes 
into consideration the broader context of patients’ rights, and where harm is caused by a 
powerful group (eg a hospital) in respect of a disempowered and vulnerable group (eg 
patients), the constitutional rights of both parties must be considered, as well as the fact that 
in practice a poor and uneducated patient rarely has a voice in determining the course of his 
medical care. By importing other measures like reforming the South African civil procedure 
by introducing inquisitorial elements in our court procedure, enabling a greater degree of 
judicial questioning of witnesses or using mandatory medical court assessors may assist with 
correcting any possible imbalance.82The more flexible approach by the South African legal 
system regarding the rules of causation or negligence in respect of such material inequality as 
seen in Oppelt v Head: Health, Department of Health Provincial Administration: Western 
Cape,83 potentially following the example of the English court in Chester v Afshar84 is 
                                                 
78
Macleod (n 10) 1048, where the court warned against a court glossing over a deficiency of a plaintiff’s case 
and finding a defendant negligent in a general and unspecified manner. See chapter 1 para 1.2. 
79
Chapter 1 para 1.1 n 24. 
80
Van Wyk (n 1).See chapter 2 paras 3 and 8. 
81
Goliath (n 21). See chapter 2 para 8. 
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Chapter 1 para 3.4. 
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celebrated and may well result in patients being correctly compensated in future, if they have 
suffered harm. 
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